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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation examines the intersections of romance, religion, and politics in 
England between 1588 and 1688, reading across the divide between centuries to enable a 
fuller understanding of romance during the English Civil War and its aftermath. In the 
decades that witnessed Charles I’s fall and his son’s restoration, royalists and republicans 
alike found solace, and grounds for resistance, in romance’s formal promise that suffering 
and disappointment would yield to the restoration of a story’s true champions. Although 
historicist efforts to contextualize seventeenth-century romance have productively 
complicated the structuralist view of it as a basic archetype, such studies are fraught with 
their own simplifications: romance is often depicted as a continental trend briefly 
embraced by midcentury royalists, especially women. While a few scholars have noted 
the artificiality of some of these limits, we have yet to come to terms with seventeenth-
century romance’s long English tradition, its ability to penetrate other genres, and its hold 
over male and female writers and readers of diverse ideologies. To this end, my project 
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traces two interwoven threads. First, I argue that the potent subjectivity offered by 
romance correlated with the widespread Protestant belief in divine election, inviting 
seventeenth-century subjects to locate themselves and their allies within a providentially 
protected community. Far from being a royalist fad, romance became a battleground 
between royalists and Puritan republicans: both sides denigrated their enemies’ 
manipulation of the genre while tacitly or openly reclaiming it for themselves. Second, I 
consider how writers of romance contended with recurring problems of form, genre, and 
gender: due to the length of romantic plot and the related issue of multiple subjectivities, 
they found innovative ways to represent the friction between providential romance and 
national or personal tragedy, as well as the tension between gendered narrative 
perspectives. As England struggled to recuperate from its civil conflicts, writers also 
turned to romance not merely to represent elect community, but to reconstruct it, thinking 
critically about whether the genre might breach and repair the very perspectival divides in 
politics, religion, gender, and identity that it had been so instrumental in maintaining. 
 
  
  ix 
Contents 
Introduction          1 
 
1.  Protestant Re-Visions of Romance: Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia  
     and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene     37 
 
2.  “Heroical” Histories: Writing Lives into National Romance   102 
 
3.  The Fall and the Summit: John Milton’s Counter-Revision  
     of Romantic Structure in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained   167 
 
4.  “My Victorious Triumphs Are All Thine”: Amorous Romance, 
     Politics, and Elect Community in Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder 231 
 
5.  “In the Next World”: John Bunyan, Aphra Behn, and the Limits of Romance 285 
 
Conclusion          350 
 
Bibliography          358 
 
Curriculum Vitae         377 
  
  x 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram from William Perkins’ A Golden Chaine (1597)  46  
 
Figure 2: First woodcut from The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part 2 (1687)  306 
 
Figure 3: Second woodcut from The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part 2 (1687) 306 
 
Figure 4: Third woodcut from The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part 2 (1687) 306 
  xi 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
CPMP  The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Merritt Hughes (New  
  Haven: Yale U P, 1962). 
 
FQ  The Faerie Queene 
 
O&D  Order and Disorder 
 
PL  Paradise Lost 
 
PR  Paradise Regained 
 
  
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 In 1640, before the armed conflicts of the English Civil War began, Thomas 
Hobbes warned against the reading of romances in his Elements of Law, claiming that the 
pastime was conducive to foolish delusion and vain pride: 
the fiction (which also is imagination) of actions done by ourselves, which never 
were done, is glorying; but because it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any 
further attempt, it is merely vain and unprofitable; as when a man imagineth 
himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some romant […] And this is 
called VAIN GLORY: and is exemplified in the fable by the fly sitting on the 
axletree, and saying to himself, What a dust do I raise!1 
 
Romance, Hobbes proposes, produces ridiculous fancies in the “pusillanimous” individual, 
since his identification with the genre’s heroes is so intense that he imagines himself to be 
greater than he is. In the most extreme cases, the result is “spiritual pride or madness”: “The 
gallant madness of Don Quixote,” which “is nothing else but an expression of such height of 
vain glory as reading of romants may produce,” may be compared to “the example of one 
that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ.”2 
The most absurd victim of romantic imagination, for Hobbes, is the religious radical who 
believes himself to be the protagonist of a heroic story written not by man, but by God. 
 In 1651, when Hobbes published his better-known Leviathan, such people were 
no longer so easy to laugh at. The Puritan-dominated New Model Army, with Oliver 
Cromwell at its head, had successfully backed the forces of Parliament against those of 
King Charles I; Charles had been beheaded by a victorious parliamentary faction that 
owed its allegiance to God rather than the King; and the zealous and ambitious Cromwell 
                                                
1 Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy (London, 1656), 50-1; cited in Victoria Kahn, Wayward Contracts: 
2 Ibid., 63. 
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was poised to become Lord Protector of England. In Leviathan, Hobbes discusses 
romance and imagination in terms much like those in the Elements, but romance has been 
unbound from the constraint that it “begetteth no appetite nor endeavour” and is therefore 
“merely vain”: “So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the 
image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an 
Alexander (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of 
romances), it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind.”3 
Victoria Kahn offers a keen summation of the genre’s progressive threat to Hobbesian 
political order in the years of civil war between the Elements and Leviathan: 
The danger here is not simply that the reader of romance will imagine himself a 
lover and knight errant […] but that the reader of romance will imagine himself a 
Hercules or Alexander, that is, a military hero of epic proportions […] Romance 
vainglory is not simply unprofitable but dangerous, as it is when the parties to the 
civil war begin to imagine that their honor demands that they engage in violent 
conflict. Thus the errant activity of the imagination […] is not simply associated 
with moral and epistemological error […] It is also associated with political 
error—with what Hobbes called “sedition and contempt.”4 
 
Hobbes’ midcentury fear of romance was a reaction both to the immediate 
memory of the war and to a long English tradition of religiously-inflected chivalric 
narrative that offered readers a heroic subject position with which to identify and a sense 
that their endeavors had the support of divine providence. His premise—that romantic 
subjectivity was inherently unruly, conducive not just to individual pride but also to 
subversive factionalism and opposition to authority—is foundational to this project. As 
we will see, subjects who imagined themselves as lovers or knights-errant might prove 
                                                
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 9.  
4 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 145. Nigel Smith also discusses Hobbes’ relationship to romance, and 
seventeenth-century romance writers’ relationship to Hobbes, in Literature and Revolution in England, 
1640-1660 (New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1994), esp. 159-160. 
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just as politically dangerous as those who thought of themselves as martial heroes, since 
all these romantic identifications explicitly or implicitly depend upon an assumption that 
one has been chosen for a life of heroic exceptionalism, predestined to prevail under 
extraordinary circumstances. In the decades that witnessed the fall of Charles I, the 
collapse of Cromwell’s Interregnum regime, Charles II’s restoration to the throne, and 
eventually the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty, English men and women of diverse 
ideological communities often expressed mistrust and contempt for romance as a vehicle 
for their religious and political opponents’ vainglory; at the same time, they found solace, 
and grounds for resistance, in the genre’s structural promise that suffering and 
disappointment would give way to the triumph of a story’s true champions.  
 
Whose Romance? 
 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.5 
 
Before proceeding, I want to set forth a stable meaning for “romance” throughout 
this project, both because it may be tempting to apply to the literary term United States 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s now famous, highly subjective test for the presence 
of pornography, and because I use the term somewhat differently than most recent scholars 
have done. Indeed, many critics who discuss romance do not attempt a precise definition of 
it, under the premise that the genre is constituted by a very large set of recognizable tropes 
or themes, including (but not at all limited to) “exotic settings, distant in time or place, or 
both; subject-matter concerning love or chivalry, or both […] high-ranking characters […] 
                                                
5 Justice Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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quests; magic and the supernatural” and “a concern with ideals” of heroic behavior.6 Before 
the rise of the internet “meme,” medieval scholars were using the word—denoting 
sameness or repetition—to describe romance’s recurring elements and plot devices: heroes 
of unknown parentage, shipwrecks, ladies lost at sea, rash promises, incestuous fathers, 
fairy abductions, and many, many more. Along these lines, Anthony Welch defines 
Renaissance romance very generally (though probably also too limitedly) “as a special 
precinct of courtly love, recreative fancy, and, in some of its forms, pastoral escape.”7 
Helen Cooper has proposed a definition based upon the disqualifying absence, rather than 
the qualifying presence, of such tropes: “with romance, any of the features that might be 
taken as definitive for the genre may be absent in any particular case without damaging that 
sense of family resemblance, though the dissimilarity increases, ultimately beyond the 
point of recognition, in proportion as the various elements are missing.”8  
Such delineations, however, avoid fully explaining what they simultaneously allow 
for: the potential for extreme disparity between various works that are all commonly 
recognized as romances, or as derived from the romance tradition. In the chapters that follow, 
many of the romantic texts we will consider seem to have remarkably few features in 
common. For example, Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene and Margaret Cavendish’s 
Assaulted and Pursued Chastity both address erotic attraction, include episodes of battle, and 
share the trope of female virtue under threat. However, one “romance” is extremely long 
(indeed, unfinished) and the other remarkably short; one thrives on magic while the other 
                                                
6 Helen Cooper, The English Romance in Time: Transforming Motifs from Geoffrey of Monmouth to the 
Death of Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford U P, 2004), 10. 
7 Anthony Welch, “Epic Romance, Royalist Retreat, and the English Civil War,” Modern Philology 105.3 
(2008), 570-602, 577. 
8 Cooper, 9. 
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eschews it; one avoids the device of disaster at sea, which the other employs repeatedly; and 
one aspires to heroic idealism and the other to heroic pragmatism. If romance is an 
assemblage of tiles that form a recognizable mosaic, Spenser’s and Cavendish’s narratives 
would seem to produce two images that look practically nothing alike—and most of the other 
texts before us may seem similarly dissimilar. Some, in fact, are not often identified or 
studied as romance at all, typically because they exhibit more obvious signs of falling into 
some other genre, including epic, panegyric, biography, or even political pamphlet.  
 We require, then, some additional approach to romance that helps explain both 
why we generally do know it when we see it—even when one romance is superficially 
unlike another—and why it sometimes manages to slip unseen into other generic 
categories. Before the structuralist movement fell into disfavor for its ahistorical method, 
Northrop Frye defined romance very broadly in terms not of its parts, but of its whole. As 
Frye’s eponymous “secular scripture,” romance is humanity’s “integrated vision of the 
world, parallel to the Christian and biblical vision”; if the Bible “is the epic of the creator, 
with God as its hero,” then romance is “the epic of the creature, man’s vision of his own 
life as a quest.”9 This epic human vision entails “a cyclical movement” of “descent” and 
“return” that fluctuates between two worlds: “a world associated with happiness, security, 
and peace,” and “a world of exciting adventures, but adventures which involve 
separation, loneliness, humiliation, pain, and the threat of more pain.”10 For Frye, the 
structure is recognizable for its positive teleology: “Most romances […] begin with a 
                                                
9 Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U 
P, 1976), 15. 
10 Ibid., 53-4. 
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departure” from the world of fulfillment into the lower world of desire—for love, for 
family, for power, for safety—“and end happily, with a return” to the realm that seemed 
lost.11 At the same time, he suggests, the world of suffering and of adventure is critical to 
our imagination of the human quest, since in the desired telos of the ideal world, “there is 
nothing to write about.”12 Milton, who managed to write several books of verse about life 
in Eden, might disagree with this last point, but Frye’s structuralist model of a secular 
quest that echoes the scriptural narrative of fall and redemption—and that tends to be 
creatively fixated not just on the redemption but also on the fallenness, loss, and 
longing—will be vital to my more historically-oriented project. Hobbes’ seventeenth-
century authoritarian politics, after all, were threatened not by the lovers, warriors, or 
miraculous events that many romantic fictions contain, but by a narrative vision that 
made people imagine themselves as heroes and history as the landscape of their romance. 
This form that transforms lived experience into genre and thrives in the temporal space 
between loss and recovery, tragedy and triumph, lies at the core of all the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century texts we will consider here, including those that are not normally 
read through the lens of romance. Finally, Frye has suggested that “an identity between 
individual and social quests has always been latent in romance,” a genre that feeds both 
“the need to experience as part of a community and the need to experience as a 
withdrawn individual.”13 This study is strongly concerned with the relationship between 
individual romantic heroism and the coherence or construction of ideologically-charged 
                                                
11 Ibid., 54. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 58-9. 
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romantic community, for if Hobbes was unsettled by one Quixote or by one would-be 
Christ in a cart, an armed fellowship of godly knights posed a more substantial problem. 
 Despite its importance, Frye’s “secular scripture” is not the structuralist phrase 
that is most often cited in more recent treatments of the genre; that distinction must go to 
Patricia Parker’s also-eponymous term “inescapable romance.”14 Parker, too, understands 
romance to be a narrative mode that simultaneously seeks and defers the telos of its quest, 
but as her title indicates, the emphasis of her study is on the deferral—on romance’s 
fundamental resistance to teleology, despite its heroes’ orientation toward a goal. This 
sense of romance as an inherently meandering, aimless form has become commonplace, 
and as a result, romance is now often discussed in opposition to epic. David Quint has 
famously distinguished the two genres according to both structure and historical politics: 
“To the victors belongs epic, with its linear teleology; to the losers belongs romance, with 
its random or circular wandering. Put another way, the victors experience history as a 
coherent, end-directed story told by their own power; the losers experience a contingency 
that they are powerless to shape to their own ends.”15 This diametric opposition between 
romance and epic is relatively new in literary studies—for Frye, romance was 
synonymous with “the epic of the creature,” and for Hobbes, the reading of romances 
endowed men with delusions of epic grandeur—and I believe that Quint’s binary, 
however often it has been rearticulated, is frequently unhelpful to an understanding of 
romance’s role in the ideological politics of the seventeenth century (or any other period). 
                                                
14 Patricia Parker, Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U P, 
1979). 
15 David Quint, Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton U P, 1993), 9.  
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This study does not position romance as the opposite of epic, or of any other genre; 
indeed, I believe that we can find romance infusing itself into various other forms, 
whether epic or lyric or historiography, because as a mode it is inherently adaptive rather 
than antagonistic. Contrary to Quint’s model, both victors and losers may experience 
their community’s history as driven either by human agency or by contingency or by 
divine providence, or perhaps by some combination of these, as we will see. Victors 
might see contingency even in their victory; losers might strive to glimpse a 
providentially “coherent, end-directed story” even in their defeat.16 Moreover, as Quint 
recognizes, victors may not remain victorious and losers may not remain cast down for 
long, which was certainly the case in seventeenth-century England. Romance, with its 
productive tension between teleological triumph and medial defeat or deferral, is 
uniquely suited for both victors and losers to locate themselves and their allies at different 
points on the form’s narrative arc, and while both success and failure could shape how 
political individuals and communities read and wrote romance in the seventeenth century, 
these vicissitudes did not initiate or terminate their engagement with it.  
Helen Cooper, who stands out among recent critics for identifying “the happy 
ending” as “the characteristic most […] definitive” of romance, draws our attention to 
narrative theorist Monika Fludernik’s term “duplicitous teleology,” that is, “the gap 
between ‘the characters’ plotting on the level of the fictional world and that narrative’s 
                                                
16 Without being strongly concerned with genre, Achsah Guibbory discusses the tension, and frequent 
interaction, between seventeenth-century visions of historical time as progressive, regressive, cyclical, or 
random in The Map of Time: Seventeenth-Century English Literature and Ideas of Pattern in History 
(Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1986). 
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overall counter-plotting.’”17 As Cooper puts it in the context of romance, “The reader will 
always know more than the protagonists (that they will survive their adventures, marry 
their beloved, win back their kingdom), but that knowledge is a shared assumption 
between author and audience that bypasses the characters themselves.”18 Seventeenth-
century Englishmen and women who were inclined toward a narrative vision of their 
individual and communal stories as quests could position themselves simultaneously as 
the characters, readers, and sometimes authors of the romance of history: while in the 
midst of profound political disappointment and personal doubt as characters ignorant of 
the future, they could presume an audience’s knowledge of the full form that promised to 
deliver them from their trials, and they could look to God as Author, their own authorial 
agency, or both to bring that deliverance about in the near or remote future. Frye has 
suggested that identifying romance as the genre of history allows one to interpret and 
represent “the maze without a plan and the maze not without a plan” as “two aspects of 
the same thing.”19 Because the form of romance insisted upon—and offered narrative 
meaning to—both success and failure, both the presence and absence of fulfillment, and 
both randomness and order, it belongs equally to history’s victors and to its losers; 
moreover, it allows its subjects to be both of these at once. 
While disturbing the assumption that romance is a genre only for losers, I also 
want to dismantle the critical commonplace that Civil War-era romance was a genre only 
for royalists. It is true that a number of royalists produced works of prose fiction, both 
                                                
17 Monika Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 22. 
Cited in Cooper, 47. 
18 Cooper, 47. 
19 Frye, The Secular Scripture, 31. 
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long and short, while in exile during the Interregnum; however, historicist efforts to 
contextualize such works have led to a general impression that Stuart royalist romance 
was the only romance in town in the mid-seventeenth century. Anthony Welch’s 
depiction of the genre as a literary realm to which defeated royalists fled for “privacy and 
stasis, a protective cocoon of rest from […] political action” is normative.20  However, 
this combination of Parker’s anti-progressive structure, Quint’s sense of romance as 
antithetical to the political concerns of the victors’ epic, and a limiting restriction of the 
mode to prose narratives of love and fancy threatens to mistake one facet of seventeenth-
century romance for the whole. Likewise common is a critical focus on romance as a 
genre for women (especially royalist women), and as a midcentury trend adopted into 
England from seventeenth-century continental (especially French) texts. When Nigel 
Smith rightly notes that “where romances were read, they could become the dominant 
way in which an individual understood him or herself,” he is speaking more particularly 
about recent continental models of the genre, focused on domesticity and psychology, 
that did indeed become popular among royalist women readers.21 Because seventeenth-
century women most certainly did produce and consume romance, important scholarship 
about women as writers and readers (including work by Mary Beth Rose, Helen Hackett, 
and Michelle Dowd and Julie Eckerle, among others) may contribute to a necessary 
understanding of women’s engagement with the genre while indirectly downplaying 
romance’s importance across and between genders during the period.22 Similarly, while it 
                                                
20 Welch, 578. 
21 Smith, 243. 
22 See Mary Beth Rose, “Gender, Genre, and History: Seventeenth-Century English Women and the Art of 
Autobiography,” in Mary Beth Rose (ed.) Women in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Literary and 
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is worthwhile to recognize that English literature was not isolated from continental 
writing, we lose a full sense of nationalistic English romance in the seventeenth-century 
when we disregard the genre’s native tradition and that tradition’s appeal to multiple 
ideological communities.  
Historicist scholars who have challenged certain of these assumptions typically 
leave a number of others intact. Erica Veevers, Ann Baynes Coiro, and Karen Britland 
have examined how earlier Stuart romance, instead of salving war-wounds, celebrated the 
monarchic power and the flourishing marriage of Charles I and Henrietta Maria, and 
thrived in court drama, poetry, and the visual arts (as in Rubens’ portrait of the royal 
couple as Saint George and the princess rescued from the dragon); however, their focus 
remains restricted to royalist culture.23 Annabel Patterson, Paul Salzman, Victoria Kahn, 
Amelia Zurcher Sandy, and Lois Potter have shown that midcentury romance, far from 
fleeing politics, could be intently and incisively political, often concerned not just with 
defeat but with resistance, recovery, and the maintenance of power; like my study, 
Kahn’s and Zurcher Sandy’s books closely read romance by both men and women, and 
Zurcher Sandy acknowledges the influence of native romance by beginning with 
Sidney’s Arcadia.24 Lori Humphrey Newcomb, too, considers the English romance 
                                                                                                                                            
Historical Perspectives (Syracuse: Syracuse U P, 1986), 245-278; Helen Hackett, Women and Romance 
Fiction in the English Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2000); and Michelle M. Dowd and Julie 
A. Eckerle (eds.), Genre and Women's Life Writing in Early Modern England (Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate, 2007). 
23 See Erica Veevers, Images of Love and Religion: Queen Henrietta Maria and Court Entertainments 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1989); Ann Baynes Coiro, “‘A Ball of Strife’: Caroline Poetry and Royal 
Marriage,” in Thomas Corns (ed.), The Royal Image: Representations of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge 
U P, 1999), 26-46; and Karen Britland, Drama at the Courts of Queen Henrietta Maria (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 2009). 
24 See Annabel Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early 
Modern England (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1984); Paul Salzman, English Prose Fiction, 1558-1700: A 
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tradition’s vitality and its appeal across lines of gender (as well as class).25 Again, 
though, these treatments remain primarily focused on prose fiction, royalist writing, or 
both. Smith has proposed that we rethink the genre’s royalist associations, arguing (as I 
do) that just as Hobbes feared, “Romance was seen to be a political form by members of 
both sides of the political conflict,” and drawing our attention to elements of romance in 
the republican James Harrington’s Oceana; still, most of the romance that Smith 
considers is royalist, virtually all of it is in the form of long prose fiction, and he regards 
romance as a discrete genre separate from epic and other modes.26 In this project, I 
consider politically-engaged romance that can be derived from a native English tradition 
in the writing of men and women on both sides of the Civil War, though my primary 
emphasis is on Puritan and republican writers, since their (often intense) investment in 
romance has received far less critical attention.  
 
Adaptive Romance 
 The reason that Puritan and republican romance has often gone unrecognized and 
unstudied, I believe, is that we have become accustomed to looking for romance as a 
mode chiefly in romances, narratives (usually in prose) that dedicate themselves solely to 
telling romantic stories. Such romance-exclusive texts were popular among royalists in 
the seventeenth century, and their opponents largely avoided them in part because of their 
                                                                                                                                            
Critical History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Kahn, Wayward Contracts; Amelia Zurcher Sandy, 
Seventeenth-Century English Romance: Allegory, Ethics, and Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007); and Lois Potter, Secret Rites and Secret Writing: Royalist Literature, 1641-1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U P, 2009). 
25 Lori Humphrey Newcomb, Reading Popular Romance in Early Modern England (New York: Columbia 
U P, 2002). 
26 Smith, 236; see also 234-49. Zurcher Sandy, in Seventeenth-Century English Romance, likewise offers a 
reading of Harrington’s Oceana but spends many more pages on royalist prose. 
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association with royalism. In order to recognize romance in the work of Puritan 
republicans like John Milton and Lucy Hutchinson (or, for that matter, in royalist 
propaganda pamphlets or the lyric poetry of John Dryden), we must bear in mind its 
structural premise—that life and history may be expressed as teleologically-directed 
heroic quests—and so be prepared to find that premise, and romance’s many recurring 
tropes, adapting themselves to other genres. Seventeenth-century Englishmen and women 
were used to seeing romance outside of romances: as we will see, Milton complained of 
romance in Charles I’s (auto)biographical confession Eikon Basilike, Hutchinson may 
have objected to romance in Milton’s Paradise Lost, Margaret Cavendish derided 
romance in republican historiography, and Samuel Pepys scoffed that Cavendish lived 
her entire life like a romance.  
It will be immediately evident from these examples that people in the seventeenth 
century habitually condemned romance when and where they found it; Hobbes was 
hardly alone. I have encountered no study of romance that does not discuss how strongly 
the genre was mocked and denounced in the Early Modern period, and much scholarship 
has demonstrated that widespread critiques of romance went hand in hand with its 
widespread popularity, sometimes showing that even writers who disavowed romance 
tacitly employed it.27 My work takes largely for granted the fact that those who voiced 
their disapproval of romance often ended up reading and writing it anyway; I hope to go 
beyond simply locating romance in places where it is not “supposed” to be in order to 
                                                
27 One such example is Robert Wilcher’s “Lucy Hutchinson and Genesis: Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 
Oxford Journals: English 59 (2010), 25-42. While Wilcher locates romance in Hutchinson’s Order and 
Disorder, despite Hutchinson’s disavowal of the genre, he does not discuss what the romance mode might 
be accomplishing in and for Hutchinson’s Genesis epic, or why she might have chosen to incorporate it.  
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show what specifically it is doing there, why its authors embraced it against their own 
protestations to the contrary, and the complex web of ideological functions it performs. 
I propose that where we find explicit references to romance’s tropes and memes, 
we also typically find appeals, sometimes implicit, to romance’s structure—that is, to the 
narrative vision of individual life or communal history as a quest. Eikon Basilike’s use of a 
captive princess’ prayer from Sidney’s New Arcadia offended Milton in large part because 
it insinuated that the King, too, was a godly romantic hero; Milton’s own references in 
Areopagitica to the “warfaring Christian” or the legend of Isis and Osiris are meant to 
reinforce his premise that history entails a long, often frustrated quest for divine truth. One 
fine example of a non-romantic text that employs a romantic trope in a gesture toward the 
genre’s larger form is John Donne’s audacious sonnet “Show me dear Christ thy spouse”: 
Show me dear Christ, thy spouse, so bright and clear. 
What, is it she, which on the other shore 
Goes richly painted? or which robbed and tore 
Laments and mourns in Germany and here? 
Sleeps she a thousand, then peeps up one year? 
Is she self truth and errs? now new, now outwore? 
Doth she, and did she, and shall she evermore 
On one, on seven, or on no hill appear? 
Dwells she with us, or like adventuring knights 
First travail we to seek and then make love? 
Betray kind husband thy spouse to our sights, 
And let mine amorous soul court thy mild dove, 
Who is most true, and pleasing to thee, then 
When she’ is embraced and open to most men.28 
 
Donne’s poem, a plea for enlightenment about the nature of God’s Church (whether 
Protestant or Catholic), compares Christians in search of this truth to knights errant on an 
adulterous (yet holy) quest for “knowledge” of the Bride of Christ. God becomes the 
                                                
28 John Carey (ed.), John Donne: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1990), 288 (emphasis mine). 
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author of the romance of history, and believers become characters within it; the speaker 
prays that his ignorance and love-longing will be relieved by the still-obscured divine 
telos of his journey and “travail.” This appeal to an orthodox Christian narrative is also 
doctrinally brash and potentially ideologically subversive. The speaker’s speculation that 
his role as a Christian knight might license him (and a whole community of his fellows) 
to have spiritual sex with Christ’s spouse, together with his suggestion that the identity of 
the Church was still a romantic mystery and might not be Anglican, lend credence to 
Hobbes’ concern that romance led people to imagine grandiose identities and actions for 
themselves, and so might make them recalcitrant to temporal authority. 
Donne’s turn to a romantic mode in his sonnet is explicit and deliberate, even 
jarring, consciously intended to produce a certain effect. However, smoother and less 
calculated uses of romance may help us better appreciate how easily accessible it was to, 
and how deeply embedded within, seventeenth-century England’s cultural imagination. In 
the rest of this section, two manuscripts will serve as examples of romance’s easy 
adaptability to other forms of discourse, and of its application to concerns both individual 
and communal, both private and public: first, Bishop Arthur Lake’s series of six sermons, 
Christ’s Conflict with and Conquest of the Tempter; second, a collection of letters from 
Mary Hatton to her fiancé, Randolph Helsby.  
Lake’s sermons, preached at Worcester during Lent of 1613, were compiled into a 
neat manuscript in 1661 that they might “Now” be “first presented to Publik view”; 
although the manuscript seems to have been intended for the printer, the text apparently 
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never went to press.29 The sermons offer a detailed explication of the text of Matthew 
4:1-12, in which Jesus is “led up of the Spirit into the Wildernesse to be tempted of the 
Devill,” and stress the theme of the Son of God’s exemplarity rather than his 
exceptionality (5). In so doing, they employ the extended metaphor of chivalric combat, 
reaching back to the medieval English tradition of representing Christ as a knight or hero 
of romance, and so suggesting that tradition’s enduring familiarity in the early and mid-
seventeenth century. It has become commonplace for readers of Milton’s Paradise 
Regained to wonder why Milton chose the temptation in the wilderness, rather than the 
Passion, for the subject of his “sequel” to Paradise Lost; Lake understands both scriptural 
episodes as two linked battles of comparable importance, although only Christ’s conquest 
in the first can be wholly imitated by his human followers.30 Lake explains that the devil 
                                                
29 Arthur Lake, Christ’s Conflict with and Conquest of the Tempter, Folger Shakespeare Library ms. V.a.394, 
page 4. All subsequent references to this text will appear parenthetically by manuscript page number. 
30 Indeed, Christ’s Conflict with and Conquest of the Tempter often speaks to some of Paradise Regained’s 
greatest interpretive dilemmas. Although Milton would have had no access to these sermons, Lake’s 
exegesis may reveal that some of Milton’s more frustrating moves had interpretive precedent within the 
seventeenth-century Church of England. For example, Lake presumes and addresses his congregation’s 
concern that Christ’s responses to Satan may be irrelevant or incomplete: “if you looke to [the devils] 
pretence, [Christ] seemes to say little to him,” whereas “if you respect the devils intent,” he “answereth him 
fullie.” He urges his audience to “marke, how wisely Christ hath handled this Conflict” in his cagey 
dealings with Satan and his refusal to identify himself in no uncertain terms as the Son of God:  
 
At the first both parties concealed themselves: & the purpose was of the Tempter to know who Christ 
was; and not onely to know, but to trie, whether hee could infect him with sinne. Marke the issue: 
Christ drave the Tempter to betray himself; but he gave not the least advantage unto him whereby he 
might know Christ, to bee other than an holy man, that ruled himself by the Law of God. Whether 
cunningly or plainlie hee sett upon Christ, he still failed of his purpose, being defeated by Christ. 
 
Another popular twentieth-century critical debate about Paradise Regained concerned whether Jesus 
performs a miraculous feat by standing on the pinnacle of the temple. Lake takes this issue on too, deciding 
in the negative and giving his congregation a brief lesson in architecture and etymology:  
 
What is meant by the pinnacle, the word πλερúγιον maketh plaine. It signifieth a little wing. Some 
referre it unto the iron which men use to sett Wethercocks upon: because that which serveth for the fan 
or wethercocke seemeth to resemble wings. But it is more probable, that thereby is meant some lower 
battlments of the Temple, such as wee call Iles: for the name Ile is but a Corruption of the word Ala a 
wing. And if you marke the Outside of the Church in the battlments, the middle part riseth like the 
bodie of a bird, & the sides spread like wings. Vilopand seemeth to describe the forme of the Temple of 
Hierusalem as if it were not much unlike our Cathedrall Churches; excepting the Crosse Ile. 
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will “[play] the Lion” in the cosmic conflict soon enough, “when the time will occasion 
us to consider Christs passion,” but that for the time being, Christ’s and humanity’s foe 
appears “as a Serpent,” both the dragon of romance and the wily antagonist in Eden (5).  
Lake never appears uncomfortable with his titular, and consistent, comparison of 
Christ to a secular martial hero; his analysis relies early and often upon the accessibility 
of a romance of combat to his congregation. Proposing in the first sermon that Christ is 
driven into the wilderness by the Holy Spirit not by physical impulsion, but by “a kind of 
morall violence,” Lake turns to lesser heroic examples to clarify his meaning:  
A morall violence I call that, when the understanding is so assured & the will so 
resolute, that without casting those doubts which would trouble ordinarie 
providence, & without dreading those dangers which will stop ordinarie 
courages, men adventure upon high attempts: we may call them Heroicall 
motions. Such as were the Acts of Moses, Ioshua, the Judges, the worthies of K. 
David in the old Testament (to say nothing of Alexander, Cyrus & others in 
prophane histories). 
       (12) 
 
Christ, like Cyrus (also a favorite example of heroic virtue for Sidney in the Defense of 
Poesy), is drawn into battle with his adversary by the “Heroicall motions” that bolster his 
resolution. As his sermons progress, Lake tends to prefer the martial imagery of 
“prophane histories”—the term, for him, is remarkably free of moral baggage—over 
further specific references to his Old Testament alternatives. He warns his audience not to 
confuse true “Heroicall motions” with the kind of “desperate humours” that might 
provoke them into vainglorious mock-tourneys with Satan:  
The Lesson that wee must learn is, that wee may not be like unto the swaggerers, 
who stick not in the vanitie of theire drunken or desperate humours to defie the 
devil & be bold to enter the lists with him: but manie of them have to theire cost 
proved how hardie they were. Our Prayer must bee: 1t, Lead us not into 
temptation. 2. If we be led, that we be led thereunto & therein by the holie Spirit: 
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So conforming our selves to Christ in the entrance to the Conflict, wee may in 
some sort speed as Christ did in the event thereof.  
       (12) 
 
Lake explains the devil’s eagerness for combat by noting that he is urged forward by his 
own sense of martial vanity: “As in warfare, souldiers choose to set upon the markablest 
enemies, & thinke it the greatest honour to give such a one an overthrow: So is the devils 
malice speciallie bent against the eminentest servants of God” (5). Both combatants, then, 
understand themselves to be engaged in a romantic episode of “courage,” “adventure,” 
and “honour,” although only one is led by the “morall violence” of extraordinary 
providence. Crucially, Lake here preemptively distinguishes between Hobbesian 
vainglorious romance and romance of some other kind: the first may be the genre of self-
interested soldiers or of the devil, but the second—though it may look much like its 
antithesis—is justified because inspired by an authorial God.  
Both Christ and Satan likewise possess their respective “weapons” of attack and 
strategies for defense, metaphors Lake typically employs in his exhortations to his 
congregation to take Christ as an example for their own “Heroicall” spirituality. “Though 
he were both God & Man,” he insists, “yet did he carrie himself, not as God but as man: 
fighting with those weapons which are common to him with us, that wee might learne 
how to resist by that patterne which wee have of him” (19). Because all of God’s people 
have access to the same weaponry as their chief, “the difference between Adam & Christ, 
was not in the weapons whereby the devill was to be encountred, but in the use of the 
weapons. The second Adam had them & did use them, & made the devill feele the force 
of them” (19). Similarly, while one of the devil’s weapons is his manipulation of biblical 
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text, Christ’s godly knowledge and employment of scripture is his spiritual armor, a 
martial metaphor that is itself scriptural in origin and is available to all believers:  
it must bee to us as armour not hangd up but putt on; seing Tentations will day 
and night sett on us, Texts of scripture must bee alwaies readie to repell them 
from us. As Christ, so wee must resist the Tempter with scriptum est it is written. 
Wee see, that the Tempter gives no rest to Christ, but goeth on trying, Whether 
he be armed at all points. St Paul Ephes. 6. teacheth that wee have a Panoplie, a 
spirituall armour to cover us from top to toe. And that wee have need to have it 
all on, God is pleased to shew us in the example of Christ. 
       (18) 
 
As the community of Christian soldiers must learn, through Christ’s chivalric conduct, 
the right uses of the weapons and armor at their disposal, so must they become familiar 
with the “politik” martial strategies of Satan’s perverse romance: “For whereas in warre 
the field may bee forsaken […] politikly,” Lake notes, “as when an Armie maketh shew 
to flie, but with a purpose to draw the enemie into the more danger […] Even so doth the 
Tempter […] he leaveth a worse place to gain a better” (46). The result, he suggests, is 
that our spiritual combat is not merely an episode, but never ends while we live: 
Trulie is it said, The life of man is a warfare. During this life wee must ever stand 
upon our guard, & not thinke ourselves secure, though we have once given the 
enemy a foile. The greatest Captaines that profane histories doe mention, have 
never received greater blows than when, overjoyfull of a victorie, they have been 
fearelesse, & not expected the return of the enemie: by whose second courage 
they have been unexpectedly surprized. […] 
     But a greater Captaine than any is our Saviour Christ, even the Captain of the 
Lords armies: who standing out in our persons, representeth the Conditions of 
our state, & biddeth we provide for a new assault so soone as a former is ended. 
     Our lesson must bee [...] We must work out our salvation with feare & 
trembling. For the difference between Corporall & spirituall warre is this, that in 
Spirituall warre there is no Truce much lesse peace: whereas in the Corporall there 
are both. The Tempter doth watch us, how he may have opportunitie to assaile us: 
wee must never thinke that hee is the least time at one with us, Though wee doe 
not feele him setting on us: & yet seldome are wee free from onsetts.  
       (20-1) 
 
Both “the greatest Captaines that profane histories doe mention” and “the Captain of the  
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Lords armies” stand as examples to the congregation, the one negative and the other positive. 
Moreover, Lake indicates that the entire life of each believer is always already a romance of 
combat—one that is indeed, in some sense, inescapable. The Lord’s army may be destined 
for a final “conquest,” but on the other face of this communal, eschatological victory are a 
nearly infinite number of solitary battles with the serpent.  
 In the last of the six sermons, Lake invites his audience to consider chivalric 
romance not simply as a useful metaphor, but as an inherent presence in the episode of the 
temptation in the wilderness, and as an essential element of Christian narrative. He urges 
reflection upon the fact that while Christ is often attended by angels or disciples throughout 
the gospels, he is always alone during his greatest trials and triumphs. This heroic solitude, 
the bishop proposes, is essential for the glorification of his exploits: “God, to prevent all 
such derogating from the Redemption, wrought by Christ, provided that at those times he 
should be alone; no Angels, no men with him: there was no helping either Angell or man, 
when hee encountred either the Serpent or the Lion” (48). And not just Christ’s isolation, 
but the divine orchestration of chivalric narrative itself, is necessary for the instruction of 
the godly: “Christ could have putt him off at the first approach; but hee would not. Hee 
stood out for us, & hee would be an Example unto us: an example, with what shield we 
should quench all the fierie darts of the devill, & with what sword we should putt him to 
flight: Christ would be a patterne unto us in both” (46-7). Fallen individuals and the 
worldly church are compelled to live within an ongoing narrative of conflict and conquest, 
but the Son of God freely chooses romance rather than instantaneous success, fitting his 
conduct to the genre of the community he has come to deliver. 
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 While Lake’s sermons envision an individual and communal Christian romance 
whose superficial resemblance to the genre of “swaggerers” is distinguished by 
“Heroicall motions” of divine origin, the letters of Mary Hatton offer a reading of private 
life as romance,31 as well as a preoccupation with the proper relationship between 
“Heroicall motions” and public action. The letters that we have from Hatton to Randolph 
Helsby mainly span the couple’s engagement between 1653 and 1655 (although a final 
letter in the collection, dated 1668, reveals a brief glimpse of an apparently happy 
companionate marriage, along with a young son named Jack and a houseful of naughty 
servants, fifteen years later).32 Crucially for our purposes, the vibrant letters that the pair 
exchanged indicate that they also exchanged reading material, including romances. 
Evidently, they enjoyed both sixteenth-century classics and contemporary texts. In March 
of 1654, Hatton informs Helsby, “I am a reading of your newe booke of mr Spencsers 
which I like well,” and offers a strong endorsement: “I do believe his poetry for 
excellency is as aboundantly great & in as handsome & pretty language as many of the 
beste in the worlde.”33 A year later, as preparations for their imminent wedding were 
                                                
31 For other arguments that one may experience both daily life and history through the hermeneutic of 
genre, including romance, see Smith, 243; Mary Ellen Lamb, “Merging the Secular and the Spiritual in 
Lady Anne Halkett’s Memoirs,” in Dowd and Eckerle, eds., 81-96; and Hayden White, The Fiction of 
Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory, 1957-2007, ed. Robert Doran (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins U P, 2010). 
32 Mary Hatton Helsby’s unconventional flirtatiousness in this later letter (which recounts for her absent 
husband, in loving detail, her corporal punishment of a pretty young maidservant) also tells us that the 
couple’s relationship had not lost its erotic spark. The letter, Folger Shakespeare Library ms. X.d.493 (7), 
will be the subject of my talk, “Queer Heterosexuality, Discipline, and Domesticity in the Letters of Mary 
Hatton Helsby” at the April 2014 meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America.  
33 Folger Shakespeare Library ms. X.d.493 (5). If this book by Spenser is indeed “newe,” and not just new 
to Hatton or Helsby, it must be an edition of the Shepheardes Calender, reprinted in 1653 with a facing 
Latin translation by Theodore Bathurst, a Latin poet and clergyman who remained active as a preacher 
during the Interregnum, by parliamentary nomination, until his death in 1652. See W. H. Kelliher, 
“Bathurst, Theodore (c. 1587-1652),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford U P, 
2004), online ed., Oct. 2009 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1701), 10 Nov. 2013. 
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underway, Helsby seems to have asked Hatton about her recent reading of a certain prose 
romance that the letters do not identify; she answers, “I am so busey in makeing ready all 
my garnishments that I have but had little time to read […] butt I did read abed after we 
rid from Chester upon that wild windie day.”34 She is less impressed by this particular 
romance than by Spenser’s poetry, and offers Helsby her review of what she has read: 
I do not methinks approve of stories of romaunce all so alike that they seem as if 
I had read the same one hundred times. Besides that how vain it was (for him 
which writt it) to make the yong gentle woman run awaie with a sweet hearte 
(her younger of manie years) when all were agreed upon the matche save only his 
more sober unckle. Tis all as olde as Helsby towre but this, and this is in deede 
some thing very freshe & newe as such a youthe could make itt. If you have not 
read itt I would advise you sadly if by my commendations you would waste a 
candell over itt. I had rather do some thing of more use than he that writ it by 
turning my wheel without a stop till some other had read throu itt in my stead. 
But it hath little bits in it that shewe he could not with carefullness & practise be 
without much commendation.35 
 
At first glance, her report may look like a straightforward dismissal of the genre, perhaps 
not much different from a critique of today’s romance novels: they are full of ridiculously 
implausible plot devices, and are packed so full of clichés that a person who has read one 
may as well have read them all. Hatton also gestures to her feminine domestic virtues by 
suggesting that she would rather be spinning than reading, and that her housework is “of 
more use” than either the composition or the consumption of such a romance.  
 However, if we were to take only this message from her letter, we would be 
ignoring much of what her poor review of this particular story implies. Far from calling 
romances bad, Hatton is complaining that this one is a bad romance—and she seems to 
have read enough of them to distinguish the ones she enjoys from the ones that are “all so 
                                                
34 Folger Shakespeare Library ms. X.d.493 (6). 
35 Ibid. 
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alike” that they resemble “one hundred” others she has seen already. In criticizing the 
lovers’ gratuitous elopement, she suggests that this silly plot point is the work of an 
amateur, who nevertheless might “with carefullness & practise” come to produce 
something better later in his career, since he shows “little bits” of creative promise 
elsewhere. In essence, Hatton seems to regard herself not as a dabbler in romances, but as 
a connoisseur of them, someone who knows the “freshe” from the trite and can tell 
whether a certain narrative is a waste of time (even if she has gone ahead and read it 
anyway). In offering to tell the wrong kind of romance (in her opinion) from the right 
kind, she is not unlike Lake, different though their standards of judgment may be. What is 
more, reading poetry and romances is apparently a pastime that these real life lovers 
share and take pleasure in discussing. The volume of Spenser that Hatton praises is 
“[Helsby’s] newe booke,” either on loan to her or given as a gift; he has asked what she 
thinks of this latest romance; and she advises him not to waste his time and candles on it 
“If [he has] not read itt” already (which she sees as a possibility), offering a specific 
example of its nonsense as evidence for why he should choose a better one. Between the 
lines of her review, Hatton tells Helsby that in marriage to her he will have both a dutiful, 
sensible housewife and a discerning, enthusiastic literary companion.  
 Hatton concludes her review with another dual indication of her contempt for bad 
romance and her love for the better kind: “I do scorne & disdaine these trifling pass times & 
nought else can I learne from manie of them. There is so much more prettyness in your poetrie 
that I shall keep itt with all the rest.”36 The “prettiest” love-language, evidently, comes from 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
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Helsby in his poetry to her. This, too, she critiques, with both playfulness and ardor: “But why 
do you tell me that hath so small a portion that I am so very rich? There your similiter 
stoppeth. But when we are married you can then say in very truth that I shal be rich beyond all 
earthly riches with that affection you will give to me.”37 Better than reading an amorous 
romance, Hatton finds, is living in one—and her writing elsewhere reveals her inclination to 
think and speak about her relationship with Helsby in the effusive narrative style of the texts 
they both enjoy. In the same letter, she reassures Helsby, who seems to be worried about 
where they will take up residence after their wedding, by reminding him of an experience they 
shared as though she were recounting an episode of courtship from a romance (one that does, 
in this case, look like Welch’s genre of “love, recreative fancy, and […] pastoral escape”):  
I shall ever account myselfe […] the happiest of women wheresoever we shall 
dwell or abide, pray then be content. Do you not remember when wee met now 
soe long agoe in the great old Inne at Stanemore when my pillyon girth brake and 
when we walked together over the pastures to the cottage engarlanded with ivie & 
honey suckle & in the middest of a gardene bloomeing with flowers. If twere for 
ioyfulness & content tis there I would fain dwell with you for ever & ever. But tis 
follie for me to write thus (as so manye have talked) or I could allmost weep with 
pleasure at the thought of dwelling there wrapt in the peace of each others love 
untill that last daye of our marriage when as shaddows wee shall have departed.38 
 
Hatton makes a move in her discussion of the love story of her life that is remarkably similar 
to the gestures she performs in her review of the silly romance: she disassociates herself from 
the romantic mode and embraces it at the same time. It is “follie,” she admits, for her to dwell 
on such episodes or to write and think in such florid impracticalities, “or [she] could almost” 
indulge in them wholeheartedly—which, in the end, she does anyway in her vision of the 
real-life lovers’ eternal marital bliss, as though true love legitimizes her literary license. 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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 Finally, the conceptual vocabulary of romance helps Hatton express herself in times 
of trouble and fear as well as on happy or amorous occasions. From a historical or political 
standpoint, by far the most noteworthy elements of the Hatton/Helsby correspondence are 
its hints that Helsby, while still a bachelor living in London, may have been on the 
periphery of some subversive action against Oliver Cromwell. The plot must have died in 
its cradle (as Mary Hatton was anxious it should). Hatton, having heard something of it, 
reveals her feelings upon receiving her latest letter from Helsby: “How greatly your letters 
reioyced me none can tell save one shipwrackd & draifting hither & thither halfe dead in 
the waving seas which at last suddenly eyeth the succours that seemed awhile agoe utterlie 
beyond the vision of even hope.”39 Having communicated her intense relief by employing 
the stock romance devices of shipwreck and miraculous providential rescue, she hopes for 
similar divine protection for Helsby in his precarious position, but seems anxious about a 
distinction similar to the one Lake draws between the “Heroicall motions” of providence 
and the “desperate humours” that make men “bold to enter the lists” with the devil, “to 
theire costs.” Hatton confesses her fear “to think how matters might ensue in that great 
Babylon [i.e., London] to your ill fortune. Yet godd knoweth the unfearing trust I have in 
him for your well fare now & hereafter. For it is in vaine that we praye to him in which we 
have not either hopes nor truste. But liken unto any other things both may att tymes faill us 
when the cloudynesses of life blinde the eyes to the ever watchfull Saviour.”40 Both she 
and Helsby are caught up in the “cloudyness” of a metaphorical tempest that prevents them 
from knowing which heroic impulses are divine and which are vain, and which may 
                                                
39 Folger Shakespeare ms. X.d.493 (3). 
40 Ibid. 
  
26 
likewise temporarily obstruct their faith in providential oversight. In the absence of this 
conviction, she desperately (and cryptically) advises him to “Bear watchefully the changes 
till time ripens the fruits that you talke of,” and not “to followe those who be placed lesse 
advantageously than the verie fewe others that can note discretely from their overseeing 
place the tymes & oportunities for fortunate action.”41  
Caught up the seas or mists of life, and “by reason of the utter darkness & 
uncertaneties of the tymes,” Hatton suggests, Helsby lacks the broad historical narrative 
vision that “verie fewe” possess, which alone can reveal the best occasion for agency and 
determine whether one’s “Heroicall motions” are valid or vainglorious. Such dangerous 
circumstances, she adds, may favor the few who are granted this vision—like, possibly, 
Cromwell himself—but are disastrous for others and may be unstable for all alike: 
It was not matteres of this favour that created Olliver (& others to be read of) but 
some suche matter did holpen the uncrowneing of the poore king.42 Tis true tis 
out of the verie mudd & mire of the tyme that a bolde man of partes & some 
place, tho he may not pick his way, maye fly upwards to fortune, by his clear 
vision of the wayes that lead unto her (straightly or crookedly). But he who 
would over throwe him when there must wait upon patience to know if such an 
Olivers power can hold all he hath gotten. Of all I have ever read this I conceive 
to be the greatest of trialls Conquerers can be putt to.43 
 
All that Hatton has “ever read,” whether histories or romances of conquest, has made her 
wary of occasions that depend upon the favor of “fortune,” and she urges Helsby to wait 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Hatton’s personal politics are difficult to discern from her correspondence. She discusses them most 
directly in this letter, in a difficult passage in which she condemns the religious hypocrisy and “selff love” 
of both parties in the War: “But if godd be truely in the heart of gentile or iewe it mattereth so little for the 
forme in which they shewe it that I would as soone be for king as round head or the last as the first, & to 
fight for the forme would not be worth one arrowe head or a blast of powder. Yet moste of the evill of the 
tymes hath come from much selff love of forme that is of preiudice to the minde of onely the ungodlie 
(whether they that love it or they that love it not). For godliness expelleth the evills of our nature & it is the 
veriest of follie to nurse in our flesh the illnesses that doome us to miserie whilst we have such a medicine 
of the true Spirit to purge us of it without verie much helpe from the doctors” (ibid). 
43 Ibid. 
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with “patience” until both time and providence can illuminate the darkness of the age and 
determine whether his heroic impulse destined for a successful telos. Given that the idea 
remained confined to their private correspondence, Hatton seems vindicated in her fear 
that the national narrative was not on the side of her fiancé’s drive toward public heroism. 
Her letters anticipate other texts throughout this project in their concern with the 
distinction (both light and serious) between worthwhile and vain romance, with the 
disturbing difficulty of knowing whether one has correctly intuited one’s role in the 
narrative of history, and with the possibility of tension between male and female partners’ 
readings of life as genre. 
 
Right Romance 
 
 Between Donne’s, Lake’s, and Hatton’s writing, we have observed romance’s 
adaptive facility: these texts feature romance beyond royalist prose fiction and outside of 
romances entirely. Taken together, they also illustrate several additional factors that are 
crucial to this project. First, they show us that seventeenth-century Englishmen and 
women who are attuned to romance are engaging not just with continental works, but also 
with England’s medieval chivalric tradition and with sixteenth-century writers like 
Spenser. Second, they remind us that romance, while read by women, was not primarily a 
women’s genre; it was also a genre of masculine fellowship (as in Donne’s sonnet),44 of 
communal Christianity (as in Lake’s sermons), and of communication between men and 
women (as in Hatton’s letters)—communication that might highlight divergent gendered 
perspectives on how to interpret life as romance. Along similar lines, these examples 
                                                
44 For a discussion of romance and male intimacy in royalist writing, see Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 223-51. 
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reveal romance as more than a mode of isolation or withdrawal (although Hatton’s vision 
of amorous seclusion with Helsby partly speaks to this aspect); it is likewise a mode of 
forging bonds between individuals and within groups, a genre for expressing and creating 
fellowship, as when Lake’s Christ retreats alone into the wilderness in order to lead and 
strengthen his community of followers. Next, they offer further evidence of Hobbes’ 
concern with the potency of romantic subjectivity: subjects who identify with the heroes 
of romance perceive their power to resist not just Satan, but also church teaching or state 
leadership. Finally, Lake’s and Hatton’s texts are each concerned in their own way with 
making, and sometimes worrying over, distinctions between right romance and wrong 
romance: if the first kind is inspired and justified by God, by true love, or by a clear 
vision of the path to historical fortune, the second kind might be a silly waste of time; the 
vanity of the world, the flesh, and the devil; or a delusion that tempts would-be heroes 
toward danger and tragedy. How might those who believed in both wrong romance and 
right romance decide which was which, and what circumstances tested their belief in the 
usefulness of that distinction?  
 To explore these matters further, and to present a more complete picture of 
romance and ideology in seventeenth-century England, this project traces two interwoven 
threads. First, I examine the relationship between the individual romantic subjectivity that 
Hobbes denounced as vainglorious and the formation of romantic community based on a 
shared sense of heroic identity, which was even more threatening to established 
authority. Expanding on ideas proposed by critics such as Sacvan Bercovitch, who finds 
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romance at the root of Puritan subjectivity, mythmaking, and conquest in America,45 and 
Michael McKeon, who links romance to nonconformist religious “enthusiasm,” or 
(according to seventeenth-century critics) “claims to spirituality which reflect the pride of 
human sufficiency by being inadequately tied to rational […] evidences,”46 I argue that 
the potent heroic subjectivity offered by romance often correlated with the widespread 
Protestant belief in divine election. Seventeenth-century subjects (especially, though not 
only, Puritans) who read themselves as the heroes of romance regularly attributed 
authorship of that romance to God; as characters predestined for trials and triumph within 
a divine narrative, they were essentially equivalent to the community of the elect. Their 
belief in their romantic heroism, as well as in their Christian salvation, finds its source in 
a private conviction of their election by God—an impression that can never be “tied to 
rational […] evidences” and therefore cannot be proven false.47 Both election and 
romance could draw individual believers together into a community united by its 
members’ shared faith in their exceptional status—a community that also, by its very 
nature, excluded the “unregenerate” who did not share its collective subjectivity.  
Like the private experience of conversion, which could then be shared and 
validated by others’ similar experiences so that it also became a public and communal 
identity, the genre could function as a powerful shibboleth, drawing its adherents together 
                                                
45 Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New Haven: Yale U P, 1975). 
46 Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1987), 88-9. 
47 Hobbes, in Leviathan, was adamant that a sacred destiny or contract could never be proven; of course, his 
real concern was that it could never be disproven either, and might seem to be confirmed by contingency: 
“For when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God’s prophet, they must either take their 
own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by, and the tumor of their own hearts for the Spirit 
of God, or they must suffer themselves to be led by […] some of their fellow subjects that can bewitch 
them, by slander of the government, into rebellion (without other miracle to confirm their calling than 
sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity), and by this means destroying all laws, both divine and 
human, reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of violence and civil war” (293). 
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while excluding and resisting those who will not or cannot participate in the “right” kind 
of romance.48 Patterson and Potter have shown that genre could function as a code 
accessible only to members of a royalist romantic community,49 and Kahn has argued that 
royalists formed affective political communities based on their prose romances of 
sentiment and sympathy.50  I argue that Puritans and republicans formed exclusive 
romantic communities of their own, based on both affective piety and a shared sense of 
elect exceptionalism. Because royalists were not the only romantic subjects, part of the 
Civil War and its aftermath was an ongoing ideological battle over whose romance was 
the right romance: both sides mocked and condemned the other side’s manipulation of 
the genre while simultaneously appropriating and reclaiming it in order to represent their 
champions, and their community, as the true heroes of national and sacred history. I also 
show, especially in later chapters, how this competition became increasingly self-
conscious and sometimes self-critical: both republicans and royalists recognized that their 
romantic rivalry and its inherently non-rational subjectivity needed to be acknowledged 
and wrestled with, and began to suggest that individual heroism and communal 
identification might depend upon romance’s mediation between conviction and 
uncertainty. Finally, I address how postwar writers might turn to romance not merely to 
represent elect community, but to reconsider and reconstruct it, thinking critically about 
                                                
48 Nigel Smith, while distinguishing romance from epic, briefly sets forth a claim about epic that I wish to 
make a similar version of, in more detail, about romance: “The history of the epic during the English 
Revolution is a process […] in which kinds of subjectivity are ‘discovered’—as epic and heroic patterns are 
worked upon by divided perceptions and divided ideological requirements […] [Epic] enabled religious 
difference to be voiced as a state of mind, as an internal history of the Puritan and Quaker individual: an 
odyssey of subjectivity. Where this might involve an inward turn for the defeated and withdrawn Royalist, 
puritan republicanism was most heroically engaged in its inwardness” (232-3). 
49 See Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, 167-210; and Potter, 72-112. 
50 See Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 223-51. 
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whether (or not) the genre might breach and repair the very divides in subjectivity and 
identity that it had been so instrumental in maintaining, and where the limits of romance 
for constructing civic and religious narratives might lie. 
In the second thread of this project, I explore how seventeenth-century writers 
who were drawn to romance contended with recurring problems of narrative vision, 
genre, and gender. As the structure of the form suggests, romance’s length and its 
“duplicitous teleology” were well suited to the vagaries of an always-unfolding national 
history. But because of these vicissitudes, while romantic subjectivity might be powerful, 
liberating, and inspiring, it also demanded experiences of disappointment, suffering, and 
ignorance in which the genre of life might look much more like tragedy. To mitigate this 
burden, writers of national or elect romance frequently imagined their characters—and, 
implicitly, themselves—being granted some prophetic perspective on the complete 
teleological narrative of history. As we will see, such visions are often limited, often 
fleeting, and often unevenly bestowed on masculine and feminine subjects: like Mary 
Hatton, who could not foresee a happy end to Randolph Helsby’s “Heroicall motions” 
through “the utter darkness & uncertaneties of the tymes,” female subjects and writers of 
romance were apt to express skepticism about, or feel excluded from, the narrative visions 
of their male counterparts. I argue, then, that due to romance’s long form and the problem of 
multiple ideological and individual subjectivities, we encounter many seventeenth-century 
struggles with the generic tension between providential romance and the tragedies of 
personal or national history. Further, much of this generic friction is also gendered, arising 
from the norm of male subjects’ visions of themselves as lofty chivalric heroes and 
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women’s self-identification as constrained lovers, wives, and mothers. Finally, I propose 
that as writers reconsidered the formation and restrictions of elect community, they also 
strove to rethink formal divides in romance, interrogating new ways of approaching mixed 
genre, gendered perspective, and masculine and feminine heroism.  
Beginning in 1588, the year that Fulke Greville began work on the publication of his 
late friend Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia, and ending one hundred years later in 1688, the 
year that Aphra Behn published Oroonoko and the “Glorious Revolution” ended the Stuart 
dynasty, this project reads across the divide between centuries in order to enable a new 
understanding of romance, elect community, and narrative vision during the English Civil 
War, the Restoration, and its aftermath. In chapter one, “Protestant Re-Visions of 
Romance: Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene,” I 
consider the two key works that grappled with romance’s civic potential and its 
limitations for a newly-Protestant state and profoundly influenced seventeenth-century 
approaches to the genre. Against critical claims that Sidney and Spenser judged romance 
too worldly to function in harmony with their religious patriotism, I argue that they each 
developed distinctive postures that acknowledged the genre’s challenges while affirming 
its Calvinist resonances. Sidney’s Pyrocles, asked to justify his erotic passion, counters 
that “they onely know it, which inwardly feele it,” setting up an intricate correspondence 
between the turn to romance and the conversion of the elect: both rely on non-rational 
subjectivity to exclude the uninitiated from a community of believers. Sidney’s zealous 
lovers form affective bonds through their shared stories and thus resist the tyranny of the 
unregenerate. Spenser, in turn, contends with romance’s errant structure by portraying the 
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genre’s tortuous temporality as a yoke to which the elect must submit as they navigate the 
hard course of providential history. His heroes may be granted prophetic narrative 
perspective to help them bear this burden: as a male hero, Redcrosse receives a 
mountaintop vision of the New Jerusalem, while the lady knight Britomart is promised a 
fruitful “tree” of offspring. Sidney’s and Spenser’s two models of romance—as a 
subjective shibboleth that can empower an elect community, and as a temporal pattern 
that endeavors to mediate between triumph and tragedy—would endure with widespread 
and multivalent applications amid the ideological conflicts of the next century.     
Chapter two (“‘Heroical’ Histories: Writing Lives into National Romance”) 
examines how Sidney and Spenser’s twin hermeneutics permeate four works of romantic 
historiography composed by royalists and republicans during and after the civil wars, as 
both sides sought to mark their community and leaders as the true heroes of the national 
narrative. Two texts highlight Sidney and Spenser’s complex midcentury reception: first, 
the 1648 pamphlet “The Faerie Leveller” extols Charles I as the living antitype of 
Spenser’s Knight of Justice, casting Spenser as a prophet who forecasted Cromwell’s 
unlikely defeat and reclaiming him from his Puritan devotees by insisting that readers loyal 
to the king hold the real key to his allegory. Next, the 1652 first printing of Fulke Greville’s 
Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney wrestles with the correspondence between Sidney’s 
romantic heroism and his tragic death while allowing its Interregnum audience to read him 
as either a courtly royalist or a godly proto-republican visionary. A second pair of works, 
the royalist Margaret Cavendish’s and the parliamentarian Lucy Hutchinson’s memoirs of 
their war-hero husbands, diverge politically yet share a generic and gendered tension 
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between the men’s lofty romantic vision and their wives’ rootedness in pragmatic concerns. 
All four texts reveal ideological competition over the right uses of romance for representing 
individual and communal history as story, alongside a pervasive sense that the genre is 
fraught with problems of variable personal and historical perspective.  
Each remaining chapter pairs a republican writer with one or more royalist ones in 
order to illuminate these ongoing struggles over romance. In chapter three (“The Fall and 
the Summit: Milton’s Counter-Revision of Romantic Structure in Paradise Lost and 
Paradise Regained”), I explore both parties’ efforts to contend with the problem of 
subjectivity and the experiences of contingency and defeat, reading Milton’s post-
Restoration biblical poetics against post-regicide romances by Margaret Cavendish and 
Percy Herbert. Much as Kahn has proposed, Cavendish and Herbert offer their fellow 
royalists a rationalist way around Hobbes’ distaste for romance, creating skeptical 
characters who accept and exploit the genre’s flexible subject positions and its 
indeterminacy between divine providence and atomistic fortune. Milton, however, 
assigns this relativism to Satan, pitting his anti-teleological skepticism against the 
protagonists’ embattled faith and reaffirming the reality of a godly subjectivity unique to 
the community of the elect. Contrary to the common argument that Milton came to reject 
romance as too royalist, I show that he develops his own sense of Puritan right romance 
that embraces the gap between conviction and uncertainty, and the distance between the 
promise of narrative fulfillment and the present unreality of that telos.  
In the last two chapters, I consider late seventeenth-century writers’ attempts to 
rethink romance in relationship to election, community, gender, and generic form. 
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Chapter four (“‘My victorious triumphs are all thine’: Amorous Romance and Elect 
Community in Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder”) reads Hutchinson’s Genesis 
epic against John Dryden’s panegyric to the restored Charles II, “Astraea Redux.” I argue 
that Dryden’s poem, reconceiving romance as reparative rather than exclusive, depicts 
the Restoration as the universalist telos to the turbulent national story: God blesses and 
elects all English people equally in their spiritual marriage to Charles II, an ecstatic union 
that subsumes distinctions of gender and ideology by reinscribing all subjects as feminine 
in sinfulness, as masculine by marriage, and as royalist. Hutchinson resists this 
triumphalist narrative, insisting in her romantic treatment of her biblical protagonists that 
both teleological plot and redemptive eroticism are gifts reserved for the Puritan elect, 
and suggesting—differently than in her Memoirs—that male and female believers may 
not be divided by hierarchical narrative vision, sharing equally in the promise of 
reproduction and in prophetic glimpses of the still-remote “full Restoration.”  
The fifth and final chapter (“‘In the next world’: John Bunyan, Aphra Behn, and 
the Limits of Romance”) mounts readings of John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part 
Two, and Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, texts known for ideological intricacy and resistance 
to generic categorization. I aim to show how this complexity relates to both authors’ self-
conscious interrogation of romance and elect community, as they return at the dawn of 
the eighteenth century to questions much like those that challenged Spenser and Sidney a 
hundred years before: can romance function as a meaningful model for history? What are 
its civic and religious applications and limitations? Bunyan, I argue, orchestrates 
productive conflicts between romantic norms and Calvinist allegory, ultimately proposing 
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that romance’s value lies in its ability to stand for (rather than embody) sacred narrative 
form, to empower a nontraditional family of dissenters, and to imagine new modes of 
godly eroticism and feminine heroism. Behn, too, affirms the genre’s capacity to unite a 
diverse community: Oroonoko and his male and female friends are politically 
heterogeneous, and the African prince subverts Calvinism’s exclusion of Ham’s black 
descendants from the narrative of the elect. Rather than being empowered or 
providentially protected, however, their group is marginalized and destroyed by 
colonialists who lack their romantic sensibility. While Bunyan draws romance to the fore, 
Behn enacts its recession in her transatlantic tragedy; her prophetic narrative vision as a 
royalist woman reveals not the New Jerusalem but the New World, a spatial and temporal 
zone she finds hostile to the ideas that allowed romance to flourish across ideological 
boundaries in seventeenth-century England. 
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Chapter One 
 
Protestant Re-Visions of Romance: 
Sir Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia  
and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene 
 
 
Before we can fully appreciate seventeenth-century writers’ ideological 
appropriations of romance, we must consider the most influential English narratives from 
the end of the previous century that served as foundations and sources for countless texts 
that followed them. Although we are examining them proleptically, Sir Philip Sidney’s 
New Arcadia and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene were both composed with one 
authorial eye toward England’s “modern” Protestant present and future and the other 
toward its troubled recent past. Near the sixteenth century’s close, and in the wake of 
England’s religious and political turmoil under the Tudor dynasty, Sidney and Spenser 
were keenly aware of romance’s medieval and Catholic history, and they were eager to 
reconsider the cherished genre’s religious and civic potential for their newly Protestant 
state. What, they asked themselves and their readers, might romance come to mean for 
God’s elect nation? What kind of literary arena could it provide for contending with 
questions of England’s faith, its monarchy, its history, and its destiny? 
The aim of this chapter is not to detail the complete inheritance that Sidney and 
Spenser’s struggles with romance’s Protestant nationalist potential left to seventeenth-
century Britons; such an effort would require a book unto itself (or more likely two). 
Rather, it is to explore four specific elements of their re-visions of romance—two from 
each author—that proved especially fruitful to the Civil War and Restoration writers we 
consider in these pages. Sidney’s New Arcadia bequeathed to English romance the two 
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traits that would eventually inspire Thomas Hobbes’ warnings about its subversive 
tendencies: first, a non-rational and therefore powerfully malleable heroic subjectivity, 
derived from the hero’s zealous faith in his or her election and protection by providence; 
second, the genre’s related ability to function as an ideological shibboleth, uniting an 
elect community of self-identified heroes and empowering them to exclude and resist 
those whom they deem inimical to their shared sacred narrative. Spenser’s Faerie Queene 
established two key points of tension in his patriotic and religious epic that prepared 
seventeenth-century writers to engage constructively with romance’s structural 
challenges: first, a tension in generic perspective, wrought by providential romance’s 
interplay with the tragic burdens of personal and national history; second, a tension in 
gendered perspective, emblematized by male and female subjects’ receipt of separate, 
and not necessarily equal, prophetic insights into romance’s long and errant form. Sidney 
and Spenser’s twin legacies—of romantic subjectivity and exclusive elect community, 
and of romance’s productive problems of genre and gender—would flourish with 
widespread applications and innovations amid the conflicts of the century to come. 
 
I. “They onely know it, which inwardly feele it”: Romantic Subjectivity and Romance 
as Shibboleth in Sir Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia 
 
 Immediately following his untimely death at the Battle of Zutphen in the name of 
a unified Protestant Europe, Sir Philip Sidney grew into a legendary figure much like the 
idealized hero of romance who unites all virtues within himself. As we will discover in 
the next chapter, readers of diverse ideologies shored up Sidney’s reputation as the 
consummate “Renaissance man”: an exemplary soldier, scholar, subject, courtier, poet, 
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lover, and Christian, all in one.51 Much contemporary criticism of Sidney has been a 
reaction against this legend, an attempt to discern his true principles beneath layers of 
error and hyperbole. Andrew Weiner, for instance, pits “the romantic image of the 
courtier-lover-poet that was for so long an obstacle to the understanding of his works” 
against the “real” Philip Sidney, a devout Protestant whose zeal sometimes jarred with 
Elizabeth I’s more moderate policies, and a serious scholar of (and commentator on) the 
religion and politics of his age.52 Weiner’s seminal Sir Philip Sidney and the Poetics of 
Protestantism opposed several earlier arguments that Sidney’s prose fiction celebrated 
erotic love despite its moral hazards and extolled conventional romantic heroism despite 
the protagonists’ flaws.53 Examining Sidney’s finished first romance, now known as the 
Old Arcadia, Weiner concluded that “Sidney did not intend [his protagonists] to be 
exemplars of heroism or virtue” and that the characters’ amorous exploits represent 
distractions from temporal ethics and temptations away from spiritual concerns. 54 
Weiner’s basic reading remains current—Blair Worden’s major study, for one, argues 
that the Old Arcadia deems love inimical to the devout statesman’s public duty and self-
                                                
51 For discussions of the conjunctions and disjunctions between Sidney’s popular biographical image and 
the appropriation and appreciation of his works, see Alan Hager, “The Exemplary Mirage: Fabrication of 
Sir Philip Sidney’s Biographical Image and the Sidney Reader,” ELH 48.1 (1981), 1-16; and Richard 
Hillyer, Sir Philip Sidney, Cultural Icon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2010. 
52 Andrew D. Weiner, Sir Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Protestantism: A Study of Contexts (Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 1978), 3. In partial contrast to Weiner, Katherine Duncan-Jones’ later biography of 
Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet (New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1991), proposes “not to ‘debunk’ 
Sidney,” but to explore his complexity and integrate his romantic, religious, and political legacies (xii). 
53 These earlier critics with a more conventionally “romantic” interpretation of Sidney’s narrative include 
Walter R. Davis, A Map of Arcadia: Sidney’s Romance in Its Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1965); 
Jon S. Lawry, Sidney’s Two Arcadias: Pattern and Proceeding (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U P, 1972); and 
Dorothy Connell, Sir Philip Sidney: The Maker’s Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). 
54 Weiner, 100. An earlier argument for a didactically non-heroic Old Arcadia, minus Weiner’s attention to 
Sidney’s devout Calvinism, is Richard Lanham’s The Old Arcadia (New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1965). 
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possession55—and the Old Arcadia remains Sidney’s more frequently studied prose 
narrative, probably due to the combined factors of its shorter length, its more focused 
structure, and its completion. 
 When Sidney died in the Low Countries, however, he left behind him in England 
an unfinished revision of his romance, featuring the same characters (plus new ones) and 
a similar but more expansive plot. His old friend and subsequent biographer Fulke 
Greville was convinced that this version was superior, despite being incomplete, and that 
it offered a more accurate reflection of Sidney’s literary, religious, and political values. In 
1588, Greville objected to an unauthorized publication of parts of the first romance and 
proposed that Sidney’s “correction,” entrusted to him, was “fitter to be printed”; two 
years later, he ensured that the New Arcadia did appear in print, breaking off mid-
sentence during a momentous scene, just as Sidney had left it.56 We know from numerous 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century references, continuations, and sequels that the revised 
romance was widely read and well loved.57 Contemporary criticism sometimes assumes 
that the Old Arcadia’s ironic critique of erotic and chivalric romance goes more or less 
unchanged in the New. Clare Kinney and Mary Ellen Lamb read the New Arcadia’s new 
elements of meta-genre—including added chivalric pageantry, numerous embedded 
                                                
55 Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics (New Haven, CT: 
Yale U P, 1996). For readings that take either or both of the Arcadias to be advocating for the compatibility 
of romance and Protestantism, see Margaret Dana, “The Providential Plot of the Old Arcadia,” SEL 17.1 
(1977), 39-57; Barbara Brumbaugh, “Cecropia and the Church of Antichrist in Sir Philip Sidney’s New 
Arcadia, SEL 38 (1998), 19-43, and “Jerusalem Delivered and the Allegory of Sidney’s Revised Arcadia,” 
Modern Philology 101.3 (2004), 337-370; and Steven Mentz, “Reason, Faith, and Shipwreck in Sidney’s 
‘New Arcadia,’ SEL 44.1 (2004), 1-18. 
56 Cited in G. A. Wilkes, “‘Left…to Play the Ill Poet in My Own Part’: The Literary Relationship of Sidney 
and Fulke Greville,” The Review of English Studies 57.230 (2006), 291-309, 293. 
57 For a rich study of Arcadia’s afterlives, see Gavin Alexander, Writing after Sidney: The Literary 
Response to Sir Philip Sidney 1586-1640 (Oxford: Oxford U P, 2007). 
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romance narratives, and characters’ retellings of those digressions—as evidence that 
Sidney’s didactic intention was to undermine romance and its sinful conventions.58 The 
New Arcadia is indeed the text to read for a fuller sense of Sidney’s self-conscious 
engagement with romance as a zealous Protestant; I propose, however, that its heightened 
meta-generic awareness illustrates not a simple moral critique of romance, but the 
keenness of Sidney’s interest in romance’s complex applications and implications for his 
Calvinist countrymen (and women).59  
 The sections that follow are particularly concerned with elements unique to 
Sidney’s revision of Arcadia that are central to his Protestant re-vision of heroic 
narrative. Interpolations and repetitions of romantic sub-narratives, together with new 
characters such as the conflicted Amphialus and the villainous Cecropia, draw out the 
resonances Sidney perceived between amorous romance, Calvinist religious identity, and 
English nationalism.60 First, Sidney’s reiterations of the psychological process of falling 
                                                
58 See Clare Kinney, “On the Margins of Romance, at the Heart of the Matter: Revisionary Fabulation in 
Sidney’s ‘New Arcadia,’” The Journal of Narrative Technique 21.2 (1991), 143-152, and “Chivalry 
Unmasked: Courtly Spectacle and the Abuses of Romance in Sidney’s ‘New Arcadia,’” SEL 35.1 (1995), 
35-52; and Mary Ellen Lamb, “Exhibiting Class and Displaying the Body in Sidney’s Countess of 
Pembroke’s Arcadia.” SEL 37 (1997), 55-72.  
59 The Defense of Poesy famously reflects Sidney’s profound concern with the fraught relationship between 
erotic or heroic literature, sin and vice, and Christian virtue. His defense of romance from the allegation 
that “it abuseth men’s wit, training it to wanton sinfulness and lustful love” is wistfully ambiguous:  
Alas, Love, I would thou couldst as well defend thy self as thou canst offend others [...] But grant   
 love of beauty to be a beastly fault, although it be very hard, since only man and no beast hath the   
 gift to discern beauty; grant that lovely name of Love to deserve all hateful reproaches, although   
 even some of my masters the philosophers spent a good deal of their lamp oil in setting forth the   
 excellency of it; grant, I say, whatsoever they will have granted […] yet, think I, when this is granted, 
 they will find their sentence may with good manners put the last words foremost, and not say that poetry  
abuseth man’s wit, but that man’s wit abuseth poetry.  
See Peter C. Herman, ed., Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology for Poetry and Astrophil and Stella: Texts and 
Contexts (Glen Allen, VA: College Publishing, 2001), 100. 
60 Barbara Brumbaugh relies on Amphialus and Cecropia to argue for a reading of the New Arcadia as an 
allegory of the spiritual struggle between the True (Protestant) and False (Catholic) churches, in which the 
heroes and heroines are ordained to prevail (see both “Cecropia and the Church of Antichrist” and 
“Jerusalem Delivered and the Allegory of Sidney’s Revised Arcadia”). 
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in love set up an intricate correspondence between the emotional experience of erotic 
surrender and the religious conversion of the elect: both endow the individual subject 
with a powerfully non-rational (but not intrinsically invalid) sense of sacred heroism and 
providential destiny. Next, Sidney suggests that this interplay between romantic and 
religious subjectivity allows believers to form a community through their shared 
narratives and to exclude the unregenerate who lack their sensitivity to, and their faith in, 
the right kind of romance. Finally, Sidney reveals the full potential of this subjective and 
communal power, as his heroes and heroines’ devotion to romance and to one another 
enables their resistance to Catholic-inflected menace and absolutist tyranny.61    
 
ROMANTIC SUBJECTIVITY: EROTIC ELECTION AND COMMUNAL NARRATIVE 
 
 The New Arcadia, with its many narrative expansions, is singularly preoccupied 
with love not as a single event but as a recurring, patterned process. The repeated stages 
through which Pyrocles, Musidorus, Philoclea, and Pamela each submit to Love’s 
authority are recounted for us in detail: each of the four protagonists first becomes 
receptive to love by means of some external stimulus, then undergoes a profound internal 
revelation of its power, and finally ecstatically embraces it as a divine force that demands 
the believer’s absolute devotion and extraordinary obedience.62 The second sonnet of 
Astrophil and Stella reinforces Sidney’s investment in this pattern, condensing the 
                                                
61 For a study of Sidney’s fraught engagement with individual autonomy and resistance to authority, see 
Richard McCoy, Sir Philip Sidney: Rebellion in Arcadia (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers U P), 1979. 
62 Patrick Scanlon has remarked on the “ritualized” nature of love in the New Arcadia, but does not discuss 
the religious resonances of Sidney’s “stylized” eroticism—which, as I will argue, is paradoxically 
individualized and deeply personal for each lover even as it is also consistent from character to character 
(“Emblematic Narrative and the Argument of Love in Sidney’s ‘New Arcadia,’” The Journal of Narrative 
Technique 15.3 [1985], 219-233, 219). 
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process into a single lyric. Astrophil recalls that Love gained “full conquest” of him “Not 
at first sight,” but “by degrees” like those we find reiterated throughout the New Arcadia: 
I saw and liked, I liked, but lovèd not, 
I loved, but straight did not what Love decreed. 
At length to Love’s decrees I—forced—agreed […] 
Now even that footstep of lost liberty 
Is gone, and now like slave-born Muscovite 
I call it praise to suffer tyranny.63 
 
I propose that Sidney’s multiple engagements with this set narrative process—which 
explicitly delineates a departure from the sudden shock of Petrarchan love—stem from 
his interest in its marked resemblance to the Calvinist ordo salutis, the process by which 
the elect soul receives salvation through God’s grace.  
Theodore Beza, Calvin’s disciple and Sidney’s contemporary, embellished 
extensively upon this point of doctrine, which holds (in simplified form) that an 
individual whom God has predestined for election from the beginning of time is first 
attracted by an outward calling to the Gospel, then convinced to embrace it by an 
intensely personal inward calling. He or she then experiences an individualized 
conversion to faith and justification by God’s grace. These stages lead to the believer’s 
sanctification, or increasing godliness, and ultimately to his or her glorification with God 
at the end of time.64 Beza’s model was adopted and translated by the English Calvinist 
William Perkins in his popular book A Golden Chaine, which distilled its story of 
salvation into a dense diagram (Fig. 1), and the pattern became a staple of Calvinist 
conversion narratives: a century after Sidney, John Bunyan recalled in Grace Abounding 
                                                
63 Herman, ed., 129. 
64 Calvinist doctrine emphasizes that the ordo salutis is not strictly chronological: various stages may 
overlap or recur. Nevertheless, each stage is an essential element of salvation. 
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to the Chief of Sinners that he became attracted to scripture and to godly preaching long 
before he experienced any interior impression of his election or became convinced of his 
sincere conversion to Christ.65 Sidney’s erotic variation on the Calvinist ordo appears at 
times to satirize his lovers’ idolatrous extremities of devotion, and at others to reflect 
genuine fascination with possible correspondences between pagan Love and Calvinism’s 
exacting, arbitrary God. Crucially, though, Sidney seems most interested in the 
conversion process’ psychological impact on believers, both singly and as a community. 
Like Calvinist election, he finds, the mimetic “election” by Love that the protagonists of 
his romance experience instills in them a powerful sense of identity and purpose, a 
subjectivity that prompts them both to set themselves apart from the “unregenerate” and 
to form affective bonds with other converts who venerate Love’s external narratives and 
recognize its internal effects. Because of this concern with individual and group 
psychology, the New Arcadia’s pagan equivalent of the ordo salutis dwells particularly 
on the predestined lover’s outward and inward “effectuall calling”—separated by Perkins 
as “effectuall preaching & hearing” and “the mollifying of the heart”—which produce a 
personal conviction of conversion, or “FAITH,” only in conjunction with one another.66  
 A variation on predestination, one of the cornerstones of Calvinist doctrine, fits 
quite comfortably into Arcadia’s pagan culture in the form of divinely-inspired prophecy. 
                                                
65 For an English salvation “narrative” that predates Sidney, see Anne Lok’s sonnet sequence A Meditation 
of a Penitent Sinner, which distinguishes sharply between the believer’s concern with the external demands 
of law and scripture and her impression of internal receipt of God’s grace, which is secondary in 
chronology but primary in importance.  
66 William Perkins, A golden chaine, or The description of theologie containing the order of the causes of 
saluation and damnation, according to Gods word. A viewe whereof is to be seene in the table annexed. 
Written in Latine, and translated by R.H. Hereunto is adioined the order which M. Theodore Beza vsed in 
comforting afflicted consciences (London, 1597).  
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The entire narrative is founded upon the Oracle that obliquely foretells the main plot of 
the narrative and its protagonists’ love and marriage; moreover, other prophecies and 
signs pertain more directly to the heroes’ election by Love to a life of romance. When 
Musidorus and Pyrocles are still in their infancy, or yet unborn, prophets and portents 
reveal that they are marked for both “Heroicall vertue” and, significantly, erotic passion:  
  For what fortune onely southsayers foretold of Musidorus, that all men might see  
  prognosticated in Pyrocles; both Heavens & Earth giving tokens of the comming  
  forth of an Heroicall vertue […] onely love was threatned, and promised to him,   
  and so to his cousin, as both the tempest and haven of their best yeares.67  
 
The princes are taught virtue as children, but their excellence was already ordained from 
their birth, along with their heroic vocation. Also predestined are their erotic awakening 
and the full course of their romance’s plot. Much as Perkins’ Calvinist elect are irrevocably 
called to Christ but must therefore confront psychological anguish and other “enemies of 
life eternall” before attaining “glorie,” Sidney’s heroes will be inevitably drawn to love, 
whose rigors constitute both a “threat” and a “promise,” since love determines both the 
“tempest” of their trials and the “haven” of those trials’ peaceful end.68 
 The New Arcadia is quite emphatic about the next stages of Love’s ordo, 
recounting them elaborately and repeatedly. The four young protagonists each receive 
some outward calling—experiencing an attraction to stories of love, witnessing the 
testimony of a lover, or both—before they receive their inward calling or “mollifying of 
the heart” and undergo an overwhelming interior desire to devote themselves to Love and 
to their beloved. Pyrocles, the first to fall in love, is moved by a number of external signs  
                                                
67 Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia: The New Arcadia, ed. Victor Skretkowicz (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 189. Future references will occur parenthetically by page number. 
68 See Perkins (Fig. 1). 
  
46 
 
Fig. 1. 
  
47 
of love’s power before feeling its full force within himself. Before arriving in Arcadia, he 
is loved by the real Zelmane, who disguises herself as a boy and dies in his service, and 
whose name and appearance he later adopts in turn to woo Philoclea. Amazed by her 
constancy, Pyrocles confesses to Philoclea “that if my starres had not wholy reserved me 
for you, there els perhaps I might have loved”; “somthing there was” in the dying 
Zelmane, he adds, “which (when I saw a picture of yours) brought againe her figure into 
my remembrance, and made my harte as apt to receive the wounde, as the power of your 
beauty with unresistable force to pearce” (299). As in the Calvinist ordo, external 
testimony or “effectuall […] hearing” renders the elect susceptible to the internal 
“mollifying of the heart,” but the two steps must be distinct; true conversion is wrought 
only by the private efficacy of the divine. Once in Arcadia, Pyrocles hears the story of 
Argalus and Parthenia, witnesses their joyful reunion and marriage, and is so affected by 
their love and her beauty that “a chaunge [is] growen” in him: he slips into a 
contemplative melancholy, mysterious to his friends but termed by Sidney’s narrator as 
“an inclination to love”; again, receptivity precedes authentic personal conversion (54, 
emphasis mine). Finally, Pyrocles explains to Musidorus that upon seeing Philoclea’s 
image and hearing “of her unworthy fortune,”  
  when with pittie once my harte was made tender […] it receaved quickly a cruell  
  impression of that wonderful passion which to be definde is impossible, because  
  no wordes reach to the strange nature of it: they onely know it, which inwardly  
  feele it, it is called love.       
(85) 
 
This predestined moment in which his heart is mollified or “made tender” marks a 
permanent change in him: like Astrophil, and comparable to the Calvinist convert who 
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undergoes the “mortification” of his unregenerate self before his “vivification” and “new 
obedience” to Christ, Pyrocles welcomes the “overthrowe of all [his] libertie” and yields 
himself entirely to the new power that has claimed him (84).69 Always one of Love’s 
elect by predestination, he can now “inwardly feele” the sign of his election.  
 However, the private affect that triumphs at the conclusion of Pyrocles’ account 
raises critical questions and gestures to the crux of Sidney’s remarkable comparison of 
erotic passion to divine election. When Pyrocles informs Musidorus of the profound 
interior alteration he has experienced, celebrating love as the true path to virtue, he has 
altered outwardly as well and is now dressed as the Amazon Zelmane, the better to win 
Philoclea without arousing her parents’ suspicion. Musidorus responds skeptically to 
Pyrocles’ attempt at erotic evangelism, disturbed both by his friend’s feminization and by 
his concomitant interest in sexual, rather than martial, conquest. Giving voice to the 
concerns of later critics who argue that Sidney’s chief aim in the New Arcadia is to 
condemn the ungodliness of romance, Musidorus berates Pyrocles for abandoning his 
manly virtue in pursuit of lust. Pyrocles at first appeals both to the Platonic philosophy of 
love and to a version of the next step in the Calvinist ordo: justification, or the 
“imputation of righteousnes” from Christ to the converted believer.70 His adoration of 
Philoclea, he claims—“the love it self”—will in time direct him to “greater matters” by 
fostering within him “the excellency of the thing loved” (81). Musidorus remains 
unconvinced by Pyrocles’ gesture toward his love’s teleological trajectory, sardonically 
                                                
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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demanding, “The beginning being so excellent, I would gladly know the end” (81).71 His 
challenge does not dampen Pyrocles’ neoplatonic zeal: 
 Enjoying, answered Pyrocles, with a great sigh. O (said Musidorus) now set ye foorth the  
 basenes of it: since if it ende in enjoying, it shewes all the rest was nothing. Ye mistake  
 me (answered Pyrocles) I spake of the end to which it is directed; which end ends not, no  
 sooner then the life.        
(81) 
 
Without denying his sexual interest in Philoclea, Pyrocles insists that his aim of 
“Enjoying” is destined for a higher spiritual “end,” but is soon forced to admit that he 
cannot convince Musidorus of the moral teleology of his erotic passion. He abandons his 
rational philosophical argument for love’s progressive nature and turns instead to a 
devout profession of faith in love’s transformative power, acknowledging that “no 
wordes reach to the strange nature of it: they only know it, which inwardly feele it” (85). 
By couching his affective experience in these terms, Pyrocles turns his discursive break 
with his friend to his advantage: his alteration in belief, behavior, and even appearance 
stems from the conversion experience which has made him one of Love’s chosen 
followers. The exclusivity and interiority of his newfound love of Love prove—to him, if 
not to anyone else—that rather than falling from grace, he has only just now attained it. 
This appeal to romantic and religious subjectivity stymies Musidorus’ argumentative 
position despite, and because of, its indifference to logic; Pyrocles’ claim to an inward 
calling that justifies his radical devotion is unfalsifiable.   
 Regardless of whether Pyrocles’ conviction is indeed divine (as he professes) or 
delusional or blasphemous (as many readers of Arcadia have argued), it proves potent 
                                                
71 For objections from critics that echo those of Musidorus, see Weiner, 60-76, and Kinney, “On the 
Margins of Romance,” 150. 
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enough to generate a small community of similar belief. Ironically, Pyrocles’ testimony 
about his “effectuall calling” to Love does function as “effectuall preaching” that serves 
as Musidorus’ outward calling, shortly to be followed by an inward. Musidorus’ reluctant 
consent to help Pyrocles/Zelmane woo Philoclea results in his first sight of her sister 
Pamela, and he is “presently striken” with his own profound interior change (115). When 
Zelmane teases him for his change of heart, he acknowledges his conversion in explicitly 
religious terms: “I recant, I recant (cryed Musidorus,) and withal falling downe prostrate” 
he utters a prayer for forgiveness that might be addressed to the inexorable deity of 
Calvinism as well as to the “spirit of Love”: “have compassion of me, and let thy glory be 
as great in pardoning them that be submitted to thee, as in conquering those that were 
rebellious” (114). The repentant lover then strives to describe his revelation, but like his 
friend, finds it too be too personal and profound for words: “But what meane I to speake 
of the causes of my love, which is as impossible to describe, as to measure the backside 
of heaven? Let this word suffice, I love” (115). Moreover, he suddenly finds himself 
possessed with the exact same faith that he recently derided in Pyrocles: 
O heaven and earth (said Musidorus) to what a passe are our mindes brought, that from 
the right line of vertue, are wryed to these crooked shifts? But o Love, it is thou that doost 
it: thou changest name upon name; thou disguisest our bodies, and disfigurest our 
mindes. But in deed thou hast reason, for though the wayes be foule, the journeys end is 
most faire and honourable.       
(117) 
 
Musidorus, having now “inwardly felt” the transfiguring force of Love, immediately 
joins Pyrocles as a devotee of its mysteries; as a result, he also shares Pyrocles’ certainty 
that Love imposes a teleological narrative structure on the lover’s “journey,” no matter 
how “crooked” it may appear along the way. As a member of Love’s chosen fellowship, 
  
51 
he becomes convinced that he can now perceive the “greater matters” and the “end” that 
he once mocked. Even if new ranks of detractors can (and do) object that Musidorus’ 
semi-religious ecstasy has drawn him away “from the right line of vertue,” his subjective 
conviction of his election, and of the predestined romance plot associated with it, 
constantly protects and renews itself.   
 The sisters Pamela and Philoclea, ordained by the Oracle to return the princes’ 
love, share similar experiences of conversion that are generated by the princes’ zeal, as 
Musidorus’ was by Pyrocles’. The reserved Pamela recounts her outward and inward 
callings in the least detail, but tells Philoclea how she first listens with pleasure to 
Musidorus’ true accounts of love’s power in others, then feels herself overcome by the 
force she once thought herself staid enough to resist. For the elect of Sidney’s pagan 
romance, Love’s “unresistable force” echoes the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace: 
the predestined lovers’ defiance or doubt must be temporary, since their “mollifying of 
the heart” and their conversion are narratively assured. Sidney’s interest in the 
transformative but frightening potential of Love’s “unresistable force”/irresistible grace is 
most evident in Philoclea’s rigorous psychological experience: while the other three 
protagonists attempt to describe their conversions to others with limited success, hers is 
the only one we witness from the heroine’s private perspective. Its Calvinist overtones 
are graver than Musidorus’ potentially comic display of recantation, featuring the 
temporary anguish that, according to the ordo salutis, often accompanies the conversion 
of the elect: in Perkins’ terms, these trials include “doubting of election,” “despaire,” and 
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“concupiscence of the flesh.”72 The outward sign that attracts Philoclea is Zelmane’s 
visible attraction for her, which Philoclea innocently imitates, “thinking the knots of 
friendship ought to bee mutuall […] til at the last (poore soule, ere she were aware) she 
accepted […] not only the signe, but the passion signified” (170). Finding herself, as she 
believes, attracted to another woman, Philoclea falls into a despairing conviction of her 
own depravity typical of Protestant conversion stories. Although she prays to the “great 
hidden deities, which have their working in the ebbing & flowing of our estates,” she 
presumes herself forsaken by them: “No, no, you cannot helpe me: Sinne must be the 
mother, and shame the daughter of my affection” (174). Yet as we know, the oracle has 
already directed Philoclea’s “estate” to this unexpected love, and at last, her hope and 
faith in Love’s miraculous power conquer her despair and doubt: 
  Alas then, ô Love, why doost thou in thy beautifull sampler sette such a worke  
  for my Desire to take out, which is as much impossible? And yet alas, why doo I  
  thus condemn my Fortune, before I heare what she can say for her selfe? What  
  doo I, sillie wench, knowe what Love hath prepared for me? […] Away then all 
  vaine examinations of why and how. Thou lovest me, excellent Zelmane, and I  
  love thee […] I am wholy given over unto thee.     
(174-175) 
 
Despite Philoclea’s continued assumption that Zelmane is female, and that their union is 
therefore both impossible and anathema, her surrender to Love and to the allure of its 
subjectivity endows her with the conviction that her faith, and ultimately her desire for 
Zelmane, will be justified by their ends. Her status as one of Love’s elect trumps all 
obstacles to her devotion, and she joins her sister and the princes in erotic fellowship.  
 Philoclea seems to be right that “Love hath prepared” an unexpected plot twist 
that will vindicate her attraction to Zelmane, since the lesbian Amazon turns out to have 
                                                
72 See Perkins (Fig. 1). 
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been the heterosexual male Pyrocles all along. Indeed, the four central lovers are all 
correct that the New Arcadia’s “great hidden deities” (of which the authorial Sidney is the 
greatest) have predestined their passion and directed it to the sanctioned end of marriage. 
However, the parallels that Sidney constructs between erotic passion and Calvinist 
conversion do not intrinsically validate his lovers’ romantic subjectivity. Their conviction 
that “though the wayes be foule, the journeys end is most faire and honourable” is 
troubled by events such as Musidorus’ eventual attempt to assault Pamela, and even more 
so by other characters whose desires are equally fierce but whose ends are unclear. The 
princesses’ parents, Basilius and Gynecia, both become smitten with Pyrocles/Zelmane as 
well; their ardor leads the king into foolish fawning, the queen into ugly resentment of 
her daughter, and both spouses into adulterous passion that cannot conclude in marriage 
to the beloved. The Old Arcadia ends with Basilius and Gynecia relieved of their 
delusions and reconciled to one another, but the unfinished New Arcadia offers few 
insights into Sidney’s intentions for them. The ambiguously tragic Amphialus, a 
character Sidney added in his revision, is still more problematic: he shares the princes’ 
commitment to chivalric virtue and Pyrocles’ adoration of Philoclea, but his obsession 
with her inspires him to kidnap her, to commit treason against her father, and finally to 
attempt suicide—a desperate last resort which, if successful, offers conclusive proof of 
one’s reprobation and damnation. But Amphialus fails to die, and when Sidney’s revised 
narrative breaks off unfinished, his fate remains unknown.73  
                                                
73 For McCoy and others, these problems in the New Arcadia constitute “a pattern of ambivalence and 
evasion” due to Sidney’s inability to reconcile his own beliefs and inclinations (216). Without discounting 
this reading, I want to suggest that Sidney may also have a productive interest in narrative ambivalence and 
evasive subjectivity.  
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The Calvinist narrative chain cannot tell us whether Basilius, Gynecia, or 
Amphialus participate in the trajectory of Love’s elect or whether they are excluded from 
it, though it may further illuminate Sidney’s preoccupation with the subjectivity of the 
believer.74 The path of the reprobate, depicted in a stark black line on the right side of 
Perkins’ diagram, stands as a terrifying counterpart to that of the elect. Some of those 
whom God has predestined for damnation, as Perkins shows, are granted “no calling,” but 
others may receive “a calling not effectuall” and even experience a temporary “yeelding 
to Gods calling”: their tantalizing “Tast[e]” of divine mercy—featuring “a general 
Illumination,” “penitence,” “temporarie faith,” and “zeale”—mirrors the experiences of 
the elect in nearly every way but is doomed to end in “relapse,” “fulnes of sinne,” and 
“damnation.”75 How, then, can Amphialus’ zeal be definitively established as different 
from Pyrocles’, and why is Philoclea’s bout with despair and doubt distinct from the 
“vnbeleeuing heart” of the reprobate?76 The answer, as the protagonists all insist, lies at 
“the journeys end”: the narratives of God and Love are anchored at both ends by 
predestination and by a glorious telos, and teleology in the New Arcadia is notoriously 
elusive (117). Much as Perkins’ Golden Chaine may have offered cold comfort to 
Protestants anxiously analyzing their own psychological states, the romantic subjectivity 
of Sidney’s lovers cannot tell us much about its own spiritual validity. 
                                                
74 McCoy discusses Sidney’s vexed obsession with individual autonomy in the political sphere; his interest 
in religious and psychological subjectivity may be related, but Sidney seems to have found the latter fruitful 
rather than confounding.  
75 See Perkins (Fig. 1). 
76 Sonnet 2 of Astrophil and Stella again condenses the problem. Like the lovers of the New Arcadia, 
Astrophil “call[s] it praise to suffer” Love’s “tyranny” after his calling “by degrees.” His final rhyme, 
however, while conventional enough in Petrarchan terms, is more disturbing in Protestant ones: the entire 
sonnet sequence, he suggests, is designed “To make myself believe that all is well, / While with a feeling 
skill I paint my hell” (Herman, ed., 129). 
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Fortunately, the New Arcadia’s fascination with devout subjectivity and recursive self-
justification seems designed to demonstrate not that the lovers are right about their own 
righteousness, but that their convictions are unprovable, undisprovable, and therefore 
tremendously powerful. The individual heroes rely on their faith that they are Love’s elect, 
and that they are therefore predestined for happiness and glory, in order to enhance their sense 
of sacred identity, to explain their radical behavior to themselves and others, and—
significantly—to appreciate similar subjectivity at work in fellow believers. When Pyrocles 
exults that “They onely know it, which inwardly feele it,” he simultaneously sets himself apart 
from the still-unregenerate Musidorus and imagines a soon-to-be-realized plural network of 
converts who “inwardly feele” as he does. The Calvinist resonance of Sidney’s erotic narrative 
bolsters the conscience of individuals and fosters a community between individuals who 
mutually recognize the outward form and the inward affect of romance. The New Arcadia’s 
self-identified elect community strengthens its sense of identity, and its sense of heroic 
purpose, as it grows in size and thrives on telling and re-telling the tales of amorous romance 
that inspire and delight each of its members by reiterating their own ecstatic experiences. 
The New Arcadia partly distinguishes its protagonists by the conventions of 
“decorum” that were staples of Sidney’s classical and medieval sources: the heroes of 
romance typically combine high birth, extreme physical beauty, and moral virtue, and 
Sidney’s four central lovers (despite their sins and errors) do not significantly depart from 
this tradition.77 Most important, however, and without qualification, Sidney’s rigorously 
                                                
77 The New Arcadia treats the convention as something of a comic cliché: the shrewish shepherdess Miso is said 
to have “onely one good point […] that she observes decorum, having a froward mind in a wretched body” (21), 
while the prince Musidorus, like countless romance heroes before him, possesses a unique birthmark that proves 
his identity and rank at a critical moment: “a redde spotte, bearing figure […] of a Lyons pawe” (163). 
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self-conscious romance sets the royal lovers’ community apart from the unregenerate 
world by endowing them with an acute sensitivity not just to Love, but also to the genre 
of Love that they inhabit: romance itself, with its distinctive values and structural 
patterns. The affinity for romance that the New Arcadia’s protagonists share is not 
entirely sui generis, as we learn from Musidorus within one of his embedded stories told 
to his beloved Pamela. He prefaces his tale of his and Pyrocles’ pre-Arcadian adventures 
with an account of their birth and upbringing. Their education accords with the didactic 
philosophy of Sidney’s Defense of Poesy in that the young princes are taught their duties 
as future rulers through heroic narratives: their “delight of tales” as children is “converted 
to the knowledge of al the stories of worthy Princes, both to move them to do nobly, & 
teach them how to do nobly; the beautie of vertue being set before there eyes, & that 
taught them with far more diligent care, then Grammatical rules” (190).78 Musidorus and 
Pyrocles’ own valiant exploits, in which they vanquish tyrants, defend ladies, and survive 
shipwrecks before their arrival in Arcadia, commence when “they would needs fall to the 
practice of these vertues, which they before learned” in the heroic histories and romances 
of their childhood (191). Moreover, as Musidorus notes, the princes’ decision to imitate 
the wanderings and upright deeds of epic romance heroes is entirely conscious:  
they determined in unknowne order to see more of the world, & to imploy those 
gifts esteemed rare in them, to the good of mankinde; and therefore would 
themselves […] goe privately to seeke exercises of their vertue; thinking it not so 
worthy, to be brought to heroycall effects by fortune, or necessitie (like Ulysses 
and Aeneas) as by ones owne choice, and working.   
(206) 
                                                
78 According to the Defense of Poesy, “Right Poets” are those who “do merely make to imitate, and imitate 
both to delight and teach, and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand which, without delight, 
they would fly as from a stranger, and teach to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved. 
Which being the noblest scope to which ever any learning was directed” (Herman, ed., 67-8). 
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In their view, they can surpass the worthiness of a fictional model by actively choosing to live 
within the genre that Ulysses and Aeneas were merely written into. Pyrocles and Musidorus 
may be the heroes of Sidney’s literary romance by chance (or by Sidney’s authorial 
predestination), but within the imaginary world of the New Arcadia, they become the heroes 
of their own lived romance by choice; their conscious affinity for the genre becomes a guiding 
principle and a cornerstone of their subjectivity. 
 The princes continue to take profound pleasure in the heroic narratives of others even 
after they have reached adulthood and willingly embarked on their own. When Kalander tells 
Musidorus the love story of Argalus and Parthenia—a true account in the context of the New 
Arcadia, but otherwise a conventional romance in every way, complete with love trials, 
quests, and finally a joyful reunion—remarking that “the strangenes of it, made me think it 
would not be unplesant unto you,” Musidorus “thanked him greatly for it, being even 
passionatly delighted with hearing so straunge an accident of a knight so famous over the 
world, as Argalus, with whome he had himselfe a long desire to meet: so had fame poured a 
noble emulation in him, towards him” (37-38). Musidorus shares this enthusiasm for true 
stories that resemble the “strange accidents” of romance with his friend and fellow 
protagonist: he later tells Pyrocles “word by word what Kalander had told him touching the 
strange storie (with al the particularities belonging) of Arcadia, which did in many sortes so 
delight Pyrocles to heare; that he would needs have much of it againe repeated” (51). 
The heroines of the New Arcadia, destined to marry their counterparts the princes, are 
similarly marked by their ability to appreciate and interpret romance narratives. When 
Musidorus (disguised as Dorus the shepherd) attempts to communicate his love to Pamela by 
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pretending to woo the vulgar shepherdess Mopsa with true tales of the princes’ “chivalries,” 
Pamela listens with pleasure (and with increasing attraction to his “effectuall preaching”) 
while Mopsa, bored by the aristocratic genre and unreceptive to its religious undertones, 
snores her way through the stories (213).79, 80 And when Philoclea finally discovers the 
identity of her suitor, she rejoices not just in his past adventures, but in the evidence his 
presence provides of their teleological structure: “Therefore, deere Pyrocles (for what can 
mine eares be so sweetly fed with as to heare you of you) be liberall unto me of those things 
which have made you indeede pretious to the worlde, and now doubt not to tell of your perils; 
for since I have you here out of them, even the remembraunce of them is plesaunt” (261). For 
Philoclea, the enjoyment of romance is contingent upon the perception of its end; “perils” 
become “plesaunt” to contemplate when their happy outcome is a foregone conclusion. The 
elite denizens of Arcadia who serve as half-parodic, half-earnest types for the elect Protestants 
of England share an appreciation and understanding for the generic form that most resembles 
Sidney’s Calvinist religious narrative, in which God’s chosen people—a community of 
potential heroes and heroines—suffer the trials of history and the enmity of the ungodly in 
anticipation of their ultimate reunion with God and their inheritance of a heavenly kingdom. 
 
Romance as Shibboleth: Community, Exclusion, and Resistance 
 Musidorus, Pamela, Pyrocles, and Philoclea are all linked—as protagonists, as 
members of Arcadia’s elite and of Love’s elect, and to each other—by their mutual affinity 
                                                
79 Mopsa’s boredom with Musidorus’ stories is a notable difference between the New Arcadia and the Old, 
in which her naïve obsession with romance makes her enthralled by them. By the time he revised the 
Arcadia, Sidney had increased his interest in distinguishing between approaches and attitudes to romance. 
80 Mary Ellen Lamb discusses the ability to appreciate and interpret romance as a sign of class distinction in 
the New Arcadia (“Exhibiting Class,” 56-8.) 
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for romance and by the many generically conventional stories they tell one another. 
However, the New Arcadia also adds one other intra-textual episode about amorous 
adventure, related by a character outside the royal and narrative elite, that contrasts with and 
comments on the romances of the young heroes. Near the middle of Sidney’s text, Pamela, 
Philoclea, and Pyrocles/Zelmane are spending their day in chivalric storytelling when they 
are interrupted by a clumsy fairy tale about a princess and her enchanted lover told by 
Mopsa, the common shepherdess who snoozes through Musidorus’ narrative courtship. 
Clare Kinney, rightly noting that Mopsa’s story highlights the intensity of Sidney’s meta-
generic awareness in his revised Arcadia, has argued that Sidney interpolated it in order to 
illuminate and criticize the heroes’ own flighty obsession with romance.81 I wish to propose 
instead that Mopsa’s absurd episode is designed not to make us reject the heroes’ equally 
foolish proclivities, but to explore why they, as Love’s self-proclaimed elect, reject her and 
her romance as unregenerate and incorrect. The New Arcadia’s romantic subjectivity has 
power to do more than foster elect community; for better or for worse, it also encourages 
exclusion of—and, sometimes, radical resistance to—those who do not, cannot, or will not 
participate in that community’s Calvinist-inflected concept of right romance. 
 Mopsa begins her story with an ironically “decorous” gracelessness of body and 
of performance that anticipates the gracelessness of her narrative’s structure: “and so 
being her time to speake (wiping her mouth, as there was good cause) she thus tumbled 
into her matter” (241). Sidney’s creation of Mopsa’s bad romance is so replete with 
sardonic genre-play that her great “matter” bears quoting in full:  
                                                
81 Kinney, “On the Margins of Romance.” 
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In time past (sayd she) there was a King, the mightiest man in all his country, that had by 
his wife, the fairest daughter that ever did eate pappe. Now this King did keepe a great 
house, that every body might come and take their meat freely. So one day, as his daughter 
was sitting in her window, playing upon a harpe, as sweete as any Rose; and combing her 
head with a combe all of precious stones, there came in a Knight into the court, upon a 
goodly horse, one haire of gold, & the other of silver; and so the Knight casting up his 
eyes to the window, did fall into such love with her, that he grew not worth the bread he 
eate; till many a sorry day going over his head, with Dayly Diligence and Grisly Grones, 
he wan her affection, so that they agreed to run away together. And so in May, when all 
true hartes rejoice, they stale out of the Castel, without staying so much as for their 
breakfast. Now forsooth, as they went togither, often all to kissing one another, the 
Knight told her, he was brought up among the water Nymphes, who had so bewitched 
him, that if he were ever askt his name, he must presently vanish away: and therefore 
charged her upon his blessing, that she never aske him what he was, nor whether he 
would. And so a great while she kept his commandement; til once, passing through a 
cruell wilderness, as darke as pitch; her mouth so watred, that she could not choose but 
aske him the question. And then, he making the greevousest complaints that would have 
melted a tree to have heard them, vanisht quite away: & she lay down, casting forth as 
pitifull cries as any shrich-owle. But having laien so, (wet by the raine, and burnt by the 
Sun) five dayes, & five nights, she gat up and went over many a high hil, & many a deepe 
river; till she came to an Aunts house of hers; and came, & cried to her for helpe: and she 
for pittie gave her a Nut, and bad her never open her Nut, til she was come to the 
extremest misery that ever tongue could speake of. And so she went, & she went, & never 
rested the evening, where she went in the morning; til she came to a second Aunt; and she 
gave her another Nut.        
(241) 
 
Here Philoclea interrupts Mopsa’s tale, presumably dismayed by the appearance of the 
second Aunt with her second magical Nut—“Now good Mopsa […] I pray thee at my 
request keepe this tale, till my marriage day, & I promise thee that the best gowne I weare 
that day shalbe thine”—and Zelmane requests that the princesses resume the aristocratic 
(and intratextually true) romance of Plangus and Erona (242). Eager for a new dress and a 
larger audience, Mopsa permits her romance to be excluded from the afternoon’s 
program, and the New Arcadia returns to its wonted high style. 
On a superficial level, Mopsa’s story is ridiculous in the same way as Chaucer’s 
Squire’s Tale and his Tale of Sir Thopas, both of which are also mercifully interrupted: it 
is crammed so full of romance tropes and conventions—nonpareiled beauties, unknown 
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knights, magical prohibitions, rash promises, meandering quests—that it ceases to be 
normative genre and becomes parody instead. Yet as Kinney and Mary Ellen Lamb have 
remarked, Sidney’s New Arcadia shares many of the same features: Pyrocles and 
Musidorus indulge in hyperbolic celebrations of their beloved ladies’ beauty, conceal 
their identities during battles and tournaments, and wander through any number of 
loosely-correlated adventures before arriving in Arcadia and relating the stories of these 
very exploits to the princesses.82 Moreover, distinction based on the various narratives’ 
truth-values proves largely unhelpful: Mopsa’s story may be a fantasy, but the “true” 
stories told by the protagonists take part in that fantasy’s cosmetic traditions and tropes, 
and in any case, Sidney acknowledges that his own text is the product of its author’s 
“fancy” as well (3). How, then, should we distinguish between Mopsa’s bad romance and 
the aristocratic characters’ narratives, or even the romance of the New Arcadia itself? 
 Kinney and Lamb’s approach contends that we should not see much difference 
between them. According to Kinney, we are meant first to laugh at Mopsa’s digression 
from the high style of the New Arcadia, and then to realize that all of the romance in 
Sidney’s text shares the same unhealthy idolatry of Love and the same interminable 
structure. Lamb has similarly argued that Mopsa’s lack of narrative skill seems at first to 
confirm her inferior class position, but ultimately undercuts class distinction by reminding 
us of the ways in which Sidney’s aristocratic characters—and even his readers—indulge in 
directionless eroticism.83 Both readings transpose Andrew Weiner’s argument about the 
Old Arcadia—that Sidney condemns the values of romance as out of step with the values 
                                                
82 See Kinney, ibid., and Lamb, “Exhibiting Class.” 
83 Lamb, ibid., 60-2. 
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of his own English Protestantism, and that the text is therefore didactic largely by negative 
example—onto the revised New: Sidney’s heroes and heroines, they suggest, cannot have 
much in common with godly Protestants if they delight in romance and venerate Love. 
 A rare recent scholar who has pursued the opposite approach to Mopsa’s tale by 
assuming its fundamental distinction from the romance of the rest of the New Arcadia is 
Tiffany Werth, who has noted one element in it that is conspicuously absent from the 
narrative of Sidney and the meta-narratives of his other characters: magic.84 In Werth’s 
argument, as in mine, Mopsa’s mistakes do indeed allow Sidney to imagine how 
Protestant romance might distinguish itself from unregenerate forms of the genre: she 
suggests that Sidney and his Elizabethan readers would have associated the “fabulous 
devices” present in Mopsa’s and many other romances with Catholic ceremony, 
mystification, and deception. Sidney can thus use Mopsa’s clumsy effort to distinguish 
the genre’s “seductive qualities” from its virtuous potential, exemplified by the 
demystified heroic style of the nobles’ stories and of the New Arcadia itself.85 Werth’s 
emphasis on magic as the motif that separates unregenerate romance from Sidney’s 
Protestant reformation of the genre offers an important corrective to the common critical 
perspective that Sidney employs romance chiefly to undermine it; however, another 
aspect of Mopsa’s abortive tale may be even more central to Sidney’s project. His interest 
in the possibility of a godly romance for the elect goes well beyond the motif of magic to 
the heart of the genre’s narrative structure. 
                                                
84 Tiffany Werth, “The Reformation of Romance in Sir Philip Sidney’s The New Arcadia,” English Literary 
Renaissance (2010), 33-55.  
85 Ibid., 35. 
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While Mopsa’s story is bursting at the seams with readily recognizable tropes and 
traditions, it lacks what Sidney’s heroes regard as romance’s most important features: a 
sense of order and the promise of an ending, which must be evident to the romance’s 
storyteller and to its audience even if they are not apparent to its characters. Patricia 
Parker has famously defined romance as inherently “inescapable,” but as we have seen, 
the New Arcadia’s protagonists become deeply invested in a “faire and honourable” end 
to the “true” story of their own journey, devoutly convinced of its direction by 
providence. As Philoclea explains when she asks Pyrocles to tell her of his past dangers, 
lengthy and even seemingly aimless wandering is a staple of providential romance’s 
narrative pattern—but only when that wandering is linked to an inevitable, if remote, 
destination. (Philoclea’s emotionally fraught conversion may make her particularly 
inclined to take this view.) Mopsa, on the other hand, is so delighted by the cosmetic 
distractions of the genre—the pretty lovers, their material fineries, their amorous 
dalliances, their emotional excesses—that she loses sight of its teleology, content to roam 
indefinitely across the romance landscape from aunt to aunt and nut to nut. Sidney 
highlights the endlessly repetitive pattern of Mopsa’s tale by having Mopsa sprinkle her 
storytelling with one emphatic and so after another: she has no eye toward an ending, 
since her pleasure in (non-) narrative rests solely in the next and so. While we might 
presume an eventual conclusion in which the princess recovers her enchanted lover and 
they live happily ever after, what matters to Sidney (and to the impatient Philoclea) is that 
Mopsa shows no interest in guiding her audience to that end. Magic and meandering, for 
her, have displaced providence and purpose; no matter how many hills and rivers the 
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princess traverses, Mopsa will never be granted membership in the heroes’ elect 
community because her superstitious, unregenerate story is going nowhere. 
 Of course, such aimless indulgence in frivolity is precisely the error of which 
Pyrocles and Musidorus stand accused, by Kinney and Lamb and by other characters in 
the New Arcadia.86 As we have seen, the princes and their lovers come to stand firm in 
their devout belief that their erotic romance has a sacred moral end, and as before, they 
cannot be refuted only because their conviction is self-reflexive and because Sidney’s 
death left their romance incomplete, but the matter of their rightness or reliability beyond 
the textual boundaries of Sidney’s romance is secondary to the power that their 
conviction grants them within it. The lovers’ sense of right romance becomes a 
shibboleth that ultimately does much more than exclude ignorant commoners; it grants 
their community the insubstantial yet indestructible authority to resist the absolutism and 
impiety of a tyrant who closely resembles the enemies of Sidney’s Protestant England. In 
the primary narrative added to the New Arcadia, the protagonists are tormented at length 
by Cecropia, who aims to marry her son Amphialus to one of the princesses and so secure 
Basilius’ kingdom for herself. Cecropia’s ties to popery, to Satanism, and to a host of 
despised Catholic monarchs have been enumerated by a number of scholars, most notably 
Barbara Brumbaugh, and her reprobation seems obvious enough in her treason against 
Basilius and her abduction and torment of his daughters.87 However, given the cultural 
                                                
86 Kinney argues that the princes, after becoming “follower[s] of Cupid,” indulge in “projected narrative 
trajectories” that are “strikingly equivocal—what, for example, is that question-begging ‘end’ of 
Musidorus; what are Pyrocles’ ‘greater matters’?” (“On the Margins of Romance,” 150). 
87 Brumbaugh has made an extensive study of Cecropia’s allegorical relationship to the Catholic church, 
arguing that Sidney lards her with attributes and iconography associated with popery and with the Whore of 
Babylon (including material pomp and ceremony, pride, and perversion of scripture) and that he ultimately 
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link between Catholicism and romance that Werth suggests made Sidney careful with the 
genre, it is especially remarkable that Cecropia demonstrates her “fulnes of sin” through 
her utter rejection of romance. While the community of Love’s elect opposes itself to 
anti-romance in the sense of Mopsa’s parody or misuse, it also resists anti-romance in the 
sense of Cecropia’s scorn and hatred for the genre.  
Cecropia’s anti-romantic doctrine—that love is merely the sophist’s name for lust, 
that all self-proclaimed lovers are hence either liars or fools, and that the “greater 
matters” and “ends” that they invoke are illusory excuses for inaction and impotence—
may sound moralistic, or even superficially puritanical, but it proves to be a cornerstone 
of her Catholic-inflected tyranny and the focus of her victims’ resistance. Cecropia 
consistently refuses to acknowledge the possible existence of divine Love, derides affect 
in favor of action, and renounces belief in a providential structure to the narrative she 
inhabits. In opposition to her evil, the protagonists assume virtues that are explicitly 
Protestant, though in so doing, they never turn from their enthusiasm for romance or their 
conviction that they have been divinely chosen. Cecropia stands as Sidney’s epitome of 
both the cynical anti-romantic and the reprobate anti-Protestant. Her villainy thus 
illustrates, more strongly than the flawed virtue of the heroes, Sidney’s investment in the 
                                                                                                                                            
uses her character to represent the Church of Antichrist (“Cecropia and the Church of Antichrist in Sir 
Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia”). Other scholars have found links between Cecropia and such infamous 
Catholic women as Catherine de Medici (Duncan-Jones, 263; Edwin Greenlaw, “The Captivity Episode in 
Sidney’s Arcadia,” in The Manly Anniversary Studies in Language and Literature [Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1923]; Kenneth Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney as a Literary Craftsman [Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1965]; 
Martin N. Raitere, Faire Bitts: Sir Philip Sidney and Renaissance Political Theory [Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
U P, 1984]; Stephanie Chamberlaine, “The Demonization of Sidney’s Cecropia: Erasing a Legal Identity,” 
Quidditas 23 [2002], 5-20), Mary Queen of Scots (William Dinsmore Briggs, “Political Ideas in Sidney’s 
Arcadia,” SP 28.2 [1931]), and Mary I of England (Worden). Neda Jeny has discussed Cecropia as a 
Satanic archetype (Notable Images of Virtue and Vice: Character Types in Sidney’s “New Arcadia” [New 
York: Peter Lang, 1989]). 
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potential for harmony between reformed romance and reformed religion. There may well 
be something threateningly non-rational in the lovers’ zeal for Love and in their faith that 
they inhabit a romantic narrative, but Sidney suggests in the Cecropia episode that their 
dangerously subversive subjectivity may be used to threaten God’s enemies.  
 Cecropia makes war on Basilius and kidnaps his daughters, along with Pyrocles/ 
Zelmane, for the sake of her son, the noble but conflicted Amphialus, who is the next heir 
to the Arcadian throne after the princesses and is sick with unrequited love for Philoclea. 
Yet immediately after the abduction, Cecropia begins attempting to quash her son’s 
romantic impulse, viewing his love as an emasculating weakness and an obstacle to his 
political and sexual ambitions. When Amphialus laments that his chivalry and courtesy 
forbid him to keep Philoclea prisoner, but that his desire forbids him to release her, his 
mother scoffs at the “Prety intricat follies” that “this childish passion of love” has 
wrought in him, and advises him instead to despise the princess as a political enemy, “For 
Hate often begetteth victory; Love commonly is the instrument of subjection” (365-366). 
Cecropia understands just enough about the romantic concept of courtly love to know 
that it demands the “subjection” of the lover to the beloved, and therefore dismisses it as 
antithetical to self-advancement. Amphialus (like the princes before him) tries to clarify 
his chivalric code by distinguishing base lust from virtuous “true-love”: “lust may well be 
a tyrant, but true-love where it is indeed, it is a servant […] Did ever mans eye looke 
thorough love upon the majesty of virtue, shining through beauty, but that he became (as 
it wel became him) a captive? & is it the stile of a captive to write, Our will and 
pleasure?” Because her absolutist authority disdains servitude, Cecropia denies that any 
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such thing as “true-love” exists: “Tush, tush sonne (said Cecropia) if you say you love, 
but withall you feare” (451-2). Her wickedness is doubly confirmed as she demonstrates 
that “true-love” is not simply an idea opposed to her pragmatism, but one beyond her 
credence. The unqualified equation of the zeal of Love with the passion of lust here 
appears not as obligatory Calvinist doctrine, but as a deviant heresy linked to Catholicism 
and tyranny. 
 As an infidel to the faith in divine Love that Pyrocles, Musidorus, and even the 
troubled Amphialus all profess, Cecropia proceeds to reject the humility toward women 
that is conventional of wooing in courtly romance. Despite being a woman who 
luxuriates in her own power, she advises her son to cease thinking of his beloved lady as 
his mistress, “For indeede (sonne, I confesse unto you) in our very creation we [women] 
are servants: and who prayseth his servaunts shall never be well obeyed” (453). 
Crucially, Cecropia here situates herself on the biblical side of a potential dispute 
between the gender politics of scripture and those of romance, only to contort both 
scripture and romance to her own ends. Her claim that women were created as the 
servants of men is part of her effort to convince Amphialus to stop courting Philoclea and 
rape her instead, since “No, is no negative in a womans mouth” and “the fault” of her 
stubbornness is “his owne, who had marred the yong Girle by seeking to have that by 
praier, which he should have taken by authoritie” (451). Cecropia’s disdain of “true-love” 
leads her to tempt women to sexual license as well. Having abandoned hope of 
persuading Philoclea to yield her virginity to Amphialus, she turns to her sister instead; 
when Pamela unsurprisingly also refuses to allow herself to be “defiled,” Cecropia 
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counsels her, “O sweet youth […] how untimely subject it is to devotion? No, no sweet 
neece, let us old folks think of such precise considerations, do you enjoy the heaven of 
your age, whereof you are sure” (404-405). In protesting that Pamela’s “devotion” to 
heavenly Love and to Musidorus makes her overly “precise,” Cecropia suggests an active 
link between romance and zealous Protestantism: since the adjective “precise” was 
current in Sidney’s day as a mildly derogatory equivalent of the similarly disparaging 
“Puritan,” Cecropia essentially complains that Pamela is simultaneously too romantic and 
too puritanical.88  
We soon discover that Cecropia’s lack of credence in divine Love is of a piece 
with her broader atheism. After advising Pamela to discard her chastity (but for the sake 
of pragmatism and pleasure, not love), she attempts to persuade Pamela that any belief in 
divinity or its laws is the response of “foolish folks” to chance phenomena beyond their 
comprehension (406). As Kenneth Myrick first pointed out, Sidney models Cecropia’s 
philosophy on Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, with its emphasis on atomistic contingency 
over divine intention: the “alterations” of nature “be but upon particular accidents, the 
universalitie being always one […] Man, who while by the pregnancie of his imagination 
he strives to things supernaturall, meane-while he looseth his own naturall felicitie” 
(406).89 Cecropia goes so far as to cite Pamela’s conviction of her distinction from the 
                                                
88 Davis suggests that this temptation of the sisters away from temperance and toward hedonism links 
Cecropia, almost in an allegorical fashion, with “Pride, the worship of the self, which is fatal to love, for it 
uses love only for self-aggrandizement” (74). 
89 Myrick, 265. Cecropia here resembles the classical philosophers in the Defense of Poesy “who, shaking 
off superstition, brought in atheism” and thus erred more than the pagan poets who wrote of “divine 
providence” in the absence of “the light of Christ” (Herman, ed., 106). Sidney apparently finds no 
inconsistency in associating Cecropia with both illusionistic popery and atheistic philosophy; both, to him, 
are the false religions of the hypocrite and the reprobate. 
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“vulgar” as evidence that she ought to perfect her goodness by renouncing the imaginary 
props that ostensibly uphold it, since (in her view) the only truly enlightened are those 
whose virtue is self-generated and self-sustaining, while the only truly unregenerate are 
the blindly theistic masses:90  
But in you (Neece) whose excellencie is such, as it neede not to be helde up by 
the staffe of vulgar opinions, I would not you should love Vertue servillie, for 
feare of I know nor what, which you see not […] Be wise, and that wisedome 
shalbe a God unto thee; be contented, and that is thy heaven: for els to thinke that 
those powers (if there be any such) above, are moved either by the eloquence of 
our prayers, or in a chafe by the folly of our actions; caries asmuch reason as if 
flies should thinke, that men take great care which of them hums sweetest, and 
which of them flies nimblest.     (406-407) 
 
In resistance to Cecropia’s atheistical, absolutist, and anti-romantic pressures, 
Pamela and the other captive protagonists attain the height of their heroism, which begins 
to take on an increasingly Protestant cast while remaining grounded in pagan faithfulness 
to Love. Aflame with “virtuous anger,” Pamela breaks in at Cecropia’s disavowal of 
providential oversight, railing against her atheism in general, but particularly at her 
rejection of the divinely-ordained teleology that grants the lovers their sense of heroic 
identity and community: 
I will not here call all your senses to witness, which can heare, nor see nothing, 
which yeeldes not most evident evidence of the unspeakeablenesse of [God’s] 
Wisedome: each thing being directed to an ende, and an ende of preservation 
                                                
90 Cecropia’s denial that divine law sets the only standard for human behavior may bring to mind the desire 
of Milton’s Satan to establish his own independent foundation for evil and good (as well as for his own 
existence)—an connection that Davis has also observed (74.) Brumbaugh points out the origin of 
Cecropia’s name in the legendary Cecrops, first king of Athens, who claimed to be autochthonous rather 
than created by the gods, and notes that Cecrops was therefore used by Protestant contemporaries of Sidney 
as a symbol for the boastful pride of the False Church; Brumbaugh adds that “Like John Milton’s Sin and 
like Edmund Spenser’s Errour, one of whose many associations is with the Roman Church […] the 
classical King Cecrops’s lower body is shaped like a serpent” (“Cecropia and the Church of Antichrist,” 
24-25). Jeny also sees Cecropia’s temptation of Pamela here as evidence of her “Satanic” nature: “She is 
not only the enemy of the good characters, but also their tempter, and the nature of her temptation is not 
sexual, but intellectual; she tries to awaken pride, the original sin” (163).  
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[…] then must nothing, no not the estate of flies (which you with so unsaverie 
skorne did jest at) be unknowne unto him.     
(409-410, emphasis mine) 
 
While Pamela, unlike the other major lovers, never dwells upon the “end” of romantic 
love per se, she demonstrates here that she too has a powerful investment in a sacred 
teleological narrative that Cecropia refuses to share.91 Pamela concludes by turning 
Cecropia’s perversion of elect exceptionalism to its properly Calvinist end, proclaiming 
that her corrupt doctrine proves her reprobate status:  
since [God] is just to exercise his might, and mightie to performe his justice, 
assure thy selfe, most wicked woman (that hast so plaguily a corrupted minde, as 
thou canst not keepe thy sickenesse to thy selfe, but must most wickedly infect 
others) assure thy selfe, I say, (for what I say dependes of everlasting and 
unremooveable causes) that the time will come, when thou shalt see his 
wisedome in the manifesting thy ougly shamelesnesse, and shalt onely perceive 
him to have bene a Creator in thy destruction.    
(410) 
 
Pamela suggests that Cecropia, like the reprobate soul in Calvinist theology, is 
intrinsically incapable of genuine spiritual “illumination”; for her, “Gods glorie” will be 
manifest only through “the declaration of Gods iustice” in his power to punish the wicked 
with “death eternall.”92 Immediately thereafter, Sidney’s narrator, who generally manages 
his concern with romantic subjectivity by declining to insert his own moral judgments 
into the New Arcadia, steps in to concur: “But Cecropia, like a Batte (which though it 
have eyes to discerne that there is a Sunne, yet hath so evill eyes, that it cannot delight in 
the Sunne) found a trueth, but could not love it” and “went away repining, but not 
repenting” (411). No longer merely ignorant of moral truth, Cecropia comes to hate the 
                                                
91 Connell also links Pamela’s argument against atheism to Sidney’s ideal of providential poetry (143). 
92 See Perkins (Fig. 1). 
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truth that Pamela reveals to her, thereby exhibiting the reprobate’s “hardening of the 
heart” and confirming her unregenerate status in opposition to the elect heroine.93 
Even Pamela’s entirely passive resistance to Cecropia in the unified name of Love 
and godliness has the effect of exposing the tyrant’s truncated capacity for moral 
enlightenment. Spying on Pamela at prayer, Cecropia finds herself trapped between doing 
evil and embracing good:  
Lastly, all [Pamela’s] senses being rather tokens then instruments of her inwarde 
motions, altogether had so straunge a working power, that even the harde-harted 
wickednesse of Cecropia, if it founde not a love of that goodness, yet it felt an 
abashment at that goodness; & if she had not a kindly remorse, yet had she an 
yrksome accusation of her own naughtiness, so that she was put from the biases 
of her fore-intended lesson.94     
(383-384) 
 
As others have noted, the princesses in particular come to resemble the heroines of 
Protestant martyrology through such passive resistance, and by “conquering their 
[enemies’] doing with [their] suffering”: Philoclea demonstrates “sweet lowlinesse” in 
her constancy and quiet patience, while Pamela models “noble height” in her piety and 
righteous disdain (473, 469).95 Moreover, both sisters exemplify a potentially radical 
Protestant reliance on the freedom and integrity of the individual conscience in resistance 
                                                
93 Cecropia’s refusal to be moved by Pamela’s providential testimony echoes Sidney’s discussion of “the 
abominable tyrant Alexander Pheraus” in the Defense of Poesy, whose corrupt nature flees from the 
didacticism of true poetry: “he that was not ashamed to make matters for tragedies, yet could not resist the 
sweet violence of a tragedy. And if it wrought no further good in him, it was that he in despite of himself 
withdrew himself from harkening to that which might mollify his hardened heart” (Herman, ed., 90). 
94 Cecropia’s “abashment” and moral paralysis foreshadow the brief moment in Milton’s Paradise Lost in 
which Satan, observing Eve from a distance, is so struck by her beauty and innocence that he “abstracted 
stood / From his own evil, and for the time remaind / Stupidly good, of enmitie disarm’d” (IX.463-65). 
95 Davis argues that while the princesses embody classical virtues such as humility, the virtue that they 
“display most clearly in their trials” is not merely stoicism, but “one from which humility and many other 
purifying virtues flow: it is Christian patience, which works out of their belief in God’s providential order” 
(75); Lawry suggests that thanks to the sisters’ saintliness, “Heroic chivalry itself, which at fist appears to 
be essential to the New Arcadia, gradually gives way to an almost Miltonic ‘new heroism’ of patience” 
(155.) Hackett has also suggested in Women and Romance Fiction that Pamela and Philoclea embody 
Sidney’s ideal of Protestant patience. 
  
72 
to Cecropia’s tyranny. Cecropia is confident that her skill at political manipulation will 
allow her to corrupt Philoclea, “not doubting the easie conquest of an unexpert virgin, who 
had already with subtiltie and impudencie begun to undermine a monarchy” (376). 
However, the “unexpert virgin” refuses to marry a man who “useth [her] like a slave,” 
declaring “libertie” to be “more dear than life itself” (471, 368). As we have seen, Cecropia 
has no better luck with Pamela, who preaches “with so faire a majestie of unconquered 
virtue, that captivitie might seeme to have authoritie over tyrannie” (411). Pamela in 
particular insists upon the inviolability of the believer’s integral self, urging Cecropia, 
  doo what thou wilt, and canst upon me: for I know thy power is not unlimited.  
  Thou maist well wracke this sillie bodie, but me thou canst never overthrowe.  
  For my part, I will not doo thee the pleasure to desire death of thee: but assure  
  thy self, both my life and death, shall triumph with honour, laying shame upon  
  thy detestable tyranny.      (472-473) 
 
As the princes liberated nations from tyrants during their public chivalric adventures, the 
princesses together take a private stand for individual liberty as they encounter their own 
romance trials.96 And as with the heroes, the heroines’ elect condition—which suddenly 
seems less like a pagan parody of Calvinist doctrine and more like the real thing—
ensures their victory, arming them with the martyr’s conviction that “how soever they 
wrong me, they cannot over-master God” (382). Cecropia’s tyrannical attempts to “bring 
[their] minde[s] into servitude” are therefore doomed to fail: “if Philoclea with sweete 
and humble dealing did avoid their assaults, [Pamela] with the Majestie of Vertue did 
beate them of” (384). 
                                                
96 In English Prose Fiction, Salzman sees the princesses’ “passive, stoical heroism” as mere “resistance to 
Cecropia” and as evidence of the New Arcadia’s problematic relationship with active heroism (58). I would 
argue that Sidney treats this sort of religious and political resistance as one of the highest forms of heroism, 
and that he regards Pamela and Philoclea’s patient sufferance as a romance exploit equal to the princes’ 
active combat with tyrants. 
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 Yet even as Sidney’s heroines increasingly speak and act like Protestant martyrs 
against Cecropia and her reprobate regime, they never feel called to turn away from 
romance. On the contrary, the narrator asserts that “to all [their trials] Vertue, and Love 
resisted, strengthned one by the other, when each found it selfe over-vehemently 
assaulted” (470). Philoclea refuses to be impure, to be servile, and to be untrue to 
Pyrocles, while Pamela’s unconquerable mind “softned in her, when with open wings 
[her thoughts] flew to Musidorus […] Then would she fortifie her resolution, with 
bethinking the worste, taking the counsel of vertue, and comfort of love.” The sisters’ 
romantic subjectivity, and their related commitment to others that share it, make it 
difficult to separate their virtuous fidelity to their suitors, and to Love as a principle, from 
the sanctification of God’s elect. Blair Worden has found that in the Old Arcadia, love is 
a vehicle through which naturally free minds enter into “voluntary servitude” and 
surrender their self-possession, but in the New Arcadia’s Cecropia episode, romantic love 
becomes the means by which the protagonists refuse to surrender their sense of heroic 
identity and spiritual integrity to an absolutist infidel who demands their submission.97 
The tentative relationship that Sidney envisions between romance, the progressive 
narrative of the elect, and the impregnability of godly subjectivity against the tyranny of 
the reprobate is radically strengthened by Cecropia’s efforts to disrupt all three elements. 
 While Mopsa’s unregenerate form of anti-romance reads as parody, Cecropia’s 
reprobate form of anti-romance is associated with a genre of its own; despite her 
renunciation of romance, she too relates to her role in the New Arcadia through a literary 
                                                
97 Worden, 348. 
  
74 
hermeneutic. Rather than perceiving herself as a heroine within a romance ordained by a 
divine power, she imagines that she stands outside of a tragedy orchestrated by herself, 
despising any dependency on a preexisting narrative arc or a superior creator. As she 
commences her scheme to depose Basilius and corrupt his daughters, she boasts to her 
son Amphialus that “though many times Fortune failed me, yet did I never faile my self” 
and thus sets about authoring her own story in defiance of Fortune, the only other 
authority she ever acknowledges (365). Cecropia couches her threats in the language of 
tragic theater, warning the unyielding Philoclea “that now she was to come to the last 
parte of the play,” and she carries them out with a flair for dramatic spectacle (475). In 
her “Tragedie,” as the narrator terms it, “the curtaynes were withdrawen from before the 
windowes of Zelmane, and of Philoclea,” and Cecropia presents them with the illusion of 
Pamela’s execution on a raised stage on the castle hall, later to feign Philoclea’s 
beheading in a similar fashion (476). Of course, these illusions are all the substance of the 
“Tragedie” that Cecropia authors. She proves incapable of altering the predestined plot of 
the protagonists’ romance, which continues along its course despite her disruptions and 
disbelief, and when she meets her own demise by falling, “ere she were aware,” from her 
castle wall, her own spectacular tragedy is entirely out of her control (492).  
The end of her “play,” however, does not exorcise the tragic mode from the New 
Arcadia: Cecropia’s death is closely followed by Amphialus’ despair, his failed attempt 
at suicide, and the sudden midsentence termination of Sidney’s revision, with the heroes’ 
ends left unresolved. Katherine Duncan-Jones has suggested that the New Arcadia’s 
“account of the long and unproductive siege of Cecropia’s fortress, culminating in the 
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bungled suicide of Amphialus, is as dark a vision of stagnation and defeat as even the 
waterlogged Netherlands could offer,” and that Sidney may have believed that he himself 
was “in the final act of a tragedy,” soon to die at Zutphen without realizing his own 
heroic telos of a pan-European Protestant community. 98  Duncan-Jones may be 
succumbing to the temptation of reading through history’s rear-view mirror, but the 
entirety of the New Arcadia has been alert to the fact that the validity of romance depends 
upon “the end to which it is directed,” and that this “end” may “[end] not” in a timely or 
expected fashion (81). For Sidney, Spenser, and many seventeenth-century writers that 
followed them, tragedy is both the antithesis of romance and a constant presence that 
shadows it; the genre toward which the narrative tends is a subjective matter for those 
internal to the plot. Yet Sidney seems to have regarded this romantic subjectivity not, or 
not only, as a foolish fantasy. If the unregenerate or the reprobate were capable of 
narrative delusion, the community of the elect was capable of real narrative vision, and of 
resistance to the false coercive plots of the ungodly. The question of whether one had 
correctly identified one’s own spiritual and narrative status could be left only to faith, to 
the unfolding of history, and to remote eschatological time. 
 
II. “Submit thy wayes unto his will”: The Weight of Romance and the Gendering of 
Narrative Vision in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene 
 
 In Sidney’s New Arcadia, the specter of tragedy is often eclipsed by the protagonists’ 
ardent, even ecstatic conviction of their membership in an elect, protected fellowship. The 
subjective experience of romance is often far otherwise for the heroes of Spenser’s Faerie 
                                                
98 Duncan-Jones, 288. McCoy likewise performs a psychological and biographical reading of the New 
Arcadia’s “problems of closure” (26). 
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Queene, for whom the genre generally offers not validation by a like-minded community, but 
confusion and isolation within the sparsely-populated landscape of Faerie Land. Still, we find 
much more consensus among contemporary scholars that Spenser made a good-faith effort to 
reform romance for the English Protestant cause than we do concerning Sidney’s relationship 
with religion and genre. While numerous critics have discussed the elements of Protestant 
doctrine that ground the epic poem, however, studies of The Faerie Queene regularly suggest 
that Spenser’s project to reconcile romance to his religion ended in failure, or at best only in 
limited success. Such arguments tend to cite the ineradicability of evil in the text, or 
Spenser’s inability to draw the errant paths of his characters (and that of his entire massive 
text) to a final conclusion. Harry Berger detects “a faint echo of hopelessness” in the 
impossibility of redemption for the minor characters who persist in ignorant error, such as 
Grill at the conclusion of Book II;99 John King suggests that Redcrosse’s yielding to 
Duessa’s seduction “intensifies a sense of the moral failure of [erotic] romance” as a genre;100 
Andrew King terms The Faerie Queene a “[movement] away from romance” in that the 
genre and Spenser’s Protestant eschatology continually foil one another;101 and David Mikics 
argues that the many vicissitudes of Spenser’s plot “[get] out of hand in a way that 
adulterates and frustrates moral point,” and that romance plot, with its “easier delights,” 
“looks inadequate to the providential didactic meaning that Spenser attaches to it.”102  
                                                
99 Harry Berger, The Allegorical Temper: Vision and Reality in Book II of Spenser’s Faerie Queene (New 
Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1957), 240. 
100 John King, Spenser’s Poetry and the Reformation Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U P, 1990), 202. 
101 Andrew King, “Sidney and Spenser,” in Corinne Saunders, ed., A Companion to Romance: From 
Classical to Contemporary (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 140-159, 149. 
102 David Mikics, The Limits of Moralizing: Pathos and Subjectivity in Spenser and Milton (Lewisburg, 
PA: Bucknell U P, 1994), 60. 
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I hope to show that the persistent sense of melancholy in Books I and III of The 
Faerie Queene stems not from Spenser’s failure to reform romance into a compatibility 
with Protestantism that satisfied him, but rather from his success. Unlike Sidney, Spenser 
portrays the romance of the elect as a sobering weight rather than an erotic or communal 
pleasure. The heroes of Books I and III fall in love and engage in chivalric exploits, as 
those of the New Arcadia do, and their adventures are ostensibly in accordance with a 
providential plan rather than in opposition to it, but this uneasy accord between human 
and divine narrative produces a conscious burden that the protagonists must assume.103 
Spenser’s Protestant reformation of the genre offered seventeenth-century writers a 
model not of irresistible ravishment by the “[easy] delights” of romance, but of willing 
submission to its hardships. Further, Spenser left his successors two distinct archetypes of 
elect perspective on narrative, divided according to gender, which many later writers 
would feel compelled either to reiterate or to resist: while the Redcrosse Knight is 
brought to a mountaintop and shown a vision of the distant New Jerusalem before he 
resumes his quest, the heroism of the lady knight Britomart—despite her own chivalric 
prowess—is constituted chiefly through her potential for motherhood, and she is told an 
incomplete narrative of her offspring’s future by the prophet Merlin. The sections that 
follow consider the third and first books of The Faerie Queene in reverse narrative order, 
the better to reflect, first, Britomart’s position near the beginning of her heroic narrative 
when she hears Merlin’s prophecy versus Redcrosse’s position near the end of his when 
                                                
103 For a more thorough discussion of the complex relationship between human and providential narrative 
perspectives in The Faerie Queene, see Richard McCabe, The Pillars of Eternity: Time and Providence in 
the Faerie Queene (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1989). 
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he receives his sight of the New Jerusalem; and second, my proposition that her narrative 
vision as a woman is less complete than his. While these sections are divided by book 
and by the gender of their heroes, both share a focus on Spenser’s Protestant nationalist 
sense of the weight of romance.  
 
Britomart at the Root of Romance: The “Hard Begin” of Elect Heroism 
 
 Book III of The Faerie Queene begins the story of Britomart, the female knight of 
chastity, and of her quest to find her future husband, Artegall, the knight of justice. While 
entirely conventional to romance, the excruciating psychosomatic intensity of Britomart’s 
love for Artegall is also symptomatic of the pain that participation in the genre will cause 
Britomart both before and after their union. After seeing his image in a magic mirror, the 
virgin lover suddenly feels herself “Sad, solemne, sowre, and full of fancies fraile / […] 
yet wist she neither how, nor why” (III.ii.27); she later describes her anguish as an 
“ulcer” that “growth daily more and more” (III.ii.39). 104  Spenser’s treatment of 
Britomart’s surrender to love may recall Sidney’s in several respects. First, Britomart’s 
nurse Glauce reassures her that her love is blameless as long as it “fixed is / On one, that 
worthy may perhaps appeare” and is suited to her “race and royall seed” (III.ii.42, 33). 
Like Sidney, Spenser insists that those who are socially and spiritually refined should 
(and do) only love those who are likewise; deviation from the love of the elite for the 
elite, or the elect for the elect, is generally an indicator of “filthy lust, contrarie unto 
kind” and is thus distinguishable from true love (III.ii.40). Second, as in the New 
                                                
104 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr  (London: Penguin, 1987). All future 
citations will appear parenthetically. 
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Arcadia, the potential godliness of true love is further demonstrated not by its capacity to 
be controlled by the lover’s rational will—which, after all, is depraved—but by the 
irrepressible zeal of its devotion. Glauce sets three tests to determine whether her 
charge’s love is “true,” and determines that it cannot be exorcised by magic, subordinated 
by rational effort, or even removed by prayer: the narrator reminds us that “love, that is in 
gentle brest begonne, / No idle charmes so lightly may remove,” and that Britomart 
retains “no power / Nor guidance of her selfe,” since she and her desire are now vehicles 
for divine will (III.ii.51, 49). Finally, as Sidney’s Pyrocles avows, love must find an 
“end” in “enjoying,” “which end ends not.” Britomart sets out in quest of her future 
husband, and learns from the prophetic powers of Merlin that she and Artegall are 
destined to produce “Most famous fruits of matrimoniall bowre”: a line of the chosen 
heroes of Britain, which stretches beyond the horizon of the future (III.iii.3). Here, 
however, the similarities between Spenser’s erotic romance and Sidney’s run up against 
limits: while Sidney’s heroes find pleasure and solidarity in their love of Love and of one 
another, Britomart’s quest for Artegall both begins and ends in comparatively solitary 
sorrow. 
 Sidney and Spenser find Protestant applications for both love’s powerful origin 
and its telos, but while Sidney is particularly concerned with love’s psychological 
inception as a seriocomic pagan type of Calvinist grace, Spenser’s account of Britomart’s 
erotic awakening is particularly invested in its ultimate reproductive result. Britomart’s 
transgressive status as a lady knight on a quest for a husband is therefore inextricably 
linked with her normative role as a wife and mother. In Book III, the tradition of amorous 
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romance finds justification in its religious and nationalist purpose: God has ordained 
virtuous love and childbearing to sustain his historical narrative and to reveal the glory of 
its conclusion—particularly with regard to the newly Protestant English state as his elect 
nation. Spenser’s narrator describes Merlin’s prophecy as the teleological story of “My 
glorious soveraines goodly auncestrie,” and as the prophecy recounts Britain’s historical 
past, it also gestures toward both the reign of Elizabeth and—more problematically—to 
the chosen state’s eschatological future.  
 With his mind ever on love’s patriotic and providential purpose, Merlin urges 
Britomart not to be dismayed by the “hard begin” of erotic desire “that meets [her] in the 
dore” and affirms that her passion for Artegall is indeed predestined and commended by 
God (III.iii.21): 
It was not, Britomart, thy wandring eye, 
   Glauncing unwares in charmed looking glas, 
   But the streight course of heavenly destiny, 
   Led with eternall providence, that has 
   Guided thy glaunce, to bring his will to pas: 
   Ne is thy fate, ne is thy fortune ill, 
   To love the prowest knight, that ever was. 
   Therefore submit thy wayes unto his will, 
And do by all dew meanes thy destiny fulfill. 
    (III.iii.24) 
 
Merlin suggests that secular romance tropes like magically-imbued objects and love at 
first sight are of value insofar as they are instruments of “heavenly destiny” and “eternall 
providence” working out its will. According to Spenser’s reformed erotic tradition, 
Britomart’s quest for her beloved is grounded and justified not by her own desire, but by 
God’s: the romance heroine becomes an agent of sacred history, and is called to yield to 
the fulfillment of her providential purpose. Spenser’s integration of secular and sacred 
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romance occurs even at the level of his syntax: with his characteristic ambiguity, he notes 
that Britomart must “submit [her] wayes unto his will,” where “his” may refer to “eternall 
providence,” to the oft-personified power of love itself, or to Artegall, “the prowest 
knight, that ever was.” As a godly believer, a romance knight, and a chaste wife-to-be, 
Britomart owes her duty and devotion to all three.  
 The “hard begin” of Britomart’s love, Merlin tells her, ultimately forecasts both 
British and divine triumph, 
  For so must all things excellent begin, 
     And eke enrooted deepe must be that Tree, 
     Whose big embodied braunches shall not lin, 
     Till they to heavens hight forth stretched bee. 
     For from thy wombe a famous Progenie 
     Shall spring, out of the auncient Trojan blood, 
     Which shall revive the sleeping memorie 
     Of those same antique Peres, the heavens brood, 
  Which Greeke and Asian rivers stained with their blood. 
 
  Renowmed kings, and sacred Emperours, 
     Thy fruitfull Ofspring, shall from thee descend; 
     Brave Captaines, and most mighty warriours, 
     That shall their conquests through all lands extend, 
     And their decayed kingdoms shall amend: 
     The feeble Britons, broken with long warre, 
     They shall upreare, and mightily defend 
     Against their forrein foe, that comes from farre, 
  Till universall peace compound all civill jarre. 
      (III.iii.22-23) 
 
Merlin’s prophecy positions Britomart “deepe” at the root of the “Tree” of her 
“Progenie”; like the tree’s branches, Britomart’s heroic destiny is necessarily 
“embodied,” narratively and physically “big” with the long line of champions that will 
proceed “from [her] wombe.” Merlin promises temporal fame and historical victory to 
Britomart and her descendents—the “auncient Trojan blood,” born and beloved of the 
classical gods, will “revive” to conquer Europe, rescue the downtrodden Britons, and 
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institute a pax Britannica—but his nationalist prophecy is also suggestive of 
eschatological history and irenic apocalypse. Britomart’s progeny is “the heavens brood” 
in a Protestant sense as well as a pagan one; her maternal “Tree” of God’s elect heroes 
will grow “to heavens hight,” and their righteous victories over “their forrein foe” will 
one day “extend” God’s elect nation “through all lands,” resulting in “universall peace” 
and the end of history itself. The providential plan of sacred time is thus founded on 
Britomart’s private erotic destiny and her reproductive body, by divine predestination. 
The will of providence, however, is beginning to look suspiciously like straightforward 
English nationalism, and this patriotic glibness raises questions about what might happen 
if the human-led state should fail to submit to the guidance of God.  
 Indeed, Merlin’s revelation of Britomart’s providential role leads Glauce to 
question the role of human agency in Britomart’s nascent quest to find Artegall: “what 
needs her to toyle,” she demands, “sith fates can make / Way for themselves, their 
purpose to partake?” (III.iii.25).105 The prophet’s response attempts to effect a union 
between divine will and mortal action: “Indeed the fates are firme, / And may not 
shrinck, though all the world do shake: / Yet ought mens good endevours them confirme, 
/ And guide the heavenly causes to their constant terme” (III.iii.25). Providence must by 
                                                
105 Andrew King suggests that “Glauce’s question could be revised to assume the reader’s perspective: why 
bother reading this work, since the generic signals at the most basic representative level tell us that it is a 
romance, shaped toward moral victory and sustaining throughout a sense of providence? However […] that 
end never happens. Glauce’s question […] is simplistic because it fails to recognize how Spenser’s work 
struggles to attain the values and meaning of romance—how The Faerie Queene is, at its deepest level, in 
the process of becoming romance, and equally in danger of failing to become that world” (147-8). This link 
between Glauce and the reader here seems quite correct, but I differ with King on the subject of why 
Glauce’s question misses the point. It is impossible that God’s providence could fail, whether in the realm 
of The Faerie Queene or in Spenser’s devoutly Protestant world; Glauce’s question is “simplistic” not 
because it does not recognize the “danger” of the failure of romance, but because it equates the inevitable 
with the straightforward and easy. Paradoxically, failure is impossible, and yet the very nature of Spenser’s 
romance is that the attainment of the inevitable is almost prohibitively painful and difficult. 
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Calvinist definition be infallible, but the righteous “ought” to act in order to “confirme” it; 
their direction of “heavenly causes” to their destined end is a sign that they have been 
chosen for that very task. The purpose of heroic adventure in Spenser’s reformed romance, 
then, is not to create a new narrative, but to represent and enact one’s alignment with a 
preordained narrative and with the God that originally created it—more or less. Spenser 
does not always seem to hew to the most strictly deterministic form of Calvinism: Merlin 
later tells Britomart that her son will end his days in peace “if” he can achieve victory over 
his enemies, and the question of individual agency reopens, together with the potential for 
temporal failure (III.iii.30). While Spenser never undermines the power of providence, the 
necessity of human action to the divine romance remains a paradox. 
 Likewise, Merlin’s initial, neatly summarized revelation of the future is only the 
simplest version of the whole story of Britomart’s obligation and its outcome. As he 
elaborates on the progress of Elizabeth I’s “goodly auncestrie,” further implications of 
Britomart’s destined duty emerge. The newly-married heroine will journey from 
fairyland to Britain, her husband’s “native soyle,” to fight the “forrein Paynims” that 
have usurped the land, but both the chivalric and erotic components of her private 
romance have fixed limits: 
     Long time ye both in armes shall beare great sway, 
     Till thy wombes burden thee from them do call, 
     And his last fate him from thee take away,  
     Too rathe cut off by practice criminall 
  Of secret foes, that him shall make in mischiefe fall. 
 
  With thee yet shall he leave for memory 
     Of his late puissance, his Image dead, 
     That living him in all activity 
     To thee shall represent. 
      (III.iii.28-29) 
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Before Britomart has even begun her extraordinary adventure as a “mayd Martiall,” 
Merlin informs her that her martial heroism will be cut short by the all-too-ordinary 
pangs of motherhood and yielded to her son; before she has even met her beloved 
husband-to-be, she learns of his untimely and violent death. Although Mikics finds that 
“Britomart’s desire […] remains disjointed from any public moral purpose,”106 and 
Andrew Fichter has suggested that “Britomart’s concerns are personal rather than civic, 
and thus she substitutes a romance obsession for heroic obligation, an image of a lover 
for one of the city,” Merlin’s prophecy strips Britomart of the option to dwell solely 
within the realm of amorous or chivalric romance.107 For the sake of Artegall’s “Image 
dead,” their progeny’s future nation, and its sacred destiny, Britomart must begin her 
quest already aware of its privately unhappy ending and of the constraints on her martial 
glory. Notably, Spenser seems to regard Britomart’s predestined return to female norms 
as a godly requirement, but also as a sympathetic personal hardship for the heroine. A 
role in the Protestant romance demands sacrifice for providence and patriotism before it 
promises reward—even, and especially, for the narrative’s elect protagonists. After the 
knight’s stories of love and combat have ended, the larger romance continues, now 
spurred forward not just by action, but by submission.  
 As Merlin’s prophecy continues, it appears as a densely compressed romance in 
itself, with like action and submission required of each of its heroes as the centuries pass. 
The descendants of Britomart and Artegall experience so many trials, triumphs, and 
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defeats that their narrative progress often disappears beneath a veneer of historical 
contingency, and even tragedy. Britomart’s grandson Vortipore is destined to succeed his 
predecessors “In kingdome, but not in felicity,” losing what his father gained to “froward 
fortune”; his own son will then “Avenge his fathers losse” and reclaim victory from their 
enemies, but only until his descendants falter (III.iii.31): 
  Then shall Cadwallin dye, and then the raine 
     Of Britons eke with him attonce shall dye; 
     Ne shall the good Cadwallader with paine, 
     Or power, be hable it to remedy, 
     When the full time prefixt by destiny, 
     Shalbe expird of Britons regiment. 
      (III.iii.40) 
 
However, Merlin indicates that ill fortune is not a vicissitude of history, but yet another 
instrument of divine will: “For th’heavens have decreed, to displace / The Britons, for 
their sinnes dew punishment, / And to the Saxons over-give their government” (III.iii.41). 
Cadwallader too must submit his secular heroism to the sacred romance and refrain from 
going into battle to redeem his people, “by vision staid from his intent” (III.iii.41). Like 
the scriptural Hebrews, the Britons are doomed to lose the rewards of their success 
because of their forgetfulness of its source. 
 Spenser’s biblical typology and Merlin’s visionary power together produce a 
moment of temporal and generic confusion, with the prophet grieving for the romantic 
Britons’ tragic decline as though it has already occurred: “O who shall helpe me to 
lament, and mourne / The royall seed, the antique Trojan blood, Whose Empire lenger 
here, then ever any stood” (III.iii.42). Hearing Merlin foretell “woe, and woe, and 
everlasting woe” to her progeny, “Late King, now captive, late Lord, now forlorne, / The 
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worlds reproch, the cruell victors scorne,” Britomart is confounded by this apparently 
tragic conclusion to her romance and its weighty reproductive purpose (III.iii.42): 
  The Damzell was full deepe empassioned, 
     Both for his griefe, and for her peoples sake, 
     Whose future woes so plaine he fashioned, 
     And sighing sore, at length him thus bespake; 
     Ah but will heavens fury never slake, 
     Nor vengeaunce huge relent it selfe at last? 
     Will not long misery late mercy make, 
     But shall their name for ever be defast, 
  And quite from of the earth their memory be rast? 
      (III.iii.43) 
 
Merlin quickly cuts their mutual mourning short and assures her that despite appearances, 
her narrative is not a tragedy, and that the elect nation of her descendants will rise again:  
  Nay but the terme (said he) is limited, 
     That in this thraldome Britons shall abide, 
     And the just revolution measured, 
     That they as Straungers shalbe notifide. 
     For twise foure hundreth yeares shalbe supplide, 
     Ere they to former rule restor’d shalbee, 
     And their importune fates all satisfide: 
     Yet during this their most obscuritee, 
  Their beames shall oft breake forth, that men them faire may see. 
      (III.iii.44) 
 
The “expiration” of the Britons’ “full time” proves to be a false ending, a mistaking of 
romance for tragedy based on subjective perspective and temporal misjudgment. In 
further resemblance to the Israelites, the Britons await a predestined “revolution,” despite 
the long duration of their “thraldome.” In the meantime, the elect nation will continue to 
produce heroes who manifest the glory of God and of his chosen people. Finally, after 
eight hundred years, the “goodly auncestrie” of Elizabeth I is complete: “when the term is 
full accomplishid,” the Tudor family will arise like “a sparke of fire” from “where it 
lurked in exile” and regain the throne of England: “So shall the Briton bloud their crowne 
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againe reclame” (III.iii.48). Merlin’s vision of the Tudor dynasty, culminating in the 
glorious reign of Elizabeth, again conjures the imagery of irenic apocalypse: 
  Thenceforth eternall union shall be made 
     Betweene the nations different afore, 
     And sacred Peace shall lovingly perswade 
     The warlike minds, to learne her goodly lore, 
     And civile armes to exercise no more: 
     Then shall a royall virgin raine, which shall 
     Stretch her white rod over the Belgicke shore, 
     And the great Castle smite so sore with all, 
  That it shall make him shake, and shortly learne to fall. 
      (III.iii.49) 
 
For a moment, this providential triumph appears to conclude Merlin’s prophecy and the 
long, turbulent romance of Britomart and her descendants. The Tudors unite nations and 
establish concord, and Elizabeth allies with the Protestant Low Countries (“the Belgicke 
shore”) and overcomes the menace of Catholic Spain (“the great Castle”). Spenser’s own 
age, in which England has emerged as a newly Protestant and newly powerful nation, 
seems to be the natural telos of Britomart’s sacred narrative: all her sacrifices, and all the 
trials, victories, and defeats of her “royall seed,” have led to this moment. 
 “But yet the end is not,” pronounces Merlin suddenly, and these are his final words 
(III.iii.50). Immediately upon indicating that more of the story is left to be told, he falls 
silent, “As overcomen of the spirites powre, / Or other ghastly spectacle dismayd, / That 
secretly he saw, yet note discoure” (III.iii.50). Britomart and Glauce are unsettled and 
bewildered by his visionary trance, but at length it subsides, and the women depart to begin 
their adventure without inquiring further into Merlin’s silence. If he can indeed see more, 
Britomart’s auditory access to his vision has been cut off. One “ending” of her romance 
after another has proved to be an illusion, and the true end remains hidden. Of course, 
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Spenser is not Merlin, and cannot reveal the future of England beyond Elizabeth’s reign, 
but the gravity of the prophet’s silence imports more than simple lack of knowledge. 
Despite the final flourishing of the English nation and the Protestant religion after many 
centuries, history continues, and the divine romance is incomplete.108 Elizabeth, just 
recently celebrated in Merlin’s prophecy as “the hope of Protestantism,” now finds herself 
in the position of her imaginary ancestor, and of each of Britomart’s successors in turn: she 
must enact, and “submit [her] wayes” to, her own role in the narrative, whatever that might 
be.109 Glauce’s query again applies: must she do anything in particular to advance the 
sacred story? But Elizabeth’s failure to follow Britomart’s procreative example casts an 
ominous shadow over the unanswerable question: her refusal to relinquish her role as a 
“mayd Martiall” in favor of the motherhood that will sustain the chosen nation threatens to 
overlay romance with tragedy once more. Andrew King notes that “At issue here is an 
imaginative reception of Elizabeth that sees her unfitness to sustain a romance-epic 
narrative of ongoing perfection. She truly is […] a dead end for the quest,”110 while Sean 
Kane observes that “just when the moral ideal is pressed close to real circumstance it opens 
up a gap for reflection on the disparity between a nation’s political behavior and its dream 
                                                
108 A similar moment occurs in Book II, when Arthur, reading from a book of prophecy, is forced to break 
off before he learns his own future: 
  After him Uther, which Pendragon hight, 
     Succeeding There abruptly it did end, 
     Without full point, or other Cesure right, 
     As if the rest some wicked hand did rend, 
     Or th’Authour selfe could not at least attend 
     To finish it. 
        (II.x.68) 
Likewise, Guyon stops reading the history of Fairie Land once he reaches the reign of Gloriana, but the 
narrator reminds us that the book “Ne yet has ended: for it was a great / And ample volume” (II.x.70). 
109 See Richard Mallette, Spenser and the Discourses of Reformation England (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 
1997), 155. 
110 King, 148. 
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of a fair and lasting peace.”111 The divine plot jars with the personal and political actions 
that Elizabeth has already taken, and Spenser and his readers must contend with the 
knowledge that, so soon after England’s return to Protestantism, the path to providential 
triumph is once again as invisible as it is inevitable. Even now, at a triumphant peak in the 
action, the next steps for “heavens brood” are more obscure than ever.  
 Britomart thus embarks on her erotic quest having learned only that her personal 
trajectory is one of mixed joy, sorrow, sacrifice, and consolation; that her descendants’ 
destinies are equally variable; and that the ultimate end belongs to a providential 
authority that has set a hard limit to what she may know. Britomart lies “enrooted” deep 
beneath the “Tree” of her progeny’s future; she must be told about the “braunches” she 
cannot see, and the limbs that grow “to heavens hight” stretch beyond the reach even of 
prophetic human eyes. Merlin’s vague and imperfect promise about the glorious “end” of 
Britomart’s love affair does not suffuse her with ecstatic zeal, as it does for Sidney’s 
heroes, but with a sense of resignation. Likening herself to a “feeble bark [...] tossed 
long” on a “Huge sea of sorrow,” she can only pray for a break in the tempest, “The 
which may bring my ship, ere it be rent, / Unto the gladsome port of her intent” (III.iv.8, 
10). In the midst of her “privy grief,” she takes comfort not in anticipation of chivalric 
success or erotic fulfillment, but in an “intent” much further off, finding 
         good reliefe, 
     Through hope of those, which Merlin had her told 
     Should of her name and nation be chiefe, 
     And fetch their being from the sacred mould 
  Of her immortal wombe, to be in heaven enrold. 
      (III.iv.11) 
 
                                                
111 Sean Kane, Spenser’s Moral Allegory (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1989), 169. 
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Britomart may assume extraordinary freedoms in stealing away from her father’s castle 
and venturing into the romance landscape disguised as a man, but her story’s “hard 
begin” does not look much like an autonomous escape into the world of chivalric 
romance. Rather, Britomart is told that she must shoulder the maternal burdens of her 
gender and the narrative weight of the genre—a weight that Merlin and Spenser 
ultimately place on Elizabeth (despite the tragic threat behind her childless old age), and 
on all of her people who regard themselves as elect Britons with a duty to their nation and 
its religion. To be one of God’s chosen is to be assigned a hero’s role in the divine 
romance, but it is also to “submit [one’s] wayes” to an unutterably long narrative that 
does not end with the defeat of an enemy, the consummation of a marriage, or even the 
birth of an heir. These generic conventions may recur again and again, and they are 
always cause for celebration, “But yet the end is not.” 
 
Redcrosse on the Mountaintop: The End(s) of Romance 
 
 Near the conclusion of Book I, the knight of holiness is likewise granted prophetic 
perspective on the providential shape of his Protestant heroic narrative. His real vision, 
while more extensive and more revelatory than Britomart’s auditory promise, 
nevertheless proves similarly subject to the burdens and the tragic accompaniments of 
Spenser’s romance. Guided to the summit of a high mountain by the hermit 
Contemplation, the hitherto unnamed Redcrosse Knight first learns his true identity, as all 
unknown heroes of romance eventually must. Unsurprisingly, he is of royal blood (and 
therefore, as generic convention dictates, naturally inclined toward the heroism he has 
already demonstrated):   
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  For well I wote, thou springst from ancient race 
    Of Saxon kings, that haue with mightie hand 
    And many bloudie battailes fought in place 
    High reard their royall throne in Britane land, 
    And vanquisht them, vnable to withstand: 
    From thence a Faerie thee vnweeting reft, 
    There as thou slepst in tender swadling band, 
    And her base Elfin brood there for thee left. 
  Such men do Chaungelings call, so chaungd by Faeries theft. 
 
  Thence she thee brought into this Faerie lond, 
    And in an heaped furrow did thee hyde, 
    Where thee a Ploughman all vnweeting fond, 
    As he his toylesome teme that way did guyde, 
    And brought thee vp in ploughmans state to byde, 
    Whereof Georgos he thee gaue to name; 
    Till prickt with courage, and thy forces pryde, 
    To Faery court thou cam'st to seeke for fame, 
  And proue thy puissaunt armes, as seemes thee best became. 
      (I.x.65-66) 
 
Moreover, like Britomart’s destined spouse Artegall, he is “sprong out from English race, / 
How ever now accompted Elfins sonne” (I.x.60). In other words, he too belongs to the elect 
nation that, like him, has undergone purification to a state of holiness. (Notably, his ancestry is 
not Briton like Artegall’s, but Saxon; as in Merlin’s prophecy, historical enmities vanish in 
anticipation of Tudor peace and Protestant unity.) Stolen into Fairy Land, he is adopted by a 
ploughman (whom many scholars have linked to Langland’s Piers Plowman, another recipient 
of sacred revelation through a mountaintop vision) and given a name: Georgos, after the earth 
in which he lay. Now risen to a higher state, the “man of earth” is destined to be exalted as 
“thine owne nations frend / And Patrone: thou Saint George shalt called bee, / Saint George of 
mery England, the signe of victoree” (I.x.61). The story of Redcrosse’s mysterious identity, 
like that of Britomart and Artegall’s love, thus culminates in a sanctified nationalistic telos.112  
                                                
112 Donald Cheney remarks that “Spenser’s distinctions between Faery and Briton are infrequent” and so finds it 
“surprising to hear the hermit Contemplation speaking of ‘base Elfin brood’ (I.x.65), and to learn that Redcross 
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 Second, the narrative’s chivalric and patriotic end merges with its Calvinist one as 
Redcrosse’s elect condition is explicitly revealed to him.113 At the top of the mountain, 
Contemplation shows him, still “far off” from where they stand, “A litle path, that was 
both steepe and long, / Which to a goodly Citie led his view,” and identifies it as the 
eternal dwelling place of God’s elect (I.x.55): 
  Faire knight (quoth he) Hierusalem that is, 
     The new Hierusalem, that God has built 
     For those to dwell in, that are chosen his, 
     His chosen people purg’d from sinfull guilt, 
     With pretious bloud, which cruelly was spilt 
     On cursed tree, of that vnspotted lam, 
      That for the sinnes of all the world was kilt: 
     Now are they Saints all in that Citie sam, 
  More deare vnto their God, then younglings to their dam. 
      (I.x.57) 
 
When Redcrosse admires the distant Jerusalem as the most beautiful city he has ever seen 
(fairer than Gloriana’s city of Cleopolis, its worldly type, and by implication far 
surpassing Elizabeth’s kingdom), Contemplation promises him that he, too, is destined to 
dwell there.114 After the accomplishment of his earthly adventures, he is called to  
   seeke this path, that I to thee presage, 
     Which after all to heauen shall thee send; 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot complete his quest until he is revealed to be a Briton* subject to the Christian dispensation” (Spenser’s 
Image of Nature: Wild Man and Shepherd in “The Faerie Queene” [New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1966], 9-10.) 
The relationship between Gloriana’s theologically hybrid Fairy Land and Elizabeth’s Protestant England is 
indeed unstable, but in this instance, Redcrosse’s inborn English (*actually Saxon) identity is directly linked to 
his predestined, explicitly Calvinist election. However, his elite national status and elect spiritual condition ties 
him back once more to the romance world of Fairy Land, the narrative landscape against which even the English 
heroes must enact their providential roles before attaining the full glory of the “Christian dispensation.” 
113 Andrew King remarks on Spenser’s elision of elitism and election by noting that “What Calvin says 
about salvation could just as easily be said about knightly or kingly identity through birth: it ‘is freely 
offered to some while others are barred from access to it’ […] Just as one must be born a knight, so one 
must be born as one of God’s Elect to be saved; both systems emphasize an identity given or inherited from 
the ‘father,’ with God being the father in the second case” (151). 
114 While Mallette suggests that “Contemplation’s vision” and his praise of Cleopolis and Gloriana have 
“close affinities with apocalyptic discourse proclaiming international triumphs for Protestant England, 
presided over by its monarch,” the major thrust of the vision, as with the end of Merlin’s prophecy, makes 
Elizabeth and her realm a necessary yet insufficient component of Protestantism’s providential plot (46). 
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     Then peaceably thy painefull pilgrimage 
     To yonder same Hierusalem do bend, 
     Where is for thee ordaind a blessed end: 
     For thou emongst those Saints, whom thou doest see, 
     Shalt be a Saint [...] 
      (I.x.61) 
 
To Redcrosse’s fear that he cannot deserve this final reward—“Unworthy wretch (quoth 
he) of so great grace, / How dare I thinke such glory to attaine?”—Contemplation issues 
the reminder that desert plays no part in the Calvinist romance of salvation, in which the 
trials of all the elect point to the same end, regardless of merit: “These that have it 
attaind, were in like cace / (Quoth he) as wretched, and liv’d in like paine” (I.x.62). 
 Yet these two great revelations are accompanied by a third, one that reiterates the 
“paine” of the narrative instead of relieving it. Contemplation informs Redcrosse that his 
election to romantic heroism is ultimately a calling that transcends such heroism and 
requires him to abandon it. Like Britomart, he must follow the conventional patterns of 
romance narrative only insofar as their purpose accords with God’s, and as before, the 
divine romance outlasts the mortal one. Redcrosse’s “service” to the Fairy Queen is 
“worthy,” as is his “aide” of “a virgin desolate fordonne,” but even the highest chivalric 
acts have no merit in themselves, and the hero must be prepared to forsake them for the 
higher end that they represent (I.x.60):    
     But when thou famous victorie hast wonne, 
     And high emongst all knights hast hong thy shield, 
     Thenceforth the suit of earthly conquest shonne, 
     And wash thy hands from guilt of bloudy field: 
  For bloud can nought but sin, & wars but sorrowes yield. 
      (I.x.61) 
 
When Contemplation devalues (and even condemns) the material trappings of romance, 
Redcrosse experiences shock and dismay at the prospect of abandoning the outward 
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substance of his career or the hard-won fruits of his courtship: “But deeds of armes must I 
at last be faine, / And Ladies love to leave so dearely bought?” (I.x.62). Contemplation 
replies that romance’s external conventions are useless once the narrative has attained its 
ends—that is, both its purpose and its truly final conclusion. In Jerusalem, the symbolism 
of the genre’s martial and amorous tropes dissipates into the truths they signify, and the 
signs alone become meaningless: “What need of armes, where peace doth ay remaine, / 
(Said he) and battailes none are to be fought? / As for loose loves they’are vaine, and 
vanish into nought” (I.x.62). The love of ladies and the love of glory are no more than 
types of the love of God and of his will, as well as potential distractions from it; they may 
first be redeemed, but are finally supplanted, by their antitype. 
We might expect this commandment that Redcrosse give up his worldly heroism 
to be his final lesson from Contemplation, and even to constitute Spenser’s supposed 
acknowledgment that his poem must “move away from romance.” But Redcrosse’s 
sacrifice is not his last or his heaviest burden, and it is not Spenser’s ultimate position on 
his problematic genre. Upon hearing this latest revelation, the young knight who was so 
eager for the adventure of romance at The Faerie Queene’s beginning becomes just as 
zealous to set it aside. If the holiness of his adventures is indeed inferior to the holiness of 
their conclusion, the Knight of Holiness is suddenly desperate to have his story over 
already, and to dispense forever with the “deeds of armes” and “Ladies love” that he had 
clung to only a few lines earlier: 
  O let me not (quoth he) then turne againe 
     Backe to the world, whose joyes so fruitlesse are; 
     But let me here for aye in peace remaine, 
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     Or streight way on that last long voyage fare, 
     That nothing may my present hope empare. 
      (I.x.63) 
 
But Contemplation admonishes his latest display of over-hasty virtue with an authority 
that also echoes the indeterminacy of Merlin’s final pronouncement: “That may not be” 
(I.x.63).115 Redcrosse’s obligation to his role in the divine romance does not end simply 
because the hero has received a vision of its ending: “ne maist thou yit / Forgo that royall 
maides bequeathed care, / Who did her cause into thy hand commit, / Till from her cursed 
foe thou have her freely quit” (I.x.63). As a sign of his election (and of his masculine 
freedom from the burden of maternity), Redcrosse has been granted not just a prophecy, 
but a personal sight of the entire narrative from a sacred height, where a perfect 
interpretation of the story, and an unobscured perspective on its true purpose and its true 
ending, are visible to him. However, this extraordinary vision of the ends of romance 
takes place above and apart from the ongoing narrative below, and having seen it, 
Redcrosse must re-descend into his unfinished story. Regardless of his longing to 
dispense with romance, his “present hope” must again be “empare[d]” by doubt and by 
the threat of tragic turns within the still-progressing plot.  
Immediately after de-valuing worldly romance as an insubstantial veneer over its 
immutable, eternal telos, Contemplation re-values worldly romance as a form of 
                                                
115 Despite his elect condition, Redcrosse’s impatience to abandon his romance course may signify the 
“total depravity” that Calvinism ascribes to all humanity, even those predestined for redemption. Mikics 
suggests that “Red Crosse’s quick conversion to the ‘joyous rest and endlesse blis’ (1.10.52) that 
Contemplation offers bears a suspicious resemblance to his surrender to the ‘eternall rest / And happie 
ease’ held out by Despair in Canto 9 (st. 40). Red Crosse remains oriented toward passive security, ‘the 
man that would not live’ (1.10.27) in the face of both Contemplation and Despair” (59). 
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submission to that same end.116 Redcrosse’s greatest trial is to return to romance after he 
has seen its end and has ceased to desire it, enacting conventional human heroism for 
God’s glory rather than his own. The knight of holiness has a duty to perform his earthly 
heroic role—protecting Una, fighting the Dragon, restoring the usurped kingdom of 
Eden—because these actions symbolize his alignment with divine order and help bring it 
to pass. His allegorical defense of the True Church, combat with Satan, and restoration of 
Paradise to its human inhabitants all clearly reflect Christ’s progress, although Saint 
George of England is not Christ, but his elect imitator. Similarly, even Christ’s heroism 
on earth mirrors his final triumph at the end of time without removing the need for it, and 
vice versa. Despite their hierarchical relationship, neither worldly romance nor its 
eschatological counterpart precludes the other. Spenser’s answer to the question of 
whether human action is necessary to advance the divine narrative remains complex, but 
he insists upon the paradox that the same conventional plot that is “vaine” and “nought” 
for the elect in Jerusalem is essential for the elect still on the path to that heavenly end.117 
Put another way, Redcrosse’s mountaintop revelation of the ends of his genre endows 
him with the perception that he is a character in an allegorical romance, though its 
ultimate author is God, not Spenser. As such, he must reenter his narrative armed with an 
external understanding of its shape and outcome; he cannot cease to be a character until 
his story progresses to its final conclusion. Redcrosse assents to Contemplation’s order 
                                                
116 Andrew King observes that “Only when the hero has withdrawn an aspiration toward romance, as 
traditionally conceived in terms of knightly prowess and self-sufficiency, can the hero then begin to move 
toward a condition of moral stability that truly is romance in its deepest, Edenic sense” (150). 
117 As Kane points out, The Faerie Queene’s chivalric “frame of militant faith” is never “dismissed […] 
Thus the legend offers the believer no simple choice between conscious purpose and unconscious wisdom 
in the working out of a pious life [….] the contradictions of holiness can only be resolved in a timeless 
vision of the New Jerusalem, and a temporal view of the work to be done in defeating its accuser” (48-9.) 
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and pledges, with God’s “grace,” to “Abet that virgins cause disconsolate,” but he 
exhibits a new sense of dissatisfaction with his knightly adventures, eager “shortly” to 
“returne unto this place, / To walke this way in Pilgrims poore estate” (I.x.64).  
While Britomart is only told that she is chosen and must choose to believe it and 
to wait for her promised progeny, despite the tragedies she knows will befall them, 
Redcrosse has visual confirmation of his election and of the eschatological unreality of 
tragedy for God’s elect. Nevertheless, the hierarchical gap between the two heroes’ 
gendered perspective quickly begins to shrink (though not to close) once Redcrosse 
redescends into the lower landscape of romance. His new teleological vision is barely 
sustainable in tandem with his everyday sight: 
     This said, adowne he looked to the ground, 
     To have returnd, but dazed were his eyne, 
     Through passing brightnesse, which did quite confound 
     His feeble sence, and too exceeding shyne. 
  So darke are earthly things compard to things diuine. 
      (I.x.67) 
 
Dazzled by the heavenly ends he has glimpsed, Redcrosse must struggle to reacclimate 
himself to his earthly purpose.118 When at last “himselfe he gan to find,” he returns down 
                                                
118 Mikics rightly interprets Redcrosse’s impaired eyesight as a sign that “Though a future saint, [he] 
remains a ‘feeble,’ deficient mortal; he cannot properly comprehend a religious truth so incommensurable 
with his humble worldly status”; however, he argues further that “The double image suggested by these 
lines persists: the poetic world cannot reconcile the earthly and the heavenly, romance and its Christian 
message” (60). I propose instead that the paradoxical reconciliation of earthly and heavenly romance is 
precisely what Contemplation insists upon, and what Redcrosse must see in order to grasp, however briefly, 
the full extent of his purpose. The outward vision on the mountaintop cannot remain forever before 
Redcrosse’s eyes after his re-descent into earthly narrative, but his subsequent submission to that 
narrative’s demands suggests that some form of the teleological revelation persists to guide him from 
within. As Pauline Parker (another of the many commenters on The Faerie Queene’s negotiation between 
achievement and deferral) asserts, “faerie land is not only the outer world, itself destined to perish, which is 
the scene of human adventure; it also stands for the inner world which man, the microcosm, carries about in 
his own soul, and within which the exterior actions have their only permanent effect. In this inner world 
too, there can be no standing still, until the tree falls as it will lie” (The Allegory of the Faerie Queene 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960], 65). 
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the mountain “to Una, who him joyd to see, / And after litle rest, gan him desire, / Of her 
adventure mindfull for to bee” (I.x.68). Their romance renews, and Book I of The Faerie 
Queene approaches its climax in Redcrosse’s three-day-long battle with the Dragon. 
 The last two cantos of Book I continue to reiterate Compassion’s and Merlin’s 
prophetic warnings that temporal endings are illusions, both for better and for worse. 
Redcrosse’s combat with the Dragon appears to end twice, both times in grim defeat, 
before the knight triumphs on the third day. Overcome with joy, the restored king of 
Eden makes Redcrosse “heire apparaunt” of his kingdom and grants him Una’s hand: 
“Therefore since now to thee perteines the same, / By dew desert of noble chevalree, / 
Both daughter and eke kingdome, lo I yield to thee” (I.xii.20). After all, according to 
generic convention, a throne and a loving marriage reward the hero after his trials, and 
Una’s father assumes that these trials are indeed finally past: “But since now safe ye 
seised have the shore, / And well arrived are, (high God be blest) / Let us devize of ease 
and everlasting rest” (I.xii.17). But Redcrosse has seen “everlasting rest,” and knows that 
it is not to be found here. Even his worldly adventures are not yet over, as he still owes 
his allegiance to Gloriana before he can return to Eden and marry Una: 
  Ah dearest Lord, said then that doughty knight, 
     Of ease or rest I may not yet devize; 
     For by the faith, which I to armes have plight,  
     I bounden am streight after this emprize, 
     As that your daughter can ye well advize,  
     Backe to returne to that great Faerie Queene, 
     And her to serve six yeares in warlike wize,  
     Gainst that proud Paynim king, that works her teene: 
  Therefore I ought crave pardon, till I there have beene. 
      (I.xii.18) 
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In his allegorical defeat of Satan and liberation of Truth, Redcrosse appears to have 
accomplished the highest ends imaginable for Protestant heroism, but he must repeat 
similar symbolic acts again and again.  His “faith [...] to armes” and to virtuous ladies 
stands for his duty to God—until, finally, it does not, when the providential end of 
allegorical romance causes all mere symbols to “vanish into nought.” In the meantime, its 
chosen heroes encounter the usual trials and the usual triumphs; Spenser’s narrator 
informs us that Redcrosse’s betrothal to Una is celebrated with “The usuall joyes at 
knitting of loves band” (I.xii.40). “But yet the end is not”: 
     Yet swimming in that sea of blisfull joy,  
     He nought forgot, how he whilome had sworne,  
     In case he could that monstrous beast destroy, 
     Unto his Faerie Queene back to returne: 
  The which he shortly did, and Una left to mourne.119 
      (I.xii.41) 
 
Ultimately more like Britomart than unlike her, Redcrosse subordinates his desire to the 
chivalric advancement of his nation, and must subordinate both callings to divine will.120 
Over the course of his narrative, “The Patron of true Holinesse” discovers that true 
holiness is neither conventional romance heroism nor the ascetic abdication of the same. 
Rather, the elect hero is called to an ongoing, often painful submission to the ends of 
                                                
119 As John Watkins puts it, “Spenser both envisions and defers an imminent exaltation of time into 
eternity. The moment Redcrosse’s victory over the Dragon seems to usher in the church’s apocalyptic 
marriage to the Lamb, the marriage rites turn out to be just a betrothal” (“‘And yet the end was not’: 
Apocalyptic Deferral and Spenser’s Literary Afterlife,” in Patrick Cheney and Lauren Silberman, eds., 
Worldmaking Spenser: Explorations in the Early Modern Age [Louisville: U P of Kentucky, 2000], 157). 
120 Mikics argues that “romance energy, as the pure willful movement of plot, escapes providential closure 
when Red Crosse, at the end of Book 1, once again departs in search of chivalric excitement […] yet again 
the victim of the short attention span encouraged by a hyperactive questing mentality” (62). Yet 
Redcrosse’s departure from Eden and Una seems much more melancholy than “hyperactive,” and the 
choice to continue questing is not Redcrosse’s own will. Far from “escap[ing] providential closure,” he 
cannot escape from providential narrative prematurely. 
  
100 
romance: to the genre’s real and allegorical providential purpose, and to its ever-remote 
but ever-certain erasure. 
 The narrator of The Faerie Queene often addresses his audience as though he 
himself were another of his elect heroes, speaking at one remove from their story but with 
the same guiding sense of the conventional tropes and narrative patterns of romance. He 
too is laden with a sense of narrative duty—to his readers, to his own Queen Gloriana, 
and to the God whose providential will for Protestant England he hopes to illustrate.121 
Notably, his rhetorical postures align him more with Britomart than with Redcrosse: like 
her, he compares himself and his poem more than once to a “feeble bark” whose “wearie 
course” is beset by “stormie surges” as it struggles to avoid going “astray” (I.xii.1, 
VI.xii.1). At times, he expresses faith in the providential direction of his venture—even 
in the final completed book of his unfinished epic, the ship “Still winneth way, ne hath 
her compasse lost” (VI.xii.1)—but in the “unperfite” final canto of the Faerie Queene’s 
fragmentary continuation, he grieves for the tragedies of the temporal world and for his 
own lack of Redcrosse’s elevated vision. His contemplation of mutability, the narrator 
explains, has made him “loath this state of life so tickle […] // Whose flowering pride, so 
fading and so fickle, / Short Time shall soon cut down with his consuming sickle” 
(“Mutabilitie,” viii.1). This is conventional imagery not for a romance of Providence, but 
for the tragedy of Fortune: struggling to produce his impossibly long poem, disappointed 
by his disfavor with Elizabeth, and near the end of his life, Spenser (like Sidney) 
                                                
121 As John Arthos remarks, the poet and “[his] own uncertainties” are as much the subject of The Faerie 
Queene as the trajectories of the heroes; Spenser, “keeping himself ever before us, in the image of [...] the 
questing knight,” turns to romance in an effort to “lead his own thought and hope to eternity and 
satisfaction” (On The Poetry of Spenser and the Form of Romances [Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1970], 65-6). 
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represents tragedy as always encroaching on the borders of romance. His Protestant 
narrative, however, weighs this anxious concept against a re-vision of romance not just as 
a mode that is threatened by tragedy, but also as a mode that involves and subsumes 
tragedy. Negotiating between the experience of contingency and the faith that at the end 
of time “all shall rest eternally / With him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight,” the Faerie 
Queene’s last line prays for the vision granted to Redcrosse but withheld from the 
marginalized, implicitly feminized poet, who stands not on a prophetic peak but struggles 
somewhere within the branches of history: “O that great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that 
Sabaoths sight” (“Mutabilitie,” viii.2). Together, Spenser’s sense of Protestant romance’s 
weight—a generic burden eased to uneven extents by gendered perspectives on the 
narrative’s structure—and Sidney’s conception of Protestant romance’s insubstantial yet 
mighty subjectivity would stand as powerful models for seventeenth-century writers to 
adopt, and to adapt, as England’s civil conflicts plunged the nation into another tempest. 
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Chapter Two 
 
“Heroical” Histories:  
Writing Lives into National Romance, 1648-1670 
 
 
 We have seen how Sidney’s New Arcadia envisions romance as the source of a 
heroic subjectivity that mimics Calvinist believers’ conviction of election, and hence as a 
generic shibboleth that draws adherents together into an exclusive, potentially subversive 
community. In this chapter, we examine how this model informs four remarkable works 
of heroic historiography composed or consumed by royalists and republicans during and 
after the civil wars. Despite their ideological diversity, all these works share Sidney’s 
fascination with romance’s capacity to locate individuals and communities within a 
heroic providential narrative, to empower them to exclude and resist the unregenerate or 
the unenlightened, and to distinguish their own understanding of right romance from 
outsiders’ or opponents’ perversions of the genre. With this paradigm in mind, it should 
become no surprise that romance emerged as a battleground between royalists and 
republicans or Puritans in the years of the Civil War and beyond. During these 
tempestuous decades in which the balance of power, and control over the telling of the 
story of England, shifted from the royalists to the republicans and back again, both sides 
mocked or condemned their enemies’ manipulation of romance while openly or tacitly 
appropriating it in order to mark their community and leaders as the true heroes of the 
national narrative. 
 Through Spenser’s Faerie Queene, however, we have seen that nationalistic romance 
offered its subjects not only confidence and power, but also a frame that demanded, and 
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assigned meaning to, uncertainty and pain. The length and weight of the genre’s many trials 
may be eased by the gift of a prophetic perspective on the story’s promised end, but not all 
narrative visions are created equal: some heroes are permitted to see the full arc of the plot 
they inhabit, while others are merely required to believe in it. In the middle of the seventeenth 
century, due to the English romance’s long form and the problem of multiple conflicting 
subjectivities, we encounter many examples of writers struggling with the generic tension 
between providential romance and tragic or contingent human history. Notably, this generic 
tension is also at times gendered tension, arising from Spenser’s gendered archetypes of 
disparate romantic perspectives: men are normatively endowed with some form of narrative 
vision that is denied to their female counterparts, who remain grounded in the worldly 
concerns of their family’s legacy. The four historiographical texts in this chapter are likewise 
united by this awareness that romance is fraught with, and perhaps uniquely equipped to 
manage, problems of variable personal and historical perspective. 
We begin with two texts that deal directly with the complex midcentury reception of 
Sidney and Spenser as writers and political conscripts. First, the 1648 royalist pamphlet 
“The Faerie Leveller” extols Charles I as the living antitype of Spenser’s Knight of Justice, 
casting Spenser as a prophet who forecasted Cromwell’s unlikely defeat and reclaiming him 
from his Puritan devotees by insisting that readers loyal to the king have exclusive 
possession of the key to his providential allegory. Next, the 1652 first printing of Fulke 
Greville’s Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney wrestles with the discrepancy between 
Sidney’s romantic heroism and his tragic death while allowing its Interregnum audience to 
entertain subjective readings of Elizabeth’s courtier as either a nostalgic royalist or a godly 
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proto-republican visionary. A second pair of works, the royalist Margaret Cavendish’s and 
the republican Lucy Hutchinson’s biographies of their war-hero husbands, stand as 
ideological opposites but share a keen sense of the generic and gendered tension between 
the men’s lofty romantic vision and their wives’ rooted reliance on materiality and 
maternity. Both John Hutchinson and William Cavendish define their exceptional romantic 
heroism not just through their wartime chivalry, but also through their affective experiences 
of love for God and the King; meanwhile, the women who write their lives must struggle to 
ensure that the men’s heroic subjectivity does not utterly exclude their wives, as well as their 
enemies, from the glorious ends of their personal and national narratives. 
 
I.  Spenser as Royalist Prophet: The “Prince of Justice” and his Followers in 1648’s 
“The Faerie Leveller” 
 
In July of 1648, with the civil war going badly for the royalists, the royalist 
newsbook Mercurius Elencticus advertised the publication of an anonymous pamphlet. 
Titled “The Faerie Leveller: or, King Charles his Leveller descried and deciphered in 
Queen Elizabeths dayes,” the pamphlet purported to offer “a lively representation of our 
times” through a fragment of Book 5 of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene.122 In this 
                                                
122 This short, strange pamphlet has received very little critical commentary to date. It is briefly mentioned 
in Ray Heffner, et al., “Spenser Allusions in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Part II (1626-1700)” 
in Studies in Philology 69.5 (1972): 173-351, 223-4. John King offers a more comprehensive introduction 
to the text in “‘The Faerie Leveller’: A 1648 Royalist Reading of ‘The Faerie Queene’, V.ii.29-54” in 
Huntington Library Quarterly 48.3 (1985): 297-308. Clark Hulse reads it as a demonstration of “the 
circularity of any political claims” based on Spenserian allegory in “Spenser, Bacon, and the Myth of 
Power” in The Historical Renaissance: New Essays on Tudor and Stuart Literature and Culture, ed. 
Heather Dubrow and Richard Strier (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1988), 315-346, 341. For my own 
awareness of “The Faerie Leveller,” I am indebted to Marissa Nicosia, whose presentation at the 2012 
meeting of the Renaissance Society of America, “The Faerie Leveller: Spenser’s Prophetical, Historical, 
and Allegorical Import in 1648,” reads it as a royalist perspective on typology and the temporality of 
allegory. Both Nicosia and King speculate that the pamphlet’s author may be Samuel Sheppard (1624-
1655), who would later compose a Spenserian imitation, The Faerie King, while in prison. 
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excerpt, Artegall, the Knight of Justice, and his squire Talus humiliate and defeat a giant 
who has seduced many disciples by pledging that he will “suppresse” the rule of tyrants, 
“And Lordings curbe that Commons over-aw: / And all the wealth of rich-men to the 
poore will draw.”123 The pamphleteer proposes that Spenser’s epic romance foresaw the 
“subverters of well-settled States [...] lately risen up and now raigneing amongst us”: 
these Levellers “were discryed long agoe in Queene Elizabeths dayes, and then 
graphically described by the Prince of English Poets Edmund Spenser, whose verses then 
propheticall are now become historicall in our dayes” (3). Adding that Spenser’s Faerie 
Queene “is altogether Allegoricall, and needes a little explanation,” he offers his audience 
a “key of the work” that “[applies] all to these times”: Artegall, described as “Prince of 
justice” (rather than knight), is identified as Charles I, and “Talus his Executioner with 
his yron flayle” as “The Kings forces, or Gregory” the hangman of London (4). The 
“Gyant Leveller” is “Col. Oliver Cromwell, L. G. of the Sts. Army”; as both John King 
and Clark Hulse point out, the pamphleteer disregards the ideological disparity between 
Cromwell and the most radical reformers who fought under him, equating Cromwell’s 
aims with the Levellers’ mission to restore the realm “to equallity” (6). 
 King notes that “Spenser’s moralism and Protestant zeal made him a favorite of 
seventeenth-century Puritans,” but that his support for Elizabeth and his moderate social 
politics offered the royalists an opportunity to extol him as one of their own.124 “The 
Faerie Leveller” asserts their right to the romance of The Faerie Queene by assigning 
                                                
123 Anonymous, The Faerie Leveller: or, King Charles his Leveller descried and deciphered in Queene 
Elizabeths dayes. By her Poet Laureat Edmond Spenser, in his unparaleld Poeme, entituled, The Faerie 
Queene. A lively representation of our times (London, 1648), 7. All subsequent references to the pamphlet 
will be from this edition and will be cited parenthetically by page number. 
124 King, “A 1648 Royalist Reading,” 298. 
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Spenser a surprising new national identity not as a Puritan forerunner but as a royalist 
prophet. King Charles I, too, is reimagined as the hero of England’s historical romance: 
following in the footsteps of Spenser’s nationalistic knights, yet also at times straying 
from them, the Prince of Justice is endowed with a distinctive set of royalist heroic 
virtues and depicted as an exemplum of the “compleat Gentleman,” worthy of popular 
veneration and emulation (4). Moreover, the pamphleteer is concerned with undermining 
the Puritans’ claim not just to Spenser, but to other instruments of literary ideology. 
Anagrams, typology, and biblical exegesis, the tools of radical preachers and prophets, 
take on royalist meaning in “The Faerie Leveller”; conscience and individual judgment, 
the subversive bywords of religious and political reformers, are repositioned to side with 
the king; and providential romance itself, which for Spenser and his Puritan admirers 
(like Milton) promised eschatological triumph for the godly, is here a narrative form that 
foretells worldly victory over Cromwell for the embattled Charles. Notably, while the 
author settles on Spenser as his prophetic vehicle, the succinct propagandistic pamphlet 
disregards Spenser’s sense of national romance’s temporal length and emotional weight, 
predicting that the King’s increasingly unlikely victory would come easily and soon. 
Instead, the author’s approach to the genre owes much to Sidney’s model of exclusive 
community and opposition through subjectivity: using The Faerie Queene as its textual 
shibboleth, the pamphlet mocks the errors of the self-proclaimed “godly,” reconstitutes 
an enlightened community of royalist readers who exclusively possess the right “key” to 
Spenser’s romance, and calls upon those loyal to the heroic Charles to resist the rebels by 
hewing to their own interior conviction of godliness and providential favor. 
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The title page of “The Faerie Leveller” immediately signals that the pamphlet’s 
relationship to the Puritan opposition is simultaneously derisive and appropriative. A 
sardonically punning note indicates that the pamphlet was “Printed just levell anens the 
Saints Army: in the yeare of their Saintships ungodly Revelling for a godly Levelling. 
1648.” This mockery of “their Saintships’” false zealousness is accompanied by an 
anagram that endows wordplay with cosmic significance, as Puritan preachers and Fifth 
Monarchist prophets were wont to do, and the pamphleteer thus inaugurates his semi-
parodic reinvention of his enemies’ literary tactics: “Parliaments Army” is rearranged on 
the next line to become “Paritie mar’s al men.”125 While careful inspection reveals that 
the anagram is inexact, the pamphlet’s first foray into providential wordplay appears both 
witty and apt. Another anagram, however, is conspicuously less felicitous: after 
identifying the “Gyant Leveller” as “Col. Oliver Cromwell, L. G. of the Sts. Army,” the 
pamphleteer notes the portentous sign that “the Letters of [Cromwell’s] name fall into 
this Anagram. / Oliver Cromewell. Com’ our vil’ Leveller” (4). This second attempt 
stretches and strains the arrangement of the letters to the point of absurdity: even with an 
extra “e” inserted into the middle of Cromwell’s name, there are clearly too few vowels 
to make up the sinister invocation that follows; “w,” “v” and “u” must all be treated as 
interchangeable; and amidst all the obvious clumsiness, a less noticeable additional “l” 
slips in. “Com’ our vil’ Leveller” therefore looks less like a genuine attempt at providential 
anagrammatics and more like an intentionally risible imitation of “their Saintships’” 
                                                
125 Harrison Meserole explains that the seventeenth-century spate of Puritan anagrammatics “had as its basis 
the Puritan belief that nothing in this world, including nomenclature, was haphazard. God had […] intended 
that a person’s name, if carefully examined, could reveal aspects of his character. To a people constantly 
engaged in self-examination, all latent indications of God’s attitude […] assumed high importance” (American 
Poetry of the Seventeenth Century [University Park: Pennsylvania State U P, 1985], xxx). 
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predilection for (sometimes strained) verbal and numerical mysticism, a parodic exposure 
of their arrogant presumption of elect access to divine code. 
Yet the pamphlet’s stylistic imitations are more than straightforwardly parodic. 
For instance, its repeated invocations of scripture echo the Puritans’ zeal, but they also 
reclaim scriptural piety for the royalist cause. The pamphleteer introduces biblical 
typology to “The Faerie Leveller” when he exhorts the reader to accept Spenser’s 
“resplendent Jewell” and to “slight it not, because it is not the publishers owne invention” 
(3). He compares his scavenged text to a marvel of natural recycling found in the book of 
Judges: “here is meat out of the Eater, sweet hony to be found in the carkasse of a slaine 
Lyon; do thou but with Jonathan taste of it, and thou shalt have thy sight cleared in some 
remarkable matters, which before thou didst not discerne, or observe” (3).126 “The Faerie 
Leveller” brings new life and fresh significance to an old poem while promising both 
literary and religious enlightenment to its readers.127 The villainous Cromwell’s fate is 
likewise both typologically fixed by the word of God and poetically anticipated by the 
verse of Thomas Sternhold, a sixteenth-century courtier favored by Henry VIII: 
So I dismisse him with that of the Traytor Judas, Act I. 25. who by transgression 
fell, that he might go to his owne place. And his complices with Thomas 
Sternehold, version of the 10 v. of the 3. Psalme. 
Destroy their false conspiracies, that they may come to naught: 
Subvert them in their heapes of sinne, that have rebellion wrought. 
      (4) 
 
                                                
126 The Jonathan cited by the pamphleteer is probably the Levite priest of Judges 18:30, who went on to 
become the priest of Samson’s Danite tribe. The reference to this rather obscure figure may be meant both 
to reinforce the author’s credibility as a student of scripture and to suggest that the proper “priestly” 
authority can guide the audience through Spenser’s riddling romance. (I am grateful to Christopher Martin 
for this identification and suggestion.) 
127 Nicosia has pointed out that the typology employed throughout “The Faerie Leveller” is not only 
biblical, but also literary and semi-secular: Spenser’s fictional Artegall becomes a prophetic type of Charles 
I, who (in theory) subsequently fulfills the Legend of Justice in real historical time. 
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Predictions of divine vengeance, the author demonstrates, are not only the province of anti-
royalists; the community of those loyal to the king is entitled to its own biblical and poetic 
hermeneutics. Moreover, his display of exegetical ability helps mark him as an enlightened 
follower of the similarly authoritative Prince of Justice, as we will see.  
 “The Faerie Leveller” moves on from its appropriation of scripture and of 
providential wordplay to its reinvention of The Faerie Queene itself—which, like the 
introductory anagrams, requires some manipulation of the source material in order to 
bolster its claim to royalist exclusivity. The pamphleteer claims that he has taken this 
prophetical fragment about the Prince of Justice and the Faerie Leveller from the “first 
Booke” of Spenser’s epic romance, which “containes the Legend of Justice, the most 
universall vertue” (4). Of course, Justice is the subject of the fifth book, and Spenser never 
indicates that this virtue has any primacy above others. But the undoubtedly conscious 
fudging of the books’ order, and the citation of justice as the “most universall” heroic 
attribute, lend the episode of Artegall and the Giant a prominence that it does not have in 
the original poem. Further, these emendations avoid any mention of the virtue of 
holiness—a paramount concern for Spenser as a Protestant poet in Elizabethan England, 
but a considerably more controversial value amidst the religious strife of the 1640s—and 
bypass Book 1’s many Calvinist overtones. The pamphleteer’s changes even undertake to 
reshape the romantic identity of the King: the young Charles I liked to represent himself as 
Saint George, as in Rubens’ portrait of his union with Henrietta Maria over the corpse of 
  
110 
the slain dragon, but against the backdrop of 1648, he becomes a different knight, 
associated less with martial (and marital) zeal and more with order and diplomacy.128  
“The Faerie Leveller” is at least as anxious to reimagine Charles as the hero of 
England’s national romance as it is to vilify the titular Cromwell or prophesy an unlikely 
outcome for the war. Again, the pamphleteer takes liberties with his presentation of the 
original text to his readers in order to perfect the literary typology through which Artegall 
merges with Charles to become the charismatic head of the “real” godly community. He 
both incorporates the story that precedes the encounter with the Giant in Book 5, Canto 
2—in which Artegall and Talus defeat the oppressive tax-collector Pollente and his 
daugher Munera, a figure for corruption and bribery—and leaves its full text out of his 
excerpt, attempting to extract heroic value from the original episode while jettisoning the 
troubling specifics that might be less suitable for Charles as Prince of Justice. Pollente 
and Munera are both listed in the “key of the work” that precedes the excerpt: he, “an 
oppressing Saracen,” is meant to symbolize “The prevalent over awing Faction in the two 
houses,” while she, “his assistant,” represents “The intolerable Tax-raisers, the Countrey 
Committees Sequestrators and Excize-men” who “must first be apprehended and brought 
to justice, ere [Cromwell’s] army be quelled” (4).129 The episode that contains them, 
                                                
128 It is worth noting that this reassignment of a heroic identity for Charles is consistent with Spenser’s 
original method, in which a number of different characters all serve as figures for Elizabeth: “In [Gloriana] 
I meane glory in my generall intention, but in my particular I conceive the most excellent and glorious 
person of our soveraine the Queene [...] And yet in some places els, I doe otherwise shadow her” (16). For 
an extended study of portrayals of Charles I in the visual and verbal arts, see Thomas Corns (ed.), The 
Royal Image: Representations of Charles I. For example, Ann Baynes Coiro notes in her contribution to the 
volume, “A Ball of Strife’: Caroline Poetry and Royal Marriage,” that Charles constantly wore the red 
cross of St. George with a portrait of his wife on the reverse, regarding it “in part, as an emblem of his 
romantic marriage” (43). 
129 Hulse points out that “At the same time that it paints the antiroyalist forces all with one brush, the 
pamphlet seeks to divide them. Of the various ad hoc administrative arrangements made by the Long 
  
111 
however, is distilled first into a short summary—“Arthegall the Champion of Justice, 
with the assistance of Talus his Groome betokening execution of Law, having overcome 
all illegall arbitrary oppressive power; under the person of Pollente, a barbarous Saracen, 
strengthened by his Daughter Munera importing bribes and taxes: He proceeds to 
suppresse the Gyant Ring leader to the faction of Levellers” (4)—and then into a new 
quatrain, composed by the pamphleteer, which gives the impression that the episode with 
the Giant begins a new canto: “Arthegall with his Groome Talus / having Pollente quel’d: 
/ And drown’d his Daughter Munera, / they on their journey wel’d” (5).  
This double act of inclusion and omission serves two ends. First, it allows for the 
tidy introduction of Artegall/Charles as an equitable peacemaker who subdues faction 
and forbids fiscal oppression, despite the fact that the pamphlet’s prophetic interpretation 
of the allegory is imperfect: in Spenser’s text, Pollente is the tax-raiser, while Munera 
stands for corruption within government, an evil less clearly restricted to Parliamentarian 
rule.130 Second, it imagines a heroic adventure for the Prince of Justice from which he 
emerges morally untarnished as a leader. Spenser, whose melancholy approach to 
romance distinguishes him from the pamphleteer claiming him, often questions his 
heroes’ successful embodiment of their respective virtues, as he does with Artegall in 5.2. 
The knight first shrinks from his mission out of “pitty” for the elegant Munera’s “goodly 
hew,” but then permits Talus to exact a brutal and merciless punishment (5.2.25): 
                                                                                                                                            
Parliament during the First Civil War, none was more controversial than the County Committees, the 
groups of local gentry responsible for the raising and maintenance of militia [....] Equally inflammartory 
was the proposal in the summer of 1647 for the confiscation and sale of the property of delinquents in order 
to pay for the army [....] Aware of his enemy’s internal divisions, the pamphleteer has aimed his fable at the 
exact points most likely to provoke dissension and conflict” (340). 
130 As Hulse argues, the political dimension of Spenserian allegory is often aggressively unstable; a royalist 
propagandist may employ it easily enough, but is likely to encounter problems of his own. 
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Yet for no pitty would he change the course 
   of Justice, which in Talus hand did lye; 
   Who rudely hayld her forth without remorse, 
   Still holding up her suppliant hands on hye, 
   And kneeling at his feet submissively. 
   But he her suppliant hands, those hands of gold, 
   And eke her feete, those feete of silver trye, 
   Which sought unrighteousnesse, and justice sold, 
Chopt off, and nayld on high, that all might them behold. 
    (5.2.26) 
 
Having mutilated the “suppliant” woman, Talus throws her, still “In vaine loud crying,” 
from her wall and drowns her in the river below; he then proceeds to raze her castle and 
destroy her wealth, “The spoile of peoples evill gotten good,” rather than restoring it to 
the oppressed population (5.2.27). Spenser’s original poem, then, highlights Artegall’s 
tendencies toward both misguided compassion and extreme retribution in the form of the 
implacable Talus, who regularly handles the ugliest elements of his master’s vocation. 
The pamphleteer’s decision to include the episode only as a vague summary thus permits 
Artegall/Charles to appear against the “Gyant Leveller” unsullied by the disturbing 
residue of his successful conquest of institutionalized oppression.    
As their encounter unfolds, the pamphleteer continues to engineer a specific set of 
heroic attributes for the Prince of Justice that represent him as a community leader 
preferable to the Giant. The Artegall of “The Faerie Leveller” must be sincerely devout, 
fair, and compassionate in order to expose and overcome his Cromwellian foe’s false 
pretense to these virtues. Both the original poem and the 1648 excerpt juxtapose the 
Giant’s impious reading of scripture with Artegall’s superior exegesis. While the Giant 
interprets Isaiah 40:4 to license his project of sociopolitical upheaval—“Therefore will I 
throw downe those mountaines high, / And make them levell with the lowly plaine” (7)—
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Artegall presents a corrective reading of the same passage as a testimony only to the 
power of God as divine monarch: 
   All in the power of their great maker lye:  
All Creatures must obey the voice of the most high [....] 
 
       The hills do not the lowly Dales disdaine. 
       The Dales do not the lofty hills envy. 
       He maketh Kings to sit in Soveraignty. 
   He maketh Subjects to their power obey. 
     (8) 
 
This contrast between the Leveller’s radical, self-serving exegesis and the hero’s 
conservative emendation recalls the pamphleteer’s efforts to undermine the biblical and 
rhetorical methods of the “Saints” in his introductory material: the pamphleteer casts 
himself as a faithful imitator of the Prince, and the Puritans’ usual tools change shape to 
support royalist values. None may “shunne” God’s “Soveraigne power,” Artegall warns, 
least of all the Leveller who acknowledges no supremacy but his own and only pretends 
to piety and spiritual enlightenment: “In vaine therefore dost thou now take in hand, / To 
call to count, or waigh his workes anew, / Whose counsells depth thou canst not 
understand” (8).131 Charles as Prince of Justice thus lays claim to both truer devotion and 
a better grasp on scripture than the hypocritical rebels who oppose him; the earthly Prince 
speaks best for the King of Heaven. 
Finally, “The Faerie Leveller” takes advantage of a rather weak moment for 
Spenser’s Artegall in order to shape its readers’ final impression of Charles’ heroic 
persona. Once Talus has slain the Giant, the peasants rise up in anger against Artegall: 
                                                
131 Hulse notes that since Artegall and the Giant share a drive toward justice, Artegall is “Unable to dispute 
his logic” and “must instead challenge [his] ability to make empirical observations at all, and hence his 
right to construct from them historical schemata and abstract principles [....] The inadequacy of empiricism 
is redressed by an appeal to first principles, and only then can the empirical data be understood” (339). 
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Which Lawlesse multitude him comming to 
   In warlike wise, when Arthegall did view, 
   He much was troubled, ne wist what to doe, 
   For loath he was his noble hands t’embrew, 
   In the base blood of such a Rascall crew, 
   And otherwise if that he should retire, 
   He fear’d lest they with shame would him pursue: 
   Therefore he Talus to them sent t’enquire 
The cause of their array, and truce for to desire. 
    (11) 
 
In The Faerie Queene, this stanza further reveals the potential deficiencies in Artegall’s 
character: faced with exercising justice upon offenders weaker than himself, he is 
stymied, and as usual, he sends Talus to protect his reputation and to handle the difficult 
work. The pamphleteer, rather than eliding this problem as he does with the similarly 
uncomfortable episode with Munera, allows its significance to shift, transforming the 
Caroline Artegall into a significantly different heroic character than Spenser’s original 
Knight of Justice. As a “Prince” and not a knight, the Artegall of “The Faerie Leveller” 
need not contend with the demands of a martial code. His “troubled” mind suggests love 
for his misguided subjects, rather than anxiety over an unexpected conflict; his concern 
with keeping his “noble hands” clean from “the base blood of such a Rascall crew” 
comes across as regal remoteness instead of snobbery or diffidence; and his delegation of 
Talus to preserve order, prevent “shame,” and seek a “truce” looks more like peaceful, 
pragmatic diplomacy than a shirking of duty. By the time the “Raskall Rout” has fled 
from Talus’ wrath, another vexed occasion for Spenser’s Artegall has become an 
ennobling, kingly one for Charles’ neo-Spenserian persona (11). The monarch as a 
romantic hero emerges as pious instead of sanctimonious, decorously proud rather than 
arrogant, and just and courageous yet equitable, merciful, and benevolent. The assistance 
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of Talus, far from calling his heroism into question, refines and shapes it: with necessary 
violence securely in the hands of the allegorical army or hangman, he is free to be well-
spoken, courtly, and wisely paternal, not warlike, rash, or punitive. 
 Having both parodied and repossessed Puritan tactics, and having turned 
Artegall’s heroism and fallibility alike to Charles’ advantage, “The Faerie Leveller” 
employs its most critical strategy to move readers to unite behind the royalist cause and 
its champion: it makes Spenser’s romance an invitation to join an exclusive enlightened 
community. Perhaps in light of his anagrammatic maxim that “Paritie mar’s al men,” the 
pamphleteer makes no secret of the disparity between himself and the intended audience 
of “The Faerie Leveller.” He has “revised, and newly published” Spenser’s prophetic 
poetry, he claims in his preface, “for the undeceiving of simple people, too apt to be 
induced into an high conceipt and overweening opinion of such Deceivers, and too ready 
to be seduced by their specious pretences of reducing all to a just equality” (3). Assuming 
that his “simple” audience is unfamiliar with The Faerie Queene, he explains that 
Spenser’s original “drift and intention” in his allegorical romance “is to set forth a 
compleat Gentleman, accomplisht with all vertues adorning a truly noble Person” (4).132 
King suggests that the pamphleteer attempts to influence common readers by “tak[ing] 
Spenser’s purpose [...] as an argument in favor of royalty and the gentry.”133  However, 
despite his favorability toward traditional social hierarchy, the author of “The Faerie 
Leveller” does more than merely reinforce it: he subtly offers his readers the opportunity 
                                                
132 King reminds us that while Spenser remained popular in certain reading circles, The Faerie Queene had 
not been reprinted since 1617, and would not be again until 1679 (“A 1648 Royalist Reading,” 298). 
133 Ibid., 301. 
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to elevate their own status above that of “simple people.” While the preface adopts a 
condescending tone, the poem itself adjusts the pamphlet’s approach, as we read that the 
levelling Giant is “admired much of Fooles, Women, and Boyes” and that “the vulgar did 
about him flocke, / And cluster thick unto his leafings vaine: / (Like foolish Flies about a 
hony crocke) / In hope by him great benefit to gaine” (5, 6). Although the readers are 
assumed at first to be “simple” themselves, as they read on they are tacitly encouraged 
not to count themselves among these gullible, emasculated masses, and to follow the 
“sweet hony” of Spenser’s prophetic wisdom in its resistance to the Leveller’s duplicitous 
“crocke.” In so doing, they are urged to read—and thus to behave—as “Gentle[men]” or 
“noble Person[s]” who can distinguish and therefore imitate true heroic virtue, as the 
pamphleteer has already done in his exegetical exercise. Modifying Sidney’s vision of an 
elect subjectivity that enables members of a heroic fellowship to discern between right 
romance and misappropriations of the genre, the pamphleteer implies a semi-secular 
opportunity for his audience’s elevation in their possession of the “key” to Spenser’s text. 
Siding with and imitating the Prince of Justice can make even a poor subject more 
princely; while his economic status may be fixed, he may influence his cultural status 
within an exclusive group of enlightened royalist readers. Through Spenser’s narrative, 
“The Faerie Leveller” reorients Sidney’s notion that certain lovers of romance may locate 
themselves within an elect Calvinist community: the recognition and appreciation of 
Spenser’s prophecy becomes a marker of membership within an elite royalist community. 
 While the pamphleteer’s preface indicates that “a little explanation” is necessary 
to grasp the spiritual and moral import of The Faerie Queene, by the time “The Faerie 
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Leveller” concludes, it has offered its audience a portion of the richest legacy of Sidneian 
romance: the subjectivity to judge correctly between the Giant’s heroism and Artegall’s. 
Artegall acknowledges that the truth of the matter may not be externally apparent, and he 
champions enlightened discernment rather than blind obedience: “But in the minde the 
doome of right must be, / And so likewise of words the which be spoken, / The Eare must 
be the Ballance to decree, / And judge whether with truth or falsehood they agree” (10). 
The reader’s preference for either the Giant or Artegall, and thence his choice of a 
political and cultural side in the Civil War, must ultimately be a matter for the private 
mind. As in the New Arcadia, this final royalist appeal to radical Protestant ideals—the 
superior subjectivity of the elect, and the supremacy of the individual conscience—
abounds with both power and risk. Sidney suggests that those who identify as elect can 
locate themselves within the real-life romance of providence, and the pamphleteer 
comparably assumes that all “noble” minds will naturally be drawn to the king’s cause 
and to faith in its success. However, individual subjectivity remains troublesome, as 
Sidney had been aware: one may mistake one’s own status and so develop a perverted 
sense of heroism, and one may side just as easily with the Giant and his disciples as with 
Artegall and Talus. Milton’s Eikonoklastes, published the following year (after Spenser’s 
supposed prophecy of royalist triumph had collapsed), reveals the other side of the tenet 
that every subject’s mind is his own and demonstrates that Spenser’s romance was 
exclusive to no faction: “If there were a man of iron, such as Talus, by our Poet Spencer, 
is fain’d to be the page of Justice, who with his iron flaile could” reform Parliament and 
purge it of corrupt members, “and expeditiously, without those deceitfull formes and 
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circumstances of Law, worse than ceremonies in Religion; I say God send it don, whether 
by one Talus, or by a thousand.”134 According to the judgment of Milton and others like 
him, even Talus and the Giant’s mass of followers might join forces, with overwhelming 
results. 
 
II. Sidney as Republican Saint: Reading Fulke Greville’s Life of the Renowned Sir 
Philip Sidney in 1652  
 
 While The Faerie Leveller stands as a striking royalist appropriation of a 
sixteenth-century romance writer who is more often associated with Milton’s Puritan 
poetics, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke’s Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney reminds us 
that Sidney, whose courtly style of chivalric and pastoral prose was imitated by many 
seventeenth-century royalists, was at least as slippery as Spenser. Romantic subjectivity 
proved to be just as crucial to seventeenth-century curators of his heroic memory as it had 
been to the fictional heroes of his New Arcadia. The few readers who still attempt 
Greville’s Life of Sidney regularly remark on the text’s generic difficulty and its singular 
approach to life writing.135 This strangeness likely derives from the fact that Greville 
originally wrote the Life between 1610 and 1614 not as a biography but as the dedication 
of a volume of tragedies to his late friend. The book is not a chronological memoir so 
much as a loosely ordered chronicle of Sidney’s most important adventures and a treatise 
                                                
134 Merritt Hughes, ed., The Complete Prose Works of John Milton: Volume III, 1648-1649 (New Haven: 
Yale U P, 1962), 390. Unless otherwise noted, all other references to Milton’s prose is from this edition 
(abbreviated CPW or cited parenthetically by line number). Given that allusions to Book 5 of The Faerie 
Queene are extremely rare throughout the seventeenth century, Milton’s striking reference to Talus a year 
after the publication of “The Faerie Leveller” may perhaps suggest that he was aware of the pamphlet. 
135 Such scholars include Charles Larson (Fulke Greville, [Boston: Twayne, 1980]), Warren Wooden (“The 
Rhetorical Design of Fulke Greville’s Life of Sidney,” Proceedings of the PMR Conference 8 [1983], 109-
18), Christopher Martin (“Between Duty and Selfness: Greville’s Life of Sidney,” Mid-Hudson Language 
Studies 9 [1986], 19-28), and Elizabeth Spiller (“The Counsel of Fulke Greville: Transforming the 
Jacobean ‘Nourish Father’ through Sidney’s ‘Nursing Father,’” Studies in Philology 97.4 [2000], 433-53.) 
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on his Protestant politics. Greville claims that he wrote the piece as a personal exercise, 
“to keep company with [Sidney], even after death” and “to entertaine, and instruct [him] 
selfe.”136 Entertainment and instruction do indeed appear to motivate the Life’s string of 
narratives about Sidney’s knightly prowess interspersed with political commentary, but 
Greville anticipates a wider audience than himself, adding that he “esteem[s] [Sidney’s] 
actions, words, and conversation, the daintiest treasure my mind [...] can at this day 
impart with our posteritie” (134). He never published the work, however, probably 
deeming it unwise to wax nostalgic for the diplomatic Elizabeth I and her independent-
minded courtier while employed by James I’s divine right regime.  
 In 1652, after Greville’s death, the Life of Sidney was printed, and thus made 
available to the reading public, for the first time. Only a few years earlier, England had 
executed Charles I and become a republican state dominated by Puritan leadership; the 
“posteritie” reading the Life were doing so under wildly different circumstances than 
Greville could have imagined. Accordingly, the Life’s new larger audience was free to 
view Greville’s portrait of Sidney through their own visions of themselves. Rightly 
calling our attention to the political significance of the text’s actual publication date, 
Peter Herman points out that although Greville celebrated Elizabeth and (especially) 
Sidney as opponents of absolute monarchy, the Life was finally printed by a publisher 
who predominately favored royalist writing, and proposes that by 1652,  
                                                
136 Sir Fulke Greville, The Life of the Renowned Sr Philip Sidney. With the true Interest of England as it 
then stood in relation to all Forrain Princes: And particularly for suppressing the power of Spain Stated by 
Him. His principall Actions, Counsels, Designes, and Death. Together with a short Account of the Maximes 
and Policies used by Queen Elizabeth in her Government (London, 1652), 134, 247. All future references 
to this text occur parenthetically by page number. 
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a book idealizing a popular earlier monarch and one of her glittering courtiers would 
likely be interpreted as a defense of England’s monarchy in general and the late 
Charles in particular. The implied contrast would not be with a monarch attempting 
to impose absolutism, but with a Parliament trying to rule without a king[.]137 
 
This interpretation certainly highlights how readers’ historical perspective and individual 
subjectivity had the power to “[alter] the reception of a text” and of a celebrated national 
figure. However, Herman’s claim that “in 1652, the ‘horizons’ circumscribing this text 
had, in effect, moved 180 degrees” underestimates what he himself calls “the fluidity of 
reputation in the seventeenth century.”138 In all likelihood, the Seiles father and son who 
printed the Life of Sidney (and who had published anti-royalist as well as royalist 
material) hoped for their latest book to appeal to a wide market:139 readers across the 
political spectrum in 1652 could position the evils of absolutism wherever they pleased 
and could embrace the gallant Sidney as a nostalgic emblem of romantic royalism/royalist 
romance or a prophetic figure of romantic republicanism/republican romance.  
If we accept Herman’s reading of a potentially royalist Sidney, we ought also to 
consider how Sidney’s sixteenth-century Protestantism and anti-absolutism might 
simultaneously emerge in the seventeenth century as Puritanism and anti-monarchism. 
An anti-royalist public could cast its gaze backward into history through the Life to 
imagine Sidney as a proto-Puritan and a proto-republican, the saintly herald of the new 
godly state who sacrificed himself in the name of a future triumph that he would not 
                                                
137 Peter C. Herman, “‘Bastard Children of Tyranny’: The Ancient Constitution and Fulke Greville’s A 
Dedication to Sir Philip Sidney,” Renaissance Quarterly 55 (2002), 969-1004, 998. 
138 Ibid., 998-9. 
139 It may be telling that the frontispiece of the Life identifies its author as “a Servant to” Elizabeth, who 
had retained moderate popularity across factions, without mention of Greville’s official relationship to 
James I. Although Herman proposes that nostalgia for Elizabeth could translate into nostalgia for Charles I, 
this description of Greville nonetheless elides the Stuart dynasty after their crushing loss of political power.  
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survive to see.140 At the same time that this subjectivity recasts Sidney as the hero of a new 
providential romance and as a head of its surviving elect community, his death for the 
Protestant cause creates new problems for the genre of Greville’s work.141 While “The Faerie 
Leveller” reimagined Spenser through a Sidneian approach to romance without regard for the 
tragic possibility that soon became reality for Charles I, the Life of Sidney required readers in 
1652 to contend with a melancholy Spenserian view of history as genre: Greville depicts his 
friend’s romantic heroism and providentialism as beset by contingency and tragedy. Given 
the subjectivity of narrative vision, Sidney’s outlook is unlike that of Greville, which is in 
turn distinct from the perspectives of multiple midcentury communities. 
 Readers of any ideology who might have been looking for a hero needed little 
imagination to see Sidney as a real-life knight seemingly sprung from fictional romance. 
The Sidney of the Life142 resembles the idealized heroes of chivalric literature, including 
Sidney’s own Pyrocles and Musidorus, by uniting all manly virtues and pursuits within 
himself. Greville compares him to Hercules (41) and to Aeneas (90) and remembers him 
as “a true modell of Worth; A man fit for […] what Action soever is greatest, and hardest 
amongst men: Withall, such a lover of Mankind, and Goodnesse, that whosoever had any 
reall parts, in him found comfort, participation, and protection to the uttermost of his 
power; like Zephyrus he giving life where he blew” (38). Critically, Sidney’s excellence 
                                                
140 For studies that explore the living Sidney’s participation in sixteenth-century discourses of 
republicanism, see Martin Raitere, Faire Bitts, and Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue. David Norbrook 
touches on Sidney’s republican legacy in the seventeenth century in Writing the English Republic: Poetry, 
Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1999), 72. 
141 Hager has argued in “The Exemplary Mirage” that the Life of Sidney “is a version of a genre 
conventionalized by Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, the Protestant saint’s life” (3). 
142 Further references to “Sidney” in this section usually refer to the stylized person that Greville represents 
as a quasi-literary figure in the Life. 
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and gentility are most recognizable to those who are of “reall parts” themselves. As in the 
New Arcadia, romantic heroism is not indiscriminately appreciable by all observers; it is 
a concept nurtured within a particular community of similar minds and shared values. 
The French Protestant King Henry of Navarre identifies both himself and Sidney as 
pillars of this community when, because of his attunement to Sidney’s indefinable 
magnanimity, he welcomes him as a friend and peer despite his inferior birth: “he found 
out this Master-spirit among us, and used him like an equall in nature, and so fit for 
friendship with a King” (36). Greville may have intended this evidence of Sidney’s 
inborn nobility to resonate with a small coterie of aristocratic readers, but in 1652, the 
audience that could witness and appreciate Sidney’s worth, thereby locating themselves 
within a morally sophisticated class or community, was now much larger. 
 While Sidney’s romantic heroism lends him broad appeal, the precise nature and 
end of that heroism arguably has a more republican than royalist cast. Greville’s praise of 
Sidney’s knighthood considers not just his individual excellence, but his magnetic power 
to draw an admiring community of excellence into coherence around him. The Life is 
ever-alert to his position of leadership within an emulous society in which the highest 
honor is to be first among equals. His skill in arms is evident not so much in his martial 
prowess as in its resonance throughout his compatriots: “Souldiers honoured him, and 
were so honoured by him, as no man thought he marched under the true Banner of Mars, 
that had not obtained Sir Philip Sidney’s approbation” (39). His communitarian charisma 
extends beyond the battlefield: Sidney is such “a generall Mecaenas of Learning” that 
“there was not a cunning Painter, a skilfull Engenier, an excellent Musician, or any other 
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Artificer of extraordinary fame, that made not himself known to this famous Spirit, and 
found him his true friend without hire; and the common Rende-vous of Worth in his 
time” (39). This role as “the common Rende-vous of Worth,” the pillar of a fellowship 
formed by the gifted and honorable, is worth more than any of Sidney’s individual 
accomplishments. Textually resurrected in 1652, Sidney could be celebrated afresh in the 
Interregnum, too, as the hero of an ostensibly egalitarian community of worthies.  
Under Sidney’s heroic influence, those of “reall parts” are moved to enrich their own 
virtues—a result, Greville claims, that Sidney desired and sought. Greville cuts short one 
passage in praise of Sidney’s artistic ability with a declaration of his true authorial purpose: 
his end was not writing, even while he wrote; [...] but […] to make himself, and  
others, not in words or opinion, but in life, and action, good and great.  
   In which Architechtonical art he was such a Master, with so commending, and 
yet equall waies amongst men, that whersoever he went, he was beloved, and 
obeyed: yea into what Action soever he came last at the first, he became first at 
the last: the whole managing of the business, not by usurpation, or violence, but 
(as it were) by right, and acknowledgment, falling into his hands, as into a 
naturall Center. 
      (21, emphases mine)  
 
In this remarkable passage, the “Architechtonical Master” Sidney acts as a poet (in his 
own terms, a “maker”) not chiefly of words but of men.143 Both his writing and his “life, 
and action” work toward the “end” of romance as Sidney himself presents it in the New 
Arcadia and the Defense of Poesy: to inspire an audience to prove their “reall parts” by 
making themselves “good and great” in the real world beyond that of the story.144 
                                                
143 In the Defense of Poesy, Sidney defines the poet’s role as “not only to make a Cyrus […] but to bestow a 
Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses, if they will learn aright why and how that maker made him” 
(Herman, ed., 65). 
144 Joseph Candido notes that “What is most curious about Greville’s statement here is that it does not 
characterize Sidney’s behavior as a simple renunciation of art for life; rather it emphasizes the importance 
of both elements in a new and distinctly mimetic form of artistic expression” (“Fulke Greville’s Biography 
of Sir Philip Sidney and the ‘Architectonic’ Tudor Life,” South Central Review 2.1 [1985], 3-12, 5). 
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Critically for the republican reading public of the Life, the system by which Sidney both 
inspires and surpasses his fellows is founded entirely upon merit. He becomes “first” 
among those he regards as “equall” to himself “not by usurpation, or violence” but “by 
right” (of virtue rather than birth) and by “acknowledgment” of others.145 Despite the fact 
that both men were dedicated to the monarchies they served, Greville allows his 1652 
audience to imagine Sidney as the founding father and head of a utopian meritocracy.   
At least as important for Puritan readers is the fact that Sidney’s civic merit is 
excelled only by his reformist piety. “Above all,” Greville notes, “he made the Religion 
he professed, the firm Basis of his life”; his “true-heartednesse to the Reformed Religion” 
directs his politics and, all too often, throws obstacles in the way of his success in his 
own time (41-2). For Sidney, devout Protestantism is essential for “Peace, Safetie, and 
Freedome,” and “to temporize with the Enemies of our Faith” is “false-heartednesse to 
God and man” which “would in the end find itself forsaken of both” (42). While Sidney 
sees service to “the Reformed Religion” as coterminous with service to England as God’s 
elect nation, his Protestant zeal often inspires his resistance to worldly authorities. 
Although Greville praises Sidney for “his chief ends being not Friends, Wife, Children, 
or himself; but above all things the honour of his Maker, and service of his Prince, or 
Country,” these three ideals—pure nationalism, service to one’s monarch, and the honor 
of God—are not always aligned in the Life (47). Puritan readers could hardly miss the 
theme that godliness, along with the sense of heroic subjectivity that it imparts to Sidney, 
dominates the courtier’s other concerns should any conflict emerge between them.  
                                                
145 A reader with royalist sympathies, of course, could attach a different significance to Sidney’s innate 
leadership “by right.” 
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Greville insists upon Sidney’s devotion to Elizabeth I; nevertheless, he takes 
pleasure in recounting the knight’s bold self-assertions before the queen in the name of 
spiritual egalitarianism and Protestant purity. While Herman argues that the Life of 
Sidney idealizes Elizabeth at the expense of James, Greville’s Elizabeth is idealized only 
to the (limited) extent that her beliefs and policies comport with Sidney’s. In every case 
where some disparity between the queen and Sidney arises and the audience is obliged to 
favor one or the other, Greville strongly guides their sympathies toward his friend. After 
Sidney makes plans to duel with an insulting nobleman and Elizabeth urges him to defer 
to the earl’s superior rank, he politely agrees not to pursue the quarrel, but first reminds 
her that “that place [of nobility] was never intended for privilege to wrong: witness her 
self, who how Soveraign soever she were by Throne, Birth, Education, and Nature; yet 
was she content to cast her own affections into the same moulds her Subjects did, and 
govern all her rights by their laws” (80). The hero thus proposes that monarchs are not 
above their subjects’ laws—a daring idea when the Life was first composed under James 
I, as Herman points out, but a foundational tenet of the English republic in 1652. Sidney’s 
sensibilities prompt him to act even in politically risky situations: in his opposition to 
Elizabeth’s proposed marriage to the Duc d’Anjou, he refuses to debase his Protestant 
faith “to catch the Queens humor” (53). Fearing that a French Catholic marriage will 
result in “a precipitate absoluteness” of Monarchy, he does not hide from Elizabeth that 
in the practice of this Marriage, he foresaw, and prophesied, that the very first 
breach of Gods ordinance, in matching herself with a Prince of a diverse faith, 
would infallibly carry with it some piece of the rending destiny, which Solomon, 
and those other Princes justly felt, for having ventured to weigh the immortall 
wisdom in even scales, with mortall conveniency or inconveniency. 
      (63-4) 
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In warning against the marriage as a blot on both Elizabeth’s authority and her elect 
condition, Sidney links the horrors of absolute monarchy, religious pollution, and divine 
vengeance as three heads of one monstrous idea; if his unwillingness to “biace Gods 
immortall truth to the fantasies of mortall Princes” made him a Protestant hero in 
Greville’s lifetime, it could only intensify his glory under the Puritan republic (60). 
 While Sidney’s claim to godly foresight bolsters his heroic status at the head of an 
elect community, the Life’s representation of him as a prophet makes the text vulnerable 
to the same generic tensions that arise in the Faerie Queene’s moments of prophetic 
vision. The passivity of other Protestants who exceed Sidney in rank but cannot match his 
zeal (Elizabeth included) frustrates his lifelong ambition to establish “a general league in 
Religion” amongst Protestant Europe to resist the “Tyrannie” of Catholicism (51-2). 
After his death, Greville describes his friend as “Sir Philip, our unbelieved Cassandra,” at 
once celebrating and lamenting Sidney as a visionary whose wisdom and warnings went 
unheeded during his lifetime (129). Greville conjures up an image of Sidney occupying a 
perspective on Christian narrative much like that of Spenser’s Merlin or Redcrosse, 
“lift[ing] up his active spirit into an universall prospect of time, States, and things [...] 
The placing of his thoughts upon which high pinnacle, layd the present Map of the 
Christian world underneath him” (90-91). 146  From his mental “pinnacle,” Sidney 
glimpses nations’ romantic roles within sacred history: “as in a dream,” he witnesses 
“that creeping Monarchie of Rome” menacing Europe, and Catholic Spain “mixing the 
                                                
146 Greville’s imagery here also invokes Jesus’ mountaintop vision of the kingdoms of the world and his 
being set by Satan on the “pinnacle” of the Temple, subjects that Milton would later take up in Paradise 
Regained (see Chapter 3). 
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temporall, and spiritual sword, to their crafty conquering ends” (94, 97). Sidney is 
confident that knowledge of Catholic monarchs as “no anointed deputies of God, but 
rather lively Images of the dark Prince, that sole author of dis-creation, and disorder, who 
ever ruines his ends with over-building” ensures knowledge of their final fate: “the 
vengeance of God must necessarily” fall on papal tyranny, and God will aid the cause of 
his champions (130). Unlike the hesitant Protestant rulers who lack his martial spirit and 
his narrative vision, Sidney trusts that “though this justice of the Almighty be many times 
slow, & therefore neglected here on earth,” the community of the elect is destined to 
triumph, while the reprobate are always already doomed (131).  
 Greville weighs Sidney’s faith in the providential romance of history and in his 
own elect perspective against an awareness that divine justice is “slow” and “neglected”; 
like the visions of Merlin and Redcrosse, Sidney’s elevated prospect reveals the narrative 
form of history but cannot bring that narrative to its conclusion. Long before the final 
victory of the godly, Sidney himself is destined to die at Zutphen, and Greville labels the 
moment of his passing the “last scene of this Tragedy” (159).147 Sidney sacrifices himself 
for the future he foresees—a tragic conclusion to pave the way for a romantic one. 
Puritans reading in the hindsight of 1652 might imagine that the end for which Sidney 
fought was still at hand, or had even come to pass in the form of a militant godly republic 
(which had finally dispensed with a monarch who was, at best, a lukewarm leader of 
God’s chosen nation or, at worst, one of Satan’s tyrannical children). Greville himself, 
                                                
147 Martin argues that “Conditioned by his own cautious pragmatism, Greville cannot bring himself to 
condone the personal drives which lay behind Sidney’s fatal vulnerability” (26). The author’s struggle 
between the his/her desire to endow his/her fallen subject with literary splendor and his/her pragmatic 
regret for the subject’s self-caused fall is also a central feature of Margaret Cavendish’s and Lucy 
Hutchinson’s respective memoirs of their husbands. 
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though, can muster little of such confidence from his less lofty vantage point early in the 
seventeenth century, and a 1652 audience would have had to contend with the tension 
between Sidneian romance and Grevillian tragedy ripples throughout the text. 
 We must keep in mind that Greville originally conceived the Life not as a memoir 
but as the preface to a collection of tragedies. As such, it concludes with an anxious 
discussion of his and his friend’s separate artistic visions and approaches to genre.148 
While Sidney was famous for his romance, Greville had become known for his tragic 
drama. Greville explains that he intends his productions to illustrate the corruption of 
power: “to trace out the high waies of ambitious Governours, and to shew in the practice, 
that the more audacity, advantage, and good successe such Soveraignties have, the more 
they hasten to their owne desolation and ruine” (243). He further indicates a strong 
preference for tragedy over romance. Historical drama, he suggests, is “fitter to hold the 
attention of the Reader, than [...] the strangeness, or perplexedness of witty Fictions; in 
which the affections, or imagination, may perchance find exercise, and entertainment, but 
the memory and judgement no enriching at all” (244). In this criticism of “witty Fictions” 
as emotionally engaging yet intellectually and morally vapid, Greville accords with the 
judgments of many of his contemporaries who denounced romance, but not with the 
opinion of Sidney, who spoke up for heroic fiction’s Protestant value in the Defense of 
Poesy and by writing Arcadia. Keenly aware that he and his friend traveled different 
artistic paths, Greville follows his personal rejection of romance with a strange, difficult 
passage that offers effusive yet halting enthusiasm for Arcadia and its author: 
                                                
148 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Wilkes, “‘Left... to Play the Ill Poet in My Own Part.’” 
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And my Noble Friend had that dexterity, even with the dashes of his pen to make the 
Arcadian Antiques beautifie the Margents of his works; yet the honour which (I beare 
him record) he never affected, I leave unto him, with this addition, that his end in them 
was not vanishing pleasure alone, but morall Images, and Examples, (as directing 
threds) to guide every man through the confusing Labyrinth of his own desires, and 
life: So that howsoever I liked them not too well (even in that unperfected shape they 
were) to condescend that such delicate (though inferior) Pictures of himselfe, should be 
suppressed; yet I do wish that work may be the last in this kind, presuming no man that 
followes can ever reach, much lesse go beyond that excellent intended patterne of his.  
        (244-5) 
 
 Greville vacillates between defending his own decision to write history as tragedy 
instead of romance and defending Sidney’s decision to write romance instead of a more 
serious genre. He proposes that his friend was a far greater poet than himself, whose 
“creeping Genius” was forced to be “more fixed upon the Images of Life, than the Images 
of Wit” (245)—but he adds that if Sidney was more suited to writing romance because 
his imagination and inspiration were of a higher order than Greville’s, he was unique in 
possessing such a gift. Sidney may have had the “dexterity” to fill Arcadia with “morall 
Images, and Examples” for a noble and godly life, yet Greville hopes that no other writer 
will attempt to imitate his example and be doomed to failure. Greville’s overwrought 
prose and parenthetical digressions here indicate a dizzying ambivalence toward Sidney’s 
endeavor: Arcadia is literally marginalized, consigned to “beautifie the Margents” of 
Sidney’s works; Greville claims that Sidney ought to be famous for his “morall” romance 
but that “he never affected” such renown; he half-defends Arcadia by noting that its end 
is not only vanishing pleasure, adding that Sidney’s fiction is too excellent to “be 
suppressed” after his death, although it is unfinished and “inferior” to the full extent of 
his personal greatness; finally, he concludes by “wish[ing] that work may be the last in 
this kind.” Sidney alone was capable of writing a godly romance and of living according 
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to the example he portrayed.149 His “tragic” demise, Greville anticipates, marks the fall of 
England’s last romantic hero, the death of romance as a viable English genre, and quite 
possibly the permanent decline of the Protestant state. 
The question of England’s future looms large throughout Greville’s Life: what 
will happen now, after Sidney’s valiant death, to the nation and the chivalric Protestant 
community which, in life, he drew together, defended, and upheld? Early in the Life, 
Greville extols Sidney as a beacon guiding his nation in his footsteps: “Did not his 
country [...] take knowledge of him as a Light, or leading Star to every degree within 
her?” (7). This “leading Star” fades into a less hopeful image when Greville laments the 
loss of his friend’s wisdom in the midst of England’s early seventeenth-century 
challenges: “he would have found, or made a way through all the traverses, even of the 
most weak and irregular times. But it pleased God in this decrepit age of the world, not to 
restore the image of her ancient vigour in him, otherwise than as in a lightning before 
death” (43). Sidney’s life here appears as a marvel rather than an example, an ephemeral 
“lightning” instead of an enduring “Light”; in his life, as in his fiction, he has shown the 
world a fleeting “image” of heroic virtue, but God has now deprived the sinful world of 
his perfection, and Sidney’s capacity to inspire greatness in others may have become 
diminished, not enhanced, by his death. This communal loss, Greville claims, is his own 
greatest grief: “Neither am I (for my part) so much in love with this life, nor believe so 
little in a better to come, as to complain of God for taking him [...] yet for the sincere 
                                                
149 Greville’s anxiety about how to represent the New Arcadia, and how to praise Sidney’s use of a genre 
Greville does not endorse, may relate to his self-consciousness of simplifying Sidney’s life into 
hagiography rather than biography. See Hager, “Exemplary Mirage.” 
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affection I bear to my Prince, and Country, my prayer to God is, that this Worth, and 
Way may not fatally be buried with him” (43). The Life cannot seem to keep from 
suggesting, though, that English honor, glory, and piety may indeed have died along with 
the man who epitomized them. Sidney’s vision of a united Protestant Europe never won 
the full support of the Elizabethan regime, and his subsequent 
Heroicall design of invading, and possessing America, how exactly soever 
projected […] by Sir Philip, did yet prove impossible to be well acted by any 
other mans spirit […] how sufficient soever his associate were in all parts of 
navigation; whereby the success of this journey fell out to be rather fortunate in 
wealth, than honor. 
      (90) 
 
In Sidney’s absence, his “Heroicall” and godly influence wanes; other Englishmen 
(including Sir Francis Drake) lack Sidney’s prevailing sense of “honor” to motivate their 
enterprises, and the “ancient vigour” of virtue fades before the modern allure of profit.  
 In the early seventeenth century, Greville read the romance of the dead as the 
tragedy of the living. While royalist readers in 1652 might have felt strong affinity for his 
nostalgic melancholia, a Puritan republican audience would have had much less cause to 
identify with Greville’s sense of Sidney’s romantic sensibilities as decayed or impotent 
and might even have disregarded the Life of Sidney’s tragic themes. Readers of the Life 
who identified themselves with the community of the godly were free to rethink the genre 
of history once more, and to see Sidney not as the last vestige of a bygone age of chivalry 
but as the first knight of the new republic, a hero whose providential romance lived on 
and offered posthumous validation to his lofty prophetic vision. As the Life draws to a 
close, Greville advises critics of his tragedies to  
look on that Stage wherein himself is an Actor, even the state he lives in, and for 
every part he may perchance find a Player, and for every Line [...] an instance of 
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life, beyond the Authors intention, or application, the vices of former Ages being 
so like to these of this Age, as it will be easie to find out some affinity, or 
resemblance between them, which whosoever readeth with this apprehension, 
will not perchance thinke the Scenes too large[.] 
      (246-7) 
 
The Life’s midcentury factions would have seen multiple ways to “find out some affinity, 
or resemblance” between their own age and Sidneian romance, and republican readers 
might have had an especially easy time of it. If Sidney’s prophetic perspective could be 
argued to have found fruition in Interregnum England, then perhaps the example of his 
life was not, after all, “too large” to be followed. The generic anxieties that dogged 
Greville might not have troubled republican readers in 1652, who could flatter 
themselves that they, as Sidney’s emulous community of spiritual and ideological 
followers, had continued or even perfected his heroic work. But those anxieties were 
certainly keenly felt by the royalists after 1649, whose royal romance had taken a sharply 
tragic turn, and they would return with a vengeance for republicans after 1660, when 
England’s political narrative reversed its course once again. 
 
III. “No other Will, but Your Majesties Pleasure”: Masculine Erotics, Feminine 
Pragmatics, and Fin Amour in Margaret Cavendish’s Life of William Cavendish150 
 
William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle, was still alive in 1667 when his wife 
Margaret published her biographical account of his wartime heroism in service to the 
Stuart royal family—an impropriety that scandalized the likes of Samuel Pepys. 
Nevertheless, The Life of the Thrice Noble, High and Puissant Prince William 
                                                
150 A version of this section appears as “Historical Romance and Fin Amour in Margaret Cavendish’s Life 
of William Cavendish” in English Studies 92.7 (November 2011), 756-70. I am grateful to many members 
of the International Margaret Cavendish Society for their warm support and scholarly assistance when this 
reading was still in its infancy as a conference paper.  
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Cavendishe (hereafter the Life of William) is a narrative written to memorialize his tragic 
“Sufferings, Losses, and ill-Fortunes” as much as to boast of his “Loyal, Heroick and 
Prudent Actions.”151 Although Pepys found more fantasy than fact in his reading of the 
Life and in his general opinion of its author, calling her husband “an ass to suffer her to 
write what she writes to him, and of him” and famously pronouncing her “a mad, 
conceited, ridiculous woman” whose “whole story […] is a romance, and all she does is 
romantic,” Cavendish prefaces the Life of William with an explicit refusal to allow the 
literary conventions of romance to interfere with her true account of her husband’s 
“Heroical” role in the “Tragedy” of the royalists’ defeat and their monarch’s death 
(c1v).152 Despite (and because of) the widespread impression, in the seventeenth century 
as well as now, that “romance was very often construed as a vehicle of royalist ideology,” 
Cavendish takes pains to associate the fusion of historiography and heroic fiction with 
Puritan republicanism.153 Her family’s opponents, she insists, are the party guilty of 
“telling Romansical Falshoods for Historical Truths” and writing “in a mystical and 
allegorical style […] with but few sprinklings of Truth [….] out of Policy to amuse and 
deceive the People” (c2r, d1r). She accuses Parliamentarian sympathizers of composing 
histories in name only that “contain nothing but Falshoods and Chimeraes” and of 
                                                
151 Margaret Cavendish, The Life of the Thrice Noble, High and Puissant Prince William Cavendishe 
(London, 1667), c2r. All subsequent references to this text are from this edition and will be cited 
parenthetically by folio page number. I refer to Margaret Cavendish as “Cavendish” when discussing her as 
the author of The Life, but as “Margaret” when she appears as a participant (or character) within it. I refer 
to William Cavendish, who is very much a literary character in his own biography, as “William.” 
152 Samuel Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. John A. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1905), 484, 630. 
Alexandra Bennett points out that Pepys’ diary indicates that he was at least entertained enough by her 
“ridiculous History” to stay up all night reading it. See “Fantastic Realism: Margaret Cavendish and the 
Possibilities of Drama,” in Authorial Conquests: Essays on Genre in the Writings of Margaret Cavendish, 
ed. Line Cottegnies and Nancy Weitz (London: Associated University Presses, 2003), 179-94, 194. 
153 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 180. 
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fictionalizing their commanders by “comparing some of them to Moses, and some others 
to all the great and most famous Heroes, both Greeks and Romans” (d1r).154 Republicans 
are mere devotees of Fortune, which “is such an Idol of the World, and is so like the 
golden Calf worshipped by the Israelites, that those Arch-Rebels never wanted 
Astrologers to foretel them good success in all their Enterprises, nor Poets to sing their 
Praises […] nay, which is worse, nor Historians neither, to record their Valour in 
fighting, and Wisdom in Governing” (d1r).155 Having tarnished the marriage of literary 
entertainment and historiography as the manipulative tool of her enemies, Cavendish 
vows to shun the manner of writers whose literary style and emphasis on the “mystical 
Designs” of history render their accounts “but pleasant Romances” (b2v). 156  The 
“romantic” conceit Pepys perceived in the Life, however, is entirely intentional on 
Cavendish’s part: even as she rejects romance as an appropriate genre for life writing, her 
case for William’s royalist heroism is grounded entirely in romantic convention.157    
                                                
154 Cavendish’s dismissal of exaggerated historiography may be tongue-in-cheek even in her preface: only a 
paragraph after her denunciation of the republicans’ likening their heroes to the “most famous […] Greeks 
and Romans,” she compares her husband to “another Scipio” (d1v). 
155 In addition to turning anti-royalist rhetoric against romance on its head, Cavendish here subverts the 
Puritan commonplace of comparing the community of the godly to the nation of Israel. The “Arch-Rebels” 
are allowed to resemble the Israelites, but only as idolaters, liars, and hypocrites; that is, as the un-godly. 
156 Emma Rees acknowledges that Cavendish’s attitude to romance is “apparently inconsistent” but 
proposes that her “strategic appropriation” of it “may function as a generic double-bluff. That is, if she 
professes a distaste for romance, she might distance herself from courtly culture and so not be associated with 
the suspicions which would inevitably fall on publications by the close-knit members of Henrietta Maria’s 
coterie.” See Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile (Manchester: Manchester U P, 2003), 89, 44. 
157 While we are accustomed to thinking of Margaret Cavendish as a writer of romances, her husband also 
enjoyed the genre, and his relationship to it was political as well as personal. In addition to collaborating 
with his wife on a number of her plays and fictions, the Earl of Newcastle was once mocked by the 
Parliamentarian Lord Fairfax, whom he had challenged to wage a more heroic form of warfare, as a man 
whose notions of honourable conduct on the battlefield “follow[ed] the rules of Amadis de Gaule, or the 
Knight of the Sun, which the language of [his] declaration seems to affect in offering pitched battles” (see 
Charles Firth, ed., The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle [London: Routledge, 1907], xii-xiii). 
Fairfax declined to gratify his opponent by “affecting” romance conventions as a military commander, and 
Cavendish’s affinity for amorous and chivalric literature thus became an object of ridicule for his enemies 
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 The Life of William Cavendish can scarcely help merging romance and history in 
its incorporation of such elements as the usurpation of a kingdom, the trials of a long exile, 
and the ultimate restoration of the rightful ruler, a basic romantic pattern that William, in 
the Life, implicitly trusts will translate into historical reality. Cavendish also describes 
William’s chivalric conduct, such as his rescue of Queen Henrietta Maria after her 
deliverance from a tempest at sea. But most importantly, the biography takes its dominant 
theme from a romantic tradition dating back to the Middle Ages, fin amour: an extremity 
of erotic devotion characterized by the lover’s limitless willingness to suffer for the sake 
of an often remote and indifferent beloved.158 Although the fin amour tradition is of 
French origin, as are the continental romances that Victoria Kahn and others have 
identified as Cavendish’s sources,159 the concept soon spread into English literature 
through such authors as Thomas Malory and thrived throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, featuring prominently in romances including Sidney’s Arcadia and 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene.160 In the New Arcadia, we have seen how the private intensity 
of erotic devotion can imbue a hero or heroine with a powerful sensation of 
exceptionalism and public purpose, and Cavendish employs fin amour to the same end in 
the Life of William; however, the love plot within her “heroical” history does not chiefly 
                                                                                                                                            
even as it was sometimes (though not always) a royalist point of pride. Rees suggests that this incident with 
Fairfax may have contributed to Cavendish’s “antipathy” to Amadis de Gaule, which she has banished from 
the library of the gods in her 1656 Heavens Library (100). 
158 The concept of fin amour is broadly equivalent to that of “courtly love,” although the latter term is the 
invention of literary critics, while the former actually appears in a number of foundational texts. 
159 See Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 180. 
160 We might note that within the framework of fin amour, William is a more perfect lover than any 
character Spenser or Sidney can produce; Sidney’s male lovers are particularly susceptible to self-centered 
lust. But in Lady Mary Wroth’s 1621 Urania, written as a companion romance to Sidney’s Arcadia and 
featuring a female protagonist, the profoundly interiorized experience of suffering for love take on a higher 
value than any potential reward for one’s patience that one might receive from an external source. 
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concern her relationship with her husband.161 Instead, the text’s focal participants in the fin 
amour tradition are her husband and King Charles II, with William in the role of the long-
suffering lover and the King as the beloved “master” (as Cavendish often terms him).  
Kahn has briefly remarked upon this dynamic in her discussion of the “romance 
of contract” in Cavendish’s work, noting that the Life represents William as an 
“unrequited” lover of the King, “uncontaminated by considerations of personal self-
interest”; she argues persuasively that his ideal of unconditional devotion contrasts 
sharply with the contractual paradigm of love and governance that Cavendish envisions 
in her prose romances.162 While Kahn’s reading is concerned with these prose fictions 
and their departure from William’s principle of passionate obedience (among other 
constructs), I propose that a closer study of the romance already present within the Life of 
William reveals Cavendish simultaneously resisting and engaging productively with 
William’s non-contractual homoerotic model, using the generic trope of fin amour to 
                                                
161 Indeed, Cavendish is so far from crafting a romance out of her own marriage that her very short account 
of their courtship approaches coldness in its emphasis on William’s markedly temperate affection and 
starkly practical reasons for desiring Margaret’s hand: 
  My Lord being arrived at Paris [...] immediately went to tender his humble duty to Her Majesty  
[…] where it was my Fortune to see him the first time [...] and after he had stay’d there some time,  
he was pleased to take some particular notice of me, and express more then an ordinary affection  
for me; insomuch that he resolved to chuse me for his Second Wife; for he having but two Sons,  
purposed to marry me, a young Woman, that might prove fruitful to him, and encrease his Posterity  
by a Masculine Off-spring [...] but God (it seems) had ordered it otherwise, and frustrated his  
Designs, by making me barren, which yet did never lessen his Love and Affection for me. 
         (P2r) 
Cavendish’s chronicle of the same courtship in her autobiographical A True Relation of My Birth, Breeding, 
and Life is somewhat warmer: “though I did dread Marriage, and shunn’d Mens companies, as much as I 
could, yet I could not, nor had the power to refuse him, by reason my Affections were fix’d on him, and he 
was the onely Person I ever was in love with.” Even in A True Relation, however, she renounces marital 
eroticism, adding that “it was not Amorous Love, I never was infected therewith, it is a Disease, or a 
Passion, or both […] but my Love was honest and honourable, being placed upon Merit.” See Sylvia 
Bowerbank and Sara Mendelson, eds., Paper Bodies (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000), 47. For a 
discussion of Cavendish’s engagement with romance in her autobiography, see Lara Dodds, “Margaret 
Cavendish’s Domestic Experiment,” in Dowd and Eckerle, eds., 151-68. 
162 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 194, 342n. 
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negotiate both a heroic subject position for her husband and a platform for her own 
pragmatic royalism. Although the spectrum of romance also offers Cavendish the model 
of feudal love between men (as in Greville’s Life of Sidney),163 she finds greater use for 
the mode of romantic devotion that is founded upon unconditional humility rather than 
mutual duty, since William’s heroism depends not upon reciprocity from Charles, but 
upon his disinterested renunciation of a reciprocal contract between monarch and subject. 
As “master,” the King holds infinite affective and material power over his servant, yet 
also takes on the less dignified role of the fickle mistress in the Life, while William’s 
abjection elevates him to the height of royalist integrity and moral potency; importantly 
for Cavendish, he has many rivals for the King’s good graces but no equal in devotion.164 
The Life is thus concerned not with elect or elite community, but with exceptional 
individualism: William’s is a romance for one, in which even his wife does not share. In 
representing her husband as a singular lover whose “Sufferings” have more than merited 
his master’s requital, Cavendish partly endorses William’s model of romance, positioning 
herself as his dutiful wife in order to authenticate his heroism. Simultaneously, however, 
she must perform the role of his antagonist, challenging his narrative vision and his non-
rational subjectivity in order to derive some material benefit for their family from 
William’s amorous selflessness.   
                                                
163 I am grateful to Mary Baine Campbell for this observation. 
164 The fin amour tradition inevitably relies on some form of gender fluidity. Most often, a male lover 
submits to the service of a lady and abases himself before her, inverting their usual gendered hierarchy; if 
the lover is female, she occupies the abject position yet thus fills the masculine role in the strength of her 
devotion. The fluidity of gender inherent in the fin amour tradition has been discussed by a number of 
scholars, and is particularly well treated in Barbara Newman’s study of medieval courtly mysticism: see 
From Virile Woman to WomanChrist (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 137-67. 
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 Cavendish’s dedication of her work to King Charles concludes with a pointed 
assertion: “I have heard him often say, He loves Your Royal Person so dearly, that He 
would most willingly, upon all occasions, sacrifice his Life and Posterity for Your 
Majesty” (n2r, n2v). Throughout the Life, Cavendish demonstrates her husband’s singular 
royalist heroism through this boundless sacrifice for his master the King, whom he 
repeatedly professes to love more than his own wife and children, despite Charles’ 
consistent failure to respond in kind. William perceives his role as a royalist subject 
through the lens of romance, and Cavendish defines her husband’s heroism by his 
unwavering fidelity to the genre’s most extreme ideals: where all other subjects fall short, 
his fidelity remains perfectly unselfish. Yet at the same time, the dedication to the King 
and the entirety of the biography are a thinly veiled petition for long-overdue royal favor. 
Even as William’s character simultaneously marginalizes and strengthens himself by 
disclaiming any reward for his love, Margaret Cavendish never loses sight of her 
husband’s practical contributions to the royalist cause and the harsh arithmetic of her 
family’s losses as a result. The result is a generically complicated text founded on the 
tension between the factual pragmatism of Margaret Cavendish as the Life’s narrator and 
the romantic subjectivity of William as its hero.  
 James Fitzmaurice has suggested that William’s commitment to suffer for the 
King without complaint demonstrates masculine stoicism that conceals his “private anger 
and bitterness.”165 However, his devotion consistently appears not as resigned willingness 
but as happiness to suffer: “I have heard him say out of a passionate Zeal and Loyalty, 
                                                
165 James Fitzmaurice, “Margaret Cavendish’s Life of William, Plutarch, and Mixed Genre,” in Cottegnies 
and Weitz (eds)., 80-102, 95. 
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That he would willingly sacrifice himself, and all his Posterity, for the sake of his 
Majesty, and the Royal Race. Nor did he ever repine either at his losses or sufferings, but 
rejoyced rather that he was able to suffer for His King and Countrey” (I1r). William 
perceives his “miseries” not as a necessary evil but as a joy and a privilege—an attitude 
out of place in historical realism, perhaps, but quite consistent with the tropes of erotic 
romance.166 Cavendish stresses the personal and particular nature of William’s feelings 
for his master, as when, unable to fulfill his “earnest desire” to accompany Charles into 
battle in Scotland, he must wait for news of the expedition: “so soon as he had 
Intelligence that the Scottish Army […] was defeated, and that no body knew what was 
become of His Majesty, [he] fell into so violent a Passion, that I verily believed it would 
have endanger’d his life; but when afterwards the happy news came of His Majesties safe 
arrival in France, never any Subject could rejoice more then my Lord did” (T1v).  
William regards his relationship with the King, whom he educated as a youth, as 
singular, even intimate, and his contemporaries attest to this special affection even 
outside of Cavendish’s narrative: the Earl of Clarendon writes that his “particular 
reverence” for Charles I was surpassed only by his “more extraordinary devotion for that 
of the prince, as he had had the honour to be trusted with his education as governor.”167 
The antagonistic Lucy Hutchinson puts it differently in her Memoirs of her own husband: 
“no man was a greater prince in all [the north of England]” than William Cavendish, “till 
a foolish ambition of glorious slavery carried him to court, where he ran himself much 
                                                
166 Here, I depart from Fitzmaurice’s reading, which sees William’s stoicism as a gentlemanly veneer and a 
vehicle through which he transforms “private anger and bitterness […] into public amiability and wit” (95). 
167 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, Selections from The History of the Rebellion, ed. Gertrude Huehns 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 256. 
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into debt, to purchase neglects of the king [...] and scorns of the proud courtiers.”168 
Hutchinson’s republican disdain remains quite consistent with the ideals of William’s fin 
amour. In order to prove the full intensity of his love through both willing and joyful 
suffering, the lover in the fin amour tradition must necessarily serve a beloved who 
exacts such sacrifice from him indefinitely and without any guarantee of reward or 
reciprocity. Charles II, as Cavendish represents him, performs this role perfectly, and has 
yet to requite his servant. Throughout most of the Life, he is conspicuous by his absence 
as William serves him from afar, and their primary interactions are indeed defined by the 
King’s “neglect”: time and again, Charles expresses his appreciation for William’s 
fidelity while keeping him at arm’s length, permitting him to live in poverty in exile, 
failing to repair his ruined estate, and declining to admit him into the inner circle of his 
government or his graces. As for the “scorns of the proud courtiers,” William 
Cavendish’s literary sensibility evidently distinguished him even among other royalists, 
as Martine Brownley has noted: “Describing the Marquis of Newcastle as ‘amorous in 
poetry and music, to which he indulged the greatest part of his time,’ [the Earl of 
Clarendon] commented that ‘many inconveniences fall out’ for the Royalists because of 
their general’s refusal to interrupt his artistic activities for pressing military business. (Sir 
Philip Warwick more bluntly explained that Newcastle ‘had the misfortune to have 
somewhat of the poet in him.’)”169 
                                                
168 Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, ed. Julius Hutchinson and Charles Firth. 
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), 117. 
169 Martine Watson Brownley, Clarendon and the Rhetoric of Historical Form (Philadelphia: U of 
Philadelphia P, 1985), 122. 
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 Significantly, Margaret Cavendish emphasizes their royalist compatriots’ 
bewilderment over William’s love rather than repressing it in her narrative. His extreme 
selflessness is incomprehensible, even undesirable, to observers who stand outside the 
love-relationship as William has defined it, but his romantic subjectivity compels him to 
disregard all who are too concerned with their own interests to be capable of his level of 
devotion. Cavendish thus manages to reproduce Sidney’s erotic exceptionalism and 
exclusivity without recourse to Calvinist election or godly community. Indeed, 
membership in a like-minded fellowship would diminish William:  
  My Lord entertaining one time some Gentlemen with a merry Discourse,  told  
  them, that he would not keep them Company except they had done and sufferd as  
  much for their King and Country as he had. They answer’d, That they had not a  
  power answerable to my Lords. My Lord replied, They should do their endeavour  
  according to their Abilities: No, said they, if we did, we should be like your Self,  
  lose all, and get but little for our pains. 
        (Aaa2r, Aaa2v) 
 
The “merry Discourse” turns suddenly serious when the gentlemen acknowledge both 
their own instincts for self-preservation and the King’s apparent indifference to William’s 
suffering. In a typically complex maneuver, Cavendish manages all at once to highlight 
Charles’ coldness, William’s reckless refusal to safeguard himself, and the extraordinary 
heroism that exalts him far above his practical fellows whose blunt rationality prevents 
them from attaining, or even admiring, his courtly perfection. 
 While his allies regard his losses as a pity, and perhaps even a source of shame, 
William wears his sufferance as a badge of honor. Cavendish recalls an incident in which 
“A Soldiers Wife, whose Husband had been slain in my Lord’s Army, came one time to 
beg some relief of my Lord,” but William’s own fortune is so much reduced that he must 
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turn her away empty-handed (Aaa2v). The widow, whose anger and bitterness may 
deliberately mirror Cavendish’s own, protests “That His Majesty’s Enemies were 
preferr’d to great Honours, and had much Wealth,” but William calmly replies that their 
mutual poverty “is a sign […] that your Husband and I were Honest Men” (Aaa2v). As 
William presents it, his unreciprocated fidelity ceases to signify only his weakness, 
diminution, and dependence on the King; instead, his very abjection becomes his greatest 
source of pride, comfort, and autonomy. His lowliness similarly serves as the foundation 
of his private integrity and public heroism in another of Cavendish’s recollections: “I 
have heard my Lord say, That when he was in Banishment, He had nothing left him, but a 
clear Conscience, by which he had and did still conquer all the Armies of misfortunes 
that ever seized upon him” (Zz1r). And as William’s romantic “Conscience” acts as a 
weapon against “the Armies of misfortune,” it shields him against the dismay of all those 
who would cast aspersions on his romantic code.  
 We eventually find that William is well aware of the singularity of his devotion 
and of its mystifying effect on others, despite his indifference to their objections. After 
Charles’ restoration produces no substantial honors for the Cavendishes, William finally 
resolves to retire to the country to make the best of the remnants of his estate. But first, he 
goes to the King to seek permission, and to dispel any rumors about his motives: 
Sir, said he to His Majesty, I am not ignorant, that many believe I am 
discontented; and ’tis probable they’l say, I retire through discontent: But I take 
God to witness, That I am in no kind or ways displeas’d; for I am so joyed at 
your Majesties happy Restauration, that I cannot be sad or troubled for any 
Concern to my own particular; but whatsoever Your Majesty is pleased to 
command me, were it to sacrifice my Life, I shall most obediently perform it; for 
I have no other Will, but Your Majesties Pleasure. 
      (Aa1r)  
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With this final declaration of fidelity, “he kissed His Majesty’s hand, and went the next 
day into Nottingham-shire, to his Mannor-house call’d Welbeck,” where his lands and 
affairs lie in ruins (Aa1r). Anticipating that court gossips will presume his shortage of 
royal favour has bred bitterness and ill will, William reiterates that his brand of love 
necessitates the abandonment of will, or rather the total submission of one’s will to the 
desires of one’s beloved—an act that strengthens the lover to his own sublime 
satisfaction even as it diminishes him in the eyes of outsiders. Having already sacrificed 
his material goods, he would happily give infinitely more to prove that his love has no 
limit, and that it is too content within its own sphere to regard the incredulity of others. 
Even if the historical Duke of Newcastle was “profoundly disappointed to find himself 
excluded from the king’s inner circle,” the literary William Cavendish thrives on this 
exclusion because it enables his exclusion of all other subjects as lesser lovers.170 
 As much as Cavendish celebrates it, William is not the only victim of his heroic 
exclusivity. The witness who regards his devotion with the greatest skepticism, and who 
suffers most in turn as a result of it, proves to be Margaret Cavendish herself. Whenever 
Margaret appears in the Life—sometimes as an active participant in its events, more often 
as an observer and counselor—her persona as character consistently resembles her 
persona as narrator in its preference for reason over romance. In this respect, she too 
occupies a doubly gendered role: while romance’s tropes allow the King to act as both 
master and mistress, and William’s feminized submission to a hierarchy of love allows 
his manly virtue to dominate the text, Margaret’s position outside of their homoerotic 
                                                
170 Anna Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind (Lexington: U P of Kentucky, 1998), 4. 
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relationship marginalizes her as a disenfranchised woman, denied political power and 
primacy in her husband’s affections. At the same time, it permits her to assume an 
aggressively rational, conventionally masculine perspective that regards romance as a 
foolish distraction from economic, political, and otherwise practical concerns. Cavendish 
frequently seems to insert herself into the narrative for the express purpose of serving as a 
skeptical counterweight, or an oppositional force, to William’s romantic tendencies. Very 
occasionally, Margaret’s rationality wins the day over her husband’s more extreme 
impulses toward fin amour, as when she manages to prevent him from embarking on a 
dangerous and virtually hopeless sea journey in search of his missing master: 
 My Lord being come to Rotterdam, was informed that His Highness the Prince  
 (now our Gracious King) was gone to Sea: Wherefore he resolved to follow him,  
 and for that purpose hired a Boat, and victual’d it; but since no body knew  
 whither His Highness was gone; and I being unwilling that my Lord should  
 venture upon so uncertain a Voyage, and (as the Proverb is) “Seek a Needle in a  
 Bottle of Hay,” he desisted from that design[.]  
       (Q2v, R1r) 
 
Far more often, though, Cavendish pits Margaret’s pragmatism against William’s  
romantic heroism only to have the generic conventions of romance prevail, or at least, 
only to depict Margaret being gently scolded by her husband for neglecting his ideals of 
honor, patience, absolute fidelity, and faith in a romantic telos to the royalists’ history. 
For instance, after emphasizing their penury in exile, Cavendish remarks on her 
husband’s enduring hope for a happy ending to the royalist story: “In this Condition (and 
how little soever the appearance was) my Lord was never without hopes of seeing yet [...] 
a happy issue of all his misfortunes and sufferings, especially of the Restauration of His 
most Gracious King and Master, to His Throne [...] whereof he always had assured 
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Hopes” (U2r, U2v). William is not merely hopeful, but “assured” that “Restauration” will 
come to pass, though his chief care is not for his own personal “happy issue,” but for that 
of “His most Gracious King and Master.” His conviction stands in marked contrast to his 
wife’s freely-admitted pessimism (or realism): “whensoever I expressed how little faith I 
had in it, he would gently reprove me, saying, I believ’d least, what I desir’d most; and 
could never be happy if I endeavour’d to exclude all hopes, and entertain’d nothing but 
doubts and fears” (U2v). From our position of hindsight after the historical Restoration, 
William’s faith or foresight appears entirely justified, but as readers in the midst of the 
narrative, we can easily imagine ourselves feeling Margaret’s doubt. Thus, when his faith 
comes to fruition, Cavendish allows—even encourages—us to imagine that her husband 
possessed a special narrative vision of the structure of history that his more rational wife 
lacked. When Margaret asks “What kind of Fate it was, that restored our Gracious King 
[…] to His Throne,” William gently corrects the terms of her inquiry by admitting divine 
providence into human contingency: “It was a blessed kind of Fate” (Zz2v).171 
 Of course, the providential conclusion to the royalist romance that William has 
anticipated proves limited: granted little share in the King’s glorious restoration, he fails 
to receive any significant material rewards or immaterial favor from Charles. He does, 
however, enjoy a much humbler moment of private restoration in Cavendish’s narrative. 
Returning home after years in exile, and “so transported with the joy of returning into his 
Native Countrey, that he regarded not” the dangerously dilapidated condition of his ship, 
                                                
171 David Norbrook has remarked that “Cavendish has no time for the providential explanations of events 
that preoccupied so many royalist as well as Puritan historians. She offers her husband’s life as a quest for 
individual glory in a world governed by fortune” (“Margaret Cavendish and Lucy Hutchinson: Identity, 
Ideology and Politics,” In-between 9.1 [2000], 179-203, 194). But while Cavendish’s disdain for 
providential history is indeed a pillar of her work, she admits it into the Life for William’s sake. 
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At last being come so far that he was able to discern the smoak of London, which 
he had not seen in a long time, he merrily was pleased to desire one that was near 
him, to jogg and awake him out of his dream, for surely, said he, I have been 
sixteen years asleep, and am not throughly awake yet. My Lord lay that night at 
Greenwich, where his Supper seem’d more savoury to him, then any meat he had 
hitherto tasted; and the noise of some scraping Fidlers, he thought the pleasantest 
harmony that ever he had heard.  
      (Y2v, Z1r)  
  
William’s sublime contentment is soon intruded upon by the arrival of Margaret, who 
finds his London lodgings “not fit for a Person of his Rank and Quality, nor of the 
capacity to contain all his Family” (Z2v). In “some passion,” she urges him to leave 
London, where he remains for the King’s sake, and tend instead to his own affairs at last, 
but once more, her husband “gently reprove[s] [her] for [her] rashness and impatience” 
and remains in the city to wait on his master (Z2v).  
 We know that William is supremely satisfied, having always made his happiness 
entirely conditional upon his master’s, but Margaret continues to struggle with the 
political and emotional ramifications of her husband’s love. Questioning his perception of 
the monarch/subject relationship as an affective but immutably hierarchical bond between 
a master and a devoted servant, she writes, 
I declared that I had observed Great Princes were not like the Sun, which sends 
forth out of it self Rays of Light, and Beams of Heat; effects that did both glorifie 
the Sun, and nourish and comfort sublunary Creatures; but their glory […] 
proceeded rather from the Ceremony which they received from their subjects.  
      (Aaa2r) 
      
But William is unmoved by his wife’s argument for the natural necessity of reciprocal 
contract, countering “That Subjects were so far from giving splendor to their Princes, that 
all the Honours and Titles, in which consists the chief splendor of a subject, were 
principally derived from them; for, said he, were there no Princes, there would be none to 
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confer Honours and Titles upon them” (Aaa2r). The absolutism of his love for the King 
renders him a “sublunary creature” comforted by his master’s Sun; all “glory” flows from 
one source and all duty from the other, to the satisfaction of both parties and the 
consternation of all others. Finally, when Margaret expresses her skepticism for the entire 
concept of fin amour after the Restoration because of its failure to guarantee gratification 
for the lover, William simply responds with enduring resolution to make it the ongoing 
basis of his life and service to the King: 
I have heard him say several times, That his love to his gracious Master King  
Charles the Second, was above the love he bore to his Wife, Children, and all his 
Posterity, nay to his own life: And when, since His Return into England, I 
answer’d him, That I observed His Gracious Master did not love him so well as 
he lov’d Him; he replied, That he cared not whether His Majesty lov’d him again 
or not; for he was resolved to love him.  
      (Zz2r) 
 
William gladly acknowledges that his love for the King defies explanation; since, as in 
the New Arcadia, “they onely know it, which inwardly feele it,” it becomes an end and a 
good in itself. Its virtue is only heightened by his own admission that his “Master seem’d 
to have forgot him,” and his private commitment to it sets him apart from and above all 
of Charles’ more pragmatic but less heroic subjects, including his own wife (Bbb2v).172 
Cavendish’s juxtaposition of William and Margaret’s characters throughout the 
Life leads us to an inevitable question. Is Cavendish’s skepticism in her intra-narrative 
role as the hero’s wife meant as a genuine critique of William’s romantic values and of 
absolute devotion to the monarchy, or does she rather intend to magnify William’s 
heroism in the eyes of her readers (including Charles II) by emphasizing his loyalty to his 
                                                
172 Fitzmaurice also remarks on the juxtaposition between Cavendish’s voice and her husband’s, noting that 
her cynicism “only serves to make her depiction of her husband’s amiability come more to the fore” (98). 
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love in the face of his wife’s pragmatic, rationalist temptations? The answer to this 
either/or question, I think, can only be yes. William’s character confirms his status as the 
ultimate hero of the royalist romance by staying steadfast to his preeminent relationship 
with the King even when his devotion yields no clear benefits and jars with his secondary 
duties to his secondary beloved. At the same time, Cavendish uses William’s stunningly 
disinterested heroism as a means to advocate for his worldly interests, since he will not 
do so himself. Because he has sought the least, he deserves the most, and Charles’ failure 
to bestow favor commensurate with William’s “Actions and Sufferings” leaves both the 
King and fin amour as a political model open to criticism. Cavendish thus manages to 
idealize her husband’s romantic principles without compromising her own rational ones, 
unifying both sets of values in an effort to make the arc of William’s romance entirely 
complete by moving the King to the requital that she believes her husband has long 
merited. Pragmatic realism and romance, often seemingly dichotomous throughout the 
Life, finally function in mutual service to one another, and Margaret’s subjectivity, once 
fragmented into the roles of submissive wife and masculine rationalist, may become 
whole again.  
We might see the legacy of William’s commitment to fin amour in Cavendish’s 
fictional romance narratives. Kahn has argued that “In contrast to William Cavendish, 
who sacrificed his interest to the king’s and whose love was unrequited, Margaret 
Cavendish suggests [in her prose romances] that passion and interest may together 
underwrite the contract of political obligation and that honor and loyalty may not be 
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incompatible with ‘politic designs.’”173 The heroines of Cavendish’s romances—one of 
whom we will meet in the next chapter—may singly embody this unification of passion 
and interest, but in the Life of William, the passion is all William’s and the interest is all 
Margaret’s. Only when her pragmatism and his devotion operate in concert can The Life 
of William Cavendish function, in Cavendish’s terms, as a “Heroical” history that speaks 
on their mutual behalf; under Kahn’s formulation, only as a married couple can they 
serve as a unified subject. Despite Cavendish’s prefatory emphasis on the incompatibility 
of romance with historiographic and political concerns, she ultimately seems to find the 
productive interplay between rational skepticism and romantic vision as intellectually 
fruitful as her own relationship with William.  
 
IV. “More [...] than the best romances describe”: Puritan Heroism, Genre, and 
Gender in Lucy Hutchinson’s Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson 
 
There can be no doubt that Lucy Hutchinson—who did, in fact, compare her 
husband John to Moses—is the sort of Puritan writer that Cavendish has in mind when 
she disdains “mystical” styles of historiography colored by “romansical” overtones. For 
Hutchinson, as for Sidney on his mental pinnacle, the mundane backdrop of human 
history is really a translucent screen through which the godly may witness a shadow-
battle between cosmic forces of good and evil. The recent civil war, she explains in her 
Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, is no mere political circumstance, but one of 
many battles in an ongoing “spirituall combate.”174 Proposing in the Memoirs to situate 
                                                
173 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 194. 
174 Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, ed. James Sutherland (London: Oxford U 
P, 1973), 38. Future references to this edition will be cited parenthetically. 
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the war within a larger narrative before returning to John Hutchinson’s life, Hutchinson 
approaches Britain’s past century with a combination of analytical historiography and 
vivid literary imagination. The Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots assumes the lurid stock 
role of the “wicked Queene” of “bloody lustfull temper” who menaces her righteous 
Protestant rival, much as Cecropia or Duessa (fictional echoes of Mary) do in Sidney’s 
and Spenser’s romances, while Elizabeth is miraculously protected from harm “by the 
good providence of God” (39, 41). Mary’s son, the licentious and prodigal James, is 
guilty of more than excessive spending and conciliation toward papists: he also nurses a 
“secrett designe of revenge upon the godly” after his mother’s death (43). Under his 
regime, “Murther, incest, Adultery, drunkennesse, swearing, fornication and all sort of 
ribaldry” flourish, and as the result of “mix’d marriages of Papist and protestant 
famelies,” “children’s soules [are] sacrific’d to devills” (42). But throughout this struggle 
between the “children of darknesse” and the “children of light” (44), God “most 
miraculously order[s] providences” for the “preservation” of his chosen people (49), and 
the predestined conclusion of the narrative of history is never in doubt: however many 
battles may appear “more successefull to the devill,” the war will at last “happily be 
decided” when “the Prince of Peace come to conclude the controversie” (281). 
 The Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, together with Lucy Hutchinson’s 
brief fragment of her own autobiography, stands as a remarkable companion piece to 
Cavendish’s Life of William. David Norbrook has provided an excellent overview about 
the relationships between the Hutchinsons and the Cavendishes (near neighbors in 
Nottinghamshire) and between the women’s heroic biographies of their husbands, which 
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were written around the same time, though Hutchinson’s republican Memoirs were not 
printed during Charles II’s reign. Norbrook notes that “it is possible that [Hutchinson] 
wrote the Memoirs in the knowledge of the Duchess’s work on her husband’s life […] 
and that this was a spur to making her work ideologically quite distinct from Cavendish’s 
writing,” a distinction that ostensibly involves the rejection of romance.175 However, 
Hutchinson’s engagement with romance is more like Cavendish’s than not, and a fuller 
consideration of the genre in the Memoirs helps us better appreciate the common ground, 
the contested territory, and the hard boundaries between Cavendish and Hutchinson as 
politically-engaged women writing heroic historiography. Much like Cavendish, 
Hutchinson explicitly disavows romance as a frivolous, culturally tarnished genre, only to 
rely on it as the best vehicle for conveying her subject’s singular heroism. Her 
autobiographical fragment acknowledges that as a girl, she “thought it no sin” to enjoy 
“amorous sonnetts or poems, and twenty things of that kind,” implying that in her 
maturity she does regard indulgence in “amorous” literature as unfit for Puritan readers 
(288). Still, romance proves indispensable for memorializing John Hutchinson as a 
republican hero, a Puritan saint, and—more importantly than in Cavendish’s Life—a 
devoted spouse.176 Like William Cavendish, his heroism is so singular that it fails to find 
its like within his partisan community; Lucy Hutchinson calls together a reading 
fellowship of her husband’s admirers and emulators only after his death. Moreover, the 
romance of the Memoirs is also chiefly one of love: like the heroes of the New Arcadia, 
                                                
175 See “Margaret Cavendish and Lucy Hutchinson,” 194, 185. 
176 Devoney Looser, discussing the genre of the Memoirs in British Women Writers and The Writing of 
History, 1670-1820 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins U P, 2000), suggests that for Hutchinson, carefully 
controlled elements of romance “are not only acceptable but necessary to honest history writing” (45). 
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John derives his elect subjectivity, in no small part, from the providential direction of his 
erotic life. But where Cavendish deemphasizes her marriage to focus on William’s love 
for the King, Hutchinson struggles with the interplay between her and William’s ardor for 
one another and his even more passionate devotion to God—and the wife of the Memoirs, 
too, ultimately takes second place in her husband’s heart as John lives into his full heroic 
destiny to serve his first love. As a result, part of Hutchinson’s work in the Memoirs is to 
carve out a complex perspective on genre and gender for herself, together with some 
sense of her own heroic subjectivity, as a Puritan republican wife who does not always 
share her husband’s narrative vision—a harder task, we will find, than Cavendish’s 
comparable endeavor in the more secular Life. 
Hutchinson’s autobiographical fragment frames the Memoirs by writing Lucy, as 
well as John, into English history as a godly heroine who has been chosen to enter the 
story at precisely the right moment. “[A]tt the time of my birth,” Hutchinson writes, the 
eternal conflict between darkness and light was just then “working up into that tempest 
wherein I have shar’d many perills [...] and many more mercies, consolations and 
preservations” (281). Being born into the midst of a historical “tempest,” she asserts, is a 
“considerable mercy” because it positions her at a crux within the divine narrative that 
gives her the potential both to witness the marvelous and to undertake heroic action 
(282). Her introduction into the narrative occurs “not in the midnight of poperie, nor in 
the dawne of the gospell’s restored day,” but “early in the morning, God being pleased to 
allow me the privelledge of beholding the admirable growth of gospell light in my dayes; 
and oh! that my soule may never forgett to blesse and prayse his name for the wonders of 
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power and goodnesse, wisdome and truth, which have bene manifested in this my time” 
(282). Hutchinson’s account of her birth further suggests that she may do more than 
simply “behold” God’s “wonders”: her mother dreams while pregnant that she catches a 
falling star, which (she is told) “signified she should have a daughter of some 
extraordinary eminency” (287). Hutchinson moves partly to diminish the effect of this 
startling claim by suggesting that the dream, “like such vaine prophecies, wrought as 
farre as it could its own accomplishment” in the form of her parents’ special care and 
indulgence, but her autobiography nevertheless introduces her as a potential heroine 
surrounded by the romantic tropes of tempests and prophetic signs (287).   
 Like Spenser’s Britomart, however, Hutchinson’s sense of wifely and pious 
obligation comes to interfere with her assertion of her own heroic agency.177 Her account 
of her portentous life breaks off while she is still a child, and the bulk of her life writing 
celebrates the civic and romantic heroism of her husband, driven primarily by his 
narrative vision, not by the ambivalent promise of her mother’s dream. John Hutchinson, 
too, is the focus of marvelous signs in infancy: “flung” from a runaway carriage by a 
desperate nursemaid, the baby is rescued from all injury “by the good providence of 
God,” which “reserv[es]” him for “a more glorious death” as a champion of the godly 
                                                
177 Several scholars have addressed the question of Lucy Hutchinson’s feminist agency vs. her 
subordination to her husband. N. H. Keeble, the Memoirs’ most recent editor, has argued that Hutchinson’s 
recurring representation of herself as her husband’s shadow or reflection is symptomatic of her total 
subordination (“‘But the Colonel’s Shadow’: Lucy Hutchinson, Women’s Writing, and the Civil War,” in 
Literature and the English Civil War, ed. Thomas Healy and Jonathan Sawday, [Cambridge: Cambridge U 
P, 1990], 227-47). On the opposite end of the spectrum, Erica Longfellow has mined Hutchinson’s 
Memoirs and her Elegies for evidence of her proto-feminist belief in the essential equality of the sexes 
(“The Transfiguration of Colonel Hutchinson in Lucy Hutchinson’s Elegies,” in Women and Religious 
Writing in Early Modern England [Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2004], 180-208). Throughout his extensive 
body of work on Hutchinson, Norbrook has advocated for a more nuanced appreciation of her intertwined 
gestures toward wifely submission and female agency; I hope to do the same here. 
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(21).178 His life continues to be preserved by providence many times in his adulthood, to 
the point that he comforts himself after the Restoration that “the Lord had not thus 
eminently preserv’d him for nothing, but that he was yett kept for some eminent service 
or suffering” in the Good Old Cause (234). John matures into a handsome, “exactly well-
proportion’d” man, whose courtly beauty (lovingly detailed in his wife’s surprisingly 
amorous blazon) is augmented by the indefinable allure that so many heroes of romance 
possess: his “countenance [...] carried in it something of magnanimity and majesty mixt 
with sweetenesse, that at the same time bespoke love and awe in all that saw him” (3).179 
This “something” accords him “majesty” and mastery even in the plane of “spirituall 
combate”: “so were all the children of darknesse convinc’d by his light that they were in 
awe more of his vertue than his authority” (206). As soon as John becomes confirmed in 
his Puritan faith and inwardly convinced that God “ha[s] bene pleas’d to chuse him out of 
the corrupted masse of lost mankind,” he resolves to enter public life, incensed at the 
injustices endured by his godly countrymen (35). Notably, Hutchinson separates her 
accounts of her husband’s conversion and of his parliamentary debut with “a short 
digression from our particular actions” to her history of Protestant England (37), but this 
                                                
178 Lucy Hutchinson’s descendant Julius Hutchinson, who prepared the original manuscript of the Memoirs, 
occasionally expresses skepticism at episodes of Hutchinson’s life writing that “[savour] almost too much 
of the ridiculous for the gravity of an historian,” but acknowledges that while some may be “untrue,” 
literary exaggerations about his ancestor were not unusual: he had heard “other tales, resembling the 
legends of romance [...] of him at Owthorpe.” See Hutchinson and Firth, eds., 38n, 390n. 
179 Sharon Achinstein has argued that in the erotic and devotional “schema of gazing and blazoning”—
typically of Christ—that we encounter in seventeenth-century Protestant women’s writing, “romance 
became deployed […] precisely because it worked to accommodate erotic desires as agency” (“Romance of 
the Spirit: Female Sexuality and Religious Desire in Early Modern England,” ELH 69 [2002], 413-438, 
418, 435). Throughout the Memoirs, Hutchinson grapples with the relationship between her romantic 
agency and her husband’s. For a reading of the blazon and female agency in Hutchinson’s work, see 
Pamela Hammons, “Polluted Palaces: Gender, Sexuality and Property in Lucy Hutchinson’s ‘Elegies,’” 
Women’s Writing 13.3 (2006), 392-415. 
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separation also serves as an important link: John’s private consciousness of his election 
heralds his public heroism and his commitment to stand with the “children of light” in the 
unfolding providential narrative in which he is now a major figure. Like Sidney’s princes 
or Spenser’s knights, he has been called to challenge tyrants and chosen to defend truth, 
and his election is of a piece with his romantic subjectivity. At the core of his romance, 
though, we encounter not combat, but love.  
At the conclusion of her account of John’s and her courtship, Hutchinson 
indicates that she has left much unsaid: “I shall passe by all the little amorous relations, 
which if I would take the paynes to relate, would make a true history of a more handsome 
management of love than the best romances describe; for these are to be forgotten as the 
vanities of youth, not worthy mention among the greater transactions of his life” (32). 
Her comment blends Puritan sobriety with authorial coyness: of course erotic romance is 
a worldly vanity “not worthy” of the Colonel’s “greater” heroism, and yet if we knew all 
that she could tell us, we would see that John Hutchinson is as consummate an amorous 
hero as he is a godly or martial one. But Hutchinson is being somewhat disingenuous 
even in her claim that her narrative will “passe by” romance here: her story of the 
courtship has already lasted several pages by the time she makes her disclaimer, and it 
has indulged in no shortage of romantic conventions. It begins by mentioning all the unfit 
lovers whom John has wisely and piously avoided: predestined for a bride who suits his 
spiritual nobility, he steers clear of the “fine snares” of “vaine weomen” hoping to 
“entangle” him (28). Hutchinson reminds us that John remains providentially ordained 
for eroticism of a different sort: “wealth and beauty thus in vaine tempted him, for it was 
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not yett his time of love; but it was not farre off” (26). Narrative suspense builds as we 
foresee an approaching destiny of which the hero remains ignorant; in keeping with 
Sidney or Spenser’s Protestant revisions of romance, the elect hero’s elect beloved will 
soon produce an interior effect in him that no other woman could. 
 Even more attached to the tropes of medieval romance than Sidney, Hutchinson 
goes so far as to introduces the possibility of magic, as John’s travels take him to a house 
endowed with a mysterious blessing or curse: according to local legend, it is a place “so 
fatall for love that never any young disengag’d person went thither who return’d againe 
free” (27). Naturally, John “laugh[s]” at this fantasy, and we may gather that he is 
therefore all the more likely to fall subject to it (27). The prophecy begins to work when 
he discovers some scholarly books in the house that belong to a lady called Lucy Apsley, 
who is currently absent. Like some particularly precocious romance lovers (including 
Sidney’s Pyrocles and Spenser’s Britomart), John appears to fall in love before first sight, 
and Hutchinson presents her audience with the gradual unfolding of his virtuous passion 
in a detailed sequence that echoes Sidney’s accounts of love’s progress. “[H]e began first 
to be sorrie she was gone before he had seene her [....] then he grew to love to heare 
mention of her”; upon being told of Lucy’s supposedly unfeminine “reserv’d and 
studious” manner and her ability as a poet, “it so much enflam’d Mr. Hutchinson’s desire 
of seeing her that he began to wonder at himselfe that his heart, which had ever had such 
an indifferency for the most excellent of weomenkind, should have so strong impulses 
towards a stranger he never saw” (28-9). When he is given the false impression that Lucy 
is already married to another suitor, the critical moment of internal transformation by 
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love is upon him: “Mr. Hutchinson immediately turn’d pale as ashes, and felt a fainting to 
seize his spiritts [...] it was not necessary for him to feigne sicknesse, for the distemper of 
his mind had infected his body with a cold sweate and such a dispersion of spiritt that all 
the courage he could at present recollect was little enough to keepe him allive” (30). 
Suffering from the usual psychosomatic effects of lovesickness, and marveling at his 
intense desire for “an unknowne person,” John “then remember’d the story was told him 
when he came downe, and began to believe there was some magick in the place which 
enchanted men out of their right sences”; despite his pride in his own religious 
rationalism, he is unable to dissuade himself from this fanciful suspicion (30). 
 But Hutchinson is careful to remind us that magic cannot be the first cause of the 
love story in the Memoirs. In a “light person” not possessed of John’s elect heroism, she 
suggests, such “an extravagant perplexity of soule” over a nascent love affair would be 
frivolous and “not [...] admirable”; in him, however, it can signify only the inward “effect 
of a miraculous power of providence, leading him to her that was destin’d to make his 
future joy” (30). God’s election legitimizes John’s half-ironic sensation that his life has 
become a romance, and when Lucy finally arrives, she too partakes in the romantic 
subjectivity of the elect, “surpriz’d with some unusuall liking in her soule” at first sight of 
John despite her parallel history of “indifferency” toward other men (31_. As the author 
of their romance, God has chosen them not just for himself, but for one another. Only at 
this point does Hutchinson elide the rest of their courtship, barring her readers from the 
intimate details that surpass “the best romances” and adding “only this”: “that never was 
there a passion more ardent and lesse idolatrous; he loved her better than his life, with 
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unexpressable tendernesse and kindnesse, had a most high oblieging esteeme of her, yet 
still consider’d honour, religion, and duty above her” (32).  
This final qualification, while it may seem a pious afterthought following 
Hutchinson’s entertaining and passionate account, points to the heart of the Memoirs as a 
testimony to John’s Puritan heroism and introduces us to the gendered and generic 
tensions that follow. Much as William Cavendish’s idealized representation as a royalist 
hero stems from his absolute devotion to his master the king in lieu of his wife or his own 
interests, John Hutchinson emerges as the epitome of heroism for a godly republic 
because, for all his ardor and affection for Lucy, “he lov[es] God above her” (10). If he 
possesses such a sincere attachment to the “little amorous relations” of his marriage, 
which “vanities” are in themselves better “than the best romances describe,” his 
willingness to subordinate them to the greater romance of providential history becomes 
all the more heroic—just as Spenser’s Redcrosse embodies Protestant heroism only once 
he learns first to surrender their erotic plots to the divine plot, and then to integrate them 
with it. Critically, however, John alone possesses the far-seeing sense of narrative scope 
that enables him to glimpse God’s glorious end, having been “led up to see” a “soule-
refreshing view” in his mind’s eye of “the promis’d land […] such a one as made him 
forget on what side of the river he stood, while by faith he tooke possession of future 
glory, and resign’d himselfe in the assured hope of returning with the Lord and his greate 
Armie of Saints” (36). John comforts himself and attempts to console his wife with this 
vision, but Lucy continues to be faced with Britomart’s archetypal feminine perspective: 
not granted her husband’s visionary faith or narrative foresight, she must rely on male 
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prophetic assurance and on her hope for her children in order to attempt any mediation 
between the triumphant romance of the elect and her tragic personal loss.  
 Thus, once Hutchinson has concluded the romance of John’s amorous adventures 
with his happy marriage to Lucy, the tone of the Memoirs shifts: the remainder details the 
Colonel’s devotion not to his wife, but to his nation and to his God. The theme of the 
hero’s “actions and sufferings” becomes as critical a refrain in the Memoirs as in 
Cavendish’s Life, and again, heroic sufferance takes precedence over heroic action once 
the protagonists’ personal and political hopes are frustrated. Fortunately for John 
Hutchinson, he, like his royalist counterpart, flourishes most when he has the most to 
endure and “ever [has] most vigor and chearefullnesse when there [is] most danger” to 
himself (202). Accordingly, the heroic glory of his military triumphs in wartime is soon 
eclipsed by that of his patience and magnanimity during his postwar disappointments. 
Once the Restoration dashes the Puritan republicans’ immediate hopes, the Colonel vows, 
with romantic rhetoric resembling William’s in the Life, that having “made shipwrack of 
all things but a good conscience,” “if the sacrifice of him might conduce to the publick 
peace and settlement, he should freely submitt his life and fortunes to their dispose” 
(228). But as John becomes increasingly committed to living a romance, even if that 
means giving his life for its end, Lucy increasingly sinks into Fulke Greville’s impression 
that the hero’s magnanimity will conclude in tragedy. 
 The Lucy of the Memoirs is forced into a position strikingly like Margaret’s in the 
Life of William: compelled to accept her status as her husband’s secondary beloved, she 
does and suffers all she can on behalf of her husband even as he does the same for God 
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and country, yet finds herself standing awkwardly between him and his heroic vocation. 
Realizing that John’s magnanimity may wreak dire consequences in the wrong political 
climate, and “that he was ambitious of being a publick sacrifice,” Lucy reacts with alarm 
and dismay “and therefore, herein only in her whole life, resolv[es] to disobey him”: she 
forges an affidavit in his name “to urge what might be in his favour” and beg pardon for 
his role in the regicide (229). The document (temporarily) has the right effect on the 
judges, but an adverse one on John and on their marriage: 
 his wife, who thought she had never deserv’d so well of him as in the endeavours 
and labours she exercis’d to bring him off, never displeas’d him more in her life, 
and had much adoe to perswade him to be contented with his deliverance […] 
had not his wife perswaded him, [he] had offer’d himselfe a voluntary sacrifice.  
But being by her convinc’d that God’s eminent appearance seem’d to have 
singled him out for preservation, he with thankes acquiesced in that thing [...] and 
beg’d humbly of God to enlighten him[.] 
         (234) 
 
The Colonel can never be “contented” to put his life or his wife before God, although 
insofar as he can be persuaded that Lucy’s design accords with the divine narrative for 
his life, he accepts it while remaining watchful for the proper providential occasion for 
his “eminent” action or martyrdom.180 John continues to refuse Lucy’s pleas that he 
                                                
180 Although most readers of the Memoirs have not questioned Lucy Hutchinson’s version of events in 
recounting her forgery of John’s recantation, Derek Hirst and Guiseppina Iacono Lobo have offered 
provocative arguments that Hutchinson’s story here contains dubious elements and that she may be trying 
to recast her husband as a “pure” republican in the wake of a recantation that was possibly his idea all 
along. See Hirst, “Remembering a Hero: Lucy Hutchinson's Memoirs of Her Husband,” in Ashgate Critical 
Essays on Women Writers in England, 1550–1700: Volume 5, Anne Clifford and Lucy Hutchinson, ed. 
Mihoko Suzuki (Aldershot, 2009), 263–72, and Lobo, “Lucy Hutchinson’s Revisions of Conscience,” 
English Literary Renaissance 42.2 (2012), 317-41. Hirst and Lobo’s cases remind us once again that the 
subjects of these politically charged, generically complex memoirs may be best understood in context as 
literary characters rather than historical figures. David Norbrook has called for our scholarly appreciation 
of the irresolvable ambiguities of the case, stating that “it proves extremely difficult to find a bedrock of 
truth about John Hutchinson independent of his wife’s narrative; what does become clear is the degree of 
the couple’s political interdependence, as part of much wider patterns of political and familial agencies. 
The senses in which [Lucy Hutchinson] actually wrote the letter […] ultimately remain […] equivocal” 
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protect himself on the grounds that he must not stray from the providential path on which 
he has been placed: when she begs him “to go out of England” for his own safety, “he 
would not; he sayd this was the place where God had sett him and protected him hitherto, 
and it would be in him an ungratefull distrust of God to forsake it” (237-8). And after he 
is taken back into custody, he (again like William Cavendish) admonishes his wife for 
doubting that their present misfortunes conceal a providential telos: “Mrs. Hutchinson 
was exceedingly sad, but he encourag’d and kindly chid her out of it [...] and told her if 
she had but patience to waite the event, she would see it all for the best” (249).  
 Fully convinced of his subjective narrative vision that his own story and the story 
of England as a godly state are inextricably interlaced, John points Lucy to evidence both 
of his own chosen status and of the predestined triumph of the elect nation. Concerning 
himself, he “[bids] her consider what reason she had to rejoyce that the Lord supported 
him, and how much more intollerable it would have bene if the Lord had suffer’d his 
spiritt to have sunke, or his patience to have bene lost under this” (264). The combination 
of his high spirits and his low station are a sure sign of the glory to come: “Once when 
his wife was lamenting his condition […] he told her he could not have bene without this 
afliction, for if he had flourisht while all the people of God were corrected, he should 
have fear’d he had not bene accounted among his children if he had not shared their lott” 
(265). Again, John’s confidence in his election is inextricably connected to his perception 
of his role in God’s narrative and his vow of solidarity with the community of the godly; 
if his story lacked their romantic structure, complete with loss and sorrow, he could not 
                                                                                                                                            
(“Memoirs and Oblivion: Lucy Hutchinson and the Restoration,” Huntington Library Quarterly 75.2 
[2012], 233-282, 238). 
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number himself as one of the chosen. And he is equally certain that the romance of the 
godly, which necessitates their trials, must conclude with the triumph of their cause:  
  he gave her reasons why she should hope and be assur’d that this cause would  
  revive, because the interest of God was so much involv’d in it that he was  
  entitled to it. She told him she did not doubt but the cause would revive. ‘But,’  
  sayd she, ‘notwithstanding all your resolution, I know this will conquer the  
  weaknesse of your constitution, and you will die in prison.’ He replied, ‘I thinke  
  I shall not; but if I doe, my blood will be so innocent I shall advance the cause  
  more by my death, hasting the vengeance of God upon my unjust enemies, than  
  I could doe by all the actions of my life.’ 
        (264) 
 
Lucy is devout enough not to reject John’s testimony that the Puritans’ narrative will end 
well, but she doubts her husband’s conviction that the plot of his own life is so united to 
it that even his death would spur its progress, to England’s and his own heroic glory. 
Struggling to reconcile long-form communal romance to imminent personal tragedy, she 
is “a little” encouraged by his “faith and cheerfulness,” but “her devining heart,” which 
possesses a separate and more worldly generic foresight, is “not to be comforted” (249). 
 As the Memoirs and John Hutchinson’s life approach their ends, the subjective 
and generic distance between husband and wife only increases. While Lucy becomes all 
the more anxious and miserable in her “horrible toyle and inconvenience” laboring for 
John’s material welfare, John grows all the more happy in his long-delayed fulfillment of 
his spiritual destiny, “never more pleasant and contented in his whole life” (264): “His 
wife bore all her owne toyles joyfully enough for the love of him, but could not but be 
very sad att the sight of his undeserved sufferings; and he would very sweetely and 
kindly chide her for it, and tell her that if she were but chearefull he should thinke this 
suffering the happiest thing that ever befell him” (264). Hutchinson consistently stresses 
that John is “not at all dismay’d, but wonderfully pleas’d” not only because his 
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opportunity for heroic sacrifice is finally at hand, but also because his misfortune renews 
his sense of narrative vision as he considers his role within the national romance (255). 
The worldly exigencies that he had faced immediately after the Restoration had pressed 
him into practical negotiation with the royalists, and Lucy had urgently advocated such 
diplomacy, but now his imprisonment reminds him that his story is one of absolute 
“spirituall combate,” not petty politics: “Mr. Hutchinson [...] told his wife this captivity was 
the happiest release in the world to him; for [...] now he thought this usage had utterly 
disoblieg’d him from all ties” to “enemies to all just and godly interests” (255-6). He vows 
to have no future commerce with royalists, “convinc’d” once and for all that “there was a 
serpentine seed in them,” and blames his current condition on his former pragmatic 
complacency: “even that consenting submission that I had hath brought this suffering upon 
me” (265, 269). Yet “this suffering” is itself a providential mercy that restores the 
Colonel’s heroic subjectivity and thus strengthens his resistance, and so he orders his wife 
not to repeat her past mistake by “mak[ing] applications to any person whatsoever” and 
thus muddying the sacred distinctions between the “children of light” and the “children of 
darknesse” (256).  
 Finally, John Hutchinson’s death in prison—as foreseen by Lucy’s “devining 
heart”—concludes her personal tragedy while cementing his Puritan romance. While ill, 
he finds himself “Incomparably well, and full of faith” as his “continuall study of the 
Scriptures did infinitely ravish his soule […] and take it off from all lower exercise”: 
elevated to a higher realm by his passionate devotion to God, he ultimately leaves behind 
the youthful erotic passion that prefigured it (270-1). Upon being informed that he will 
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die of his illness, “The Colonell, without the least dejection or amazement, replied very 
composedly and chearefully, ‘The will of the Lord be done, I am ready for it,’” professing 
his “unspeakable joy” in Christ and “[speaking] only these two words” on his deathbed: 
“‘’Tis as I would have it. ’Tis where I would have it’” (271-2). His doctors see his easy 
passing as “evidence of a devine assistance that over-rul’d all the powers and operations of 
nature,” proof of a providential authority that presides over the end of John’s story (272-
3). At the last, when the friends gathered around him remind him of his absent wife, his 
final thoughts of her convey wistfulness and gentle sympathy for her plight without 
descending to grief or disrupting his pristine contentment: “when some nam’d Mrs. 
Hutchinson, [he] sayd, ‘Alas, how will she be surpriz’d!’ [H]e fetched a sigh, and within a 
little while departed, his countenance settling so amiably and cheerefull in death that he 
lookt after he was dead as he us’d to do when he was best pleas’d in life” (272).  
 Similar to Cavendish, Hutchinson is committed to the sincere glorification of her 
husband’s romantic heroism even as she simultaneously invites her readers’ sympathy for 
the tragic end to her own love story. But while Cavendish declines to prioritize either 
William’s romance or Margaret’s rationality and welcomes the generic hodgepodge that 
results, Hutchinson suggests that her struggle to read and write John’s life in a spirit of 
fidelity to his narrative vision is symptomatic of her own weakness in devotion, both to 
John and to God. Hutchinson the author therefore strives toward a faith in providential 
romance that Lucy the character could not achieve, and her preface invokes an elect 
community that Lucy seems unable to perceive in the body of the text. Chastising herself 
for her tendency to become mired in the “amorous relations” that John could enjoy yet 
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subordinate, and for her difficulty in following his example of putting God before all 
other loves, she bestows upon her children both the Memoirs and the task of remaining 
“united” in carrying on their father’s heroic work: 
Let not excesse of love and delight in the streame make us forgett the fountaine: 
he and all his excellencies came from God, and flow’d back into their owne 
spring. There lett us seeke them, thither lett us hasten after him [....] Our 
conjunction, if wee had any with him, was undissoluble; if wee were knitt 
together by one spiritt into one body of Christ, wee are so still; if wee were 
mutually united in one love of God, good men, and goodnesse, wee are so still. 
What is it then we waile in his remoove? The distance? Faithlesse fooles! ’tis 
sorrow only makes it[.] 
      (3) 
 
Rather than spend the rest of her life fruitlessly indulging in the tragedy of the loss of her 
beloved, Hutchinson presses herself and her audience to regard John’s death—and, by 
implication, the decline of his cause—as the middle, rather than the end, of the communal 
history of “God, good men, and goodnesse.” Notably, this generic shift from tragedy 
back to a form of romance higher than the narrative of their marriage remains contingent 
upon progeny as well as community: Hutchinson makes no clear distinction between the 
“children of light” and her own children, though she has come to borrow John’s vision of 
history in the absence of her own personal assurance.  
Colonel Hutchinson has valiantly fulfilled his role in the romance of his biological 
and ideological family and has risen above it, and now serves as a guide to those who 
must continue to live and progress within it: “wee may mourne [...] that wee want his 
guide and assistance in our way; and yett, if our teares did not putt out our eies, wee 
should see him, even in heaven, holding forth his flaming lamp of vertuous examples and 
precepts to light us through the darke world” (3). To follow the example of John’s 
heroism is to further advance the narrative of the elect, as he anticipated before his death, 
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while to “persue [the] sad remembrance” of it is to “ramble into an inextricable 
wildernesse”—an anti-teleological, pseudo-romantic substitute for the romance of 
providence (63). Yet this exhortation contrasts sharply with the eerie wandering that 
Hutchinson imagines for Lucy at the end of the Memoirs: “the spring after [his death] 
there came [to the prison] an apparition of a gentlewoman in mourning, in such a habitt 
as Mrs. Hutchinson us’d to weare there […] and was often seene walking in the 
Colonell’s chamber” (277). While still alive, Hutchinson suggests that Lucy has become 
a ghost who haunts her beloved husband’s cell.181 This final literary fancy blends the 
supernatural elements of romance with the perturbed spirits of tragedy while leaving the 
author of the Memoirs not quite unified with her character. Lucy Hutchinson’s endeavor 
to reconcile the romance of the elect to the tragic experiences that befall them, and to find 
prospects on which both male and female “children of light” could stand together in 
visionary resistance to the plots of the “children of darknesse,” would prove to be an 
ongoing project in her Genesis epic Order and Disorder.  
  
                                                
181 Erin Murphy has noted that while Hutchinson’s preface “promises her children that her text will 
preserve the memory of their father, suggesting that, through writing, the connection between past and 
present, parent and children will be maintained in the face of morality,” this “transcendence of time 
becomes threatened” at the end of the Memoirs by the appearance of Lucy’s ghost (Familial Forms: 
Politics and Genealogy in Seventeenth-Century English Literature [Lanham, MD: U of Delaware P, 2011], 
149). Keeble, in “But the Colonel’s Shadow,” cites Lucy’s shade as further evidence of her wifely 
subordination, but I believe we can also read the ghost as a sign of both her generic agency and her ongoing 
struggle to locate a romantic or heroic role for the female believer. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Fall and the Summit:  
Milton’s Counter-Revision of Romance  
in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained 
 
 
 The fact that both Puritans and royalists could insist that Spenser’s allegory spoke 
for their religio-political community and that Sidney was their ancestral champion—and 
the ease with which Cavendish and Hutchinson could sneer at romance as their enemies’ 
hobby-horse before turning to embrace it as a mode of representation for their husbands’ 
heroism—confirm Sidney’s sixteenth-century Protestant hope and Hobbes’ seventeenth-
century absolutist fear that romance was subjective and subversive, all the more powerful 
for the non-rational interiority it enabled. Hobbes was not alone in his midcentury 
anxiety: although postwar royalists and post-Restoration republicans continued their 
battle for romance as a genre that could accommodate and explain both heroic victories 
and crushing disappointments, their competition became increasingly self-conscious. 
Both communities were aware that the generic conflict, and the easily-manipulated 
subjectivity that occasioned it, needed to be faced and wrestled with: in Sir Percy 
Herbert’s postwar royalist romance The Princess Cloria, the beleaguered king Euarchus 
articulates the problem of romantic subjectivity run amok when he wonders “what 
assurances” he and his allies can possibly have of their status as the heroes of history 
“when every one pretends to be in the right, both in his belief and proceedings?”182 Many 
writers of political prose and poetry did not, however, assume along with Hobbes that the 
                                                
182 Percy Herbert, The Princess Cloria, or, The Royal Romance (London, 1661), 319. All subsequent 
references to this text will appear parenthetically by page number. 
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best answer was to abandon romance. Instead, their efforts became less concerned with 
heroic and communal faith in providential favor—the sort of unfalsifiable conviction that 
disturbed Hobbes—than with how a narrative’s protagonists might negotiate between 
belief and uncertainty, and between the hope of future success and the present realities of 
failure, contingency, and delay. This chapter explores the ongoing, increasingly meta-
generic ideological struggle, but with particular emphasis on John Milton’s turns (back) 
to romance in his post-Restoration poems—for while royalists are well known for their 
enduring engagement with the genre, Milton is broadly considered to have forsaken it in 
frustration as his career progressed.       
The young Milton’s love of romance is accepted as a matter of record. In his 1642 
anti-episcopal pamphlet An Apology for Smectymnuus, Milton recounts his literary 
education, dwelling at some length on how his “younger feet wandered [...] among those 
lofty fables and romances, which recount in solemn cantos the deeds of knighthood.”183 
Clear signs of this romantic reading appear prominently in his fanciful masque Comus 
and throughout his later prose. Areopagitica, for example, features the extended chivalric 
metaphor of “the true warfaring Christian” and his quest for Truth, and praises “our sage 
and serious Poet Spenser” as “a better teacher then Scotus or Aquinas.”184 The allegorical 
search for truth reappears in Of Education, and the imagery of Spenserian and folk 
romance features even in the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, where Milton again 
imagines history as a heroic narrative in which chosen protagonists defend Truth from 
“serpentine” Error: at select times, God “calls together the prudent and religious counsels 
                                                
183 CPW, 694. 
184 Ibid., 728-9. 
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of men [...] to be the sole advocate[s] of a discountenanced truth: [...] a high enterprise 
and a hard, and such as every seventh son of a seventh son does not venture on.”185 
Nevertheless, as the tensions of civil war escalated, and as his political enemies 
began increasingly to define royalist heroism and history through the language and narrative 
shape of romance, Milton’s youthful enthusiasm for the genre seemed rapidly to cool. In his 
1650 Eikonoklastes, Milton denounces romance as an insincere, ungodly tool with which 
Charles I and his followers manipulate popular sentiment. Eikonoklastes mocks its target, 
the propagandistic Eikon Basilike, for assigning to Charles a seemingly heartfelt prayer that 
was in fact plagiarized from “no serious book, but the vain amatorious poem of Sir Philip 
Sidney’s Arcadia—a book in that kind full of worth and wit, but among religious thoughts 
and duties not worthy to be named,” accusing the King of slavish devotion to the “sweet 
rhapsodies of heathenism and knight-errantry.”186 Milton was clearly familiar enough with 
Sidney’s New Arcadia to recognize a passage cribbed from it,187 but if the royalists were 
now claiming Sidney for their own in a war of both arms and ideas, he was compelled to 
disdain the book as witty enough (for a romance), but otherwise “not worthy.” The 
“religious” zeal and romantic rhetoric that often went hand-in-hand in Milton’s earlier 
writing appeared to become incompatible. 
The anti-romantic Eikonoklastes is often regarded as Milton’s final word on the 
genre. While a small set of Miltonists, including Barbara Lewalski, Northrop Frye, Maureen 
Quilligan, and Colin Burrow, have suggested that Milton remained committed to romance’s 
                                                
185 Ibid., 697. 
186 Ibid., 793, 795. 
187 For Milton’s own appreciative references to Sidney’s Arcadia in his commonplace book, see Ruth 
Mohl, ed., “Milton’s Commonplace Book,” in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Vol. 1 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale U P, 1953), 371-2, 463-4. 
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godly potential for a Puritan audience, more have determined that the genre’s royalist 
associations overshadowed his enthusiasm, and that his eventual distaste for it spread into 
his later epic poems, Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained.188 George Williamson finds 
that Milton ultimately rejected romance as too Cavalier; Stanley Fish and Regina Schwartz 
both propose that Milton was politically and religiously motivated to abandon genre 
altogether in favor of a poetics of divine temporality that resisted conventional narrative 
shape; and David Loewenstein suggests that the crushing disappointment of the Puritan 
cause left Milton uneasy about optimistic genres after the Restoration.189 Annabel Patterson 
makes the crucial point that both positive and negative views of romance seem to coexist in 
Milton’s late poetry, a dichotomy also noted by Clare Kinney and John Steadman.190 But all 
three conclude that Milton saw something about the genre as finally and fundamentally 
fallen: in Patterson’s words, its usurpation by the royalists led to “his sense that the romantic 
mode, cultural or political, was irretrievably spoiled.”191 
 Scholars who argue for Milton’s break with romance overwhelmingly cite the 
genre’s cosmetic associations with royalist ideology as his primary reason for rejecting it. 
However, historicist critics have often put too much stock in romance’s being a distinctly 
                                                
188 See Barbara Lewalski, “Milton: Revaluations of Romance,” in Four Essays on Romance, ed. Herschel 
Baker (Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1971), 55-70; Northrop Frye, “The Typology of Paradise Regained,” in 
Milton: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Arthur E. Barker (New York: Oxford U P, 1965), 429-446; 
Maureen Quilligan, Milton’s Spenser: The Politics of Reading (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1983); and Colin 
Burrow, Epic Romance: Homer to Milton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
189 See George Williamson, “Milton the Anti-Romantic,” Modern Philology 60.1 (1962): 13-21; Stanley 
Fish, “Things and Actions Indifferent: The Temptation of Plot in Paradise Regained,” Milton Studies 17 
(1983): 163-85; Regina Schwartz, “From Shadowy Types to Shadowy Types: The Unendings of Paradise 
Lost,” Milton Studies 24 (1988): 123-39; and David Loewenstein, Milton and the Drama of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1990). 
190 See Annabel Patterson, “Paradise Regained: A Last Chance at True Romance,” Milton Studies 17 
(1983): 187-208; Clare Kinney, Strategies of Poetic Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1992); and 
John Steadman, Moral Fiction in Milton and Spenser (Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1995). 
191 Patterson, “Last Chance at True Romance,” 197.  
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royalist genre, as Nigel Smith and Amelia Zurcher Sandy have pointed out; moreover, we 
must keep in mind that even the young Milton never defined romance by its externalities 
alone.192 Defending his reading habits in the Apology for Smectymnuus, Milton claims that 
narratives of knighthood taught him “that every free and gentle spirit without that oath ought 
to be borne a Knight, nor needed to expect the guilt spurre, or the laying of a sword upon his 
shoulder to stirre him up [...] to secure and protect the weaknesse of any attempted 
chastity.”193 In other words, Milton, like many Protestant writers before him, sees romance 
as belonging to the “free and gentle” soul, whose heroic vocation is to stand in defense of 
godliness, regardless of the presence or absence of other chivalric tropes. I argue in this 
chapter that Milton never abandoned this idea. Rather than trusting an angry political 
pamphlet to contain Milton’s final word on genre, we might look to his most seminal 
poetry instead.194 In so doing, we find that romance as a Puritan literary mode is very 
much alive in Paradise Lost, and especially in Paradise Regained, despite aspects of 
these texts that appear anti-romantic, and that Milton actually found romance more useful 
to his ideology, not less, after 1660. 
Milton’s late poems feature both positive and negative gestures toward romance 
not because of Milton’s ambivalence, but because they embody a struggle between the 
genre as an ungodly, implicitly royalist mode and an equally (or more) romantic Puritan 
alternative. Critically, they are concerned not so much with the early Caroline approaches 
                                                
192 See Smith, Literature and Revolution, and Zurcher Sandy, Seventeenth-Century English Romance. 
193 CPW, 694. 
194 The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates offers an apt lesson about drawing conclusions from emotional 
source material. Milton declines to interpret David’s cry in Psalm 51, “Against thee onely have I sinn’d,” as 
evidence that Kings are beholden only to God: “any wise men will see that the pathetical words of a Psalme 
can be no certaine decision to a poynt that hath abundantly more certain rules to goe by” (in C. A. Patrides, 
ed., John Milton: Selected Prose [Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1985], 258-9). 
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to amorous and chivalric romance that Patterson cites as with the much more recent 
postwar romances and semi-historical romans-à-clef of the 1650s and 1660s. While these 
later royalist texts retained many of the genre’s external tropes by featuring the 
meandering adventures and hardships of dispossessed aristocratic characters, they made 
major revisions to the foundations of its narrative structure, and particularly to its didactic 
and religious components. As Paul Salzman and Victoria Kahn have discussed in detail, 
although the restoration of Charles II seemed to align history with romance’s common 
theme of royal loss and recovery, the King’s supporters were disturbed enough by the 
upheaval of the Interregnum that their treatment of the genre was irrevocably altered to 
address the problems of historical contingency and unstable heroic subjectivity.195 A brief 
look at Herbert’s The Princess Cloria and at Margaret Cavendish’s postwar prose romance 
Assaulted and Pursued Chastity will introduce the royalist revisions that Milton counters 
with his own poetic assertion of Puritan romance. This chapter will then turn to three of 
Milton’s poetic perspectives on historical time, narrative, and genre, ordered not 
according to the date of their composition but by their chronology within Christian 
history: first Paradise Lost, followed by the early but essentially Miltonic “On the 
Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” and concluding with Milton’s truly final word on 
romance, Paradise Regained. 
 
“A World Within Him Self”: Royalist Romances of Pragmatic Providence 
 
The unique structural characteristics of postwar royalist romance have been well 
characterized by Salzman, whose analysis helps begin to reveal a great deal about the 
                                                
195 See Salzman, English Prose Fiction, and Kahn, Wayward Contracts. 
  
173 
most immediate textual backdrop to Milton’s 1671 poem. Salzman argues that the 
royalist narratives that reacted to the demise of Charles I and the eventual restoration of 
Charles II fundamentally revise several assumptions about the narrative structure and 
didactic goals of the genre. Postwar royalist romances thrive on ambiguity instead of 
absolutes, offering their readers “questions rather than answers” about the nature of 
providence and of heroic virtue. 196  Their dispossessed and disillusioned characters 
wonder about the extent of God’s role in human events and hence about their own 
responsibilities, unsure whether to interpret the tempest of history as a divinely-structured 
plot or a series of contingencies dependent upon the interaction of individual agency with 
uncontrollable fortune. As Smith, Kahn, and others have discussed, the writers of such 
romances were engaging directly not just with their ideological opponents, but with the 
anti-romantic political philosophy of their fellow royalist Hobbes, who was particularly 
alarmed by the genre’s chaotic potential to convince anyone of his or her special status as 
a hero ordained and justified by providential decree. Instead of shunning romance 
altogether, some royalist writers set out to attempt a quasi-Hobbesian variant on the 
genre. In denying the certainty of providential authorship and of any divine inspiration 
for heroic subjectivity, they continued to combat Puritan theology while confronting their 
own doubts; in acknowledging the remoteness or silence of a heavenly authority, they 
continued to resist republicanism by insisting upon the need for a heroic earthly authority 
to provide for the common good by determining and imposing the most effective political 
and narrative order. 
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Sir Percy Herbert’s The Princess Cloria, a coded roman-à-clef  begun in exile 
during the 1650s and printed in England after the Restoration, epitomizes the royalist 
revision of romance in its self-conscious anxiety over heroic subjectivity and providential 
narrative structure.197 As Salzman has noted, the protagonists of Cloria are not atheists, 
but they do, in the words of Cloria’s page, continually question “whether [divine] power 
have any consideration or regard to our actions, otherwise then to maintain a succession 
and increase upon earth [...] as it fareth with Birds, Beasts, Plants and the like” (361). The 
royal Arethusius (Herbert’s figure for Charles II) finds himself so stymied by the political 
machinations of religious zealots that he at times doubts the value and purpose of 
religion: “scarce can it be believed, there are any Gods in Heaven, or at the most that 
minde our actions upon earth” (463). Throughout the narrative, character after character 
verges on the conclusion that “either [the Gods’] Justice or [their] Power” must be 
lacking (555). Herbert does introduce other sympathetic characters who attempt to offer 
pious consolation to the heroes, such as the priest Hephestion, who counsels Euarchus that 
ignorant humans must “observe in a manner continually, both a perfect charity, and an 
entire patience” (320). “Perfect charity” and “entire patience” have the sound of Milton’s 
favorite Protestant virtues, but unlike most of Milton’s heroes, the denizens of Cloria fear 
that they may be practicing them in a spiritual vacuum, valuing patience for its own sake 
rather than as the expectation of the fulfillment of providential order. In the context of 
Hephestion’s advice, “Perfect charity” and “entire patience” are tools for survival in a 
world without assurances; they seem more like the armor of resignation than the weapons 
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of faith. Indeed, Herbert’s characters express unresolvable doubt and discomfort about how 
providence ought to be understood and defined as a force operating within history. 
Locrinus conflates divine providence with an impersonal “predominate fate” that has used 
“some strange period” of civil strife as an instrument “for the punishing of wickedness” 
(539-40). And when Arethusius has the opportunity to trust that providence will reward 
righteousness rather than dispassionately punish evil, he instead grounds his hope that he 
may one day return to the throne of Lydia in “the instability of things,” or the vague 
vicissitudes of time, which “would of necessity at last bring him to his Rights” (445). Not 
God, but Arethusius’ subjects, awash in cosmic uncertainty, will ultimately depend upon a 
mortal monarch to restore (or impose) order, just as Hobbes’ political philosophy finds fit. 
Salzman notes that Arethusius’ eventual triumph and return to power are made 
retroactively “inevitable” by the historical fact of Charles II’s restoration and are then 
“gladly embraced by fiction”—that is, history happens to have conformed to romance’s 
conventional shape—but the king’s happy ending is not obviously the work of any 
providential power internal to his story.198  
As an inhabitant of a formulaic genre that nevertheless acknowledges no clear 
authorial providence, the romantic hero Arethusius ironically arrives at a personal 
philosophy that embraces many of Hobbes’ most anti-romantic principles. He finally 
finds comfort in his stoical avowal that “man was a world within him self, being not to be 
deprived of an inward felicity by any power or tyranny, if he proved not the destroyer 
thereof by his own passions” (416). Much as Hephestion’s “perfect charity” and “entire 
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patience” resemble Miltonic virtues but prove distinct in their lack of a zealous origin and 
end, Arethusius’ “world within him self” might sound like Milton’s “Paradise within” 
(PL 12.587), but it is not.199 In Cloria’s universe, which might be ruled by a cold 
providence or by “predominate fate” or by atomistic chance—or by some vague 
combination of the three—Arethusius must weather the tempest of history through clear-
eyed self-reliance, not through faith in the unseen. He turns inward not for divine 
guidance and inspiration, but because his only certain reference is himself, and his own 
judgment leads him to a pragmatic philosophy in which one’s outward actions may not 
match one’s inner sense of virtuous heroism: in order to be an effective ruler, Arethusius 
resolves, “sometimes we must dissemble towards people [...] I cannot deny it” (392). He 
comes to the Hobbesian conclusion that while his duty as king compels him to act for the 
good of his kingdom and its people, he has no external “assurances” about the right 
course of action, and so the nature of that public good, and the substance of that 
individual action, must be his to determine as well as he can. Having acknowledged the 
instability of romance and the self-imposed nature of heroic subjectivity, he is free to take 
control of the navigation of his story while also benevolently controlling others. 
Margaret Cavendish’s romantic style, while less melancholy than Herbert’s 
Cloria and less overtly historicized, features a similar principle of wariness about 
crediting a narrative plan to divine providence and hence a similar emphasis on politic 
pragmatism and self-reliance. As we have seen in her Life of William, Cavendish deeply 
mistrusts any human claim to know the mind of God, associating such assertions with 
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Puritans such as Milton.200 In her Philosophical Letters, she derides those who claim to 
hold “the Key of Divine Providence”: 
The truth is, what is Immaterial, belongs not to a Natural knowledg or 
understanding, but is Supernatural, and goes beyond a natural reach or capacity. 
Concerning “the Key of Divine Providence”, I believe God did never give or lend 
it to any man; for surely, God, who is infinitely Wise, would never intrust so frail 
and foolish a Creature as Man, with it, as to let him know his secret Counsels, 
Acts, and Decrees. But setting aside Pride and Presumption, Sense and Reason 
may easily perceive, that Man [...] is not made with such infinite Excellence, as 
to pierce into the least secrets of God; Wherefore I am in a maze when I hear of 
such men, which pretend to know so much[.]201 
 
Cavendish strips all such dangerously zealous presumption from her definition of 
providence in The World’s Olio as the distinctly human ability “to observe the Effect of 
Things, and to compare the past with the present, as to guess, and so to provide for the 
Future.”202 We will recall that in her introduction to the Life of William, Cavendish 
disdains the Puritans’ vision of history as a “mystical” narrative authored by God’s 
providence in which heroism is the exclusive province of the godly. Writers who 
compose “mystical” histories, she alleges, do so “out of Policy to amuse and deceive the 
People” and substitute “Romansical Falshoods for Historical Truths.”203 In her own 
romances, Cavendish releases herself from accountability to William’s model of the 
genre and holds even her fanciful narratives to the standards of rational historiography 
and natural philosophy. Her fictions reformulate the genre’s Protestant reliance on 
providential plot: as in The World’s Olio, providence signifies not God’s design for 
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human affairs, but the individual’s potential to provide for herself. In so doing, she 
reasons and acts in order to chart her own future, rather than attempting to strain for a 
glimpse of a sacred narrative vision that might explain her movement through time and 
space. Rather than inhabiting a preexisting and predestined narrative, they create their 
own narratives out of apparent chaos.  
In Cavendish’s 1656 Assaulted and Pursued Chastity, both heroine and narrator 
regard pragmatic providence as their guiding principle. The romance’s nameless heroine, 
hereafter known by one of her assumed names, Travellia, enters the narrative when an 
unscrupulous guardian abandons her “to Chance, Time, and Fortune.”204 The lady set 
adrift on fortune’s figurative and literal tide is, of course, a common trope in Early 
Modern, medieval, and classical romance, but her destiny usually proves to be secure in 
the hands of providential forces. Travellia, however, must provide for her own ends. Like 
The Princess Cloria, Assaulted and Pursued Chastity is not an atheistic romance: its 
characters acknowledge the Greco-Roman pantheon, and Travellia’s adoptive father goes 
so far as to pronounce on his deathbed that the gods “will reward [her] Vertue” (Ll4v). 
Crucially, though, the heroes presume no knowledge of how the gods direct the 
trajectories of their lives, apart from their belief that heaven helps those who help 
themselves. For instance, upon “considering” her “dangerous condition” at finding her 
virginity for sale in a brothel, Travellia reflects “that the Gods would not hear her, if she 
lasily called for help and watch’d for Miracles neglecting Naturall means; Whereupon she 
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thought the best ways was secretly to convey herself out of that place, and trust herself 
againe to chance; by reason there could not be more danger than where she was in” (Ff3r). 
While Travellia never rejects outright the potential for miracles to occur, she determines 
that there is neither sense nor virtue in expecting one to save her now. Divine providence, 
in her experience, functions through pragmatic providence, and so she turns to “Naturall 
means” and judges future contingencies less dangerous than the certainties of the present.  
Yet while she often acknowledges the roles of “Chance” and “Fortune” in aiding or 
frustrating mortal endeavors, Travellia leaves as little as possible to their random disposal. 
Most notably, she acquires a pistol by exploiting the naïve romantic imagination of her 
captor’s maidservant, concocting a parodic story about the prophecy of a “wise Wizard” to 
justify her request for the gun, which she conceals in anticipation of future need and 
eventually uses to shoot her would-be rapist (Ff3v). Although she deceives the “simple 
Wench” by pretending that the pistol can perform a supernatural charm to protect her from 
evil and ensure her happiness, the weapon’s purpose in Cavendish’s rational narrative—as 
opposed to Travellia’s opportunistically fanciful one—is almost comically natural (Ff3v). 
Metaphysical forces arrange for neither the pistol nor successful escape to come to 
Travellia by happenstance; she provides both for herself. Moreover, while she harbors a 
Hobbesian disdain for romances as full of “impossibilities [...] ridiculous to reason” 
(despite inhabiting one herself),205 she is well aware of the genre’s power to manipulate the 
passions of others—a power that she exploits to further her own rational romance (Ff4v).206 
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 Like her fictional heroine, the authorial Cavendish’s narrative vision for 
Assasulted and Pursued Chastity is founded not upon providential “impossibilities,” but 
upon the study of human nature and in the relationship between probability and 
contingency. Her rational romance attributes unhappy events, such as defeat in battle, to 
Fortune: Travellia’s father observes that “nothing [is] more subject to Chance than War, 
and that the valiantest and wisest Men might fall by Fortunes hand” (Ll3v). Cavendish 
even takes care that felicitous events that would pass without question in many romances 
must not be made “ridiculous to reason” in hers. When the Prince receives word that his 
first wife has died, leaving him free to marry Travellia, the message from his home 
reaches him despite the fact that he has been abroad in disguise for many years; yet it 
arrives not by supernatural or even authorial intervention, but thanks to the pragmatic 
providence of his loyal subjects, who, “although they knew not where he was, yet they 
sent Letters into several Countryes, in hope some might light into his hands” (Mm1v). 
Assaulted and Pursued Chastity may follow a conventional romance trajectory through 
tribulation to satisfaction, but Cavendish ensures its narrative progress through the 
confluence of chance, human discernment, and statistical logic. 
At the height of her narrative, Travellia becomes an evangelist on behalf of 
pragmatic providence. Shipwrecked and held by natives who plan to sacrifice her to their 
gods, she patiently observes her captors until the ideal opportunity, then astounds them 
with a learned sermon on how “[their] ignorance hath lead [them] wrong wayes” despite 
their well-meaning piety (Hh3v). She persuades the natives to forsake their superstitious 
                                                                                                                                            
dismiss romance is sometimes “less a simple rebuttal of Hobbes [...] than an adaptation of [his] arguments 
concerning the power of self-interest” (Wayward Contracts, 172, 192). 
  
181 
zeal and thus to become “a civilized people” (Hh4v) by explaining that while the gods of 
nature certainly “governe all their Works,” they do so in a surprising manner: 
the Gods made [Chance] by their providence when they made man, for man hath 
no more knowledge of the transitory things of the world than what chance gives 
them, who is an unjust distributer, For all externall gifts comes from her hand 
[....] none have perfect knowledge, for the Gods mix mans nature with such an 
aspiring ambition; that if they had a perfect knowledge [...] of the first cause; and 
the effects produced there from, they would have warr’d with the Gods, and 
strove to usurp their authority, so busie and vain-glorious hath the Gods made the 
minds of men. Wherefore the Gods governe the world by ignorance[.] 
       (Hh3v) 
 
Throughout Cavendish’s works, “providence” refers almost always to human prudence; 
here, Travellia employs it just once in a metaphysical sense. This divine providence has a 
single design for creation: to order it by creating disorder in the form of “Chance.” It 
protects human affairs not by bestowing prophetic visions upon the faithful or by guiding 
them toward a sacred end, but by frustrating such a teleology and any mortal claim to 
know it, since if man could truly perceive divine order, the result of that heady 
knowledge would be a Hobbesian form of spiritual chaos. The function of divine 
providence, Travellia concludes, is to necessitate human providence. For despite 
Chance’s regency in the material world, it cannot intrude into the realm of individual 
reason and subjectivity: “For the Soul is a kind of God in it self, to direct and guide those 
things that are inferior to it; to perceive and descry into those things that are far above it, 
to create by invention, to delight in contemplations” (Hh3v-Hh4r). While divine 
providence makes the world subject to contingency, human providence allows self-
reliance and pragmatism to contend with Chance. Travellia assumes that randomness is 
intrinsic to the universe, and arrives at a happy ending through her ability to “provide for 
the Future” by owning her own secular subjectivity, analyzing patterns of experience, and 
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making the best of contingency. Rather than pretending to a vision of predestined sacred 
narrative, she creates her own narrative out of apparent chaos. In Catherine Gallagher’s 
terminology, much as Herbert’s Arethusius becomes convinced by his romantic trials of 
the necessity of acting as roi absolu, Travellia steps in to perform as moi absolu, “a kind 
of God in [her] self.”207 
Kahn has described postwar royalist romance as “a crisis of genre”: after the 
execution of Charles I, and despite the eventual restoration of his son, the royalists 
required a “revised [...] form” of romance in order to sustain it as a mode suitable for 
their community after the Interregnum, one which could account for individual 
subjectivity and for the tragic vicissitudes of history while emphasizing the need for 
pragmatic personal rule over the self and others.208 This “crisis” manifests itself through 
romances that retain their conventional narrative arc—from loss through wandering trials 
to eventual renewal—but take nothing else for granted. While Herbert laments the loss of 
naive providential romance, and Cavendish is more cheerfully ironic in her embrace of 
new perspectives on subjectivity and narrative, both writers feel compelled to raise 
similar questions: is the structure of plot—whether historical or fanciful—guided by 
providence, by fate, by random chance, by human agency, or by a combination thereof? 
Can mortals reliably distinguish between these forces? What constitutes heroic identity 
amidst such structural and spiritual ambiguity? Herbert’s and Cavendish’s responses are 
likewise similar: creation is barred from knowledge of divine providence, if such a thing 
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exists; pragmatic and secular self-reliance is essential, since the “world within” is an 
individual’s only constant reference amidst external turmoil; and because events occur 
apparently at random, a successful figure of authority must act to impose order, while a 
successful search for narrative order requires a sense of self-possession over one’s own 
persona and plot. Patience is often rewarded in these romances, but it is not the Miltonic 
version of the virtue: for Herbert and Cavendish, it signifies either resignation or 
calculated compromise, a waiting for a better chance, not for the providential “fullness of 
time.” The result, in Kahn’s words, is “an ironic self-consciousness about literary 
convention and genre,” a worldly “detachment from the conventions of romance” that 
coexists with the royalist reliance on romance’s political utility as a narrative of 
tribulation and restoration.209  	  
Paradise Lost: Two Falls into Two Romances 
Given The Princess Cloria and Assaulted and Pursued Chastity as representative 
models of the latest variations on seventeenth-century romance, Milton’s knotty approach 
to the genre in his late poetry becomes considerably easier to untangle. The new royalist 
paradigm of the pragmatic, individualistic hero struggling to contend with the vicissitudes 
of fortune—treated with seriousness and skill by writers like Herbert and Cavendish—
appears from a Miltonic perspective as something far more sinister. George Williamson 
has claimed of Paradise Lost that “its romantic elements, if any, [belong] to the forces of 
evil. If the ‘true warfaring Christian’ had once been a ‘Knight in Arms,’ he had defected 
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to the other side” by the time Milton wrote his epic.210 As Williamson, Patterson, and 
others have noted, Milton clearly does associate Satan and his fallen confederates with 
many of the trappings of romance. They are compared to “Faerie Elves” (1.781) or 
“Aerie Knights” who “Prick forth” across the landscape of a weirdly Spenserian hell 
(2.536); their martial ranks resemble  
what resounds 
In Fable or Romance of Uthers Son 
Begirt with British and Armoric Knights; 
And all who since, Baptiz’d or Infidel 
Jousted in Aspramont or Montalban, 
Damasco, or Marocco, or Trebisond 
Or whom Biserta sent from Afric shore 
When Charlemain with all his peerage fell 
By Fontarabbia. 
    (1.579-87) 
 
Satan even imagines himself as a romantic hero, claiming to believe in his own version of 
the fortunate fall, by which his “wandring quest” undertaken “with lonely steps” may one 
day appear “More glorious” (2.828-30, 16). The chivalric narratives the young Milton 
loved appear to have been corrupted, co-opted by the ungodly. Annabel Patterson argues 
as much—yet she also points out the puzzle that “much of what Milton condemned” 
about romance, “he also managed to retain in one way or another” elsewhere in Paradise 
Lost. 211  Clare Kinney observes a similar apparent contradiction: “[Satan’s] fallen 
romance is never entirely transcended [....] One might even suggest that Adam and Eve’s 
‘wandering steps and slow’ at the conclusion of Book 12 will carry them out of Christian 
epic and into this most errant of genres.”212 I propose that the poem presents us with two 
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parallel falls into romance, and with two parallel visions of romance’s narrative form. In 
light of Herbert’s and Cavendish’s texts, the relationship in Paradise Lost between bad 
romance and acceptable—even godly—romance appears less contradictory and 
mysterious: Satan falls into the royalist romance of the exiled subject of fortune, while 
Adam and Eve fall into the providential romance of God’s community. 
 Crucially, the distinction between Satanic and godly romance does not rest entirely 
on generic externalities. Williamson proposes that Milton grew to reject narratives of war 
and chivalry in favor of those “Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom” (PL 9.32), and it is true 
that Satan is more often associated with the spectacular trappings of romance such as 
knight-errantry and tournaments (though these outward signs are not wholly absent from 
the poem’s positive turns toward the genre).213 Yet as the royalist romances that postdate 
Charles I’s fall reveal, Milton was hardly alone in coming to prefer a heroic ethic of 
patience and endurance over one of martial prowess. To a large extent, the harsh reality of 
civil war had soured royalists and republicans alike on the glories of chivalry, and the most 
famous “Heroic Martyr” of the age was surely Charles I himself. Milton does not simply 
condemn romance in Paradise Lost, nor does he merely oppose a gaudy romance of war to 
a sober narrative of obedience to God; instead of this stark and simple difference, he 
actively resists the new royalist romance of patience and self-integrity by assigning its 
unique characteristics to the fallen angels and by combating it with a providential romance 
that extols corrective Puritan forms of the same traits. Where royalist writers approach the 
fact that heroic identity may be assumed by anyone by suggesting that it may have no basis 
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in divine favor, Milton insists more strongly than ever on the authenticity of an exceptional 
subjectivity for the godly; where they make room for tragedy, contingency, and doubt by 
displacing providence, he proposes that these apparent threats to romance reassert the value 
of a providential understanding of the genre.  
 Once we have identified the distinctive features of postwar royalist romance—
deliberate murkiness about ordered or predestined narrative, valorization of secular 
subjectivity and strength of will, and a thematic blend of fatalism and pragmatism—the 
prevalence of these features in Paradise Lost’s infernal romance is striking, even 
uncanny. The poem’s first two books in particular, set in Hell and focused on Satan, 
pursue the thematic concerns of writers like Cavendish and Herbert, suggesting that 
regardless of what texts in particular Milton may or may not have known, he remained as 
familiar as he had been in his pamphlet-writing days with popular royalist strategies of 
manipulating history as story. Book 2, for instance, opens with Satan calling his followers 
to a council on how they may be restored to their “just inheritance of old,” and “by what 
best way, / Whether of open Warr or covert guile” (2.38, 41). The debate that follows 
amongst the devils bears a marked resemblance to the ongoing conversations throughout 
Cloria and other royalist romans-à-clef about the proper course(s) of action for the 
deposed prince and his community of followers: should the exiles fight, wait, plot, or do 
all these things at the times they deem best?214 While the unsubtle and belligerent Moloch, 
like a demonic variation on Herbert’s passionately martial figure for James II, urges open 
war with the adversary who has driven them from their “just inheritance,” Belial advises 
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what the narrator describes as “ignoble ease, and peaceful sloath,” but what he himself 
represents as sufferance and pragmatic patience (2.227). “To suffer, as to doe, / Our strength 
is equal,” he claims, suggesting that “since fate inevitable / Subdues us,” the fallen angels 
should delay action until they discover “what chance, what change” might be “Worth 
waiting” (2.197-200, 222-3).215 Mammon agrees, stressing the royalist virtues of politic 
consideration and self-reliance: he favors “peaceful Counsels” and proposes that they 
“might rise / By pollicy, and long process of time” (2.279, 296-7). Instead of relying on 
“force impossible,” they ought to embrace the superior liberty and “inward felicity” that 
Cloria’s Arethusius recommends, which comes only from accepting the self-sufficiency of 
one’s subjectivity: “Let us [...] // rather seek / Our own good from our selves, and from our 
own / Live to our selves [...] / Free, and to none accountable” (2.249-55). Finally, 
Beelzebub, “Majestic though in ruin” and radiating the “Princely counsel,” 
“Deliberation,” and “public care” of a royal exile like Herbert’s hero (2.303-5), serves as 
the public mouthpiece for Satan’s plan to tempt humanity into the same sin and false 
belief that the devils share: once they have fallen from their own “inheritance” into hell’s 
perverse narrative, they too “shall curse / Thir frail Originals, and faded bliss” (2.374-5). 
Having thus determined, the devils disperse, comforting and entertaining themselves by 
recasting recent events within romantic molds, as the royalist writers of historical romances 
do: they compose epic tales of “Thir own Heroic deeds and hapless fall / By doom of Battel; 
and complain that Fate / Free Vertue should enthrall to Force or Chance” (2.549-51).  
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 Milton here parodies another trend in postwar royalist romance which should now 
be familiar. The devils are notoriously vague whenever they ponder the origins of their story 
or contemplate its future course: is their narrative shaped by divine will, impersonal fate, 
contingency, or personal agency? Beelzebub questions whether God’s “high Supremacy” is 
“upheld by strength, or Chance, or Fate” (1.132-3); Mammon imagines that “him to 
unthrone we then / May hope, when everlasting Fate shall yeild / To fickle Chance” (2.231-
3); and Satan proposes that resolution to perform “Great things [...] / Will once more lift us 
up, in spight of Fate,” speculating that “perhaps [...] / with neighbouring Arms / And 
opportune excursion we may chance / Re-enter Heav’n” (2.392-7). All three lack clarity not 
just about which of these forces orders events, but about how they stand in relation to one 
another. Can chance overcome fate? Can action subdue fortune? Satan even equates 
“chance” with “Arms / And opportune excursion,” which seem to belong to the deliberative 
sphere of skill and careful planning. Like the royalists’ heroes, they avoid settling on a 
cosmology that could definitively structure or frustrate their narrative and are skeptical that 
God’s design might supersede fate, chance, or strategy. Satan resolves that “If then his 
Providence / Out of our evil seek to bring forth good, / Our labour must be to pervert that 
end, [...] // Which oft times may succeed”: with fortune’s favor, politic consideration and 
timely action might prove more influential than a mysterious, ambiguous God (1.162-6).  
 The fallen angels’ doubt that divine providence exercises complete control over 
events leads them to seek alternative means of explaining their own story’s past and 
determining its future. Much as the deposed Arethusius finds his chief solace in his belief 
that “man was a world within him self, being not to be deprived of an inward felicity by 
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any power or tyranny,” and as Travellia lives by the maxim that “the Soul is a kind of 
God in it self,” the community of devils console themselves by deriving their heroic 
subjectivity not from sacred conviction, but from the secular supremacy of the individual 
will. “[T]he mind and spirit remains / Invincible,” pronounces Beelzebub (1.139-40), 
anticipating Satan’s more famous declaration: “The mind is its own place, and in it self / 
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n. / What matter where, if I be still the 
same[?]” (1.254-6). Milton’s refiguration of the exiled prince justifies his continued 
leadership by boasting “A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time” (1.253). Moreover, 
such interior constancy and dauntlessness also allow him to claim that he and his 
followers have won a moral victory: “What though the field be lost? / All is not lost; th’ 
unconquerable Will [...] // And courage never to submit or yield: / And what is else not to be 
overcome?” (1.105-9). The passive self-reliance that is characteristic of Herbert’s 
Arethusius soon persuades Satan to depend on an active self-reliance that is typical of 
Cavendish’s heroes as well: “Let us not slip th’ occasion” to regain the upper hand, he 
urges, since all occasions within his narrative are potentially equal and must be analyzed 
as logistical rather than providential opportunities (1.178). Indeed, Satan places the same 
emphasis on pragmatic providence that Cavendish and Travellia do: looking back on his 
defeat, he considers that “through experience of this great event [...] in foresight much 
advanc’t, / We may with much more successful hope resolve / To wage by force of guile 
eternal Warr” against Heaven (1.118-21). His narrative vision comes only from personal 
experience; in Cavendish’s words, by “observ[ing] the Effect of Things,” and “compar[ing] 
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the past with the present,” he aims “to provide for the Future” that he and his army wish to 
bring into being. 
 Imitating the heroes of postwar royalist romance, Satan thus attempts to create his 
own order out of what looks to him like a disorderly universe by turning to a “world 
within him self” for guidance. But within a Miltonic narrative cosmology, such 
profoundly secular and self-reflexive subjectivity is doomed. Milton ensures that instead 
of finding a “paradise within” himself, Satan instead discovers, “Which way I flie is Hell; 
my self am Hell” (4.75). His world within is a world insulated from both divine guidance 
and providential hope. In the midst of all of Satan’s romantic pretensions, we must keep 
in mind that he does not even believe in the narrative that he takes such pains to 
construct. When he urges his followers to exercise their own capacity for rational 
providence to regain their lost inheritance, he is “Vaunting aloud, but wrackt with deep 
despair” (1.126). In this despair, he clings all the more closely to his relativistic, neo-
romantic “world within,” but forsakes a major structural pillar of the genre, unable to 
imagine a happy ending to his own story: “So farwell Hope, and with Hope farwell Fear, / 
Farwell Remorse: all Good to me is lost; / Evil be thou my Good” (4.108-110). Satan’s 
illusory romance thus collapses into irrevocable tragedy. 
Maureen Quilligan has said of Satan and his followers that “In effect, their story 
is over” before it begins: “Having already fallen […] they have been hardened in their 
hearts; they are no longer free to choose the one thing that would give their story a plot—
a developing climactic chronology. All they can do is repeat their mistakes.”216 In 
                                                
216 Quilligan, 108. 
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adopting the royalist romance of restoration as the official narrative model for their cause, 
the fallen angels abandon the teleological romance of the godly for the parody and 
tragedy of the unregenerate: as they “[reason] high / Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will 
and Fate, / Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledg absolute,” They “[find] no end, in wandring 
mazes lost” (2.558-61). Wandering movement, of course, is endemic to the genre’s 
structure and to its characters, as Milton reminds us in the closing lines of Paradise Lost. 
But the devils’ wandering—unlike the wandering that Adam and Eve will later 
experience when they descend into the romance landscape beyond Eden—is doomed to 
have “no end,” no telos. The peregrinations of God’s heroes will finally lead them, as 
individuals and as a community, to reunion with the divine, but those who embark on a 
romantic quest separate from Providence are “lost” in a maze without an exit. In the 
absence of any sincere attempt at mediation between an errant middle and a teleological 
end, this endless romance is not really romance at all: the devils, using the royalist model, 
are doing it wrong.  Milton’s narrator concludes that their treatment of the genre, with its 
“Vain wisdom” and “false Philosophie,” may possess the “pleasing sorcerie” to “charm / 
Pain for a while or anguish, and excite / Fallacious hope, or arm th’ obdured brest / With 
stubborn patience as with triple steel,” but it lacks any power to produce a perfectible story 
of loss and restoration (2.565-9). 
 Time and again, Milton’s fallen angels demonstrate postwar royalist perspectives 
on the absence or inaccessibility of inherent narrative order and the need to create a 
pragmatic personalized substitute. They also display what Milton (like many Puritans) 
saw as a royalist affinity for consciously and ostentatiously packaging their own history 
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in the frivolous trappings of genre (the sort of behavior that he also mocked and 
denounced in Eikonoklastes.) These parodic themes dominate Books 1 and 2 of Paradise 
Lost—and yet, as a number of readers have perceived, the poem’s overall attitude toward 
romance is not obviously or simply parodic. Considered comprehensively, the genre 
proves to be one of Milton’s many “things indifferent,” neither godly nor ungodly in 
itself, but only insofar as it is handled and interpreted by regenerate or unregenerate 
minds. The first two books of Paradise Lost explore the dire implications of a romance 
divorced from providential structure; the last two, on the other hand, “assert Eternal 
Providence” as the author of the arc of time (1.25). Adam and Eve’s fall into romance 
comes with new terms for a right understanding of the genre, including a rejection of both 
fatalism and the power of conventional heroism; an emphasis on the insufficiency of the 
individual mind to interpret or control the plot of history; an insistence upon the 
authenticity of a special narrative perspective for those whom God has chosen for such a 
vision; and a reaffirmation of romantic structure that, by providential design, is 
simultaneously errant and teleological. 
 Book 11 opens with Adam and Eve “in lowliest plight” but declared newly 
“Regenerat” (11.1, 5). As the first sinful and repentant members of the godly community, 
they have fallen into a romance that is Puritan and providential in nature where Satan’s was 
royalist and secular. The Father pronounces the entirety of their plot as individual believers, 
declined from “Happiness / And Immortalitie” to “Death [...] / after Life / Tri’d in sharp 
tribulation” but ultimately “refin’d / By Faith and faithful works, to second Life” and “up 
with Heav’n and Earth renewd” (11.58-66). The larger romance of the entire community 
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throughout history remains for Adam to learn from the archangel Michael during the final 
two books. Michael comes to Adam in a fitting shape, and one that indicates that the 
external markers of romance are not quite restricted to Satan or his secular model: he 
appears in “A militarie Vest” like those “worn by Kings and Heroes old,” armed with his 
“Sword, / Satans dire dread” (11.241-8). He thus enters Adam and Eve’s newly romantic 
world in his knightly biblical form as the hero of heaven’s army and the vanquisher of “the 
dragon” Satan.217 Milton may further intend for him to evoke the image of Saint George, 
England’s dragonslayer, who is of course also Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight, another godly 
hero who receives a sacred vision concerning time and genre on the peak of a mountain. 
(Milton also adheres to Spenser’s gendered archetypes of prophetic reception here: while 
Adam “to foresight [wakes]” on high, Eve “sleep[s] below,” assured in dreams that “the 
Promis’d Seed,” her progeny, “shall all restore” [11.368, 12.623].) In the vision that 
Michael subsequently reveals to Adam, several other types of the final battle against the 
Satanic serpent will take place, and Adam (now in Redcrosse’s position) will learn with 
difficulty to reject wrong perspectives on romantic narrative in favor of the providential 
model reserved for the regenerate, avoiding the royalist-inflected errors into which the 
devils fall in the first two books of the poem. 
 Like Contemplation leading Redcrosse, Adam’s literary progenitor and 
“historical” progeny, Michael and Adam “both ascend / In the Visions of God”:  
 
It was a Hill 
Of Paradise the highest, from whose top 
The Hemisphere of Earth in cleerest Ken 
                                                
217 See Revelation 12:7-9. 
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Stretcht out to amplest reach of prospect lay. 
Not higher that Hill nor wider looking round, 
Whereon for different cause the Tempter set 
Our second Adam in the Wilderness, 
To shew him all Earths Kingdomes and thir Glory. 
    (11.376-84) 
 
Regina Schwartz has noted that Milton here typologically anticipates the yet-unwritten 
Paradise Regained and suggests the challenge that Adam faces in his mountaintop vision: 
“The analogy is not to a place of definitive revelation, but to a place of temptation, and 
the temptation that Adam faces in the final books is to view the prospect of what lay 
before him and want to possess it.” Schwartz argues that Adam’s desire “to possess that 
entire story, to ‘know’ his future rather than to determine it [...] is, in Stanley Fish’s 
phrase, the ‘temptation of plot.’”218 But in Fish’s reading (to which Schwarz subscribes), 
to succumb to the temptation of plot is to mistake timeless divine non-narrative for 
human narrative; what Adam (and later Jesus, as I will argue) must learn to do on their 
respective visionary summits is accept sacred time as a still-unfolding narrative, and as 
one which they, called to obey God and to trust in his authorial providence, have only 
limited power to “determine.” Unlike the heroes of postwar royalist romance (and Satan), 
who do strive to determine their own destinies in the absence of providential certainty, 
the protagonists of Milton’s Puritan romance demonstrate the superior authenticity of 
their heroic subjectivity by living in willing accordance within the plot predestined by 
God.219 The urge to leap to the end of the romance while bypassing the tortuous 
                                                
218 Schwartz, 134.  
219 Mary Beth Rose has discussed Milton’s passive heroism (particularly as gendered feminine) in Gender 
and Heroism in Early Modern English Literature (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002), 85-99. Miltonic 
heroism is indeed often passive and implicitly feminized, though the potential for active heroism in the 
providentially correct moment always stands as a critical aspect of the hero’s calling. 
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experience of the middle—to possess the full story at once while elevated to a god’s-eye 
view without embracing the intra-narrative human perspective—is the temptation of non-
plot. Satan will fall to this temptation, and press Jesus to do the same, in Paradise 
Regained; in The Faerie Queene, as we have seen, Redcrosse begs for permanent 
residency on the visionary peak and for a premature exit from his romance, which his 
guide forbids. On the mountain with Michael, Adam too repeatedly imposes his 
perspective on the narrative of history over the providential plot, and prematurely 
presumes a conclusion to the story that winds and stretches on, often to his dismay. As he 
must learn from his own guide, the long and burdensome middle of the romance must 
precede the sure but distant end, historical time must precede apocalyptic timelessness, 
and only divine narrative can point the way to divine non-narrative.  
 Much as the fallen Eve contemplates suicide, and as Satan’s concealed reaction to 
his own fall is circuitous despair, Adam is first tempted away from narrative temporality 
upon witnessing death: “O miserable Mankind, to what fall / Degraded, to what wretched 
state reserv’d! / Better end heer unborn” (11.500-2). Like Herbert’s forlorn exiles, he 
questions whether a providential hand may be glimpsed amidst such “inhuman pains”; only 
after Michael reinterprets death as indicative of human faithlessness does Adam “yeild it 
just” and “submit” (11.511, 526). As his vision of history continues, Adam faces both the 
temptations of wrong romance and the temptation of non-romance again and again, and 
must learn to renounce both before his re-descent into the “lower World” where individual 
and communal narrative unfolds within time (11.283). 
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 Adam is first confronted with the tropes of “Soft” and “amorous” romance as he 
witnesses the courtship and marriage of his progeny with “A Beavie of fair Women” 
(11.582-4). Unsurprisingly, this vision “Of love and youth not lost” holds strong allure 
for the man “soon enclin’d to admit delight” who had recently defended his own 
inclination toward courtly love for his wife: “Much better seems this Vision, and more 
hope / Of peaceful dayes portends [...] / Here Nature seems fulfill’d in all her ends” (11.594, 
599-602). Adam makes two mistakes here: his attraction to the amorous courtly romance 
of “these fair Atheists,” and his assumption that wooing and marriage can in themselves 
be the “end” of nature and of his descendants’ story (11.625).220 Yet once Michael 
corrects him, he reacts too vehemently, lamenting the very nature of the genre into which 
he himself has fallen—“O pittie and shame, that they who to live well / Enterd so faire, 
should turn aside to tread / Paths indirect”—and interprets this errant mode as feminine, 
inextricably associated with the evils of “Woman” (11.629-33).221 Scolded by his guide 
once more, he is immediately presented with the spectacle of another, more typically 
masculine, mode of romance: “Cities of Men with lofty Gates and Towrs, / Concours in 
Arms, fierce Faces threatning Warr, / Giants of mightie Bone, and bould emprise” who 
“joine” in “cruel Tournament” (11.640-2, 652). Michael is quick also to denounce this 
martial and chivalric variant, in which destruction and conquest are “Valour and Heroic 
Vertu call’d,” although Adam finds the violent story before him inherently unappealing 
                                                
220 Erin Murphy has noted in Familial Forms that the “tangle of historical styles” in Books 11 and 12, 
including “tragic, cyclical, millenarian, and typological,” contribute to a “problem of narrative” (126, 117). 
Adam’s greatest difficulty with this narrative is that it undermines his “ability to authorize”: to license and 
control the actions of his offspring, and also to determine the narrative’s shape (124). 
221 Spenser’s Redcrosse makes a similar about-face, from expressing his yearning for “Ladies love” in one 
stanza to over-zealously renouncing “joyes so fruitlesse” in the next (FQ I.x.62-3). 
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(11.690). The last and most critical alternative corrupt narrative that he must resist is the 
one that appeals most to the war-weary royalists and the fallen angels, which valorizes 
deliberative action and avoidance of conflict over both love and war. Neither the 
“Council” of the “grave” not the “jollitie” and “luxurie” of the peaceful can produce a 
happy ending once “The brazen Throat of Warr [has] ceast to roar,” much to Adam’s 
sorrow (11.661-2, 713-15): 
I had hope 
When violence was ceas’t, and Warr on Earth, 
All would have then gon well, peace would have crownd 
With length of happy dayes the race of men; 
But I was farr deceav’d; for now I see 
Peace to corrupt no less than Warr to waste. 
    (11.779-84) 
 
Godless peace, Michael explains, is simply godless war’s twin: both “great exploits, but 
of true vertu void,” each leads endlessly to the other, with no triumphant conclusion in 
sight (11.790). Neither love, nor war, nor either politic or indulgent peace can underpin a  
teleological narrative with the power to redeem fallen humanity. 
 Faced with all this failure, Adam again laments history as story, along with his 
privileged oversight of it. The genre of history, he now assumes, must really be tragedy: 
“those few escap’t” on Noah’s ark, he grieves, “Famin and anguish will at last consume / 
Wandring that watrie Desert” (11.777-9). He has forgotten both the providential structure 
of the godly community’s story and the providential source of his own special view of it: 
   O Visions ill foreseen! better had I 
Liv’d ignorant of future [...] 
Let no man seek 
Henceforth to be foretold what shall befall 
Him or his Childern, evil he may be sure[.] 
    (11.763-72) 
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David Loewenstein, reading Milton’s work through the hermeneutic of drama, sees Adam’s 
vision on the summit as evidence that Milton could not discount the fallen nature of all 
human endeavors and hence could not shake the sense that the tragic mode pervades 
historical narrative, despite holding out simultaneous hope for history as “divine 
comedy.”222 Romance, known onstage as tragicomedy, helps us navigate this generic divide. 
As we have seen other writers strive to manage, tragedy is the close companion of romance 
prior to its apparently unlikely resolution, and the incarnation and the second coming of 
Christ guaranteed for Milton that romantic structure stood internal to time as well as 
externally as time’s telos. In believing that history can only end tragically, Adam again 
speaks too soon. While the visions of Book 11 teach him to reject bad romance in all its 
guises, they also lead him into another temptation: to despair of the genre’s promise 
altogether, as Satan secretly does. Michael’s continued narrative in Book 12 therefore serves 
a new purpose: to re-educate Adam to recognize right romance as the true genre of history 
and to embrace it despite its formal challenges. Crucially, the final book of Paradise Lost 
returns to the most recognizably romantic tropes that the poem has previously associated 
with the demonic fellowship of Satan—the wandering quest and heroic combat—and 
reclaims them for the providential romance of a Puritan community. Perhaps more 
importantly, it warns against the devils’ and the royalists’ greatest narrative error as Milton 
perceives it: failure to entrust the structure of events to God’s often occluded design. 
 Unable to view the romance of providence, as opposed to its secular substitutes, 
with his deficient “mortal sight,” Adam relies on Michael to narrate the rest of history 
                                                
222 Loewenstein, 123-4. 
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(12.9). The archangel unfolds his story though one type after another of Jesus’ 
wandering(s) in the wilderness and his battle(s) with Satan. First, Abraham escapes from 
the tyranny and idolatry instituted by the first despot, Nimrod, and leads his people—“one 
peculiar Nation” selected “From all the rest”—into the wilderness, “Not wandring poor, 
but trusting all his wealth / With God, who call’d him, in a land unknown” (12.111-12, 
133-4). Later, the heroic brothers Moses and Aaron liberate the community of God’s 
chosen from slavery and “return / With glory and spoile back to thir promis’d Land” 
through “the wide Wilderness” (12.171-2, 224). Along the way, they engage in allegorical 
chivalric combat with the Pharaoh, taming “The River-dragon” with “ten wounds,” and in 
real warfare with other nations: “the rest / Were long to tell, how many Battels fought, / 
How many Kings destroyd, and Kingdoms won” (12.190-1, 260-2). Joshua, Moses’ 
successor, is the next martial hero to foreshadow the eponymous Jesus, “His Name and 
Office bearing, who shall quell / The adversarie Serpent, and bring back / Through the 
worlds wilderness long wanderd man / Safe to eternal Paradise of rest” (12.311-14). All 
these figures, Michael assures Adam, prepare the way for “the true / Anointed King 
Messiah,” the hero of the right royal romance, “born / Barr’d of his right” but destined at 
last to “ascend / The Throne hereditarie” of his father (12.358-60, 369-70).  
 Yet the very romantic tropes that enlighten Adam about the chosen people’s 
providential plot becomes a source of further confusion to him: he tends to over-literalize 
Michael’s metaphors and to revert to his old habits of rashly assuming knowledge of the 
story’s shape and end. In his joy at the introduction of the Messiah, he does both: 
   O Prophet of glad tidings, finisher 
Of utmost hope! now clear I understand 
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What oft my steddiest thoughts have searcht in vain [...] 
Needs must the Serpent now his capital bruise 
Expect with mortal pain: say where and when 
Thir fight, what stroke shall bruise the Victors heel. 
    (12.375-85) 
 
Although the last hero has indeed entered the story, Adam’s haste to declare it “finish[ed],” 
and to proclaim that “now [...] [he] understand[s]” what he had missed before, remains 
problematic. He has been disposed both to mourn and to celebrate prematurely since the 
start of his vision, and responded with nearly identical exultation to Michael’s account of 
Abraham’s success: 
O sent from Heav’n, 
Enlightner of my darkness, gracious things 
Thou hast reveald [...] 
now first I finde 
Mine eyes true op’ning, and my heart much eas’d, 
Erwhile perplext with thoughts what would becom 
Of mee and all Mankind; but now I see 
His day, in whom all Nations shall be blest[.] 
    (12.270-77) 
 
As he did then, Michael must again correct his pupil: “Dream not of thir fight, / As of a 
Duel, or the local wounds / Of head or heel” (12.386-8). Clearly, Adam has been inspired 
by the imagery of the divine romance, but he remains at risk of understanding the genre 
strictly through the secular externalities that have ensnared the devils. Yet his graver mistake 
is to presume that now he understands, that the great battle must surely occur now: he is still 
poised to use his subjectivity to justify seizing and interpreting his own occasions, to strive 
toward the end of a human narrative rather than live fully immersed within the providential 
plot. And just as the fight between the Satan and the Son will not resemble a human duel, 
its temporality resists easy placement within human history. 
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As Schwartz has discussed, the Son’s destined combat with the devil appears both 
endlessly repeated and indefinitely forestalled as Michael draws his narrative to a close: 
Satan’s defeat first seems accomplished at Jesus’ birth, but the bruising of the serpent’s head 
must be performed again through his perfect obedience to God (12.393-7), again during his 
sacrifice on the cross (12.427-33), and once more at his harrowing of hell and reascension 
into heaven (12.451-7). Yet even then, the divine romance remains unfinished: Michael 
explains that after the “deliverer’s” victory, “the few / His faithful” will resume their roles as 
the narrative’s exclusive community of earthly heroes, armed “With spiritual Armour” in 
resistance to “The enemies of truth” (12.479-91). This spiritual chivalry will endure as long 
as time itself, until the Son returns “to dissolve” his enemy—a verb that likewise vaporizes 
the weight of the previous martial imagery—and to establish “Ages of endless date” (12.546-
9). The end of time marks the final end of the romance; until then, both history and genre 
stretch on towards an indistinct vanishing point. Schwartz argues that Michael’s lesson in 
deferral indicates that sacred time is fundamentally non-narrative and resistant to teleology—
that “Adam cannot get there, Adam cannot see there, because there is no ‘there’ there”—yet 
Michael is quite clear that a ‘there’ that is not here is not the same as a ‘there’ that will never 
be anywhere.223 Adam must learn not that the romance and its end are unattainable or unreal, 
but that they do not belong to him to possess or identify. The hardest challenge he faces on 
the summit is to distinguish the ways in which reading history as a romance can enlighten 
him from the ways in which it can only make wandering in darkness bearable.224 
                                                
223 Schwartz, 134-6. 
224 Milton understood romance as a genre that mediated between deferral and fulfillment, and between 
enlightenment and ignorance, at least as early as Areopagitica (1644), which famously compares 
humanity’s slow quest for Truth to Plutarch’s ancient romance of Isis and Osiris: “the sad friends of Truth, 
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By the time Adam descends from the visionary mountain of meta-narrative back 
to the lower world of lived narrative—and back to Eve, consoled by her dreams of the 
hero that will spring from the tree of her descendants—his perspective on the structure of 
history is neither transcendently clear nor existentially nebulous. Unlike the protagonists 
of royalist or infernal romance, he feels compelled neither to exercise sole control over 
his story nor to despair of its meaning. We might recognize the “mystical” zeal of 
Cavendish’s stereotypical Puritan in Adam’s vow “ever to observe / [God’s] providence, 
and on him sole depend, / Mercifull over all his works, with good / Still overcoming 
evil,” but we no longer see any pretense to ownership of the “key” to that providence 
(12.563-6, emphasis mine). His full view of the romance of time has had a similar effect 
as his earlier prayer for forgiveness, which brought him “Strength added from above, new 
hope to spring / Out of despair, joy, but with fear yet linkt” (11.138-9). Rather than 
exulting in his newly regenerate subjectivity, he is compelled to conclude, “full of doubt I 
stand, / Whether I should repent me now of sin / [...] or rejoyce / Much more, that much 
more good thereof shall spring” (12.473-6). This doubt never appears fully resolved; as 
Adam and Eve take their “wandring steps” out of paradise and into the world of 
Michael’s errant narrative, they share “one Faith unanimous though sad, / With cause for 
evils past, yet much more cheer’d / With meditation on the happie end” (12.648, 603-
5).225 For both Milton and his ideological opponents, the romance of an individual life or 
                                                                                                                                            
such as durst appear, imitating the carefull search that Isis made for the mangl’d body of Osiris, went up 
and down gathering limb by limb still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, Lords and 
Commons, nor ever shall doe, till her Masters second comming; he shall bring together every joynt and 
member, and shall mould them into an immortall feature of lovelines and perfection” (CPW, 1018). 
225 Achsah Guibbory argues in The Map of Time that Adam and Eve’s imperfect understanding of their 
narrative represents the failure of education in a fallen world; people cannot be taught, and retain, divine 
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of a community’s history offers not a straight path to knowledge, but a wandering course 
through which the heroes can perceive the limits of knowledge and yet keep moving. But 
in Miltonic romance, only the promise of providential structure, and the legitimacy of a 
sacred perspective bestowed by God, can justify that movement and lend it direction. 
 
“On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity”: The Persistence of History 
 
Milton’s 1629 poem celebrating the birth of Jesus, “On the Morning of Christ’s 
Nativity,” offers an important temporal link between the fall of man and the regaining of 
paradise as moments within Christian history. Despite the fact that the lyric was 
composed half a lifetime before Milton wrote his epics on the Nativity’s prequel and 
sequel, it also illuminates the coherence of his career’s commitment to a poetics of sacred 
temporality and sacred genre. While Milton honed his approach to narrative in his much 
later poetry and incorporated heightened political concerns into his postwar treatment of 
romance, he was also returning in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained to ideas that had 
dominated his earliest work. 
The young Milton’s Nativity Ode opens with a jubilance that anticipates Adam’s 
naive delight in collapsing vast stretches of narrative into now: 
This is the month, and this the happy morn 
Wherein the Son of Heav'n's eternal King, 
Of wedded Maid, and Virgin Mother born, 
Our great redemption from above did bring; 
For so the holy sages once did sing, 
  That he our deadly forfeit should release, 
And with his Father work us a perpetual peace. 
    (1-7; emphasis mine) 
                                                                                                                                            
truths (193-9). While Milton would surely agree, Adam and Eve’s doubt and confusion are symptomatic 
not simply of their denseness, but also of the genre that they now inhabit; moreover, part of their task in 
entering their new narrative is to live with their doubts rather than struggle to overcome them. 
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Verbs in past and conditional future tenses are circumscribed by the “now” and “forever” 
implied in the stanza’s first and last lines; the poem’s narrator dips us into historical time 
and then draws us upward out of it with the ecstatic promise that we are about to be 
granted our own vision of an event that transcends history. His enthusiasm flourishes 
throughout the Nativity Ode’s first half, permeating the world of the poem like the music 
of the angelic chorus: 
Nature that heard such sound 
Beneath the hollow round 
  Of Cynthia's seat, the Airy region thrilling, 
Now was almost won 
To think her part was don, 
  And that her raign had here its last fulfilling[.] 
    (101-6) 
 
Again, the narrator’s supposition of what Nature “almost” thinks resembles Adam’s 
untimely conclusion upon witnessing his progeny’s amorous romance: “Here Nature seems 
fulfill’d in all her ends” (PL 11.602). As David Quint has argued, the Nativity Ode is a 
conscious exercise in this kind of narrative prematurity.226 The eager poet’s fantasies of 
temporal perfection reach far higher than Adam’s: he imagines that, hearing the music of 
the spheres that heralds Christ’s birth, “Time will run back, and fetch the age of gold” 
(135). Rather than merely stopping, time (as in the opening stanza) will effectively implode 
into infinity, drawn into a singularity that is apocalyptic as well as originary: “Yea Truth, 
and Justice then / Will down return to men,” and “Hell it self will pass away, / And leave 
her dolorous mansions to the peering Day,” while “Heav’n as at some festivall, / Will open 
wide the Gates of her high Palace Hall” (139-42, 147-8). Quint has observed that Milton’s 
                                                
226 David Quint, “Expectation and Prematurity in Milton’s ‘Nativity Ode,’” Modern Philology 97.2 (1999): 
195-219. 
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speaker enjoys a brief flirtation with universalism here as he imagines a defunct hell and a 
communally inclusive heaven.227 Like either Redcrosse or Adam on their overseeing peaks, 
the speaker is poised to grasp and possess the entirety of the story at once, to wind up the 
thread of history so that its entirety is visible, with the end result that time and plot, and 
perhaps even the exceptionalism of the godly, no longer carry useful meaning. 
We already know what Michael would say, and the voice of wisdom likewise enters 
the Nativity Ode to temper the poet’s anti-narrative zeal: “But wisest Fate sayes no, / This 
must not yet be so” (149-50).228 As Adam must accept the forestalling of the final battle 
with the serpent throughout his vision, the speaker is forced to acknowledge that the birth 
of Christ spells neither the fulfillment of nature nor the end of the Christian plot: “The Babe 
lies yet in smiling infancy, / That on the bitter cross / Must redeem our loss, / So both 
himself and us to glorify” (151-4). Time, history, and their attendant sorrows persist.229 
Having established that the poem remains set firmly in historical rather than apocalyptic 
time, Milton offers a brief but sudden introduction to the antagonist of the ongoing story, 
characterizing him with an image that is medieval or Spenserian as well as biblical: 
from this happy day 
Th’ old Dragon under ground 
In straiter limits bound, 
  Not half so far casts his usurped sway, 
And wroth to see his Kingdom fail, 
Swindges the scaly Horrour of his foulded tail. 
    (167-72) 
                                                
227 Ibid., 208-9. 
228 It is worth noting that in 1629, well before the royalists’ exilic writing, the young Milton feels free to 
conflate Fate and Providence unproblematically and without any further explanation. We might compare 
his lack of concern over terminology here to the Father’s sharp clarification in Paradise Lost: “Necessitie 
and Chance / Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate” (7.172-3). 
229 Quint argues that the poet’s “desire to be exempted from history” through his temporal fantasy “is a 
form of regressive ‘infancy,’ and the poem must subsequently remind him that, instead, the Last Judgment 
will involve the destruction of ‘the aged earth’ (line 160), a creation that will die to be reborn” 
(“Expectation and Prematurity,” 210, 207-8). 
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Satan here appears as “Th’ old Dragon” of both Revelation and England’s foundational 
romance, destined for eventual combat with the Christian narrative’s martial hero(es). 
The Dragon’s role in the Nativity Ode is small, but startling and complex: technically, the 
stanza he dominates reports that the birth of Christ has constrained his power and struck a 
decisive blow against his usurpation, yet the monster’s abrupt appearance serves 
nevertheless as an alarming warning that the final battle has yet to take place. The Dragon 
may be “bound,” but he remains a menacing creature, lurking “under ground” in all his 
wrath and “scaly Horrour”: like the peasants who run to see the spectacle of the satanic 
dragon after its defeat in Book I of The Faerie Queene, but wisely dread “Some lingring 
life within his hollow brest,” we are invited at once to celebrate the enemy’s predestined 
doom as though it were already accomplished, and yet to fear his persistent power (FQ 
1.12.10). Milton evokes a similar sense of temporal ambivalence in the stanza’s opening 
lines: “And then at last our bliss / Full and perfect is, / But now begins” (165-7). In these 
few words, we are reminded that the romance of history concludes in “bliss,” but that we 
can only trust in this finality from our imperfect vantage point somewhere in the 
melancholy middle of an unfinished and very long story—and yet that the present 
moment promises and anticipates the ending.  
This limited perspective may sound similar to the ambivalent consolation offered 
to Spenser’s Britomart or to Eve, and Milton’s figure for the heroic acceptance of it is 
again an expectant mother. The last stanza of the poem presents a powerful corrective to 
the temporal acrobatics of the first, as time, motion, and creation rest in momentary 
contemplation and communion with Mary: 
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But see the Virgin blest, 
Hath laid her Babe to rest. 
  Time is our tedious Song should here have ending: 
Heav’n’s youngest teemed Star, 
Hath fixed her polished Car, 
  Her sleeping Lord with Handmaid Lamp attending: 
And all about the Courtly Stable, 
Bright-harnest Angels sit in order serviceable.  
    (237-44) 
 
While Balachandra Rajan has seen in this final stanza a moment of “crystalline joy,” 
other readers have been less optimistic.230 J. Martin Evans, for one, finds Milton’s 
conclusion emblematic of the sorrowful “poetry of absence” that characterizes the 
Nativity Ode: the scene of “rest” in the stable holds us “trapped in the long-drawn-out 
‘moment’ of transition preceding the millennium,” able dimly “to apprehend the paradisal 
state of perfection,” but excluded from dwelling within it.231 Evans sets his interpretation 
in direct opposition to Rajan’s; however, it seems to me that these two positions need not 
be mutually exclusive. The poem does press us to acknowledge the absence of paradise, 
justice, harmony, and an eschatological experience of history; but it also points us to an 
understanding of this absence as present absence—not eternal, though keenly palpable 
for now—and to a perception of a form of divine presence within the absence. Much as 
Adam descends from his mountaintop vision in neither joy nor sorrow but “peace of 
thought” (PL 12.558), the small community in the stable at the end of the Nativity Ode 
“does achieve a measure of readiness and composure.”232 The stillness of the tableau 
vivant in the poem’s last stanza mediates between celebration and melancholy, between 
                                                
230 Balachandra Rajan, “In Order Serviceable,” Modern Language Review 3 (1968): 13-22, 13. 
231 J. Martin Evans, The Miltonic Moment (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 35-7.  For 
another reading that also finds that “joylessness” prevails in the poem, see T. K. Meier, “Milton’s Nativity 
Ode: Sectarian Discord,” Modern Language Review 65 (1970): 7-10, 7. 
232 Quint, “Expectation and Prematurity,” 215. 
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the absence of an apocalyptic Messiah and the presence of the newborn Babe, an emblem 
not of action and conclusion but of potential and beginning. As the figures in and around 
the stable all fall silent to wait on the infant Jesus “in order serviceable,” we are left with 
an image of patience as pristine presentness, of contentment with providential narrative 
as it is imperfectly understood, with “sitting” inside the moment as it stands internal to 
history.233 Mary, the poet, the star, and the angels share this “crystalline” moment with 
one another, and perhaps with the reader—but on this occasion of his birth, the Son of 
God is the focus of their experience rather than a participant in it. More than forty years 
later, Milton’s last poem returns to many of the themes of his early ode, but Paradise 
Regained allows us to witness the adult Jesus’ own human contentions with the problems 
and promises of subjectivity, time, and genre. 
 
Paradise Regained: A New “Chance at True Romance”234 
 
Published nearly forty years after Comus, Paradise Regained stands as Milton’s 
only other work that does not merely allude to or contain elements of romance, but 
arguably is a romance in its entirety. The poem opens with one of the genre’s archetypal 
premises: an unknown hero raised in obscurity suddenly discovers that he is the son of a 
king and heir to a usurped kingdom, and must then face the personal and practical 
implications of his identity. The Jesus of Book I is “the Son of Joseph deem’d […] as then 
                                                
233 With good reason, it has become commonplace to connect the conclusion of the Nativity Ode to the 
final line of Milton’s sonnet on his blindness: “They also serve who only stand and wait.” 
234 A version of this section appears as “Milton’s Counter-Revision of Romantic Structure in Paradise 
Regained,” Huntington Library Quarterly 76.1 (2013). I am grateful to John Rogers; to Erin Murphy; and 
to Nigel Smith, Peter Lake, and the members of the Folger Institute’s 2011-2012 Researching the Archive 
Seminar for their great help in revising and polishing this material.  
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obscure, / Unmarkt, unknown” (1.23-25). Having grown to “youths full flowr” (1.67), he 
learns the truth of his birth from his mother: 
  For know, thou art no Son of mortal man; 
  Though men esteem thee low of Parentage,   
  Thy Father is the Eternal King, who rules 
  All Heaven and Earth, Angels and Sons of men, 
  A messenger from God fore-told […] 
  Thou shouldst be great and sit on David's Throne,   
  And of thy Kingdom there should be no end.   
(1.234-241) 
 
Over the course of Milton’s brief epic,235 Jesus withdraws from human society to wander 
through an isolated landscape, where he encounters and defeats his mortal enemy, and 
returns to the world confident in his heroic identity and in the providential teleology of his 
life’s story. Milton’s use of the conventional tropes and narrative structure of romance is 
deliberate and sincere, as I will argue hereafter, but Paradise Regained’s relationship to 
the genre is certainly more complicated than it appears in this cursory sketch of the plot. 
Jesus’ story may be a romance in itself, but the hero must resist a Satanic presentation of 
romance that seems equally conventional in its chivalric content and its narrative about 
heroic action in pursuit of a lost paternal inheritance. Given the generically-charged nature 
of the opponents’ combat, why does Milton regard romance as such a ground of 
contention, and what is his final attitude toward it in Paradise Regained? 
These questions were once the subjects of extensive critical conversation. Nearly 
fifty years ago, Barbara Lewalski described “Jesus’ adventure and conquest over Satan in 
the Wilderness” as “the true, fully achieved Romance Quest” in which the hero “antitypes 
                                                
235 I follow Barbara Lewalski in finding it unproblematic to categorize Paradise Regained as both a brief 
epic and a romance (see, respectively, Milton’s Brief Epic [Providence, RI: Brown U P, 1966] and 
“Revaluations of Romance”). 
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the romance knights” and “achieves, as Adam did not and as fallen man cannot, the 
highest romance purposes.”236 Her reading of Milton’s poem as a bold experiment with 
genre that “exalt[s] [the romance ethos] to the order of perfection” accords with Northrop 
Frye’s description of Paradise Regained as “a parody of a dragon-killing romance, or, 
more accurately,” as “the reality of which the dragon-killing romance is a parody.”237 
Stanley Fish visited the poem twice, once in 1971 and again in 1983. His earlier essay on 
the Son’s “Inaction and Silence” hesitates to break from Lewalski and Frye’s pro-
romantic reading: while he argues that the audience faces a “literary temptation” in its 
expectation of an active hero, he concludes that heroic action finally becomes “purified” 
by complete submission to God, and is therefore “now not only allowed, but enjoined.”238 
However, Fish’s return to the poem in 1983 implies that reading it as a romance is 
impossible after all. This later essay—Schwartz’s source for the “temptation of plot”—
redefines the core temptation in Paradise Regained for both Jesus and the reader as the 
temptation not just of heroic action, but of narrative itself. Fish contends that Satan makes 
a “continual effort […] to persuade the Son of God that the Son himself is a character in a 
plot, in a narrative where every change of scene brings new opportunities and new risks,” 
and that “What defeats Satan finally is the Son’s inability or unwillingness […] to 
recognize the fact that there is a plot at all.”239 Even the final temptation on the pinnacle 
is not the “climax” of a “plot,” Fish concludes: “There is no final moment in Paradise 
                                                
236 Lewalski, “Revaluations of Romance,” 68-70. 
237 Northrop Frye, “Agon and Logos: Revolution and Revelation,” in The Prison and the Pinnacle, ed. 
Balachandra Rajan (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1973), 135-63, 136. 
238 Stanley Fish, “Inaction and Silence: The Reader in Paradise Regained,” in Calm of Mind: Tercentenary 
Essays on Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, ed. Joseph Wittreich (Cleveland, OH: Press of Case 
Western Reserve University, 1971), 25-47, 44-5. 
239 Fish, “The Temptation of Plot,” 166. 
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Regained.  In this last scene, which ends nothing, the Son does no more or less than he 
does before and will have to do again.” Jesus’ active inaction is not a definitive triumph 
but an ongoing process: the poem’s events (or non-events) are removed “from the story 
line of a plot into a timeless realm where they are eternally occurring.”240 Rather than 
perfecting romance, Fish decides, the Son both refuses the heroism that characterizes the 
genre and erases the temporality that makes its narrative shape possible. Finally, Annabel 
Patterson’s 1983 essay on Paradise Regained, “Milton’s Last Chance at True Romance,” 
concludes that this last chance ultimately fails to redeem the genre. “The poem appears to 
be constructed on rigorously antiromantic lines,” she argues, as it avoids a clear sense of 
a beginning, a middle, and an end, and portrays the genre’s tropes and trappings as 
Satanic temptations to be rejected in favor of an ambiguous “new Christian narrative 
whose rules are yet to be revealed.”241 Within the same publication in the same year, 
Patterson and Fish each determined that Milton was politically and religiously motivated 
to exclude Paradise Regained from traditional categories of genre and narrative 
temporality; their consensus marked the poem’s “last chance at true romance” in Milton 
studies, and twenty years of critical conversation on Paradise Regained’s relationship to 
romance came to an end.  
                                                
240 Ibid., 181-3. For another argument for Paradise Regained’s ultimate sense of removal from narrative 
time, see Stuart Curran, “The Mental Pinnacle: Paradise Regained and the Romantic Four-Book Epic,” in 
Calm of Mind: Tercentenary Essays on Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, ed. Joseph Wittreich 
(Cleveland, OH: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), 133-62. Curran proposes that “the 
epiphanic moment on the pinnacle” is “literally for Milton the moment divorced from time” and that 
“Christ himself is further and further separated from a time-bound world as he progresses” throughout the 
poem (160). I argue, rather, that Jesus’ capacity for extra-temporal insight only heightens his commitment 
to performing the right role within the temporal narrative.  
241 Patterson, “Last Chance at True Romance,” 201. 
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I hope to show here that the matter has not been settled, and that a more complete 
historicist consideration of post-Restoration contexts can in fact strengthen Lewalski and 
Frye’s structuralist instincts about the poem’s genre. Paradise Regained does not abandon 
outworn romance in order to escape its temptations; rather, like Paradise Lost, it counters 
the new royalist romance by assigning its innovative quasi-Hobbesian characteristics to 
Satan and by combating it with a Puritan alternative. Satan’s temptation in Paradise 
Regained is indeed literary, but Jesus’ resistance and his triumph are no less literary: while 
Satan’s self-conscious assumptions and uncertainties about heroic narrative bear all the 
hallmarks of the royalist genre in crisis and seem more anxious than ever, Jesus becomes 
progressively more assured that providentially-guided romance is the genre of human 
history, and that his sense of heroic subjectivity is authentically sacred, self-sufficient 
proof against his enemies. If anything, Milton displays a heightened generic self-
consciousness compared with Herbert or Cavendish, since one of the forces that the hero 
of his “dragon-killing romance” must overcome is a rival form of the genre itself.242 
 Paradise Regained opens as Jesus “One day forth walk’d alone, the Spirit leading” 
into the wilderness, armed only with his tentative new knowledge of his identity and purpose 
and “Musing and much revolving in his brest, / How best the mighty work he might begin / 
Of Saviour to mankind” (1.185-9). Having retreated from the public world into the 
indeterminate landscape of romance, he soon encounters another of the genre’s well-known 
figures: “an aged man in Rural weeds” who offers the wandering hero his assistance 
                                                
242 I am grateful to John Rogers for this observation. 
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(1.314).243 Scholars have long noted this seemingly innocuous old shepherd’s resemblance to 
Spenser’s Archimago, the cunningly deceitful villain of The Faerie Queene; unlike Spenser’s 
Redcrosse Knight (also an unknown hero traversing the wilderness on a mission of holiness), 
Jesus easily recognizes his foe, and his romantic and meta-romantic battle with Satan thus 
begins. Satan’s anxiety over Jesus’ uncertain future and his urgent sense that the dethroned 
heir must form a plan for regaining his father’s kingdom are again parallel to the concerns in 
postwar royalist romance, and at Paradise Lost’s infernal council, about which active or 
passive postures the exile should adopt. The ensuing temptations are accordingly varied, as 
Satan alternately exhorts Jesus to rely on martial force, on pragmatic patience, and on his 
wits. This new heroic narrative offers many paths to triumph, as long as its protagonist, like 
Cavendish’s Travellia, does anything other than wait for a divine sign (such as those found in 
passé romances that are “ridiculous to reason”) and acts to further his own ends.       
 The order of Satan’s temptations notably corresponds to the order in which Adam 
must learn to reject false heroics in Paradise Lost: first love, then war, then shallow peace. 
As Salzman has remarked, erotic romance plays a relatively minor role in postwar royalist 
narratives, and so Satan wastes little time in confirming that Jesus is immune to the sensual 
charms of women modeled on the ladies of archaic Arthurian texts, “Fairer then feign’d of 
old, or fabl’d since / Of Fairy Damsels met in Forest wide / By Knights of Logres, or of 
Lyones, / Lancelot or Pelleas, or Pellenore” (2.358-361).244 Instead, he turns to romantic 
allures that are less obviously frivolous and that feature more prominently in postwar 
                                                
243 Like many romances, The Princess Cloria also opens with an errant protagonist (Cassianus) wandering 
through an unfamiliar country and encountering a (legitimately) hospitable stranger. 
244 Satan scoffs at the “libertine” Belial’s suggestion that the devils entrap Jesus with “Amorous Nets,” 
arguing that many great men “[make] small account / Of beauty and her lures [...] / on worthier things 
intent,” but he tries the tactic anyway, just to be sure (2.162, 193-5). 
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heroic texts: the temptations of combat and of politics. He begins by warning Jesus that his 
“years are ripe, and over-ripe” for the martial display with which the untried young hero of 
chivalric romance conventionally proves his mettle to the world, and for which Arethusius’ 
younger brother in Cloria (Herbert’s figure for James II) particularly yearns (3.31). Such is 
Jesus’ “skill,” Satan suggests, that were he “sought to deeds / That might require th’ array 
of war […] all the world / Could not sustain [his] Prowess”:  
  These God-like Vertues wherefore dost thou hide? 
  Affecting private life, or more obscure 
  In savage Wilderness, wherefore deprive 
  All Earth her wonder at thy acts, thy self 
  The fame and glory, glory the reward     
  That sole excites to high attempts the flame 
  Of most erected Spirits[?]      
(III.16-30) 
 
Jesus responds by denying the value of the conventional quest for individual credit, 
which he scorns as “false glory, attributed / To things not glorious, men not worthy of 
fame,” in language reminiscent of Michael’s to Adam (III.69-70). Moreover, he rejects 
martial action as a means of demonstrating one’s heroic virtue: 
They err who count it glorious to subdue 
 By Conquest far and wide, to over-run  
Large Countries, and in field great Battels win, 
Great Cities by assault: what do these Worthies, 
But rob and spoil, burn, slaughter, and enslave     
Peaceable Nations[?]      
(III.71-76) 
 
Conquest and victory in battle, the chivalric hero’s badges of honor, are exposed by Jesus  
as excuses for wanton destruction and, what is more, as the cornerstones of tyranny: the 
conquering champion’s only motive and reward, he argues, is to become the unlawful 
king of an unconsenting people.  
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After linking martial chivalry to the corruption of absolute monarchy, Jesus 
counters that any earthly glory must be “attain’d / Without ambition, war, or violence; / By 
deeds of peace, by wisdom eminent, / By patience, temperance” (3.89-92). Yet as Adam 
learns in Paradise Lost, peace is not without its own perils. In Cloria, an inclination toward 
peaceful prudence rather than glorious violence distinguishes Arethusius from his bellicose 
brother, but as we have seen, Arethusius’ cautiousness works in tandem with his ambition 
for advancement and political success. Lewalski has pointed out that Milton regards the 
entire premise of heroic ambition as mistaken in his later work: in Paradise Lost, Eve 
“assumes the faulty heroism of a knight-errant looking for adventures to prove her unaided 
virtue” when the trials of romance will “come unsought” (PL 9.366), while Jesus, who 
functions in Paradise Regained as the antitype not only of Adam but also of Eve, instead 
accepts the trials that God has ordained, crucially seeking not his own glory, “but his / Who 
sent me” (PR 3.106-7).245 Heroic patience, for Milton, can never be politic in the ambitious 
sense (though it is certainly political in the sense that it allows Jesus to resist his 
adversary).246 Jesus is waiting not for the right time to exercise his own pragmatic 
providence, as Arethusius and Travellia continually do, but for divine providence “To 
exercise him,” as it is now doing “in the Wilderness” (1.156).  
Having thus failed to move Jesus to action by encouraging him to go out in search 
of unknown adventure to prove his merit and win glory, Satan turns instead to a more 
specific quest, one that constitutes the plot of countless heroic romances, including Cloria 
                                                
245 Lewalski, “Revaluations of Romance,” 67. 
246 For an argument on patience and republican resistance in the poem, see David Norbrook, “Republican 
Occasions in Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,” Milton Studies 42 (2002): 122-148. 
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and, of course, the historical trajectory of Charles II. As the unrecognized heir to a 
kingdom, he insists, Jesus must surely answer the clear call of narrative destiny: 
  Of glory as thou wilt, said he, so deem,     
  Worth or not worth the seeking, let it pass: 
  But to a Kingdom thou art born, ordain'd 
  To sit upon thy Father David's Throne; 
  By Mothers side thy Father, though thy right 
  Be now in powerful hands, that will not part    
  Easily from possession won with arms […] 
    and think'st thou to regain 
  Thy right by sitting still or thus retiring?    
(3.150-6, 163-4) 
 
Now knowing Jesus’ hatred of monarchical oppression, Satan reminds him that his 
father’s throne has been wrongfully usurped by the Romans, who have ruled the realm as 
tyrants and “violated” its sacred Temple “with foul affronts, / Abominations rather” 
(3.160-2): if Jesus is truly the long-lost heir of David, as the rumor runs, then the obvious 
task before him as a romantic hero is to reclaim his royal right, end the usurpers’ tyranny, 
and establish a reign of virtue. And having found Jesus to be unmoved by power or 
worldly possessions, Satan appeals directly to the hero’s sense of godliness, invoking 
  Zeal of thy Fathers house, Duty to free       
   Thy Country from her Heathen servitude; 
  So shalt thou best fullfil, best verifie 
  The Prophets old, who sung thy endless raign, 
  The happier raign the sooner it begins, 
  Raign then; what canst thou better do the while?   
(3.175-80) 
 
According to Satan, Jesus is bound by all the obligations of royal romance, which Satan 
describes in vivid generic terms: he has a “monster” (as Satan terms Tiberius) to “expel,” 
an ancestral right to reclaim, a people to liberate, a prophecy to fulfill (4.100). And in 
addition to mobilizing romance’s conventional imagery in support of his argument, Satan 
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incorporates the revised royalist theme of politic calculation, proposing to his adversary 
that “Zeal and Duty are not slow; / But on Occasions forelock watchful wait. / They 
themselves rather are occasion best” (3.172-4). In other words, the dispossessed hero 
remains passive and patient only in anticipation of the right opportunity, which his own 
“Zeal and Duty” can easily bring about. Critically, these virtues “are occasion” in 
“themselves”; the right time for action in royalist romance is dictated not by providence, 
but by the hero’s internal political barometer. Jesus refuses to adopt this revisionary 
rhetoric, insisting that “All things are best fulfil’d in their due time,” which “The Father in 
his purpose hath decreed, / He in whose hand all times and seasons roul” (3.182, 186-7). 
Providential temporality, not royal birthright, political contingency, or secular subjectivity, 
determines the proper “occasions” for the hero’s struggles and his eventual victory.247 
In a final effort to motivate Jesus to yield to the pressures of his artificial narrative 
and meet his enemies in combat, Satan shows him the battling armies of Parthia and 
Scythia, which Milton’s narrator explicitly links to the chivalric Roland cycle in a lengthy 
metaphor reminiscent of Paradise Lost 1.579-87: 
  Such forces met not, nor so wide a camp, 
  When Agrican with all his Northern powers 
  Besieg’d Albracca, as Romances tell; 
The City of Gallaphrone, from thence to win    
The fairest of her Sex Angelica 
His daughter, sought by many Prowest Knights, 
Both Paynim, and the Peers of Charlemane. 
Such and so numerous was thir Chivalrie; 
At sight whereof the Fiend yet more presum’d,    
And to our Saviour thus his words renew’d.   
(3.337-346) 
                                                
247 Laurie Zwicky identifies the distinction between satanic and messianic understandings of time as the 
difference between the Greek concepts chronos and kairos: see “Kairos in Paradise Regained: The Divine 
Plan,” ELH 31.3 (1964), 271-7. 
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Apparently inspired by the impressive visual trappings of “Chivalrie,” Satan claims that he 
has shown Jesus this spectacle not to test his virtue, but to spur him along his destined 
course: he will never regain his “foretold” kingdom, Satan warns, “unless [he] / 
Endeavour[s], as [his] Father David did” (3.351-3). He attempts simultaneously to attach 
Jesus to earthly hereditary succession by offering him his royal ancestor as a model of 
political virtue—as Herbert’s Euarchus functions for Arethusius, and the historical Charles 
I for his son and his subjects—and to persuade him that a providential plan for his heroic 
story is indeterminate at best, and perhaps nonexistent. Fate and prophecy may interact 
with chance, mass contingency, and individual agency in some nebulous fashion, but no 
outcome can be guaranteed: “prediction still / In all things, and all men, supposes means, / 
Without means us’d, what it predicts revokes” (3.354-6). Here again we find a dependence 
on pragmatic providence that parallels Cavendish’s conviction that the gods are most 
helpful to those who act instead of waiting on divine aid. Satan thus rests his case in 
accordance with the postwar royalist stance that the plot of romance is founded upon the 
uneasy collaboration of uncertain fortune or fate and opportunistic heroism. Within this 
model, the hero may either “on Occasions forelock watchful wait” or “Endeavour” to 
reclaim his right; both options require politic judgment and self-generated authority, since 
faith in providence alone answers no questions and ensures no victory. 
 Earlier in the poem, Jesus has privately acknowledged that he once found the 
royal romance of usurpation and restoration compelling.248 Prior to his discovery of his 
                                                
248 While Adam, creation’s first lover, is innately horrified by violence but drawn to erotic romance, Jesus 
sees no appeal in amorous narrative, yet initially finds himself attracted to a romance of valor. 
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identity from Mary and his exercise of his heroic subjectivity in the wilderness, the young 
hero aspired to just the sort of virtuous martial chivalry to which Satan tempts him:  
     victorious deeds    
  Flam’d in my heart, heroic acts, one while 
  To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke, 
  Then to subdue and quell o’re all the earth 
  Brute violence and proud Tyrannick pow’r, 
  Till truth were freed, and equity restor’d[.]   
(1.215-20) 
 
However, as he comes to understand his own sacred nature and the sacred nature of his 
quest, his perspective on romance matures, and he exposes Satan’s entire heroic narrative 
as a perverse veneer parodying, overlaying, and obscuring the true divine plot. In Jesus’ 
re-reading, it is Satan, not Tiberius and the Romans, who has “usurp’t” the earthly 
kingdom and must be overcome, and who “first made” all “brutish monster[s]” in need of 
expulsion (4.127-9, 183). As for the enslaved Israelites, their suffering under Roman rule 
is their own divinely ordained trial, and an apt punishment for their idolatry; moreover, 
their deliverance will come without any need for good fortune, politic “occasion,” or 
monarchical might, since God “at length, time to himself best known […] May bring 
them back repentant and sincere” in accordance with his divine “providence” (3.433-5, 
440). The time for action belongs to God to determine. In response to Satan’s insistence 
that he fill an authoritative void by acting as roi absolu of his people and as moi absolu of 
his narrative, Jesus rebuffs these false absolutes as the desperate skeptic’s substitutes for 
the one true absolute, which will prevail no matter how long it may remain concealed by 
political disaster or disappointment. 
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 Finally, Jesus rejects Satan’s assumption that his mission to reclaim his kingdom 
is identical to that of the worldly royal hero and must therefore be accomplished by 
worldly royalist means: 
  Know therefore when my season comes to sit 
  On David’s Throne, it shall be like a tree 
  Spreading and over-shadowing all the Earth, 
  Or as a stone that shall to pieces dash 
  All Monarchies besides throughout the world,    
  And of my Kingdom there shall be no end: 
  Means there shall be to this, but what the means, 
  Is not for thee to know, nor me to tell.    
(4.146-53) 
 
Jesus’ declaration that his romance of inheritance is explicitly anti-royalist, opposed to 
“All Monarchies besides,” settles the matter of his narrative’s ideology while refusing to 
answer any questions about its practical progress or its temporal telos. Yet even as he 
dismisses martial chivalry and worldly politics as elements of his narrative, he stresses that 
narrative’s temporal reality and the thematic conventionality of its inevitable conclusion. 
As in Book 12 of Paradise Lost, the Christian champion’s victory is both indefinitely 
forestalled and absolutely assured: contrary to Fish’s case that Jesus must resist the 
temptation of teleological plot, he reiterates that his “season” will come, that his story’s 
glorious ending is guaranteed by divine will, and that this ending does, in fact, involve the 
forceful conquest of enemies and the recovery of a kingdom.249 Satan has been right about 
the most basic tropes of the romance of sacred kingship, but entirely wrong about their 
packaging and about the means that govern their progress. That progress is certain, but 
Satan—despite his insistence on fixed generic rules for heroic success—is too committed 
                                                
249 For another argument that heroic action in the temporal world is consistently deferred in Paradise 
Regained, but never denied its ultimate importance and eventuality, see Norbrook, “Republican 
Occasions,” 136. 
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to his own revision of Jesus’ romance to believe in authentic narrative certainty, and 
therefore cannot conceive of the middle of the story that ensures the transcendent end. 
 Jesus’ pronouncement that the true story of his recovery of his father’s throne is 
“not for [Satan] to know, nor [him] to tell” may recall the Lady’s dismissal of Comus—
“Fain would I somthing say, yet to what end? / Thou has nor Eare, nor Soul to apprehend 
/ The sublime notion” (783-5). It should also put us in mind of all the other instances in 
which we have witnessed the exclusionary power of divinely-inspired subjectivity and 
the stunted ability of the unregenerate to produce or comprehend romance. Satan’s 
temptations that Jesus replace God’s romance with an inferior revision may be deceitful, 
but they also correspond to Satan’s own willfully faulty understanding of the genre. 
Being “compos’d of lies / From the beginning,” Satan tells the same lies about the nature 
of romantic narrative to himself, as we have seen in Paradise Lost (1.407-8). His 
suggestion that Jesus’ success hinges upon the collaboration of politic action and fortune 
mirrors his speech to his demonic followers in Book I, wherein he proposes that they take 
urgent measures to “learn” Jesus’ true identity in order to assess their “danger” which 
stands “on the utmost edge / Of hazard” (I.91-5). Satan’s use of the terminology of 
gambling here again suggests his Cavendish-esque belief that chance and agency together 
govern affairs; accordingly, he imagines that he may yet “subvert” God’s plan for his Son 
if he acts swiftly (1.124). Even so, his stance on the nature of fate vacillates throughout 
this poem as well, continuing to offer conflicting royalist perspectives on the muddled 
powers of personal agency, impersonal fortune, random contingency, and providence. 
Both Jesus and Milton’s narrator are unequivocal that God’s providence is the only 
  
222 
driving force behind the narrative of history: Jesus reproves the Greek philosophers, and 
by implication Herbert’s forlorn characters, for “accus[ing] [God] under usual names, / 
Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite / Of mortal things” (4.316-18), while the 
narrator reminds us that Satan, “unweeting” and “contrary” to his own perceived purpose, 
“fulfill’d / The purpos’d Counsel pre-ordain’d and fixt / Of the most High” (1.126-8). 
However, Satan can neither admit such certainty nor fully shake it. Despite his suggestion 
to himself and his crew that they may act to influence their fate, elsewhere he admits 
once more that he despairs of altering God’s judgment: “all hope is lost / Of my reception 
into grace; what worse? / For where no hope is left, is left no fear” (3.204-6). Like 
Arethusius, Satan finds it easier to conceive of divinity as the inexorable punisher of 
wickedness than as the assured ally of virtue. His hopeless courage thus serves only to 
inspire further fruitless action, and with it, further delusional hope; the circularity of 
Satan’s belief and behavior locks him into an anti-teleological pattern entirely opposed to 
the trajectory of heroic romance, despite his apparent affinity for recent royalist 
treatments of the genre. Ironically, while Satan does indeed attempt to convince Jesus 
that he is a character in a certain kind of chivalric text, as Fish suggests, Jesus is already 
aware that he is a character in the ultimate providential plot, while Satan is finally 
defeated by his own “inability or unwillingness […] to recognize” that that plot exists.250 
Having rejected a legitimately developing narrative for himself, Satan’s cannot conceive 
that his adversary could possess one without relying on illusory “hazard” to direct its 
progress.  
                                                
250 Fish, “The Temptation of Plot,” 166 
  
223 
 Satan’s inability or refusal to grasp the full sense of an ending to God’s or his own  
narrative impacts his most seemingly candid speech in the poem, throwing it into sharp 
relief. When Jesus demands to know the reason for his solicitous concern—“Know’st 
thou not that my rising is thy fall, / And my promotion will be thy destruction?” (3.201-
2)—Satan replies that he has grown weary of waiting to learn the nature and extent of his 
defeat, since he is already certain of his doom: 
  If there be worse, the expectation more 
  Of worse torments me then the feeling can. 
  I would be at the worst; worst is my Port, 
  My harbour and my ultimate repose,     
  The end I would attain, my final good.    
(3.207-11) 
 
Claiming to be eager for the conclusion of the divine narrative, he irrationally justifies his 
attempts to provoke Jesus into alleviating his uncertainty by alleging that he is already 
certain how the story ends. With his characteristic terseness, Jesus declines to sympathize 
with Satan’s suffering and cuts through the Gordian knot of his illogical claim to 
simultaneous suspense and despair:  
My time I told thee (and that time for thee 
Were better farthest off) is not yet come; 
When that comes think not thou to find me slack 
On my part aught endeavouring, or to need 
Thy politic maxims, or that cumbersome    
Luggage of war there shewn me, argument 
Of human weakness rather then of strength. 
(3.396-402) 
 
Beyond banishing “politic maxims” and the “Luggage of war” from his heroic narrative 
as signs of secular “weakness,” Jesus speaks only of that narrative’s certain progress 
toward its actively heroic climax, and gestures parenthetically toward his enemy’s willful 
ignorance. Satan is granted no insight into the divine plot because he refuses to believe 
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that any such insight is really possible or that any such immutable plot really exists. And 
he cannot in fact conceive of the story’s conclusion; if he could, he would have no desire 
to hasten it. Satan pleads for relief from the suffering caused by the narrative’s illusory 
suspense; Jesus ominously informs him that if he understood the narrative’s providential 
plot, he would be in no suspense at all.   
The effect of Jesus’ words is often to frustrate not only his adversary, but the 
audience too. The subjectivity of Milton’s protagonist is so intensely interiorized, 
exclusive, and combative that it has been excluding and repelling readers for centuries. In 
consequence, Paradise Regained has developed a reputation for being a difficult, 
narratively unconventional poem about indeterminacy, negation, inaction, and silence. 
Fish, Patterson, and Schwartz all broadly agree that Satan’s goal is to press Jesus into 
making certain statements about his divinity and taking actions that confirm it, and that 
Jesus resists him by refusing to provide answers that would violate the ambiguity of the 
sacred (or, for that matter, give the reader any satisfying information). This argument is 
sensible from a very specific angle, but we must be careful about how we understand 
Satanic “certainty” as opposed to divine “ambiguity.” Satan, committed to a royalist 
romantic discourse, actually harps on ambiguity and uncertainty as absolute facts before 
grasping at their opposites. Just as it is he who experiences the real difficulty in thinking 
of himself as a hero within a teleological plot, it is he who keeps insisting upon the 
inauthenticity of sacred subjectivity, narrative ambiguity, and its attendant vexations, as 
in his warning that prophecy does not entail predestination (3.354-6), his willful claim 
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that the title “Son of God [...] bears no single sence” (4.517), and his final grand tirade 
before setting Jesus on the pinnacle of the temple:    
if I read aught in Heaven, 
Or Heav’n write aught of Fate, by what the Stars 
Voluminous, or single characters, 
In their conjunction met, give me to spell,    
  Sorrows, and labours, opposition, hate 
  Attends thee, scorns, reproaches, injuries, 
  Violence and stripes, and lastly cruel death. 
  A Kingdom they portend thee, but what Kingdom, 
  Real or Allegoric I discern not,      
  Nor when, eternal sure, as without end, 
  Without beginning; for no date prefixt 
  Directs me in the Starry Rubric set.   
(4.382-393) 
 
With this last gasp of malicious frustration, Satan articulates all the confusions of his 
revised romance at once: is he reading the text of Heaven or of Fate?251 Can a hero’s 
suffering really be a meaningful and necessary harbinger of his triumph? Is Jesus’ 
kingship “Real,” or only a convenient metaphor? Finally, his confusion leads him to 
proclaim that, because he cannot discern its pattern, the narrative itself must be inherently 
unstructured and meaningless: there are no ends, no beginnings, no coherent middles. He 
is obsessed not with seeking answers to his questions, but with endlessly repeating the 
questions to which he has already decided there can be no answers. Patterson holds that 
Satan is “driven by the need to know the truth” about Jesus’ identity and his mission, but 
as the eternal enemy of all Milton’s heroes who seek out and defend Truth, Satan is 
repelled by the truth about anything.252 He has spent the entire poem insisting to Jesus 
that truth is relative, that special godly subjectivity is a delusion, that a nebulous 
                                                
251 David Gay also interprets Satan’s reading of Jesus’ horoscope in the “Starry Rubric” as his mistaken 
reliance on both empty external icons and irreligious fatalism. See “Astrology and Iconoclasm in Milton’s 
‘Paradise Regained,’” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 41.1 (2001): 175-190. 
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providence cannot allow him to know anything for sure, and that the only path to power 
and security is through one’s own secular standards and politic self-determination.  
Jesus, on the other hand, appears to become increasingly vague in his responses to 
Satan even as he becomes increasingly sure—at least, sure enough—of his sacred heroic 
identity and of his quest. Whatever narrative vision his wandering trials have granted 
him, however, would be meaningless to Satan, who is always already convinced that 
providential illumination cannot be real or trustworthy. To Satan, divinely-imparted 
certainty and self-assuredness look indistinguishable from infuriating ambiguity, as is the 
case with Jesus’ riddling “Think not but that I know these things, or think / I know them 
not; not therefore am I short / Of knowing what I ought” (4.286-8). We, the audience, are 
also not fully privy to what Jesus knows about himself and his destiny; but we, like the 
poem’s hero (and like Adam in Paradise Lost or the “serviceable” cast of the Nativity 
Ode), know all that we need to at present. It would be a grave mistake for us to assume 
along with Satan that what we do not know does not exist to be known, that “there is no 
‘there’ there.”  
The critical impulse to reduce Paradise Regained to anti-narrative silence is 
perhaps linked to the urge to decouple its imagery from romance or any other genre. For 
instance, Patterson proposes that the answer to whether the Son’s Kingdom is “Real or 
Allegoric” is “neither,” but we would do much better to accept the full weight of the 
romantic trope and say that it is both.253 The Kingdom of God that would “to pieces dash 
/ All monarchies besides” may have been a powerful symbol in the hearts and minds of 
                                                
253 Ibid. 
  
227 
the community that passively resisted the restoration of royalism, but Milton and his 
fellow Puritan republicans would have insisted that its immateriality was temporary, just 
as Jesus does. Milton’s Christian narrative, as “the reality of which the dragon-killing 
romance is a parody,” features a real hero destined to overcome a real foe in real time and 
finally for all time. Even though (as Michael warns Adam) the Son’s battle with Satan 
remains deferred and never takes the form of a martial “Duel” (PL 12.387), the real fact 
and the providentially ordained outcome of their combat still stand as traditional 
bulwarks against Satan’s innovative ambiguation. When Jesus stands on the pinnacle of 
the temple, he stands in opposition to his enemy’s attempts to strip all absolute meaning 
from sacred identity, godly heroism, and narrative temporality and to locate the self as the 
only absolute power. Undaunted by all temptations to value romance’s surface over its 
structure, to choose politic calculation over faithful patience, and to create a new story to 
suit his own heroism in his own time, Jesus takes his place within the story that has 
already been written and waits for its next adventure. He becomes so possessed with the 
certainty of his heroic identity, his narrative, and its providential form that Satan flees 
before that profoundly interiorized conviction, “smitten with amazement,” unable to 
withstand what he refuses to understand (4.562).  
 In that moment, the romantic plot within Paradise Regained has reached its 
predestined climax: Jesus has “vanquish[ed] / Temptation” and “regain’d lost Paradise” 
(4.607-8). Yet the challenges of Milton’s poem do not disappear. Jesus may have attained 
the knowledge he needs, but the audience has heard few revelations and seen little action. 
And as countless readers have noted, the larger story does not end with Jesus’ descent 
  
228 
from the pinnacle. He can only now “on [his] glorious work  / [...] enter, and begin to 
save mankind,” and the horizon of the romance landscape remains wide open as he 
returns “Home to his Mothers house” (4.634-5, 639). As one romantic episode concludes, 
another begins. But the divine romance of Paradise Regained is neither endless nor 
aimless. J. Martin Evans has also argued that Milton regards contemplation as a 
predecessor to action rather than a replacement for it, and that Paradise Regained signals 
the continuation of the Christian story rather than the dissolution of narrative: “Although 
the final lines return Christ to his mother’s house, Milton has made it clear that the 
‘Queller of Satan’ (4.634) is only on the brink of his divine mission. The real action is 
just about to begin.”254 The poem does continually promise “real” romantic heroism in an 
indefinite future—but given those promises, why does Milton return Jesus to Mary’s 
house at all? Why do the last lines of the poem gesture toward further patience and quiet 
contemplation rather than to action?  
To begin to answer this question, we must return to the visionary summit, 
Spenser’s device in The Faerie Queene that so inspired Milton. The Redcrosse Knight, 
Adam, and Jesus are all granted visions of sacred narrative as they stand on great heights. 
When Redcrosse descends from his momentary prospect above his story, his vision fades 
as his eyes readjust to the mortal world; he then returns, only imperfectly enlightened, to 
the burden of time and action in his role as a Christian warrior. Adam’s mortal sight is 
likewise too weak for a complete understanding of providential history, and he returns 
from the mountain poised to enter the active world with mixed faith and doubt. But 
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Paradise Regained ends not with Jesus’ spectacular battle with Satan or his 
commencement of active labors: it ends with his quiet return to his mother’s house. Had 
Spenser made a similar move, the Legend of Holiness would have concluded with 
Redcrosse relaxing in the castle of Cœlia, his combat with the dragon still ahead. A 
historicist explanation is possible: while Spenser is immediately concerned with the next 
tasks facing his elect nation, Milton’s England has been derailed from its course. But this 
rationale seems insufficient. Unlike Redcrosse and Adam, Jesus does not lose his grasp 
on the narrative vision he has received. When he comes down from his mountain or his 
pinnacle, his descent is only physical. In effect, Jesus dwells in his visionary moment 
even after it has passed: he finds it down on the ground, whether at the banquet that the 
angels provide in the wilderness or in Mary’s house, in the midst of everyday life. From 
that time on, his universal prospect and his private home are one and the same.  
Paradise Regained’s concluding evocation of Jesus at home with his mother also 
recalls the quiet scene in the stable at the end of the Nativity Ode, which finds the 
“Courtly Stable” full of angels waiting with the “Virgin blest” in “order serviceable,” 
peacefully anticipating her baby’s remote heroic future (237-44). When he returns from 
the wilderness of his first romantic quest, Jesus reenters this domestic space as an adult 
who can consciously participate in the experience of standing “serviceable” to God’s 
will, simultaneously aware of the “Full and perfect” arc of sacred narrative and of his 
present place within its meandering course. He sees the story at once from a divine, 
authorial height and through the lowly striving of a human character like Mary, bridging 
the gap between masculine and feminine types of romantic perspective. Stuart Curran has 
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proposed that by the end of the poem Jesus “lives without time,” “liberated from the 
constraints of time and history.”255 In a sense, this is so, but the full extent of Jesus’ 
heroic accomplishment (and of Milton’s generic accomplishment) is only apparent if we 
recognize that he lives simultaneously within time, dedicated to the occluded demands of 
historical narrative as they arise and make themselves known. Both Jesus and Milton 
remain committed to providential romance as a genre ideally suited to the tempest of 
time, and of the post-Restoration Puritan moment in particular, in that it embodies the 
tension between the doubts and disappointments of the present and the triumphant 
promise of the future, using that tension to drive the story of the godly community 
onward through its political vicissitudes and toward its final vanishing point. While 
Satan’s royalist-inflected romance attempts to shed an artificial light on the darkness of 
history, Milton’s renewed chance at true romance depends both upon the hero’s 
providential illumination and on his willingness to venture, or to stand and wait, in the 
human world of darkened narrative vision. 
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Chapter Four 
 
“My Victorious Triumphs Are All Thine”: 
Amorous Romance, Politics, and Elect Community  
in Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder256 
 
 
Percy Herbert, Margaret Cavendish, and John Milton all determined, in their own 
ways, that postwar ideological romance had to confront the challenges of contingency and 
variable subjectivity, and that both heroism and identification with a romantic community 
might depend less on narrative vision than on one’s response to narrative uncertainty. Milton, 
in his generic conflict with royalist romance, continued to insist on the legitimacy of divinely-
inspired subjectivity, opposing the Hobbesian proposition that no such thing could be proven 
and perhaps did not exist at all. In her biblical epic Order and Disorder, Lucy Hutchinson is 
similarly adamant; as we will see, though, she is particularly invested in resisting a royalist 
model that questions not elect subjectivity’s authenticity, but its exclusivity. This chapter, and 
the final one that follows, explore a subtle shift in seventeenth-century attitudes to romance: 
some writers, instead of concerning themselves with the genre’s subversive power (for good 
or ill) to locate subjects within already-demarcated ideological communities, grew more 
interested in its potential to envision and construct new communities, and to repair old divides 
in subjectivity. While Hutchinson refuses to indulge the idea that romance might mend rifts in 
religion or politics—a possibility that inspired her royalist contemporary, John Dryden—her 
tacit return to romance in Order and Disorder does help her renegotiate some of the ruptures 
in generic and gendered perspective that troubled her Memoirs of her husband.    
                                                
256 An article derived from this chapter is forthcoming from Studies in Philology. 
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 Although scholarship on Lucy Hutchinson’s twenty-canto Genesis epic Order and 
Disorder is only now emerging from its infancy, one assertion in her preface has already 
struck a number of readers and become the subject of extensive conversation. Hutchinson 
warns a potential audience of “people [...] that understand and love the elegancies of 
poems” that they will find “nothing of fancy” in her work, and avows that a literary 
imagination has no place in biblical hermeneutics: 
  Had I a fancy, I durst not have exercised it here; for I tremble to think of turning  
  Scripture into a romance; and shall not be troubled at their dislike who dislike on  
  that account, and profess they think no poem can be good that shuts out  
  drunkenness, and lasciviousness, and libelling satire, the themes of all their  
  celebrated songs. These (though I will not much defend my own weakness)  
  dislike not the poem so much as the subject of it.257 
 
Hutchinson thus appears to identify romance as an ungodly literary form, and (as has also 
been the case with Milton) many scholars have taken her at her word. C. A. Moore, who 
discussed the 1679 publication of the first five cantos of Order and Disorder long before 
the poem’s full length and its authorship were known, read it as “a veiled rebuke of 
Milton” for his highly inventive retelling of Genesis in Paradise Lost.258 Many decades 
later, Robert Mayer agrees that Hutchinson meant to rebuke Paradise Lost for 
romanticizing scripture, preferring to represent Order and Disorder “not as an 
                                                
257 Lucy Hutchinson, Order and Disorder, ed. David Norbrook (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 5. All 
subsequent references will be to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text by canto and line 
numbers.  
258 C. A. Moore, “Miltoniana (1679-1741),” Modern Philology 24 (1927): 321-39, 321. Prominent 
Miltonists, such as John Shawcross and Joseph Wittreich, have followed Moore’s summary of 
Hutchinson’s work. See, respectively, Milton: A Biography for the Years 1624-1700 (Binghamton, NY: 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984), and “Milton’s Transgressive Maneuvers: Receptions 
(Then and Now) and the Sexual Politics of Paradise Lost,” in Milton and Heresy, eds. Stephen Dobranski 
and John Rumrich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 244-66. Milton’s and Hutchinson’s 
perspectives on the extent of creativity permissible in biblical poetics is also the subject of Robert 
Wilcher’s “‘Adventurous song’ or ‘presumptuous folly’: The Problem of ‘utterance’ in John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost and Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder,” Seventeenth Century 21.2 (2006): 304-14. 
  
233 
imaginative work at all but as a ‘recourse to the fountain of Truth,’”259 and David 
Norbrook, who discovered, attributed, and edited the complete text of the poem, likewise 
acknowledges that Hutchinson “may have been hitting at Milton” for his creative 
“[addition] to the text” of Scripture.260 Indeed, Hutchinson does seem to equate such 
“fancy” with a crass and impious treatment of God’s word as “romance,” a genre she 
associates not only (perhaps) with Milton but also with Cavalier writing.261   
 Yet Norbrook also regards Hutchinson’s declamation of “fancy” with a healthy 
measure of skepticism: he rightly finds Order and Disorder “far from artless” and reads 
the poem as suggesting that “human artifice can be redeemed” by God.262 Even in the 
poem’s preface, Hutchinson begins to imagine precisely this sort of artistic redemption. 
Referring to her previous translation of Lucretius’ and Ovid’s pagan accounts “of the 
original of things,” she claims that Order and Disorder began as a form of personal 
prayer and penitence: “These meditations were not at first designed for public view, but 
fixed upon to reclaim a busy roving thought from wandering in the pernicious and 
perplexed maze of human inventions; whereinto the vain curiosity of youth had drawn 
                                                
259 Robert Mayer, “Lucy Hutchinson: A Life of Writing,” Seventeenth Century 22.2 (2007), 305-35, 317.  
260 David Norbrook, “The Poem and its Contexts,” introduction to Order and Disorder, xii-lviii, xxv. 
Norbrook also points out that we cannot be entirely certain that the composition of Order and Disorder 
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each of them entrusted sensitive manuscripts” (xiv, xvii). See also Norbrook’s “Lucy Hutchinson, John 
Milton, and the Republican Biblical Epic,” in Milton and the Grounds of Contention, eds. Mark Kelley et 
al. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2003), 37-63. 
261 As Robert Wilcher has noted in “Lucy Hutchinson and Genesis: Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 
Hutchinson’s denunciation of romance in the preface to Order and Disorder illustrates McKeon’s 
observation that the genre was frequently invoked in a “trivializing or pejorative” sense in the seventeenth 
century (34); see McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel (27). Salzman, in English Prose Fiction, 
claims that by 1670, romance was often associated with love rather than war or politics (179). While 
Hutchinson links romance to “lasciviousness” in her preface, as the poem unfolds, she does not treat these 
thematic categories as separate.  
262 Norbrook, “The Poem and its Contexts,” xxix, xxxi. 
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me” (3). In essence, Hutchinson began to compose her poem in her hope of redemption 
from a “roving,” “wandering” romance of the mind; her pious “meditations” on Scripture 
have led her, by the grace of God, away from the Lucretian “maze” of atomistic 
contingency and into a providential plot in which God presides over the teleological 
narrative of creation. Not at all unlike Milton in his supposedly more imaginative 
Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, Hutchinson turns away from the ideologically 
corrupt romance of Fortune, but rather than truly rejecting the genre, she instead 
embraces the romance of Providence, the plot of which follows the ever-purposeful trials 
and triumphs of the Elect. The poem that she began in search of redemption from 
romance will, by its (unfinished) end, prove to be a Puritan redemption of romance. 
As Robert Wilcher has noted, “Romance was a narrative genre that had appealed 
to [Hutchinson’s] adolescent imagination during the 1630s”: 263  in her fragmentary 
autobiography, Hutchinson recalls that as a girl, “I thought it no sin to learne or heare 
wittie songs and amorous sonnetts or poems, and twenty things of that kind, wherein I 
was so apt that I became the confident in all the loves that were managed among my 
mother’s young weomen.”264 Norbrook has judged that she was probably one of the 
seventeenth century’s many admirers of Sidney’s Arcadia; he observes parallels between 
Sidney’s romantic imagery and Hutchinson’s in her Elegies and points out that Elegy 11 
“gives her husband the Sidneian name of ‘Philocles’ [...] which fuses Sidney’s male 
Pyrocles with the female Philoclea.”265 But apart from Norbrook’s passing note, Wilcher 
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is the one scholar to date who has concerned himself specifically with Hutchinson’s 
poetry, the romance tradition, and the potential for a godly treatment of the genre. 
Wilcher provides a useful overview of some of Order and Disorder’s romance elements 
in “Lucy Hutchinson and Genesis: Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” arguing that while 
“features of fictional romance” are “deliberately eschewed in the 1679 volume,” which 
included only the poem’s first five cantos and their account of the Creation and the Fall, 
elements of the genre “became prominent in the narrative expansion of later episodes 
involving the experiences of such female characters as Sarah, Rebecca, and Rachel”; he 
proposes “to draw attention to some differences between the five-canto poem published 
in 1679 and the fifteen cantos that follow it.”266 In particular, he points to sections in 
which Hutchinson does invent psychological interiority for her Biblical characters and to 
passages that feature love, wooing, and marriage—most notably Jacob and Rachel’s 
pastoral courtship near the end of the poem. Wilcher claims that these “features of 
fictional romance” are sparse in the first half of the poem and that when they do appear, 
they chiefly involve the emotional and erotic experiences of women. The chapters of 
Genesis that do not feature “the marriages and other sexual liaisons of the patriarchs,” he 
argues, give Hutchinson scope for “moral and religious ‘meditations’” and “occasional 
political observations,” but “offer little to stimulate an imagination nourished in its early 
years on amorous sonnets and romances.”267  In his reading, romance occasionally 
emerges to enrich certain episodes of Order and Disorder, but does not underlie the 
poem’s full form or its narrative purpose. 
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Wilcher is quite correct to “draw [our] attention” to the elements of romance 
inherent in Order and Disorder, and indeed, Hutchinson’s engagement with the genre 
frequently pertains to affective emotion, love, and marriage. However, while this chapter 
is indebted to his work, I would like to move beyond Wilcher’s straightforward 
enumeration of some of the romantic episodes in the poem and his definition of the genre 
according to Pierre Huet’s seventeenth-century view that “Romances [...] have Love for 
their principal Theme, and meddle not with War and Politicks but by accident” (an 
opinion that his contemporaries did not necessarily share, as we have seen).268 As 
Wilcher recognizes, Hutchinson did not always automatically “tremble to think of turning 
Scripture into a romance”; it now remains for us to determine what modes of romance 
she employed and, perhaps most importantly, why she turned to the genre so often in 
Order and Disorder after repudiating it in her preface.  
First, I hope to show that Hutchinson effects no clear separation between romance 
that is amorous, psychological, or pastoral (or feminine) and romance that is chivalric, 
heroic, or political (or masculine); indeed, her poem reconsiders some of the generic and 
gendered gaps that emerged in the Memoirs. Moreover, as is often the case with other 
writers whom we have discussed, Hutchinson’s romantic eroticism is inextricably 
connected to her sense of heroism, and private emotion and action in her text have direct 
relationships to public politics and governance. It is thus not quite true that Hutchinson 
reserves romance for the second half of Order and Disorder; erotic and heroic romantic 
content runs throughout her text and connects later episodes in Genesis and passages in 
                                                
268 Huet’s definition of romance is cited by Wilcher (“Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 35) and Salzman (179). 
  
237 
the poem to earlier ones. Second, I propose that Hutchinson’s self-contradictory tendency 
to romanticize Scripture is neither an accident nor merely a natural offshoot of her 
youthful enthusiasm for the genre. Rather, like Milton, Hutchinson takes royalist modes 
of amorous and heroic romance into account in composing Order and Disorder and 
combats them not with anti-romance, but with right romance as the exclusive province of 
a godly republican audience. While Wilcher regards Hutchinson’s exploration of “the 
mystery of ‘election’ [in the poem’s first several books] as one of [her] “moral and 
religious ‘meditations’” rather than an example of “creative engagement,” we shall see 
that her treatment of elect exceptionalism lays fundamental groundwork for her postwar 
Puritan romance, and that it reappears as a major theme throughout diverse instances of 
her engagement with the genre.269 Before we return to her Genesis epic, a consideration 
of the romantic elements of John Dryden’s poem “Astraea Redux” will help illuminate 
how Hutchinson intends Order and Disorder to present a godly audience with treatments 
of exclusive elect community, erotic love, chivalric heroism, and teleological narrative 
that actively resist both Cavalier literature and royalist political ideology.  
  
Patrilineal Romance and Erotic Universalism in Dryden’s “Astraea Redux” 
 
 Dryden’s jubilant lyric poem, written to commemorate Charles II’s return to 
England more than a decade after his father’s execution, does not attempt to approach the 
royalist narrative of a tyrant’s usurpation of the throne and the rightful heir’s recovery of 
it by recounting the story in lengthy, detailed chronological order, as a generically 
conventional romance would do. Nevertheless, there is no question that “Astraea Redux” 
                                                
269 Wilcher, “Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 35. 
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embraces romance’s form and its tropes as a means of understanding history, celebrating 
Charles’ restoration, and advocating for royalist policy. Dryden’s young king appears not 
simply as another Augustus, the Virgilian harbinger of a new golden age of justice, but 
also as the tempest-tossed hero of countless classical, medieval, and Early Modern 
romances. Having been driven “into exile from his rightful throne,” the “Heir to his 
father’s sorrows with his crown” is “Forced to suffer for himself and us,” his people.270 
Charles has been “tossed by fate, and hurried up and down”; Dryden describes the 
physical and psychic journey of his youth as a long “pilgrimage” through which “His 
manly courage over[comes] his fate” and he returns to rule his kingdom at last (50-56). 
And as generic expectations dictate, the sources of the hero’s strife are directed, however 
indirectly, to guide him to security and triumph: “those loud storms that did against him 
roar / Have cast his shipwrecked vessel on the shore” of his kingdom, where Charles’ 
romance will conclude in his reunion with his loving subjects in a symbolic marriage 
(123-4). Dryden’s poem, reconceiving romance as reparative rather than exclusive, 
depicts the Restoration as the harmonious telos to the turbulent national story, and hints 
moreover at religious universalism: God has blessed and redeemed all English people 
equally in their blissful union with the King.  
 “Astraea Redux” reminds us that while Herbert and Cavendish’s postwar 
discomfort with providential or “mystical” romance was widespread among royalist 
writers, it was not ubiquitous. Although Dryden’s poem attributes its events to various 
forces, including fate and the stars, it insists upon God as the final authority, 
                                                
270 Keith Walker, ed., John Dryden: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1987), 9-17, lines 75, 50-2. 
Further references will be cited parenthetically by line number. 
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wholeheartedly embracing a divine design to history and a narrative shape in which all of 
the hero’s peregrinations and sufferings are constructed to restore him to his rightful 
station. In his epigraph, with its beautifully free translation of Virgil’s fourth eclogue, 
Dryden conforms to the classical tendency to depict historical time as cyclical: “The last 
great age, foretold by sacred rhymes, / Renews its finish’d course; Saturnian times / Roll 
round again” (epigraph). In the body of the poem, however, his vision of predestined 
history unfolds according to the more linear modus operandi of a Christian providence.271 
Charles II’s peaceful restoration to the throne illustrates Christ’s mercy upon sinful 
England: 
Heaven would no bargain for its blessings drive, 
But what we could not pay for, freely give. 
The prince of peace would, like himself, confer 
A gift unhoped, without the price of war[.] 
    (137-140) 
 
Such free grace is granted to an entire nation that does not deserve it; Dryden begins to 
suggest that neither he nor God have marked out an exclusive subset of Englishmen and 
women as the sole beneficiaries. Still, the “prince of peace” has his own policy for 
conferring such gifts: they are best given and best received only when their absence has 
been long felt. Knowing “his blessing’s worth,” God in his providence “took care, / That 
we should know it by repeated prayer; / Which stormed the skies and ravished Charles 
from thence, / As heaven itself is took by violence” (141-4). In other words, he has 
authored and presided over a lengthy national romance. Even in rejoicing at the king’s 
                                                
271 For discussions of Dryden’s complex treatment of the pattern(s) of historical time, see Anne Barbeau, 
The Intellectual Design of John Dryden’s Heroic Plays (New Haven, CT: Yale U P, 1970); Guibbory, 213-
253; and James Winn, “Past and Present in Dryden’s ‘Fables,’” Huntington Library Quarterly 63.1/2 
(2000), 157-74. 
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miraculous return, Dryden’s language evokes the “violence” that “ravished” him away in 
the first place and reminds his audience how many times their pleas for deliverance had 
to be “repeated” before they were granted; the story of Charles’ loss and recovery is 
linear and orderly in retrospect, but (by God’s will) it did not appear so while it was still 
in progress. Although Dryden’s divine romance belongs to England, not to a subset of its 
people determined by religion, his God is not unlike Milton’s or Hutchinson’s in that he 
punishes, rewards, and teaches his people through the patterns of genre. 
 Indeed, once the unfolding of history has allowed him to see the full arc of the 
divine plot, Dryden’s poetic voice resembles Milton’s Adam in questioning how best to 
“express” his “doubtful thoughts” that must “both regret and bless” the “sufferings” of 
Charles and of the realm (71-2). His realization that “blind” humans can “light alone in 
dark afflictions find” likewise has a Miltonic ring to it (95-6).272 And like Hutchinson in 
her autobiographical memoirs, Dryden ultimately chooses to celebrate the fact that he 
was born in an age of historical romance, an age of heroism and hardship: 
   Some lazy ages lost in sleep and ease 
No action leave to busy chronicles: 
Such whose supine felicity but makes 
In story chasms, in epochés mistakes; 
O’er whom time gently shakes his wings of down 
Till with his silent sickle they are mown. 
Such is not Charles’s too too active age, 
Which, governed by the wild distempered rage 
Of some black star infecting all the skies, 
Made him at his own cost like Adam wise. 
    (105-114) 
                                                
272 As Ingo Berensmeyer notes, “We tend to identify this trope [‘the traditional metaphorics of light against 
darkness and of physical blindness against spiritual insight’] with Milton,” but “By using the Puritans’ very 
own weapons, ‘Astraea Redux’ thus denies Puritan claims to a special authority of interpreting 
contemporary political events in religious terms” (“The Art of Oblivion: Politics of Remembering and 
Forgetting in Restoration England,” European Journal of English Studies 10.1 [2006], 81-96, 89). We will 
remember that the anonymous author of “The Faerie Leveller” made a similar move in 1648. 
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The present period may be “too too active,” subject to great suffering and “cost,” yet it 
seems that Dryden’s speaker would hardly have it otherwise. A peaceful era is “lazy” and 
“supine,” and finally “lost,” doomed to be “gently [...] mown” into historical oblivion; it 
creates a dull blank or even a nihilistic rift within the great “story” of time and offers no 
material to great storytellers. The age of Charles II may appear to be “governed by the 
wild distempered rage / Of some black star,” but it is really (or also) authored by God, 
and it offers the kind of wisdom that can only be attained by one who—“like Adam”— 
lives through the tempest of the story rather than the “chasm” of peaceful ignorance. 
Dryden further distinguishes himself from a Cavendish-esque approach to 
romance by downplaying the role of heroic agency in shaping history. Like Milton’s 
characters, the historical figures in “Astraea Redux” may err when they mistake the right 
occasion for heroic action, such as Sir George Booth, whose 1659 military campaign on 
Charles’ behalf ended in defeat. Dryden commends Booth’s dutiful courage but rebukes 
his “valour” as “forward,” comparing him to “the watchful traveller / That by the moon’s 
mistaken light did rise”: “The attempt was fair; but heaven’s prefixed hour / Not come” 
(145-9). Divine illumination alone can determine the right time for the right agent to act, 
and in this case, it is General Monck “whom Providence designed” to deliver England 
from the “real bonds” of “false freedom” (151-2).273 Unlike the conclusion of Paradise 
                                                
273 John Patrick Montaño, in Courting the Moderates: Ideology, Propaganda, and the Emergence of Party, 
1660-1678 (Newark: U of Delaware P, 2002) also points to “Astraea Redux” in remarking on “Dryden’s 
belief that history cannot be influenced by man, but is a preordained plan which—through the workings of 
providence—will both justify and verify his moral philosophy” (98). Montaño identifies Booth as one of 
Dryden’s figures of “passionate virtue” who “attempt to shape or influence history,” adding that “For them, 
as for the rebels, tyrants, and lawbreakers, there can be no lasting victory. In the end, the onward rush of 
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Lost, however, which emphasizes the centuries of anticipation and struggle that both pre- 
and post-date the arrival of the Messiah, and which reminds us that neither Adam’s first-
born son nor his grandchildren nor any of his conceivable descendants will complete the 
narrative that Adam’s fall began, “Astraea Redux” comforts its audience with the 
conventional romantic promise of the next generation. History enabled Dryden to rejoice 
in a real-world exemplar of patrilineal romance, in which a faithful son recovers what 
was stolen from his father, and also of intergenerational romance, in which young people 
set the foolish mistakes of their parents to rights.  
 The poem opens by establishing tense resentment between the younger generation 
(among whom Dryden counts himself) and their puritanical elders: “Youth, that with joys 
had unacquainted been, / Envied grey hairs, that once good days had seen: / We thought 
our sires, not with their own content, / Had ere we came to age our portion spent” (26-9). 
By the time the poem ends, however, this fear has been allayed by the restoration of the 
young king and by his restoration of England, in turn, to an even happier state than it had 
enjoyed under his father. Charles may be “Heir to his father’s sorrows with his crown,” 
but he is also destined to see those sorrows end and to heal his nation’s grief, undoing the 
ill suffered and the damage done by the previous generation (52). Indeed, his time of trial 
proves to be precisely that, a test rendering him worthy of his crown and ensuring that he 
will wear it with care: 
Nor is he only by afflictions shown 
To conquer others’ realms, but rule his own; 
Recovering hardly what he lost before, 
His right endears it much, his purchase more. 
                                                                                                                                            
history will sweep them from the stage and make way for the patient examples of exact virtue,” such as 
Monck and Charles II (ibid). 
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Inured to suffer ere he came to reign, 
No rash procedure will his actions stain. 
    (83-8) 
 
Charles II’s diplomatic future reign is implicitly contrasted with his father’s past, which 
may occasionally have been marred by “rash procedure” as a result of Charles I’s 
sheltered youth. The son’s triumph is even more complete in that he does not merely 
correct his father’s flaws but also transcends his virtue, perfecting the patrilineal 
narrative. Dryden praises the new king for the same peace-loving personality that made 
Charles I an easier target for his enemies: “But you, whose goodness your descent doth 
show, / Your heavenly parentage and earthly too, / By that same mildness which your 
father’s crown / Before did ravish, shall secure your own” (256-9). Finally, at the 
conclusion of “Astraea Redux,” the young people who lamented the wrongs of their 
“sires” will welcome their monarch’s return and collectively perform the role of the bride 
in the historical romance’s royal wedding, as both figures of promising generational 
futurity unite in the present. 
Critically, the happy ending to the exiled king’s story is represented not by Charles’ 
or General Monck’s martial conquest, but by the loving marriage of Charles to his subjects 
after a long span of strife and separation.274 Dryden’s England, deprived of her royal 
bridegroom before the consummation of their union, has spent years envying her happier 
sisters on the continent and bemoaning the God or the star that keeps her from her lord:  
And heaven that seemed regardless of our fate, 
For France and Spain did miracles create [...] 
We sighed to hear the fair Iberian bride 
                                                
274 For a discussion of Dryden’s devaluation of martial heroics, especially in his later poetry, see James 
Winn, “‘Thy Wars Brought Nothing About’: Dryden’s Critique of Military Heroism,” Seventeenth Century 
21.2 (2006), 364-82. 
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Must grow a lily to the lily’s side; 
While our cross stars denied us Charles’s bed, 
Whom our first flames and virgin love did wed. 
    (13-20) 
 
For Dryden, the rebellious people and their monarch are star-crossed lovers rather than 
adversaries in war. Even the rebellion itself, which must be attributed not just to 
“Heaven” or to the “stars” but to the English nation, ought to be understood not as 
political hostility between irreconcilable foes, but as the folly of an amorous quarrel: 
instead of traitors, the people are “Like early lovers, whose unpractised hearts / Were 
long the May-game of malicious arts,” subjecting the faithful Charles to the mistrust and 
fickleness of the archetypal coy or harsh mistress (211-12).275 But Dryden assures the 
king that, like all tragicomic lovers who have put their love to the test, “since reformed by 
what we did amiss / We by our sufferings learn to prize our bliss” (209-10).276 Having 
found that “their jealousies were vain,” the repentant subjects “With double heat renew 
their fires again”; and now that they have endured separation from their beloved as a 
fitting punishment for their coldness, the much-anticipated wedding night is finally at 
hand (213-14). 
This consummate reunion accomplishes more than putting an end to a quarrel: it 
effectively wipes the quarrel from history and memory, an erotic Oblivion Act 
comparable to the legislation that pardoned countless republicans after monarchy was 
                                                
275 Charles thus plays a more gender-normative role in the amorous romance of Dryden’s “Astraea Redux” 
than in Cavendish’s Life of William, which figured the King as the fickle mistress and William as his long-
suffering lover. 
276 Winn suggests that these lines describe “the English as repenting their affair with Cromwell and 
returning to their true lover Charles” (“When Beauty Fires the Blood”: Love and the Arts in the Age of 
Dryden [Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1992], 256). 
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restored. 277  Dryden performs this erasure with another metaphor of marriage and 
sexuality in identifying the ship that carried Charles back to England: “The Naseby, now 
no longer England’s shame, / But better to be lost in Charles’s name, / (Like some 
unequal bride in nobler sheets) / Receives her lord” (230-33). The Naseby, first named in 
1655 for the 1645 battle that dealt a crushing defeat to the royalists, was rechristened the 
Royal Charles five years later when it arrived in Holland to transport the king home. By 
bearing the weight of Charles’ body and by taking his name, Dryden suggests, the 
vessel’s former “shame” is “lost” along with the name that commemorated that 
ignominy.278 England’s feminine inferiority submits to the King’s masculine authority 
and is claimed and transfigured by it; the ugly shame of civil war morphs first into the 
alluring shame of the “unequal” virgin bride in her marriage bed and then into unashamed 
wedded union. Through the power of love and marriage, the original significance of the 
old name is transformed, and then forgotten. A similar process occurs as Dryden 
imagines the ship nearing the white cliffs of Dover, whose color again initially signifies 
shame. The poet assures the monarch that his eager eyes do not deceive him: “As you 
meet it, the land approacheth you. / The land returns, and in the white it wears / The 
marks of penitence and sorrow bears” (253-5). Yet Charles’ love and forgiveness remake 
England’s remorse into something new: tears of humility turn into “tears of joy, for your 
returning spilt,” which “Work out and expiate our former guilt” (274-5). Likewise, 
Dryden soon reassesses the significance of whiteness—“And now time’s whiter series is 
                                                
277 Berensmeyer argues that “Astraea Redux” imagines a kind of “anti-republican countermemory” (90). 
278 Paul Hammond notes that “Such renaming reverses the revolution of the 1640s and 1650s which had 
involved many instances of public renaming as new leaders assumed control of the language of 
government, and radical groups produced new vocabularies for the description of English history and 
society” (John Dryden: A Literary Life [London: Macmillan, 1991], 28). 
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begun, / Which in soft centuries shall smoothly run”—and the color of England’s 
contrition implicitly becomes the color of its purity and perfection as the king’s bride 
(292-3). Mingling the imagery of amorous reunion and Catholic penitence, Dryden 
represents the mutual love between the king and his people as a force that transforms all 
the sufferings of the past two decades into the blessings of a finished romantic narrative. 
The poem’s earlier hints at universalism merge with its amorous romance: the entire 
nation is redeemed; all subjects are reinscribed as feminine in shame but then as 
masculine in marriage; and most important, everyone is now a royalist.279 Dryden’s royal 
romance has transformed elect community into all-inclusive erotic union.  
Lois Potter has pointed out that the dramatic and prose Stuart romances that 
idealized the relationship between Charles I and Henrietta Maria delineated a 
distinctively royalist stance on erotic love and marriage, in which “true love” valorizes 
compromise and transcends the worldly divisions of nationality and religion that might 
otherwise have kept the king and the French Catholic queen apart.280 “Astraea Redux” 
takes a similar position in celebrating the restored relationship between Charles II and his 
universally beloved subjects: love overcomes all obstacles and heals all wounds, even 
those caused by bitter civil strife. Erotic love, in this royalist mode, is a nebulous yet 
tremendously potent force that sweeps away abstruse political and philosophical 
concerns. Of course, as Potter and Victoria Kahn have demonstrated, it erects different 
                                                
279 Berensmeyer proposes that “The poem’s Royalist ideological content is perfectly mirrored in its form, 
the ‘perfect union’ of subjects under a patriarchal kingship and the hierarchical order of things poetically 
expressed in the well-ordered and harmonious form of the couplet. In Dryden’s lines, civilization rhymes 
with empire and London with Rome rather than Jerusalem” (90-1). 
280 See Potter, 77-80. Love plays a similarly conciliatory role in the postwar fiction of Margaret Cavendish, 
according to Victoria Kahn (Wayward Contracts, 171-95). 
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ideologies in their place and is far from apolitical. The royalist politics and poetics of 
eroticism serve to extol monarchy as the only form of government that can effect a 
perfect union between the state and its people, pointing to harmonious affection as both 
the rationale and the result of policy such as the Indemnity and Oblivion Act of 1660 and 
the subsequent Test Acts that mandated membership in the Anglican Communion for 
public employees. Such love conquers all, joining royalists and republicans, fostering 
religious harmony through conformity, and reuniting spouses whom violence or 
misunderstanding have thrust apart. This universalizing spirit of love, which proceeds 
from Charles II as the messianic prince of peace, inspires Dryden’s ardent patriotism in 
“Astraea Redux”—and Hutchinson’s burning contempt in Order and Disorder. 
 
“Mixed Marriages” Produce Monsters: Spiritual Miscegenation and Tyranny in Order 
and Disorder 
 
 Lucy Hutchinson has left us some indication that she was familiar with Dryden’s 
widely-read “Astraea Redux,” and even that she may have admired the poem’s style if 
not its political sentiment. In one of her elegies on the death of her husband, Hutchinson 
remarks that “Glorie itt Selfe is a vaine Thing,” with the exception of glory bestowed by 
God.281 She compares receiving this heavenly gift both to the convergence of rivers and 
to wifely submission in marriage: “Soe Marriadge floods ye lesser streames / Looseing 
Their owne gett nobler names.”282 If the image has its emotional source in Hutchinson’s 
adoration of her republican husband, its poetic source may well be Dryden’s royalist 
ecstasy at being “lost in Charles’s name / (Like some unequal bride in nobler sheets)” 
                                                
281 Hutchinson, Elegies, ed. Norbrook, Elegy 22:33.   
282 Ibid., Elegy 22:37-8.   
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(231-2). Despite her possible adoption of his language, however, Hutchinson uses Order 
and Disorder to express contempt and revulsion for the royalist perspective on 
universalizing love that we find in “Astraea Redux” and elsewhere. But while she takes 
pride in the notion that her poem will be unpopular with Cavalier readers because it 
“shuts out […] lasciviousness,” her biblical narrative does not distinguish itself from 
royalist models of romance by shunning eroticism. Instead, godly love in Order and 
Disorder plays a vital role in the divine romance by explicitly and utterly eschewing 
Dryden’s royalist policy of prioritizing harmonious union over perfect religious and 
political agreement: according to the poem’s conception of right romance, unity of 
ideology must precede unity in marriage. Hutchinson’s elect community, conventionally 
Sidneian in its erotic foundation, remains as exclusive as ever.283  
Hutchinson’s uncompromising stance on romantic love emerges within the poem’s 
first five cantos and arises out of martial chivalric rhetoric. It is founded on her identification 
of the Fall, together with God’s subsequent promise that Eve’s “seed” will break the head of 
the serpent, as the “first beginning” of the “great war” between “two opposèd seeds”: 
  Two sovereign champions here we find, 
  Satan and Christ contending for mankind. 
  Two empires here, two opposite cities rise, 
  Dividing all in two societies: 
  The little Church and the World’s larger State, 
  Pursuing it with ceaseless spite and hate. 
      (5.80-1, 85-90) 
 
                                                
283 As Erin Murphy has observed in Familial Forms, Hutchinson strongly upholds marriage between people 
of different nationalities in her autobiographical fragment, in which she traces her own family’s descent 
through both the Saxons and the invading Normans: “Hutchinson uses marriage as a figure of consent, 
which has the power to remake the relation between the conquerors and the conquered, allowing the nation 
to find a more peaceful future” in the intermarriage of its people, rather than in a stable line of kings (158). 
But critically, while Hutchinson imagines that mutual love within an intercultural marriage may nurture the 
growth of a godly state, the discordant values within an interfaith marriage can never do so. 
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While Christ and Satan are the “champions” of this cosmic combat, humans serve as 
lesser warriors: “each age [is] with new combatants supplied,” and the “great war” has 
been “Carried along more than five thousand year, / With various success on either side” 
(5.82-84). Yet the “little Church” finds “Hope in the promise” of God’s “most certain 
oracle,” while “Hell and the World fight upon desperate terms” (5.92-94): both sides 
know that the war is predestined to end with Christ and his “society” victorious. This 
interpretation of Genesis as the beginning of the narrative of Christian salvation is a 
theological commonplace, which Hutchinson couches in the language of epic romance.284 
Her expanded reading of the divine “oracle,” however, adds further nuance to her 
scriptural reformation of the genre for a godly audience. God’s promise, she explains, 
implicitly contains his “Precepts and rules” for the “new obedience” of his chosen people 
(5.210). Chief among these is the forbidding of any association with the seed of Satan:  
  Our first injunction is to hate and fly  
  The flatteries of our first grand enemy;  
  To have no friendship with his cursèd race,  
  The interest of the opposite seed t’embrace[.] 
      (5.213-16) 
 
Much is contained within this primary “injunction.” First, there is Hutchinson’s 
assumption that it is “ours”—in other words, that she and her readers are among the 
community of the elect, the protagonists of and “combatants” in the sacred heroic 
narrative for whom the command is intended. Next, there are several polarizing absolutes: 
                                                
284 Wilcher has noted that Hutchinson also “adopts the epic machinery of infernal councils and devilish 
intrigue to underpin crucial turns” elsewhere in Order and Disorder’s narrative, “often with the slenderest 
of biblical warrants” for her generic play: “For example, when the ‘pious’ followers of Enos thwart the 
devils’ hope that the ‘holy seed’ of Adam has been ‘extinguished’ by the murder of Abel, Satan ‘calls his 
mates to arms’ and, to the acclaim of ‘Hell’s malicious court’, proposes that they once more use ‘woman’ 
as a ‘bait’ to ‘lure’ mankind into ‘the fool’s paradise’ (6:423-80)” (“Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 29).  
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that all who do not fall into this first person plural are the “cursèd race” of the “grand 
enemy,” that their “interest” is diametrically opposed to that of the godly, and that the two 
factions must therefore have nothing to do with one another (other than battle). Last, there 
is a hint of sexual prohibition in particular within the broader rule of separation: “The 
interest of the opposite seed” may suggest philosophical and political concerns, but the 
outlawing of “friendship” and “embrac[ing]” verges into the personal and the erotic. 
Critically, any eroticism in Hutchinson’s lines is restrictive rather than inviting; she 
gestures toward the possibility of sexual congress with the “opposite seed,” but only to 
dismiss it as repugnant. Her formulation renders Dryden’s universalist erotics unthinkable.  
 Order and Disorder’s narrative following the Fall makes the theme of spiritual 
miscegenation, and God’s hatred of it, explicit. After murdering his brother Abel, Cain, 
the first reprobate, “found a wife who left for him her God” and “Both founders of the 
Worldly State became” (6.350-1). An unholy marriage in which religion is subordinated 
to desire produces the entirety of the “cursèd race” that is destined to wage war on the 
elect for millennia to come. (Notably, the annotations of the Geneva Bible suggest that 
Cain’s son Lamech, by taking two wives, was the first to profane “the lawful institution 
of marriage, which is, that two should be one flesh”; Hutchinson, who imagines marriage 
already corrupted by Cain’s wife’s abandonment of God for her reprobate husband, sees 
no need to include Lamech or his bigamy in her poem.)285 She then identifies Seth, Adam 
and Eve’s third child, as “the founder of the Holy State,” but notes that from the inception 
                                                
285 Christopher Barker (printer), The Bible. Translated according to the Ebrew and Greeke, and conferred 
with the best translations in diuers languages. With most profitable Annotations vpon all the hard places, 
and other things of great importance, as may appeare in the Epistle to the Reader (London, 1583), 3. 
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of history, God’s elect community has been in danger of losing its numbers to the 
“Worldly State” through intermarriage: “Seth’s offspring did God’s ways decline, / 
Mixed with Cain’s impious brood, yet of that line / In every age some few with pure 
hearts sought / The Lord of Life and to their children taught” (7.1-4). The combat 
between the “two opposite cities” becomes a reproductive battle as well as an ideological 
one, though as ever, the elect are destined to win, regardless of their army’s small size: 
although Cain and his wife’s “family increased,” Hutchinson notes that “Oft are they 
multiplied who are not blessed,” their increase becoming mere rankness of nature devoid 
of providential purpose, while “The holy seed still with advantage dies / That it in new 
and glorious form might rise” (6.353-4, 429-30).  
 As the narrative continues, Hutchinson’s emphasis on God’s prohibition of love 
and marriage between the elect and the reprobate leads her into forcefully Calvinist 
readings of scripture, such as Genesis 6:1-4, in which “the sons of God saw the daughters 
of men that they were fair, and they took them wives of all that they liked.” First, 
Hutchinson imagines that “all the Devils” conspire to teach women the “art and wit” that 
compose courtly wooing: “To govern and conceal their own desires / That lovers might 
augment their ardent fires; / To counterfeit repentance, rage, tears, smiles, / Kindness and 
jealousy” (6.513-14, 527-30). Under Hutchinson’s treatment, such Cavalier flirtations 
become “sorceries,” and she thus trades the vocabulary of amorous courtly romance for 
the black magic of a more Spenserian form of the genre (6.510). After adding this detail 
to the biblical account, she relies on the Geneva Bible’s annotations in order to embed her 
concern with spiritual miscegenation into the remainder of the story: 
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     Cain’s lovely daughters, exercising these 
  Too fatally, the Sons of God did please, 
  Who all the greater ends of marriage slight, 
  Conducted by their sensual appetite; 
  With profane wives defiling that pure bed 
  Which God to holy use determined, 
  To be a seminary for his plants 
  And fill his city with inhabitants. 
      (6.533-40) 
 
The “sons of God,” for the Calvinist adherents to the Geneva translation, are not angelic 
beings but “The children of the godly which began to degenerate,” while the “daughters 
of men” are specifically “Those that came of wicked parents, as of Cain,” and their being 
“fair” signifies merely their “Having more respect to their beauty, and to worldly 
considerations, than to their manners and godliness.”286 Hutchinson adopts this reading of 
Genesis 6:2 wholesale, adding her own observation that the defilers of marriage thus 
deprive the godly “city” of its rightful “inhabitants,” depopulating the Holy State. She 
proceeds to emphasize that the profane union of the reprobate with the bewitched “Sons 
of God” is the explicit cause of the monstrous births that follow: “But these mixed 
marriages produced a brood / That stained the earth with violence and blood: / Men of 
prodigious valour, strength and size / Whose monstrous crimes were no less prodigies” 
(6.541-4). For Hutchinson, the grotesqueness of “these mixed marriages” has nothing to 
do with the union of humans with angels or demons, nor with intercourse between 
physically or nationally distinct peoples. Rather, the abomination is spiritual 
miscegenation; it lies in the erotic and social “embracing” of the “opposite seed.”  
 Hutchinson then embellishes her account further, proposing that this early 
spiritual miscegenation introduced false religion into the world, which she associates with 
                                                
286 Ibid., 4. 
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the gaudy trappings of popery (or high Anglicanism): under the “Oppression” of the 
tyrannical offspring, “sincere worship was no more allowed / But driven out by the 
tumultuous crowd / Who new ways of invoking God begin, / Bringing vain pomp and 
men’s inventions in” (6.547-50). Her greatly expanded version of Genesis 6:1-4 thus 
considers the values and aims of both Caroline amorous romance and Caroline 
conciliatory policy and turns them upside down.287 In Order and Disorder, no love can 
justify the union of two peoples who are at spiritual war with one another; by implication, 
the fallen Protestants who stubbornly commit spiritual miscegenation in the name of love 
and dynastic reproduction (namely, both Charles I and his son, in taking Catholic wives) 
or for the sake of money or status (such as nonconformists who submit to the Test Acts 
and join the politic communion of the king’s established church) have merely fallen prey 
to the “sorceries” of courtly Duessas and threaten to reintroduce corruption into God’s 
chosen nation, “fill[ing] his city” with the wrong “inhabitants.” These sins, like the 
“mixed marriages” at the dawn of history, are victories for Satan in the cosmic war, and 
Hutchinson brands those who commit or celebrate them “proud rebels,” reserving (as 
usual) the accusation of rebellion against a higher authority for royalists, collaborators, or 
their analogues (6.555).288 God’s love and election are reserved for the true believers for 
whom marriage can never be a compromise: 
     Yet though more generally among mankind 
  False worship was advanced and truth declined, 
  There were a few that yet continued pure 
                                                
287 Wilcher suggests that “The subversively republican tenor of some of Hutchinson’s reflections on such 
figures as Cain [...] might also be taken as a deliberate counterblast to royalist romances of the 1650s, 
which garnished their tales of love and war with ‘divers Politicall Notions, and Singular Remarks of 
Moderne Transactions’” (“Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 35). 
288 See also Norbrook, “The Poem and Its Contexts,” xxvii. 
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  Nor these polluted mixtures would endure, 
  But God in his own ordinances sought 
  And men his undefilèd precepts taught.  
      (6.557-62) 
 
Only the “few” who keep themselves “pure” by shunning the “polluted mixtures” of 
spiritually unequal people, thanks to their unique adherence to God’s law, are fit to lead the 
Holy State. This entity is neither strictly political nor merely spiritual; it always retains its 
own autonomy despite the tyranny of the Worldly State, since its “ordinances” are divine 
rather than human and the seat of its government is the home and family, yet it is ruled by 
“devout patriarchs” whose leadership of their “chaste pious wi[ves]” and “holy offspring” 
stretches beyond the private sphere by “warn[ing] and rebuk[ing] those reprobates of old” 
and “Building a house which in that dark age blazed” (6.637, 618-20, 573).289 
 As Wilcher argues, Hutchinson does embellish Scripture with her own creative 
content more and more frequently as the poem progresses. In Cantos 17 and 18, the story 
of Jacob and Esau provides her with an opportunity to illustrate her renunciation of erotic 
compromise: her significant expansion on Esau’s marriage to two Canaanite women 
invokes several tropes of royalist amorous romance, then demolishes them. Esau 
demonstrates his reprobation in his violation of God’s “first injunction” for the elect: 
despite being his father Isaac’s favorite son, he “Undutiful in his behaviour proves” and 
“His father’s and his grandsire’s precepts slights / Matching with the accursèd Canaanites” 
(17.466-8). Yet Hutchinson does not end here, as the text of Genesis does; instead, she 
                                                
289 For an excellent study of the radical political dimension of the home and family in seventeenth-century 
England, see Katharine Gillespie’s Domesticity and Dissent in the Seventeenth Century: English Women’s 
Writing and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2004). Murphy’s Familial Forms has also 
discussed how the discourse of a separate domestic space in the seventeenth century “does not render the 
family apolitical, but rather redefines its relationship to politics for the republican cause by maintaining its 
separation from government” (136). 
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digresses by inviting us to imagine Esau as the conventional romance hero in thrall to 
love—or, more specifically, as a Drydenesque star-crossed wooer who becomes 
convinced that love conquers all. Esau, “rough, yet bold and brave,” “oft chased the flying 
deer” until “Bright Aholibamah with piercing rays / Ardour like lightning through his 
breast conveys, / Which working there begets a violent flame” that consumes his thoughts 
and transforms the archetypal hunter into prey: “at the last, entrapped with beauty’s snare, 
/ His fierce soul was subdued” (17.505, 470-81).290 Hutchinson then invents Esau’s 
interior monologue as he perceives himself to be in love and reasons his way through the 
values of royalist romance as seen through Hutchinson’s antagonistic lens: 
  Nor did he check but flattered his desire. 
  ‘Can I,’ said he, ‘burn with a nobler fire? 
  If Nature in creation have designed 
  Man must be linked with womankind, 
  What should I seek in her that I must wed 
  But beauty wherewith pleasure may be fed? 
  Is’t not a princess that inflames my love? 
  Can any other choice so happy prove? 
  My father tells me they’re a cursèd brood, 
  But why should he appoint me my own food [….] 
  When I at home have made a nobler choice, 
  Wherein ’tis fit my father should rejoice. 
      (17.483-96) 
 
According to Esau’s romantic subjectivity, no sentiment can be “nobler” than the love of a 
beautiful woman, which accords with the primal order of “Nature,” and no “choice” of a 
beloved could be more “happy” than a “princess” of royal blood. Hutchinson phrases 
Esau’s thoughts to make his assumptions appear as blunt and shallow as possible, but these 
                                                
290 Referring to a rhetorically similar passage in Canto 11, in which the Pharaoh becomes enamored with 
Abraham’s wife Sara, Wilcher proposes that “The conventional romance idiom of love as a ‘flame’ fuelled 
by ‘sparkling eyes’ and causing its victim to ‘burn’ inwardly is given a more sinister gloss by imagery of 
ravishment, feasting, and drunken ‘infection’; and the rendering of this episode might be seen as a parallel 
to Milton’s briefer evocation of the debauched courtiers of Charles II as the ‘wild rout’ of ‘Bacchus and his 
revellers’ [PL 7:32-4]” (“Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 36). 
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are of course the conventions of countless romances, including England’s foundational 
Protestant ones; love may well be ennobling, all romance lovers are beautiful, and virtually 
every heroine turns out to be a princess. Esau’s reasoning then takes a more explicitly 
Caroline turn: the fact that his love is proscribed by the ideology of his community only 
intensifies its potential merit. Why should it matter that he is a Hebrew and his lady a 
Canaanite if he loves her? Why should religious and political difference dictate his private 
desires, particularly when the public good of marriage to a princess and harmony with her 
nation will result? How can the archaic rules and enmities of a former generation stand in 
the way of young love, especially if its practical benefits could easily reconcile all parties? 
Esau’s passion for Aholibamah is strong enough that it outweighs all other concerns, yet (in 
his view) manages to satisfy them anyway—the very happy situation in which the lovers of 
Caroline court drama and Dryden’s Restoration narrative find themselves. Charmed by 
Esau’s courtly conduct, Aholibamah and her father give “free assent unto his wishes,” just 
as the enamored people of “Astraea Redux” do, and so the hero marries his Canaanite 
princess with mitigating eroticism as his guiding principle, “determined to be satisfied, / 
Though duty and religion both denied” (17.506, 477-8). 
 But as we know, this sort of blindly unprejudiced, universalist love is never a 
virtue for Hutchinson. When Esau contemplates the reasons why his love should 
supersede religion and custom, he merely “Flatter[s] his desire,” having “no design but 
pleasing his own will” (17.474); through her fanciful treatment of his courtship, 
Hutchinson insinuates that the Caroline virtue of erotic compromise might be exposed as 
a reckless (even Satanic) drive toward self-gratification. Moreover, she proposes that any 
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love that would so disregard “duty and religion” must eventually prove itself to be no 
more than “flagrant lust” (17.476). Because Esau desires Aholibamah only for “base 
ends,” his ardor quickly cools and he reenacts the same amorous romance with a different 
Canaanite woman:291 “Adah, Duke Eber’s daughter, seems more bright / And with new 
violence did his dead flames light” (17.513-14).292 Finally, Hutchinson envisions the 
domestic aftermath of Esau’s two marriages, in which the illusory ideal of intercultural 
and inter-ideological harmony evaporates. His mother Rebecca, “godly, sober, modest, 
plain,” attempts to make the best of her new daughters-in-law, “(Since they unto her 
family were brought),” and strives “with pious kindness […] // To instruct them in God’s 
worship, and correct / Those vanities which graceless dames affect” (17.519-24). But the 
Canaanites refuse to assimilate: “they, proud of their princely families, / Her and her 
pious counsels much despise, / Practise their idol-worship in despite” (17.525-27). Like 
England’s two consecutive Catholic queens, Henrietta Maria and Catherine of Braganza, 
the foreign princesses of Genesis show no interest in changing their religion or their 
lavish habits to match the expectations of their husband’s society, and in the eyes of its 
most “godly, sober” members, they appear only as bad influences toward “sinful riot” 
(17.520). Similar perversions, we may imagine, will be the result of the ill-advised 
“marriage” Dryden celebrated between England and the hedonistic Charles II. When 
Esau at last selects a third bride of his father’s choosing, “adding this wife more / To his 
                                                
291 Wilcher cites Hutchinson’s axiom here that “Eager desires die when fruition’s past” (17.510) as 
“evidence of [her] familiarity with the amatory verse of Sir John Suckling, the poet of the 1630s who had the 
strongest influence on the Earl of Rochester and other libertine poets of the restored Stuart court” (Ibid., 37).  
292 Given that the themes of Esau’s wooing already play on those of early Caroline court drama, Hutchinson 
may further intend for Esau’s repetitive romances with his two brides to glance slightingly at the young 
Charles I’s two controversial courtships of Catholic princesses, first the failed negotiation for the hand of 
the Spanish Infanta and then the successful match with Henrietta Maria of France. 
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unquiet Canaanitish dames,” he remains in thrall to his foreign wives’ exotic eroticism 
and incapable of sincere repentance: “Yet burns he still in their accursèd flames, / Nor 
doth those idol-worshippers remove / But still retains them in his guilty love” (18.340-4). 
In a final interjection of her narrative voice into Esau’s story, Hutchinson suggests that 
the only acceptable solution to such “mixed marriages” is an aggressively Miltonic one: 
“But had not such a show to mend been forced, / He would those wicked women have 
divorced / And to his father’s will his own resigned” (18.361-363). Unlike pre- and post-
war Caroline romance, which might celebrate the harmonious union of opposed religions, 
sanction the marriage of the heroine to a reformed rake, or imagine the king and his 
people as reconciled lovers, thereby extolling true love as a great obliterator of 
ideological distinctions and healer of old wounds, Order and Disorder upholds such 
barriers to politic affection with militant zeal. In the world of Hutchinson’s biblical epic, 
romance could never build community by destroying spiritual difference; rather, spiritual 
difference stands in the way of the elect community’s right romance.  
 
“’Tis only like desires like things unite”: Godly Love and Governance 
 
 Tarnishing royalist portrayals of tolerant love as mere “lasciviousness,” however, 
does not entail that Order and Disorder disavow all tropes of amorous narrative. On the 
contrary, Hutchinson’s renunciation of spiritual miscegenation leads her to a perspective 
on elect eroticism that combines the natural law of Lucretius (whom she had renounced 
in nearly the same breath as romance in her preface) with basic romantic convention: 
  ’Tis only like desires like things unite: 
  In union likeness only feeds delight. 
  Where unlike natures in conjunction are, 
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  There is no product but perpetual war, 
  Such as there was in Nature’s troubled womb 
  Until the severed births from thence did come.293 
      (3.263-268) 
 
This explanation of Adam’s need for a mate like himself serves as the foundation for 
godly love throughout the rest of the poem and introduces certain associations with 
romance long before Hutchinson repudiates others. Sidney and Spenser adopted the 
romance genre’s medieval tradition that the elite must (and do) love only the elite, and 
added the corollary that the elect must (and do) truly love only the elect;294 Hutchinson 
retains this concept, which permits her to adopt both subversive and conservative stances 
on marriage and its ramifications, public and private. The scientific and erotic principle 
that “only like desires like things unite” points to several of her more radical positions. 
First, it underlies her belief in the essential equality of men and women in prelapsarian 
creation, a theme that will play into her reconsideration of gendered heroism throughout 
the poem. Hutchinson is like many biblical commentators in her emphasis on Eve’s 
creation out of Adam’s body and on the couple’s becoming “one flesh” again in marriage 
(“We, late of one made two, again in one / Shall reunite”), but as Shannon Miller has 
pointed out, she is unique in her interpretation that this union is the result of childbearing, 
(“When marriage male and female doth combine, / Children in one flesh shall two 
parents join”), which grants both parents equal status in relationship to their offspring and 
                                                
293 As Jonathan Goldberg has also noted in The Seeds of Things: Theorizing Sexuality and Materiality in 
Renaissance Representations (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 122-78, Lucretius remains a 
major influence on Hutchinson’s writing despite her repudiation of his atheism and of her translation of De 
Rerum Natura. 
294 For a compelling discussion of how the medieval and Early Modern romance tradition combines the 
theme of union between elite heirs and heiresses with the theme of mutual love as spiritual fulfillment, see 
Cooper, 218-68. 
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begins to alter the Spenserian idea of reproduction as a strictly feminine heroic motive 
(3.406-7, 415-16).295 Next, as we have seen, her postulate that the mingling of “unlike 
natures” is inimical to love and precludes meaningful unity grounds her suggestion that 
“mixed marriages,” even royally sanctioned or required ones, are perversions void under 
natural and divine (if not human) law. 
 Finally, the tenet that “likeness only” can produce true “union” allows for 
Hutchinson’s implication that the “war” that inevitably results from “unlike natures in 
conjunction” may occur on a political or national level as well as a domestic or an 
atomistic one. Original human likeness, and attraction to that likeness, are the sources of 
both godly marriage and reproduction and godly governance. In a remarkably swift 
progression of thought, Hutchinson proposes that man’s “Need of a suitable and a kind 
aid” applies not only to a domestic spouse “To whom he might his joys communicate,” 
but to all social and sociopolitical relationships. The erotic desire to unite and share freely 
with one’s equal partner as a solution to loneliness and spiritual stagnation becomes the 
foundation of the entire state, and even a justification for the redistribution of wealth: just 
as it is “not good” that Adam should be alone in Eden, “It is not good virtue should lie 
obscure, / That barren rocks rich treasures should immure, / Which our kind Lord to 
some, for all men gave, / That all might share of all his bounties have” (3.345-8). In a 
society rooted in likeness and thus cemented by godly love, “the great” are not “permitted 
                                                
295 Shannon Miller, “Maternity, Marriage, and Contract: Lucy Hutchinson’s Response to Patriarchal Theory 
in Order and Disorder,” in Engendering the Fall: John Milton and Seventeenth-Century Women Writers 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 107-35, 118-25. Erica Longfellow (188-90) and 
Robert Mayer (311) have also emphasized the radicalism of Hutchinson’s portrayal of mutuality in 
marriage. Norbrook is somewhat more tempered (and rightly so) in his conclusion that Hutchinson’s 
depiction of male and female relations in marriage incorporates both mutuality and conservative hierarchy 
(see “The Poem and its Contexts,” xliii-lii, and “The Republican Biblical Epic,” 56-61.) 
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to retreat” from their care of “the simple and the weak,” who—like Eve—risk harm from 
“strong and subtle foes” when left “alone” (3.355-60). She concludes that, beginning with 
Adam and Eve but continuing throughout history, 
  Men for each other’s mutual help were made, 
  The meanest may afford the highest aid, 
  The highest to necessity must yield: 
  Even princes are beholding to the field. 
      (3.361-4) 
 
Hutchinson annotates the final line with a marginal reference to Ecclesiastes 5:9: “the 
profit of the earth is for all: the king himself is served by the field.” Anyone who fails 
to live by this law of mutuality simultaneously “Injures himself” by cutting himself off 
from the amorous and social joys of “mortal converse” and “others doth betray / 
Whom Providence committed to his trust, / And in that act nor prudent is nor just” 
(3.365-8).296 The recent rulers of seventeenth-century England are, of course, the implicit 
objects of this criticism; rather than governing their “associates” with the humility and 
love of spiritual equals granted material power, they have assumed absolute superiority 
and thus forced their “partners” into “conjunction” with an “unlike nature,” thereby 
ensuring “perpetual war,” whether on the battlefield or in the heart. This state of endless 
warfare may remind us of Hobbes’ fear of the anarchy wrought by myriad subjectivities, 
                                                
296 Joan Bennett, who reads Order and Disorder as seventeenth-century “feminist liberation theology” in 
“Mary Astell, Lucy Hutchinson, John Milton, and Feminist Liberation Theology,” in Milton in the Age of 
Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text, and Terrorism (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2006), 139-
66, argues that for Hutchinson, both husband and wife must “[coordinate] their efforts for the creation of a 
just society within an order that, while it gave the husband a governing role, required that he govern by 
right reason and that the wife guide her actions by her own right reason as well, rendering male and female 
both very powerful” (147). Bennett concludes that while Hutchinson never questioned women’s domestic 
subordination to men, she “viewed both women and men as constantly active participants with 
Providence”; her liberation theology entails the belief “that all humans are of equal spiritual worth and 
calling” and that therefore “no matter where they were placed in a hierarchical order, each person embodied 
ability and held responsibility for the welfare of the whole order” (156).             
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but in Hutchinson’s case, the war must be blamed on the phallocratic absolutists, not on 
those who resist or refuse them. The royalist parody of marital union, she suggests, must 
be acknowledged as tyrannical imposition rather than disguised as a bride’s comely 
submission to her loving groom. She has thus moved with astonishing speed from a 
conventional literary law of erotic attraction and a basic Lucretian principle to a radical 
political stance. If “only like desires like things unite,” then the political equivalent of 
spiritual miscegenation—that is, the tyranny of a reprobate monarch over an elect 
people—is anathema to the laws of God’s created universe (whether erotic, material, or 
spiritual), and the only righteous response to it is the divorce that both Esau and England 
are too servile to choose.297 
Yet even as we track Hutchinson’s use of the romance tenet of love-in-likeness to 
its radical conclusion, we find conservative principles interwoven along the way. 
Hutchinson responds to her belief that all human beings—male and female, rich and 
poor—are equal in creation by simultaneously deconstructing and upholding gendered 
and sociopolitical hierarchy. “The great,” whether husbands, the wealthy, or the 
powerful, may be joined to “the weak” in a bond of “mutual help,” but in order for each 
group to perform its sacred duty, their relational inequality must stand; God has given the 
riches of the earth “to some, for all men,” but the rich must first possess them in order to 
                                                
297 It is worth noting that if Hutchinson regards a nation’s subjection to a bad king as analogous to Esau’s 
enthrallment to his reprobate wives, she places the monarch in an implicitly feminized position: he is the 
gaudy, wicked woman whom the fallen and deluded subjects uxoriously adore, and whom the godly 
subjects wish (and ought) to divorce. This metaphor constitutes another radical departure from Dryden’s 
formulation and from traditional royalist political theory, which regarded the monarch as his people’s 
husband; accordingly, his duty was to rule them with love, and theirs to obey him. For a reading of 
Milton’s performance of similar manipulations of gendered conventions in his divorce tracts and political 
writings, see Murphy, 84-5, 240. 
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exercise their virtue by sharing them with their poor dependents. Hutchinson’s 
paradoxical perspective calls for radical reform while necessarily preserving many 
essentials of the status quo, including restriction of leadership to an elite minority: she 
imagines government by an aristocracy of the elect, defined (in her case) as those “few 
with pure hearts” who uphold the Holy State in “every age” by keeping the law of love, 
reproduction, and social fellowship only with others like themselves. These true “Sons of 
God” who shun spiritual miscegenation and the tyranny it breeds are uniquely fit for good 
marriage and good governance, both of which are predicated at once on “mutual help” 
and worldly hierarchy. Hutchinson here turns to the rules of romance to imagine an elect 
community that is founded not only upon spiritual likeness and equality, but also upon 
temporal difference and disparity. 
Just as conservative politics enter into Hutchinson’s most reformist ideology, her 
romance tropes are surprisingly at their most earnest and their most traditional in her 
imaginative interpretations of the love between the young patriarchs and matriarchs of 
Genesis, which Hutchinson sets in opposition to the reprobate characters’ twisted 
variation on royalist romance. Isaac falls in love with Rebecca, who is predestined and 
“by Providence / Marked forth” to be his wife, at first sight: “At [her] approach, to her 
such love he took / That every passion else quickly forsook / His much-enamoured 
breast” (16.136-7, 265-7). And nowhere is romance more prevalent in Order and 
Disorder than in Jacob’s courtship of Rachel in Book 19: while Hutchinson ironizes and 
parodies the genre in Esau’s wooing of his Canaanite wives, her sudden turn to pastoral 
romance at the end of the poem is startling in both its conventionality and its sincerity. 
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Rachel’s resemblance to the beautiful and universally beloved shepherdesses of the 
Arcadia (or even of court pastoral drama) is certainly intentional: the shepherds of Haran 
introduce her to Jacob as “the only loadstone, the bright star / By whose light all our 
youth attracted are” (19.212-14). Her response to her many lovers, and the effect she 
creates in them, calls to mind Sidney’s shepherdess Urania or, as Wilcher has suggested, 
Shakespeare’s Perdita:298 
Yet she her thoughts pure as her looks doth keep, 
Harbours no care but for her flock of sheep, 
Who, of their guardian proud, before her play 
Whilst all the amorous shepherds pine away, 
Whose courtship she nor scorns nor entertains. 
Of a successful rival none complains, 
For her lovers all the same indifference find, 
And yet her coldness is of such a kind, 
So managed, it a reverence begets, 
And higher value on her beauties sets. 
      (19.215-24) 
 
Unlike the “blazing” women of the Worldly State, whose charms are “sorceries” and 
whose beauty inflames lust and generates strife, Rachel unites her suitors in their love for 
her and inspires “reverence” in them. Nor is their devotion misplaced; much as the New 
Arcadia’s lovers claim to desire heavenly beauty and therefore heavenly goodness in the 
objects of their passion, Hutchinson suggests that Rachel’s “beauties” are indeed of 
“higher value.” Her blazon of the shepherdess pays further conscious yet un-ironic tribute 
to traditional romance and highlights the conservative model of heroism in which birth, 
beauty, and virtue are inextricably intertwined:  
of that noble kind 
Was Rachel’s beauty that it showed a mind 
                                                
298 Wilcher, “Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” p. 39: “The single detail that Rachel tended her father’s sheep is 
enough to license an extended description of her as a rustic cynosure, like Perdita in The Winter’s Tale.” 
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Worthy of such a cabinet: Nature the mould 
Formed to those gemlike virtues it should hold. 
Vigour and courage in her bright eyes shone, 
On the large forehead wisdom had a throne. 
A blushing modesty, accompanied  
With tempting sweetness, did her motions guide. 
The opening of her lips was eloquence [...] 
In every smile was gentleness and truth [...] 
Her voice was harmony, her radiant hair 
Chaste Love’s strong band, not lust’s alluring snare. 
    (19.287-300) 
 
At his first meeting with Rachel, Jacob is attracted simultaneously by his cousin’s beauty 
and by the bond of kinship between them: “Nature’s force he felt / Contending with the 
late intruder, Love, / Which should more powerful in his bosom prove. / He tells her who 
he is, nor then forbears / To claim that dear relation with joy’s tears” (19.254-8). 
Likewise, “kindred and sympathy” first move Rachel to love Jacob in return, followed by 
“virtuous conversation” and “Jacob’s merit” (19.309-11). Hutchinson makes no 
distinction between Jacob and Rachel’s likeness in virtue and their likeness in blood as 
“noble” descendants of Abraham; both are features of their elect condition, which 
generates their godly desire for one another, justifies it as legitimate and pure, and 
ensures the continuance of the Holy State.  
 Indeed, Jacob and Rachel’s pastoral love affair is significantly distinct from 
Esau’s Canaanite courtships only in that their match accords with the wishes of Jacob’s 
family and with God’s will for his chosen people. Hutchinson deliberately notes that 
Rachel differs from the wicked women earlier in the poem not in that she is “insensible of 
Love”—a cold defect of character that “would a stain to all her beauties prove”—but in 
that “when that fire into her bosom came / It burnt as purely as a martyr’s flame” 
(19.305-8). Love does, and should, affect the elect as it does the reprobate; in fact, it does 
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so with greater legitimacy, strength, and constancy. Much as the “fierce” Esau is 
“subdued” by Aholibamah’s beauty, Jacob finds himself “vanquished in the field” upon 
first encountering his “fair foe” (19.251-3).299 Esau sacrifices his community and its 
culture for the sake of pleasing his wives, effectively submitting his will to theirs, while 
Jacob quickly finds that “his chief desires” are only “To serve” Rachel (19.259); notably, 
Hutchinson does not question the value of the virtuous lover’s courtly “service” to his 
mistress, as Milton does through Raphael’s interrogation of Adam’s love for Eve in 
Paradise Lost.300 Finally, Hutchinson parallels Esau’s resistance to any obstacles to the 
fulfillment of his desire for Aholibamah with Jacob’s stubborn pursuit of Rachel 
throughout his many years of service to Laban: 
For easier may you the firm rocks remove 
Than change the purpose of a well-fixed love, 
Which, being once seated in a generous mind, 
No difficulty can in nature find 
That it surmounts not, with delight t’acquire 
The dear enjoyment of that strong desire. 
    (19.317-22) 
 
Hutchinson here describes a strength of will akin to Esau’s, but commends what she 
deplored before. The brothers’ progress as lovers is outwardly similar, and yet inwardly, 
no two desires could be less alike: Esau boorishly loves multiple unworthy women, while 
Jacob’s love takes hold “in a generous mind” and is “well-fixed” not only in that it is 
constant and firmly implanted, but also in that Rachel is its deserving object. Because 
Jacob’s desires are directed toward his own cultural and spiritual likeness—because his 
                                                
299 Wilcher identifies this martial metaphor for love as “the kind [...] that the poet would have encountered 
in the ‘witty songs’ and the prose romances of her girlhood reading” (Ibid., 39). 
300 Upon Adam’s admission that he feels “awe” in the presence of Eve and that “what she wills to do or say 
/ Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best,” Raphael admonishes him that Eve, as a woman, is “worthy 
well / Thy cherishing, thy honoring, and thy love— / Not thy subjection” (PL 8.549-59, 568-70).  
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choice accords with the wishes of his pious mother, and God’s election—what is 
condemnable in Esau is praiseworthy in him. Hutchinson retains the romantic rhetoric 
that she used polemically against Esau in her sincere account of Jacob and Rachel’s love, 
but the very amorous conduct that leads Esau further into sin makes Jacob into the un-
ironic hero of Hutchinson’s Puritan pastoral romance and the latest builder of God’s 
nation.  
We might compare Hutchinson’s privileging of the elect Jacob and Rachel’s 
godly romance over the reprobate Esau’s superficially similar experiences to her account 
of her and her husband’s courtship in the Memoirs. Hutchinson describes how her 
husband-to-be falls suddenly in love with her after refusing to “be entangled in any of 
[the] fine snares” of worldly ladies “sett out with all the gayety and bravery that vain 
weomen put on to sett themselves off”; she later notes that his “extravagant perplexity of 
soule concerning [Lucy] […] had not bene admirable in another light person, but in him, 
who was from his childhood so serious and so rationall in all his considerations, it was 
the effect of a miraculous power of providence, leading him to her that was destin’d to 
make his future joy.”301 John Hutchinson’s amorous passion would be condemnable in a 
lesser man, but in a person of his intelligence and virtue, it instead serves as evidence of 
God’s providential work within the individual mind and heart. Hutchinson is not so bold 
in the Memoirs as to identify herself and her husband as elect lovers and the “light 
person” or the “vain women” as lustful reprobates, but the parallels with Order and 
Disorder’s Calvinist categorization of love and lust are undeniable. John’s passion leads, 
                                                
301 Hutchinson, Memoirs, ed. Sutherland, 28, 30. 
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Hutchinson coyly adds, into “a more handsome management of love then the best 
romances describe”:302 this true story, authored by providence, admits and yet also 
surpasses the conventions of genre.303 Likewise, although the preface to Order and 
Disorder expresses abhorrence for “turning Scripture into a romance,” the poem as we 
have it concludes with a pastoral love affair and a significantly revised implication: that 
the heroic and erotic stories ordained by God are like, but infinitely better than, “the best 
romances” produced by human art or policy. As we have seen, however, John and Lucy’s 
romance in the Memoirs becomes strained by the tension between his spiritual vision of 
the narrative of the elect and her worldly concerns as a wife and mother; the characters of 
Genesis allow Hutchinson to reimagine a godly romantic subjectivity that does not 
splinter so easily along gendered lines. 
 
“What will full Restoration be?”: Rethinking Teleology, Gender, and Narrative Vision 
 
“Love is the cément of the Holy State,” pronounces the narrator in comparing the 
offspring of Cain and Seth near the beginning of Order and Disorder, “Nor hath it place 
or fellowship with hate” (6.419-20): as ever, the elect, who are alone capable of true love 
and sincere political fellowship, must resist any temptation or legal act that might pollute 
their community with those whom “lust or interest [...] in leagues combines, / But holy 
love or friendship never joins” (6.415-16). Esau and his “blazing” court ladies are 
counted among “the bright slaves of Satan’s empire” who have forsaken Rachel’s pure 
martyrlike burning for “a wild fire and an unhallowed flame” (6.418). And while elect 
                                                
302 Ibid., 52. 
303 Devoney Looser suggests that for Hutchinson, carefully controlled elements of romance “are not only 
acceptable but necessary to honest history writing” (45). 
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sexuality is always oriented toward the future of the Holy State—springing from and 
flowing back toward “God, the fountain of all love” (6.422)—Hutchinson represents all 
ungodly activity, including sex and reproduction, as purposeless and stagnant, 
as a declining stream 
That breaks off its communion with its head, 
By whom its life and sweetness late were fed, 
Turns to a noisome, dead, and poisonous lake, 
Infecting all who the foul waters take[.]304 
    (4.22-26) 
 
Like so many of her radical Protestant fellows and predecessors, Hutchinson endows the 
community of the elect with a long yet fecund and progressive narrative, while identifying 
their enemies by their very excommunication from such a teleological timeline. However 
alike their respective versions of erotic romance may appear, one is destined to for 
propagation, continuance, and a sacred end, while the other is going nowhere. 
Both Jacob and Rachel’s marriage and the Hutchinsons’ are the conclusions of 
micro-romances within the ongoing trans-historical romance of the elect, authored by 
God himself: Hutchinson judges that her future husband’s unprecedented longing for her, 
like Jacob’s similarly “extravagant perplexity of soule” toward Rachel, was “certainly 
[...] of the Lord, though he perceiv’d it not, who had ordein’d him, through so many 
                                                
304 Hutchinson similarly uses the imagery of stagnant water and sterility in her description of the fate of the 
reprobate cities of Sodom and Gomorrah: 
The earth itself with all her shining fruits, 
From its first native beauty much estranged, 
Into a killing, noisome lake was changed, 
Bounded with slime and noisome poisonous weeds, 
Where no fish lives, nor any fowl e’er breeds [...] 
The waters such unsavoury vapours make, 
Whence Heber’s brood surnamed it the Dead Lake. 
   (13.262-270) 
It is worth noting that while she does acknowledge that “lascivious love” in Sodom is often homosexual in 
nature (13.12), she does not dwell at length on the Sodomites’ particular transgression; for Hutchinson, all 
forms of sexual sin result in the same stagnant end, and her concern with the ubiquitous sin of heterosexual 
spiritual miscegenation largely eclipses her attention to more outré sins such as homosexuality and incest. 
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various providences, to be yoak’d with her in whom he found so much satisfaction.”305 
The story of Jacob in Order and Disorder, like so many romances, breaks off unfinished 
with the rest of the poem, but its conclusion incorporates an implication that the divine 
romance is likewise unfinished only because it is ongoing. In the poem’s final line, Jacob 
is “Carried off [...] safe” from Laban’s vengeful troops, “for God at first did send / An 
unseen guard of angels to attend / His servant home, though yet he knew it not, / And 
Bethel’s certain vision had forgot” (20.144-9). Despite the fact that the minor heroes 
frequently “forget” the promised plot of their story or fail to “perceive” its unfolding, 
God’s providence continues to preside as author, whether of the epic romance of the Holy 
State or of the individual amorous narratives of its elect members, whose unions in love 
and marriage sustain “the blessed Seed” destined to generate their community’s 
“sovereign champion.”306  Indeed, Hutchinson reminds her readers that the original 
marriage of Adam and Eve prefigures the true end of the heroic and erotic romance of 
history, when Christ, having vanquished Satan in the universe’s final battle, will be 
eternally united to his chosen bride, the Church: 
 ‘Henceforth no longer two but one we are [....] 
As my victorious triumphs are all thine, 
So are thy injuries and sufferings mine, 
Which I for thee will vanquish as my own, 
And give thee rest in the celestial throne.’ 
The bride, with these caresses entertained, 
In naked beauty doth before him stand, 
And knows no shame, purged from all foul desire 
Whose secret guilt kindles the blushing fire. 
                                                
305 Hutchinson, Memoirs, ed. Sutherland, 29. 
306 Wilcher likewise finds it “appropriate that [Order and Disorder] should remain unfinished, like the great 
English exemplars of the romance genre, Sidney’s New Arcadia and Spenser’s Faerie Queene [....] In that 
incompleteness [...] it forces a marriage between the puritan writer’s understanding of the human story 
derived from her bible-centred conception of universal history and the ongoing flow of human stories that 
are the life-blood of romance” (“Paraphrase, Epic, Romance,” 42). 
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Her glorious Lord is naked too, no more 
Concealed in types and shadows as before. 
    (3.493-498) 
 
These reconciled lovers recall Dryden’s joyous national marriage yet leave it far behind. 
Their “nakedness” serves a double purpose: not only does it showcase the ultimate 
redemption of elect eroticism, made fully perfect at the end of time, but it also signifies 
the telos of Christian art and hermeneutics, justifying their purpose and marking their 
ending. The “glorious Lord” is “no more / Concealed” in the “types and shadows” of 
history and text; in the very eschatological moment that it becomes possible to read time 
as a finished romance, it also becomes unnecessary, even meaningless. Typology, genre, 
and other such interpretive tools are finally stripped away to reveal the real thing.  
Long before the ends of the divine romance are realized, however, the wandering 
narrative of God’s chosen people winds slowly (yet progressively) on from one 
generation to the next. As Shannon Miller, Erin Murphy, and others have observed, much 
of Order and Disorder is preoccupied with the business of reproduction: from Adam and 
Eve to Abraham and Sarah to Isaac and Rebecca to Jacob and Rachel, elect families 
constantly experience gratification, then disappointment, then renewed joy as they await 
the birth of the “blessed seed,” the child or children destined to carry on the physical and 
spiritual lineage of the Holy State in its eternal combat with “Hell and the World.” For all 
four of these couples, the wait is long and the result unexpected, entirely out of step with 
the orderly patrilineal narrative of “Astraea Redux”: the first three patriarchs beget first-
born sons who show early promise but are not chosen for heroic roles, and Jacob 
produces many children with Leah while he and his beloved Rachel remain childless. 
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This recurring theme, of course, inheres in the original text of Genesis, but Hutchinson 
emphasizes it for her own personal, theological, and political ends. First, since “Children in 
one flesh […] two parents join,” Hutchinson presents her male and female heroes as 
equally concerned with the worldly promise of reproduction and its potential for failure; 
both husbands and wives experience the hope that Spenser’s Britomart has in her offspring, 
along with the fear that romance will become tragedy. Further, Norbrook notes that “Calvin 
and other Protestant commentators saw the Jacob-Esau story as paralleling that of Isaac and 
Ishmael: the normal order of primogeniture is inverted for the sake of the elect, anticipating 
the belated triumph of the true church.” 307  Hutchinson adopts this Reformation-era 
Calvinist theme and modifies it for the Restoration, repeatedly emphasizing that neither the 
first-born son nor the next generation in general—both of them sources of imminent hope 
in “Astraea Redux” and throughout romance-inflected royalist historiography—are in 
themselves legitimate symbols of teleology according to sacred narrative.  
The story of Esau and his family provides Order and Disorder’s most emphatic 
polemic against primogeniture as well as spiritual miscegenation; at the same time, it 
reiterates Hutchinson’s interest in resisting gendered binaries for elect heroism. In 
favoring his “vigorous” elder son and intending to “dispense / [His] blessings unto [him],” 
Isaac is “governed by a partial blind affection” and “Stuck to that choice which was not 
God’s election” (17.179, 18.8-9, 77-8). Upon discovering that he has been acted upon “by 
a secret Providence / Whose workings were not obvious to his sense” and has thus blessed 
Jacob instead (18.141-2), Hutchinson’s uniquely introspective Isaac is overcome not with 
                                                
307 Norbrook, ed., Order and Disorder, 217n. 
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anger at his wife and younger son, whose deceit is justified by “powerful reason” 
(17.541), but with guilt and “trembling horror” at his own resistance to divine will: 
By God long since, by himself pronounced but late, 
He sees his sons’ irrevocable state, 
And now acknowledges mortals in vain 
Strive to prevent what God doth once ordain [....] 
   These things resolved in his disturbèd thoughts, 
And he convinced thereby of his own faults 
Who to the oracles of God so slight 
Regard had given, nor having placed aright 
His partial love, doted on him the Lord 
As a profane wild reprobate abhorred; 
Therefore at length he did his will submit 
To God’s[.] 
    (18.124-8, 151-8) 
 
In the Memoirs, John Hutchinson was endowed with a narrative vision of God’s plot for 
his Holy State, which his wife’s “partial blind affection” prevented her from seeing, 
much to her own dismay and submissive self-recrimination. In Order and Disorder, 
Hutchinson makes Rebecca the heroic visionary and her husband the spouse who must 
repent of his confusion between worldly and godly concerns. In political terms, the 
“vain” law of primogeniture, so pivotal to divine right monarchy and to the royalist 
reading of Charles II as the hero of his family’s dynastic romance, may easily run afoul 
of “God’s election.” If it does so, the godly patriarch must abandon it and “submit” to 
legitimate divine right.308 Any assumption that the divine plot accords with the human 
                                                
308 Bennett, discussing Cantos 17 and 18 of Order and Disorder, identifies Isaac’s pious but deceitful wife 
Rebecca as a particular heroine for Hutchinson, arguing that Rebecca exemplifies godly conduct at the 
intersection of the domestic and the public sphere. In helping her (and God’s) favorite child Jacob achieve 
his birthright, Rebecca individually exercises right reason, not by permanently challenging patriarchy but 
by “[discerning] the wisest action and [executing] that action well” such that “that virtuous purpose [is] 
acted upon by those with governing authority” (“Feminist Liberation Theology,” 155-156).  Isaac has been 
temporarily blind to God’s will, but Rebecca sees and enacts it; she then explains her reasoning and actions 
to her husband, who accepts hers and God’s wisdom, thus restoring mutual right reason both to their 
marriage and to their community. 
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order of primogeniture is either a grave error that the elect must learn to correct in 
themselves (as Isaac does), or else the fatal fallacy of the damned. Cain, of course, is the 
original firstborn son to prove unworthy of his inborn status, and Hutchinson imagines 
that after Adam’s first son has murdered his second, Satan “exult[s]” at his apparent 
triumph over the “champion” destined to destroy him, believing “The holy seed 
extinguished by [Abel’s] death / But God revived it in succeeding Seth” (6.424-6). The 
champion’s victory was never contingent upon either of Adam’s eldest sons, nor does it 
depend upon anyone else’s firstborn in time to come, least of all Charles II.   
Hutchinson is not simply concerned with turning “the normal order of 
primogeniture” upside down in order to favor symbolically disenfranchised younger 
children, however. Beyond separating eldest sons from their traditional heroic roles, 
Order and Disorder rejects another common theme of romance that Dryden’s postwar 
royalist narrative embraces: the hope that the suffering of one generation will be 
ameliorated by the young heroes of the subsequent one.309 The promise of future 
redemption is paramount to Hutchinson’s treatment of the history of the Holy State, but 
crucially, that salvific end lies in the deep future, and never in the hands of the present 
population’s immediate offspring. Eve is the first character in the poem to misunderstand 
the scope of the divine romance, imagining that its temporality is restricted to the life 
spans of herself and her children,310 and that her conception of her first son represents a 
singular triumph and heralds the fulfillment of God’s promise: 
                                                
309 Salzman comments that the restoration of the king in royalist romance “has a religious as well as a 
political resonance” in the “possible symbol of the father’s death and the son’s ‘resurrection’” (174). 
310 Milton has Adam make a similar error in the final books of Paradise Lost, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter. 
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  When Cain was born, exultingly she thought 
  She had into the world her champion brought; 
  But from the error of that fond conceit 
  She learned that such as live on faith must wait 
  To have the promises whereon they stay 
  Performed alone in God’s own time and way. 
      (6.33-8) 
 
Hutchinson makes clear that Eve’s error is not simply her assumption that her first-born 
son must be the promised seed, nor even that the story’s end is near at hand, but rather 
that she possesses any conventionally heroic power to bring the end about:311 
  Th’entail of life and victory was not 
  To earthly men, of earthly men begot; 
  And such alone could Eve to Adam breed 
  Whose sin and curse was fixed in all his seed; 
  And to recover its corrupted fruit  
  It must be set into a nobler root, 
  Its ignominious parentage disclaim 
  And be adopted into a new name: 
  Which then obscured in th’oracle did lie 
  Till the full time revealed the mystery. 
      (6.39-48) 
 
Order and Disorder revisits Spenser’s paradoxical treatments of both heroic action 
and reproduction in Book III of The Faerie Queene, and reaches similar conclusions: 
human activity is undeniably part of the divine plot, yet by comparison with God’s will it is 
neither sufficient nor necessary in the usual sense of the word.312 The bearing of children is 
                                                
311 Miller has argued that Hutchinson “revise[s] aspects of Genesis [...] to suggest how maternal procreation 
can be used as a counter to seventeenth-century patriarchal theory” (109). Miller’s case is convincing 
insofar as the women of Order and Disorder participate fully in the conflict between the Holy and Worldly 
States (and their reproductive capacity is the crux of that participation), but we must keep in mind that 
Hutchinson places firm limits on the power of human mothers and their equally human offspring to resist 
worldly order. The only decisive challenge to the hierarchy of the Worldly State belongs to the “champion” 
Christ, and it will be “Performed alone in God’s own time and way.” 
312 In contrast to the many books on Spenser and Milton, no study of Hutchinson’s literary relationship to 
Spenser has yet been made. (Goldberg’s The Seeds of Things discusses both Spenser and Hutchinson in 
relationship to Lucretius, but not to one another.) However, Hutchinson’s original allegory of Divine 
Vengeance (8.187-250) and her imaginative episode personifying such figures as Sleep and Night (14.43-
147) resemble both Spenserian and Virgilian material. Given Spenser’s enduring popularity throughout the 
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similar: in Order and Disorder, as for Britomart, reproduction is a providential 
commandment without a predictable triumph or a foreseeable end. Beginning with Eve, 
every mother is called to “maintain / Posterity, not frighted with the pain” in the hope of the 
“promise that thereby she shall / Recover all the hurt of her first fall / When, in mysterious 
manner, from her womb / Her father, brother, husband, son shall come” (5.221-8). Again, 
the mortal role in the divine romance is both a certainty and a mystery—and the mystery in 
which all elect mothers still share is not precisely identical to the mystery of Christ’s 
incarnation that Eve fails to anticipate in Canto 6. The precept given to women in Canto 5 
clearly refers to the incarnation of Christ thousands of years in Eve’s future, and yet it also 
remains operative for Eve’s living descendants, despite the historical fact of Jesus’ birth 
seventeen centuries prior to Hutchinson’s composition of Order and Disorder. The “full 
time” has “revealed the mystery” of Christ’s identity as the “champion” of the Christian 
romance, but the mystery of the ongoing commandment to childbearing remains shrouded 
in time that is not yet full. The matriarchs of Genesis continue to face the reproductive 
quest and the obscured narrative vision of Spenser’s Britomart—although crucially, they 
are no longer alone in that feminized subject position. 
 The disappointment of the republican cause, paired with the enduring Puritan 
belief in a providential arc to history, necessitates Hutchinson’s return to this Spenserian 
or Sidneian style of unfinished, long-form romance—a mode which Charles II’s return to 
power had obviated for post-Restoration royalist treatments of the genre, including 
“Astraea Redux.” The king’s return lent the royal romance a beautiful simplicity: as 
                                                                                                                                            
seventeenth century and Hutchinson’s youthful fondness for “amorous [...] poems” and epic romance, it 
seems highly likely that she had at least some familiarity with The Faerie Queene. 
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literary convention dictated, the loving and fruitful union of Charles II’s parents perfectly 
performed its reproductive function and resulted in a heroic first-born son who 
successfully reclaimed his father’s usurped throne. Everything, in the end, had gone 
according to the generic plan.313 In order to survive and retain positive ideological value, 
Puritan republican romance therefore required a different plan: a much more expansive 
one that refused to recognize the royalist “end.”314 After introducing the Spenserian 
paradox of reproduction early in Order and Disorder, Hutchinson continues to raise it 
throughout the rest of the poem, consistently stressing both the hope of futurity and the 
failure of immediate expectation, and thereby rejecting the primogeniture, imminent 
resolution, and narrative finality that Dryden emphasizes.315 Moreover, this trial troubles 
the patriarchs as much as it does their wives, since the prophetic perspectives offered to 
the men of Genesis typically take the promissory form of future descendants; as before, 
Hutchinson’s compound project relies on her own embellishments and explications of 
preexisting scripture. To God’s assurance to Abraham that his aging wife Sarah, rather 
than her young maid Hagar, will become the mother of his heir, Hutchinson adds an 
association between the unborn Isaac and the promise of the holy seed’s birth made to 
Adam and Eve: “And now my promises shall take effect, / Nor shalt thou long the 
blessed seed expect. / Yet not from Hagar’s but from Sarah’s womb / The children of the 
                                                
313 In Potter’s words, “Events had transformed the fantastic prophecies into reality, and the mock tragedy 
into true tragicomedy” (112). 
314 For Milton’s similar but distinctive treatment of Puritan republican romance in Paradise Lost and 
Paradise Regained, see the previous chapter. 
315 For another perspective on the “troubled promise of reproduction” in Order and Disorder, see Murphy, 
152-75. Murphy argues that Hutchinson represents reproduction as a window into sacred history and as a 
form of redemption distinct from the linear genealogical promise of the birth of Christ. However, she points 
out that Hutchinson also depicts childbirth and children as sources of sorrow, disappointment, and death; 
the struggle of godly parents is to reconcile the pain and mortality inherent in reproduction with the equally 
inherent promise of earthly and eschatological fulfillment. 
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covenant shall come” (12.167-70). Again, the first-born son is rejected and the human 
order of primogeniture gives way to a higher order. But, lest divine inheritance law seem a 
simple matter of radical inversion, Hutchinson further invents God’s revelation to Abraham 
that “the blessed seed” refers not merely to an individual, but to a continuum of godly 
lineage, long before (and, as we have seen, long after) it manifests itself as a specific 
person. Isaac both is and is not the expected heir to the promise of history, God explains: 
It is in Isaac that I have decreed 
A glorious name unto thy holy seed. 
From him the godly nations shall descend [...] 
And from a race of kings at last shall rise 
That glorious Monarch whose great victories 
Shall overthrow the powers of Death and Hell 
And them from their usurpèd realm expel [....] 
But first a long and various tract of time 
Must be expired before thy nephews climb 
To these last glories; yet here steadfast rest 
Thy faith: the world shall be in Isaac blessed. 
    (14.297-314) 
 
As it turns out, Isaac is destined to be the heir whose line will eventually produce 
the true heir, the “sovereign champion” destined to reclaim his “usurpèd realm.” But 
there is nothing immediate about the promised triumph of this family line: a nebulous 
span of time, made known to Abraham and to us only as “long and various,” separates 
Abraham and his son from the “glorious Monarch” whom Isaac’s birth anticipates. God 
warns Abraham that the arrival of the “blessed seed” remains a distant prospect, even as 
it is also imminent in Isaac’s birth. Yet the message ends in renewed comfort, with God’s 
reassertion of Isaac’s critical role in the protracted plot. Abraham will be long dead by the 
time of Christ’s birth, to say nothing of the End of Days (since, as we have seen, the holy 
seed endures after Christ’s death and resurrection, continuing to emerge from the erotic 
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union of elect women and men throughout history)—but he may “steadfast rest / [His] 
faith” in his own son, “here” and now. Reminiscent of Spenser’s Merlin providing 
limited solace to Britomart, Hutchinson’s God offers Abraham no direct vision of his 
romance’s end, instead exhorting him simultaneously to imagine the full landscape of 
sacred time and to content himself with his far more limited sight of the present occasion 
as he moves through the twists and turns of his own linear reproductive narrative. Unlike 
the assured triumph of the rightful heir in the royalist family romance, Isaac’s arrival 
must never be mistaken for the telos of his story, and yet his failure to embody that end 
must not be regarded as a disappointment. God seems to present Abraham and his 
“nephews” with their “long and various” period of waiting—with the weight of 
romance—as a gift in itself. By analogy, Charles II (like Ishmael) is the false heir of a 
false teleology, but his opponents have, as yet, no “glorious Monarch” of their own at 
hand to overthrow him and reclaim the “usurpèd realm.” Yet both the King’s success and 
the disappointment that it spells for Puritan republicans are temporary and illusory. The 
future in which worldly monarchy will be obliterated may be almost infinitely far off, but 
“the godly nations” may “steadfast rest / [Their] faith” not only in the distant future, but 
even “here” in the seemingly unpromising present: by God’s mysterious means, in their 
own children and in their pure community of faith, “the world shall be [...] blessed.”316 
Beyond relying on Genesis’ repeated stories of delayed childbirth and 
disappointing first sons, Hutchinson also invents her own material in order to appropriate 
                                                
316 Murphy argues that “Hutchinson highlights the threat of relying upon reproduction as the ground of 
stability, instead embracing the power of sacred history. The promise of the future, however, is not enough. 
Her commitment to the form of typology comes only after she has been able to challenge this system to 
respect the present, as well as provide a bridge to the future” (174-5). 
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the rhetoric of the royal romance and turn it to her own ends. The word “restoration,” 
which appears frequently throughout Order and Disorder, refers always and only to the 
fulfillment of God’s promises to the elect or to the triumphant conclusion of the 
providential narrative.317 In a lengthy creative digression, Hutchinson characterizes the 
renewal of life after the Flood as “Earth’s restoration” by God, but reminds her audience 
that, as always, each happy ending to the trials of the godly merely prefigures their 
ultimate joy at the end of time, which surpasses the imagination: “What will full 
Restoration be, if this / But the first daybreak of God’s favour is?” (8.149, 27-28). The 
royalist “restoration,” then, is doubly illusory for Hutchinson. It is a temporary triumph of 
the Worldly State, falsely represented as a glorious victory for virtue; and it is a 
vicissitude, celebrated as the end of the royal romance, which fails to recognize the entire 
arc of the romance of Providence. The true Restoration is still at hand, and its glory is 
reserved for the Holy State alone. 
 Shortly after her lyrical meditation on the Flood’s aftermath undercuts royalist  
language by looking forward to the “full Restoration,” Hutchinson continues to subvert 
the imagery of the Worldly State’s romance about itself. The mountains that rise “from 
th’imprisoning flood, / Their faces slimed, their standards dropping mud” appear “as a 
prince who, long in prison bound, / Comes squalid forth at first, untrimmed, uncrowned” 
(8.35-38). She appears to adopt the premise of “Astraea Redux”—that the world’s rebirth 
arrives in the form of a restored prince who arises from exile to recover his lost throne—
                                                
317 Norbrook reminds us that the word “restoration” had simultaneous deep significance for royalism, 
Puritanism, and even secular republicanism: “For royalists, of course, the word mainly referred to Charles 
II’s return in 1660; but Puritan republicans appealed to Isaiah 1.26, ‘I will restore thy judges as at the first,’ 
as well as to Machiavelli’s more secular theory, to present reform as an act of restoration, a return to first 
principles” (“The Poem and its Contexts,” xxxix). 
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but again, her resistance to her enemies’ rhetoric is complex and multifaceted. First, as 
with the term “restoration,” she claims it for Puritan republicanism and thereby changes 
its meaning: the emergent figure is not an earthly prince who has overcome earthly 
opponents, but the earth itself, responding to divine mercy, without which no release 
would be possible. Second, Hutchinson alters the image that she has appropriated from 
Drydenesque romance: the prince first appears not as a splendid conquering hero, but as a 
“squalid” and “untrimmed” former prisoner. On one hand, Hutchinson’s monarch can 
triumph even while “uncrowned”; on the other, his natural form is lowly, unadorned, and 
unclean before his transformation by God’s grace. Only under the care of “Heaven’s 
compassionate, kind, refreshing eye” do the mountains appear kingly: “Again they fair, 
again they stately grew, / Again looked down on the sunk realm where they / So long 
space late captived and vanquished lay” (8.39, 42-44). Third, Hutchinson proceeds to 
challenge any remnants of royalist ideology that might still linger around the royal image 
after her appropriation and transformation of it. After depicting God’s restoration of the 
humble mountains, she issues a dire warning to them, and to the rulers that they both 
resemble and represent, never to forget the sole source and sustainer of their majesty: 
     But curb, fair hills; O curb your growing pride: 
  He who above your covering clouds doth ride, 
  Whose pity drew you from your low estate, 
  When you insult will cast down your proud height [...] 
  Your new-restorèd glory shall expire [...] 
  And you, great Lords, who on the mountains reign, 
  With them shall once more be destroyed again. 
      (8.45-54) 
 
The language of “restoration” appears once more, but this time in a royalist context as the 
resurgence of monarchy, and Hutchinson again emphasizes the corruption and transience 
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of the concept according to royalist usage: any restoration tainted by “growing pride” and 
impiety is ultimately doomed to “expire” to make way for the “full Restoration” of the 
elect. Finally, after appropriating the image of the returning prince, transfiguring it, and 
critiquing it, Hutchinson unceremoniously discards it, ending her admonition with a 
dismissal: “But let’s not glance at judgements due to you / While we old miracles of 
grace review” (8.63-64). The heroic figure of royalist romance is initially useful as an 
emblem of salvation, but his monarchist overtones shadow “the first daybreak of God’s 
favour” by coming to signify the resurgence of sin, and finally the image’s efficacy 
withers before true “miracles of grace” and the distant prospect of “full Restoration.” 
Hutchinson seeks a two-pronged victory over royalist language and symbolism by 
recuperating them for Puritan republicanism when the values of the opposing narratives 
intersect, and by casting them aside as soon as they do not, extracting the pith of the royal 
romance and throwing away the rind. 
“What will full Restoration be?” is the question that Order and Disorder 
consistently poses and invites its godly readership to contemplate. Hutchinson offers rare 
and partial answers to it, as when she imagines “That glorious Monarch whose great 
victories / Shall overthrow the powers of Death and Hell / And them from their usurpèd 
realm expel” and the subsequent consummation of the marriage between the true 
“Monarch” and his bride, “no more / Concealed in types and shadows.” For the most part, 
though, the question is for asking rather than answering; both the protagonists of Genesis 
and God’s elect community throughout history—whether male or female—are called 
occasionally to take heroic action, but more often to wait. For the most part, they can 
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only trust that “God’s repeated interventions in history always look forward to the future, 
insisting that however unclear it may seem, it will follow a coherent pattern”—the plot of 
providential romance.318 Moreover, while the plot of sacred history is ongoing, visible to 
the heroes of the Holy State only in rare visionary moments, the individual believer can 
(and should) pursue his or her own tiny progressive narrative: 
So we, pursuing our attainments, should 
Press forward from what’s positively good, 
Still climbing higher, until we reach the best, 
And, that acquired, forever fix out rest, 
Our souls so ravished with the joys divine 
That they no more to creatures can decline. 
As God’s rest was but a more high retreat 
From the delights of this inferior seat, 
So must our souls upon our Sabbaths climb 
Above the world, sequestered for that time 
From those legitimate delights which may 
Rejoice us here upon a common day [....] 
Yet is this rest but a far distant view 
Of that celestial life which we pursue 
By Satan oft so interrupted here 
That little of its glory doth appear. 
    (3.574-585, 612-15) 
 
This exhortation and admonition to the audience begins with Platonic language in urging a 
gradual “climbing higher, until we reach the best” and develops into a neoplatonic Christian 
reminder of the ends of the divine narrative, when all material referents will be “no more.” In 
quotidian life, the Sabbath’s day of rest presents the godly with the best opportunity to 
meditate on these ends, yet the Sabbath too is a type with an unfulfilled antitype. Long before 
the romantic episodes of the poem’s later cantos, Hutchinson’s ruminations on the last day of 
Creation—and on the End of Days—seem (perhaps even consciously) inspired by The 
Faerie Queene’s moments of visionary Protestantism, drawing both from Redcrosse’s “climb 
                                                
318 Ibid., xxxi-xxxxii. 
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/ Above the world” to catch longing, fleeting sight of the New Jerusalem in the distance, and 
from the final four perfectly “unperfite” lines of Spenser’s epic romance: 
For all that moveth doth in Change delight: 
But thence-forth all shall rest eternally  
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight:  
O thou great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that Sabaoths sight. 
    (FQ, “Mutabilitie,” viii.2) 
 
Redcrosse is granted a narrative vision of the story’s end, as is John Hutchinson in the 
Memoirs, while Britomart and Lucy must accept promises and grope through narrative 
obscurity; in Order and Disorder, Hutchinson upholds both variations on elect romantic 
subjectivity while rejecting a gendered hierarchy to them. Both Adam and Eve, both 
Abraham and Sarah, must hold out hope for their promised descendants; at the same time, 
nothing precludes a female hero, past or present, from achieving “a far distant view / Of 
that celestial life,” and Rebecca’s vision may even outstrip Isaac’s. Both the patriarchs 
and matriarchs of Order and Disorder are sometimes accorded brief glimpses of God’s 
full narrative about themselves and their progeny, but such vision fades quickly, and for 
the most part, men and women alike must pray and hope for what they cannot see. 
Likewise, Hutchinson’s elect community of Puritan republicans find themselves 
somewhere in the middle of the romance of history, able in their time of religious and 
political disappointment to perceive “little of its glory.” Order and Disorder strives to 
remind its audience that the absence of present triumph only demonstrates the plot’s 
unfinishedness: in the meantime, the godly are left with the struggle and the reward of 
“Press[ing] forward” to attain a momentary Sabbath’s sight of something their 
adversaries could only feebly mimic: “full Restoration.” 
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Chapter Five 
 
“In the next world”: 
John Bunyan, Aphra Behn,  
and the Limits of Romance 
 
 
This final chapter considers two works of prose fiction which appeared at a time 
when the civil wars were passing into more distant memory and the “Glorious Revolution” 
was poised to end both James II’s troubled reign and the Stuart dynasty itself. John 
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part Two (1684) and Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko (1688), 
texts both known for their resistance to generic categorization, continue English writers’ 
postwar considerations of how romance might redefine and reconstruct community, and 
whether it serves more to reiterate, or to repair, divisions in religion, politics, and other 
sites of identity. At the dawn of the eighteenth century, and immediately prior to their own 
deaths, Bunyan and Behn could look back on decades past and return to questions much 
like those that challenged Spenser and Sidney: can romance function as a meaningful 
model for national, individual, or sacred history? What are its civic and religious 
applications and limitations? I argue here that Bunyan, after several prior experiments 
mingling romance and Puritan symbolism, deliberately orchestrates productive conflicts in 
Part Two of his Pilgrim’s Progress between romance convention and the spiritual journey 
to the “next world” of the Celestial City. Bunyan concluded his career as a preacher and 
an allegorist by suggesting that romance’s value lies in its capacity to generate and 
empower a nontraditional family of dissenters, and in its ability to stand for (rather than 
embody) sacred narrative form. Behn’s Oroonoko—a narrative of slavery, rebellion, love, 
and death in the “next world” of the American colonies—likewise affirms romance’s 
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capacity to unite a diverse group of adherents: despite Behn’s ardent royalism, Oroonoko 
and his friends are politically heterogeneous, and the African prince subverts Calvinism’s 
exclusion of Ham’s black descendants from the narrative of the elect. Rather than being 
empowered or providentially protected, however, their community is no sooner made than 
marginalized, and is eventually destroyed by colonialists who reject its members’ 
romantic sensibility. While Bunyan’s allegory interrogates romance by drawing it to the 
fore, Behn enacts its recession in her transatlantic tragedy. Her prophetic perspective as a 
royalist woman near the end of her life reveals not the New Jerusalem but the New World, 
a spatial and temporal zone she finds hostile to the ideas that allowed romance to flourish 
across ideological boundaries in seventeenth-century England. 
 
I. Reconceiving Community and Genre in The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part Two 
 
Unlike John Milton and Lucy Hutchinson, who each confessed their youthful 
enthusiasm for reading romance but made statements repudiating the genre later in life 
(despite their tacit continued commitment to it in their biblical poetics), John Bunyan 
never made any effort to conceal the fact that he based the structure and style of The 
Pilgrim’s Progress on the chapbook romances he read as a boy.319 “Give me [...] George 
on horseback or Bevis of Southampton,” he recalled of his early reading preferences, 
“give me some book that teaches curious arts, that tells of old fables; but for the holy 
                                                
319 Roger Sharrock has objected to seeing The Pilgrim’s Progress as “an imitation of a chivalric romance,” 
preferring to read it as “something growing out of oral narrative like the fairy- or folk-tale” (“Life and 
Story in The Pilgrim’s Progress,” in The Pilgrim’s Progress: Critical and Historical Views, ed. Vincent 
Newey [Liverpool: Liverpool U P, 1980], 49-68, 56). However, we have Bunyan’s own testimony about 
his reading habits to consider; and at any rate, it seems unnecessary to reject the relevance of one generic 
form in favor of its close cousin.  
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Scriptures I cared not.”320 By the time he began to write fanciful allegorical fiction as a 
preacher of those scriptures he once dismissed in favor of tales of love and chivalric 
adventure, the Puritan minister actively defended his use of romance as a didactic 
instrument and made no attempt to obscure its presence in the first part of his Pilgrim’s 
Progress (1678). In the intervening years before he produced Part Two of his wildly 
popular book—during which he had also published the comparably romance-inspired Life 
and Death of Mr. Badman (1680) and The Holy War (1682)—Bunyan had the time and 
opportunity to contemplate the merits and the limits of the genre as a spiritual guide for 
him, his dissenting flock, and his expanding readership. Without ever turning away from 
romance in his final fictional work, Bunyan directs his, and our, attention to the friction at 
various points of contact between romantic convention and Christian narrative time, 
exhibiting and encouraging critical self-consciousness about how elect community is 
constituted and how genre both enriches and constrains temporal perspective. 
In Part One of The Pilgrim’s Progress, Bunyan’s allegorical approach to time, 
space, and genre is relatively straightforward: Christian travels from the City of 
Destruction through the sins and dangers of life to the Celestial City. His heroic romance 
ends when he enters the City after crossing the River, an act that stands for the death of 
his mortal body. While the precise moment of the end of his quest cannot quite be 
defined—Christian is, “as it were in Heaven, before [he] came at it; being swallowed up” 
from the narrator’s limited perception “with the sight of Angels”—the conclusion of his 
narrative aligns fairly neatly with his temporal and spatial attainment of his generic 
                                                
320 John Bunyan, A Few Sighes from Hell (1653), in The Miscellaneous Works of John Bunyan, vol. 1, ed. 
T. L. Underwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 333. 
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goal.321  The less-studied Part Two, in which Christian’s wife, children, and other 
followers retrace his journey, complicates the questions of what constitutes spiritual 
romance and where its “end” lies. Both the rich potential and the difficulty in mapping 
Christian allegory onto the narrative structure of romance emerge through two major 
avenues: first, Bunyan’s transformation of his hero from an embattled individual to an 
imitative community; second, his focus on female characters, none of whom appear as 
pilgrims in Part One.322 While Christian’s romance was characterized by isolated paths 
and unknown perils, Part Two is populated by protagonists who pay a different sort of 
tribute to romance convention in their meta-consciousness of heroic antecedents, their 
deliberate pursuit of chivalric combat, and their concern with love, courtship, and the 
promise of reproduction. These conventional tropes contribute to Bunyan’s construction 
of his markedly unconventional pilgrim community. However, the pilgrims’ various 
goals, while all generic staples, are difficult to square with their claim to be “upon the 
same Errand” as Christian: once they too reach the Celestial City, the significance of 
their martial and marital pursuits must diminish (191). The communal, feminine, and 
familial concerns that are unique to Part Two, and that enrich Bunyan’s construction of 
elect fellowship, also “have curious consequences for the allegory,” in the words of 
Christopher Hill.323 In adding these new elements, Bunyan forces us to consider the 
temporal, spatial, and narrative discontinuities between earthly and apocalyptic romance. 
                                                
321 John Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress, ed. Roger Pooley (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 163. All 
future references to The Pilgrim’s Progress are from this edition and are cited parenthetically. 
322 Betty Schellenberg was the first Bunyan scholar to make the argument that the “hero” of Part Two is 
“the group,” rather than either Christiana or Great-heart. See “Sociability and the Sequel: Rewriting Hero 
and Journey in The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part II,” Studies in the Novel 23.3 (1991), 312-24, 319. 
323 Christopher Hill, A Tinker and a Poor Man: John Bunyan and His Church, 1628-1688 (New York: 
Knopf, 1989), 229. 
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In a sense, the romance genre itself is an allegory in The Pilgrim’s Progress, the symbol 
rather than the essence of sacred narrative form, possessed of the usual limitations that 
attend the relationship between the allegorical and the “real.” 
 
“Warm with desires”: Imitative Community and Non-Normative Love 
It has become commonplace to remark that Part Two of The Pilgrim’s Progress is 
far less suspenseful than Part One, more focused on companionship and conversation 
than on combat. In 1928, Ronald Knox mockingly observed that “Christian goes on a 
pilgrimage, Christiana on a walking tour”; more recent scholarship, although less 
disparaging, generally acknowledges that the quip is grounded in reality.324 There is 
something touristy, even groupie-like, about Christiana and her companions’ retracing of 
Christian’s journey: Christiana and Mercy ask to have the same bed that Christian slept in 
at House Beautiful, where they lie awake together talking of his adventures (224). Later, 
Great-heart takes them sightseeing on the battlefield where Christian fought Apollyon 
and points out its various attractions, the relics of Christian’s chivalric valor:  
This is the place; on this ground Christian stood, and up there came Apollyon 
against him. And look [...] here is some of your Husband’s blood upon these stones 
to this day: Behold also how here and there are yet to be seen upon the place, some 
of the Shivers of Apollyon’s Broken Darts [...] Verily Christian did here play the 
Man, and showed himself as stout as could, had he been there, even Hercules 
himself. When Apollyon was beat, he made his retreat to the next Valley, that is 
called The Valley of the shadow of Death, unto which we shall come anon. 
 Lo, yonder also stands a Monument on which is Engraven this Battle, 
and Christian’s Victory, to his Fame, throughout all Ages[.]  
(242) 
 
Instead of reliving the experience of fighting Apollyon firsthand, Christiana and her 
party—together with the readers of Part Two—are encouraged to experience the memory 
                                                
324 Ronald Knox, Essays in Satire (Dutton: London, 1928), 206. 
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of the battle as both terror and pleasure. This retracing of Christian’s path and the shared 
remembrance it engenders allow romance to continue to flourish as a unifying communal 
center despite (even because of) its explicit derivativeness. Moreover, as we will shortly 
see, the community that gradually forms around the memory of Christian’s romance 
fosters new, non-normative unions and modes of intimacy, even as it also retains its 
familiar properties of demarcating God’s elect and excluding the reprobate.  
As Christiana’s party gradually encounters other Pilgrims, the newcomers reveal 
that “Christian’s Name” is now “famous,” with word of his heroic pilgrimage “spread 
abroad far and near” (294). Michael Austin reminds us that Christian’s story has in fact 
“become a written text” avidly consumed by fictional fans of his sacred romance: Mr. 
Sagacity informs the dreaming narrator that “there are but few houses that have heard of 
him and his doings, but have sought after and got the Records of his Pilgrimage; yea, I 
think I may say, that that his hazardous Journey has got a many well-wishers to his ways” 
(178).325  In other words, the real text of Bunyan’s Part One has apparently entered the 
imagined or dreamed universe of Part Two, “just as most of the characters that Quixote 
and Sancho encounter in Don Quixote II have read Don Quixote.”326 But Christian gains 
more than readers and “well-wishers.” Valiant-for-truth articulates a recurring theme 
when he explains how he too came to set out on pilgrimage with his “Jerusalem Blade” at 
the ready (293): 
We had one Mr. Tell-true came in to our parts, and he told it about, what 
Christian had done, that went from the City of Destruction. Namely [...] how he 
                                                
325 Michael Austin, “The Figural Logic of the Sequel and the Unity of ‘The Pilgrim’s Progress,’” Studies in 
Philology 102.4 (2005), 484-509, 498. McKeon also notes this self-reflexivity, remarking that the subject 
of Part Two is mainly “the documentary objectivity” of Part One (313). 
326 Austin, 498. 
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had killed a Serpent that did come out to resist him in his Journey; and how he 
got through to whither he intended [...] In a word, that man so told the Story of 
Christian and his Travels, that my heart fell into a burning haste to be gone after 
him, nor could father or mother stay me. 
(293-4) 
 
Exposure to Christian’s chivalric romance moves certain readers to run off in imitative 
pursuit, and Christiana’s band therefore expands as new Pilgrims join her “walking tour” 
and pass much of their time simply “talking of Christian,” delighting and reassuring 
themselves with recollections of his famous exploits (281).  
This shared awareness of generic context has led many scholars to remark that 
Part Two is about not only the imitation of individual heroism, but also Christian 
community.327 Moreover, it is about community nurtured by storytelling: Bethany Bear 
argues that in both parts of The Pilgrim’s Progress, godly “fancy” or imagination can 
serve as a sign of election and as a force that “sustain[s] love among Christians,” and we 
may say the same for the Puritan romance that delights both Bunyan’s readers and his 
characters.328 The elect may glimpse their status in their enthusiasm for Christian and his 
heroic narrative, and even the many stories they habitually share of one another’s 
humbler “progresses” strengthen them with the reminder that both triumphs and trials are 
common to all pilgrims. As Christiana puts it, “This relation of Mr. Fearing has done me 
Good. I thought nobody had been like me, but I see there was some Semblance ’twixt this 
good man and I” (256). While much of Part One is concerned with the burdensome and 
                                                
327 Readings that focus prominently on Christian community in Part Two include John R. Knott, “Bunyan 
and the Holy Community,” Studies in Philology 8 (1983), 200-25; E. Beatrice Batson, John Bunyan: 
Allegory and Imagination (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 47-53; Schellenberg, “Sociability and the 
Sequel”; Kathleen Swaim, “The Church,” in Pilgrim’s Progress, Puritan Progress: Discourses and 
Contexts (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1993), 198-231; and Abram Steen, “‘Over this Jordan’: Dying and the 
Nonconformist Community in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress,” Modern Philology 110.1 (2012), 47-73. 
328 Bethany Joy Bear, “Fantastical Faith: John Bunyan and the Sanctification of Fancy,” Studies in 
Philology 109.5 (2012), 671-701, 671. 
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frightening isolation of the dissenting soul, Part Two (like Hutchinson’s Order and 
Disorder) relishes the relief of being “like” and with others—a comfort furnished by 
shared narrative norms and repetitions. Much as communal story enables the Pilgrims to 
recognize and reassure one another until they reach the safety of Beulah, which houses a 
composite “History of all the famous Acts” of Christians past for all to read (306), 
Bunyan’s prologue to Part One promises his readers that their election might be revealed 
to them by their regard for the book they hold and by their capacity to comprehend it:  
Wouldst read they self, and read thou knowest not what,  
And yet know whether thou art blest or not, 
By reading the same Lines? 
(9) 
 
The prologue to Part Two offers a similar assurance: “Things that seem to be hid in words 
obscure, / Do but the Godly mind the more allure” (173).329 The allegorical romance that 
Bunyan’s reading audience and his characters consume and strive to imitate contains 
symbolic meaning not only within its pages, but in its very being as a sacred communal 
text; a multi-plotted narrative about the journey of the elect comes to symbolize, in itself, 
elect fellowship. 
Some (most notably Roger Sharrock) have suggested that Part Two’s comforting 
communal focus renders it gentler, more inclusive, and less literally or ideologically 
combative than Part One; however, we must acknowledge that the text never relinquishes 
Protestant romance’s longstanding vehemence about the exclusivity of the elect.330 Even 
                                                
329 Of course, both promises contain an ominous corollary: if readers do not find themselves “allure[d]” by 
Bunyan’s allegorical romance, they evidently fall into the category of the “or not” rather than of the “blest.” 
330 See Roger Sharrock, John Bunyan: The Pilgrim’s Progress (London: Edwin Arnold, 1966); Rosemary 
Freeman, English Emblem Books (London: Chatto and Windus, 1948), 208; N. H. Keeble, “Christiana’s 
Key: The Unity of The Pilgrim’s Progress,” in Newey, 1-20, 2; David Seed, “Dialogue and Debate in The 
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when Christiana insists that “Surely, surely” her neighbors’ “Hearts would be affected” if 
they could perceive Christ’s redemptive sacrifice as she does, Great-heart cautions her 
that “To be affected with Christ and with what he has done is a thing special” (214). It is 
not a universal phenomenon “communicated to every one,” not even “to every one that 
did see your Jesus bleed”: some such witnesses “laughed” and “instead of becoming his 
Disciples, did harden their Hearts against him” (214). Bunyan has designed Part Two 
such that the same can be said about being moved by Christian and his narrative. 
Christiana’s unregenerate neighbors scoff at the “Fantastical [...] whimsical Fools” who 
would leave home in search of godly romance, and the narrator notes that “the baser sort, 
that could see no more than a Mole, nor understand any more than a Beast [...] had no 
reverence for these men, nor took they notice of their Valour or Adventures” (280). 
“Comfort” and zeal, as Great-heart explains, come not from “the sight and consideration” 
of heroism, but from “an indeared Affection begot in us by it,” a gift of interpretation and 
passionate enthusiasm not granted to “the baser sort” (214). Elsewhere, Great-heart 
represents such souls not merely as contemptuous of romance, but as excluded from 
narrative as a model for human life: “the fear of God is the beginning of Wisdom; and to 
be sure they that want the beginning, have neither middle, nor end” (256). Much as 
Milton’s fallen angels move “in wandering mazes lost” (PL 2.561), and as Hutchinson 
                                                                                                                                            
Pilgrim’s Progress,” in Newey, 85-90; James Grantham Turner, “Bunyan’s Sense of Place,” in Newey, 91-
110; and Stuart Sim, “‘Safe for Those for Whom it is to be Safe’: Salvation and Damnation in Bunyan’s 
Fiction,” in John Bunyan and His England, 1628-1688, ed. Anne Laurence, W. R. Owens, and Stuart Sim 
(London: Hambledon, 1990), 158. In opposition to most of his fellow contributors to Newey’s 1980 
volume, Brean Hammond argues that Part Two’s tone remains exclusive and combative (“The Pilgrim’s 
Progress: Satire and Social Comment,” 118-131). For a recent interpretation that objects to reading a “shift 
away from [Bunyan’s] combative and oppositional outlook” in Part Two, see Abram Steen. 
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likens the Worldly State to stagnant water (O&D 4.22-26), Bunyan understands 
reprobation as incapacity for teleological plot.331  
 By now, we will find nothing surprising in Bunyan’s reiteration of this norm of 
Protestant romance: as in Sidney, Spenser, Milton, and Hutchinson, the godly turn to the 
genre’s form to identify themselves as members of a present community or a historical 
continuum of elect heroes, categories from which the reprobate are always already cut 
off. Yet Bunyan and his characters do more than retread familiar territory, and the 
impulse of Sharrock and others that Part Two is more interested in Christian unity and 
intimacy than in exclusion can still lead us onto solid new ground. Beyond simply using 
romance to assign believers to the family of the godly, Bunyan relies on the genre’s 
conventions to think quite unconventionally about how that family might be composed 
and how it might locate itself within narrative time. Central to this reimagining are the 
women of Part Two, whose “affected” and affective “Hearts” grant them the “indeared 
Affection” that inspires elect heroism and offer Bunyan a conduit for channeling erotic 
and generative concerns into his dissenting romance. 
 Apart from a few contributions, neither eroticism nor women have fared well in 
Bunyan studies, even in recent years. Very few scholars have inquired closely into 
Bunyan’s oft-cited claim in Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners that God had “made 
[him] shie of women” and of heterosocial contact,332 or attempted to complicate the 
                                                
331 Part One’s Ignorance offers perhaps the most discussed and the most spectacular example: shunted 
directly to hell from a trapdoor at the very gates of the Celestial City, he was never on the progressive 
heroic journey he believed himself to be. 
332 John Bunyan, Grace Abounding, with Other Spiritual Autobiographies, ed. John Stachniewski and Anita 
Pacheco (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1998), 86. Cited hereafter as Grace Abounding. 
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consensus that he shunned real and fictional women for their inextricable sexuality.333 
While Kathleen Swaim has famously argued that Christiana and Mercy allow Bunyan to 
imagine a “feminine heroic” in Part Two,334 other feminist scholars such as Margaret 
Olofson Thickstun and Margaret Sönser Breen have seen the female protagonists’ need 
for male protection and instruction as evidence of their heroism’s hard limits.335 Readings 
persist such as Thomas Luxon’s, who finds that “Bunyan’s most persistent refrain” is that 
“the carnal things of this world,” which include wives, marriage, sexuality, and family, 
“are essentially worthless in the long run.”336 Unsurprisingly, Luxon has very little to say 
about The Pilgrim’s Progress’ problematic second part, with its multiple female pilgrims 
and the four marriages, hardly counted “worthless,” that are celebrated within its pages. 
Part Two is even more remarkable, however, in that its godly women do not seem to have 
been included for the primary end of entering into marriages with its male pilgrims, even 
though these marriages are encouraged.337 For one thing, Bunyan introduces marriage 
and reproduction into his sequel partly to interrogate erotic romance’s vexed (but not 
void) relationship to Christian temporality, as we will discuss hereafter. For another, Part 
Two’s women demonstrate that Bunyan’s elect community may be bound together most 
                                                
333 Margaret J. M. Ezell is a notable exception, though her reading seeks to show not that Bunyan approved 
of female sexuality, but that he “retained […] a very acute sense of the sexual politics of his time and place, 
especially the particular difficulties faced by male spiritual leaders and their female followers, and that this 
in turn informs the numerous examples he offers in his writings of women characters and relations between 
the sexes.” See “Bunyan’s Women, Women’s Bunyan” in Trauma and Transformation: The Political 
Progress of John Bunyan, ed. Vera J. Camden (Stanford, CA: Stanford U P, 2008), 63-80, 68. 
334 Kathleen Swaim, “Christiana’s Heroics,” in Pilgrim’s Progress, Puritan Progress, 160-197. 
335 See Margaret Olofson Thickstun, “From Christiana to Stand-fast: Subsuming the Feminine in The 
Pilgrim’s Progress,” SEL 26 (1986), 439-53; and Margaret Sönser Breen, “The Sexed Pilgrim’s Progress,” 
SEL 32.3 (1992), 443-60. 
336 Thomas Luxon, “One Soul Versus One Flesh: Friendship, Marriage, and the Puritan Self,” in Camden, 
Trauma and Transformation, 81-99, 87.  
337 Hill has remarked that Part Two “deals specifically with the salvation of women—single women or 
widows, not dependent on men” (230). 
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strongly not through traditional marriage, but through non-normative and sometimes 
transgressive forms of eroticism, intimacy, and affective piety. 
Bunyan’s female characters and their offspring imbue the romance of Part Two 
with an erotic charge that is absent in Part One, in which the vocabulary of sexuality 
inevitably signals a falling away from the divine rather than an approach toward it, as 
with Faithful’s temptation by Wanton.338 Notably, Bunyan (like numerous other male 
believers) embraces the hetero-eroticism of the Song of Songs and gives it homoerotic 
spiritual application when describing his personal salvation narrative in Grace 
Abounding.339 In The Pilgrim’s Progress, he relies upon Part Two’s women and young 
men to reflect this particular element of his own religious experience—though not 
generally through interactions with one another that suggest heterosexual desire or future 
marriage. At the house of Gaius, the Song of Songs itself furnishes the means by which 
the language of love is purified for the pilgrims’ consumption. When Christiana’s son 
Matthew asks whether they may lawfully eat the “very good tasted” dish of apples that 
their host has offered, since their “first Mother” succumbed to desire for the same fruit, 
Gaius answers in verse: 
Apples were they with which we were beguil’d, 
Yet Sin, not Apples hath our Souls defil’d. 
Apples forbid, if eat, corrupts the Blood. 
To eat such, when commanded, does us good. 
Drink of his Flagons then, thou, Church, his Dove, 
And eat his Apples, who art sick of Love. 
    (264) 
 
                                                
338 S. J. Newman has also made the rare claim that “Sex is no longer the danger of Part I but the erotic 
accessibility of a more temperate zone […] Fertility and procreation are now signs of grace” (“Bunyan’s 
Solidness,” in Newey, 239-40). 
339 Grace Abounding, 27-28. 
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The Song of Songs’ imagery of wooing and lovesickness, taken here (as usual) to be an 
allegory of Christ’s spiritual courtship of his Church, sanctions an erotic undercurrent to 
Bunyan’s own allegory at the same time that it permits Matthew to satisfy his bodily 
appetite with what God has sanctified. Even though Gaius’ house is also the site where 
Part Two’s marriages are performed, the Song of Songs’ eroticism here simply urges the 
little “Church” to enjoy the communal love-feast that has been prepared for them, 
bypassing or ignoring married heterosexual desire in favor of the community’s “lovesick” 
desire for Christ and for fellowship with one another.  
 We might be tempted to assume that Bunyan is displacing the sexual onto the 
gastronomic and communal due to his own supposed discomfort with women and sex. 
Other evidence, however, suggests that his investment lies not in non-erotic paths to 
Christian communion, but in non-normative ones that allow Part Two’s eroticism to 
focus on a loving community of women and men rather than on heterosexual union 
between one man and one woman. And women usually remain the origins of this 
intimacy and diffuse amorousness: most commonly, the erotic impulse felt by the male 
author of Grace Abounding is expressed by the female characters of The Pilgrim’s 
Progress. The group’s journey begins only because Christiana first becomes possessed 
with a longing to follow her husband to the Celestial City when a mysterious figure 
called Secret enters her house. After a godly greeting from this male “Stranger,” “she 
blushed and trembled, also her heart began to wax warm with desires to know from 
whence he came” (182). Christiana’s private sensual arousal in response to a man who is 
not and will not become her spouse (or, stepping outside the allegory, to an intimate 
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interior sensation that is deliberately gendered male) prompts her to gather her children 
and pursue her husband, not out of specific desire for either Christian or Secret, but out of 
more generalized yearning to “come into [God’s] presence” with Christian and “with 
Legions more, his Companions,” who “will all be glad” to welcome her into their 
fellowship (182).340  
In keeping with his casting both his characters and his audience as imitative 
readers of Christian’s romance, Bunyan’s prologue positions his young female readers 
similarly to Christiana in her private moment with Secret. “Young Ladies, and young 
Gentle-women too” share Christiana’s intimate, if not precisely sexual, physical and 
emotional response when they are visited by Bunyan’s Pilgrim (that is, when they read 
and interpret Part One): 
Their Cabinets, their Bosoms, and their Hearts, 
My Pilgrim has, ’cause he to them imparts 
His pretty riddles in such wholesome strains 
As yields them profit double to the pains   
Of reading.  
(172) 
 
These lines appear particularly transgressive when we consider that the reading of 
“pretty” romances or novels was commonly condemned for threatening the chastity of 
seventeenth-century women, as was zealous Puritanism; Bunyan himself was 
                                                
340 The forceful bodily grounding of Christiana’s “desires,” represented in Christiana as symptoms of 
arousal, is echoed later when Mercy, “being a young, and breeding woman,” feels pangs of craving for a 
magic mirror that always shows the image of Christ and symbolizes “the Word of God,” without which she 
“thinks she shall miscarry” (289). These moments in combination may remind us of the intense longing of 
Spenser’s Britomart, who becomes providentially “sick with love” after viewing an image of Artegall in a 
magic mirror—though as Charles Firth pointed out in the late nineteenth century, Bunyan might have 
encountered many comparable moments in the chapbook romances of his youth without “ever read[ing] a 
line of Spenser” (Sir Charles Harding Firth, ed., The Pilgrim’s Progress [London: Methuen, 1898], cited in 
Cynthia Wall, ed., The Pilgrim’s Progress [New York: Norton, 2009], 388-9). Thanks to the genre’s 
ubiquity, such intertwinings of sacred and profane love would have been abundant across Bunyan’s literary 
landscape. 
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tendentiously accused of sexually enticing female members of his flock.341 Yet much as 
he did with Christiana and Secret, Bunyan here celebrates the “wholesome” merits of 
women’s amorous receptivity, even outside of reproductive marriage. For although the 
Pilgrim possesses “their Bosoms, and their Hearts,” their attraction to him—whether “he” 
stands for Christian, the book, or Bunyan as its author—paves the way to their desire for 
Christ and endows them with membership in the pilgrim community of characters and 
fellow readers. Margaret Sönser Breen’s argument for women’s subordination throughout 
Part Two depends upon her reading of Bunyan’s female characters as inextricably 
“sexed,” unlike their male counterparts.342 While their feminine sexuality does render 
them, in Bunyan’s eyes, unfit for martial action and in danger of sexual predation, it also 
makes them singular vessels—and, more importantly, conduits—for godly erotic 
possibility. In these instances, Bunyan’s fellowship of dissenters is grounded in women’s 
private spaces, their secret thoughts, and even their bodies. 
Generally, though, Part Two’s new erotic charge is more likely to be couched in 
terms of affect rather than embodiment.343 Victoria Kahn has argued that affect is a major 
constituent in the postwar reconstruction of the royalists’ sense of romantic community; 
Bunyan shows that affective community, like romance itself, is not uniquely royalist 
territory.344 In Part Two, this emotional force emerges most strongly from the dual bond 
of Christian fellowship and female friendship between Christiana and Mercy. Their 
                                                
341 For a helpful discussion of this allegation and its repercussions for Bunyan, see Ezell. 
342 See “The Sexed Pilgrim’s Progress,” passim.  
343 Scholars have long remarked that Bunyan’s affective register becomes much more pronounced in Part 
Two: Charles W. Baird points out that “prominence is given to human emotions and sentiments” rather 
than to doctrine (John Bunyan: A Study in Narrative Technique [Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1977], 92), and Batson notes that “Emotions, desires, relationships, and joys receive strong emphasis” (53).  
344 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, esp. 223-251. 
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relationship, rather than that of any of the heterosexual couples, typifies the love that 
extends beyond the norms of marriage to permeate and bind Bunyan’s pilgrim 
community.345 Christiana follows the precedent of Secret by initially acting as a sort of 
matchmaker between Mercy and Mercy’s own erotic experience of redemption, “glad at 
heart, not only that she had a Companion, but also for that she had prevailed with this 
poor Maid to fall in love with her own Salvation” (188). Mercy’s love for Christ goes on 
to influence her mortal courtships: after rejecting a “sweet heart” of “some breeding, and 
that pretended to Religion; but a man that stuck very close to the World,” Mercy vows 
that her own godliness “shall be to [her] as a Husband,” but she eventually reconciles her 
zealous “Conditions” with worldly romance by becoming betrothed to Christiana’s son 
Matthew (209-10). Notably, though, the match between the young pair is made just after 
Gaius proclaims himself “glad to see” Mercy and Christiana “together here, a lovely 
Couple” (262). Gaius advises Christiana to make her and Mercy’s love official through 
marriage: “take Mercy into a nearer Relation to thee. If she will, let her be given to 
Matthew thy eldest son. ’Tis the way to preserve you a Posterity in the Earth” (262). 
While Matthew’s contribution is essential for “Posterity” and for a legally recognized 
“nearer Relation,” Christiana and Mercy themselves already make up a “lovely” and 
loving “Couple” whose tenderness to one another brings comfort and delight to their 
fellow pilgrims.  
Mercy and Christiana, having previously been extolled by the Interpreter as types 
of the inseparable Ruth and Naomi, thus complete their assumption of the biblical 
                                                
345 Sharrock notes more vaguely that the “touching and interesting” relationship between Christiana and 
Mercy contributes to the “considerable softening of the atmosphere” in Part Two (“Life and Story,” 63). 
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heroines’ relationship, becoming a daughter- and mother-in-law whose emotional and 
companionate devotion to one another also resembles a marriage in itself. At times, their 
multivalent bond appears as warm communal intimacy, as when they lie together in 
Christian’s erstwhile bed, talking of their dreams of the Celestial City. At others, it takes 
on the sublime cast of awe and dread in the face of one another’s beauty of holiness: 
when the women are bathed, made “fair as the Moon” (in another reference to the Song 
of Songs), and clothed as brides of Christ in “fine Linen, white and clean,”  
  they seemed to be a Terror one to the other; For that they could not see that glory  
  each one had in her self, which they could see in each other. Now therefore they 
  began to esteem each other better than themselves. For you are fairer than I am, said  
  one; and, You are more comely than I am, said another. 
          (209-10) 
 
Once again, Bunyan sees no disharmony between erotic love for Christ and ardent desire 
to stand in the presence of fellow believers. In a marginal gloss to a later moment when 
Christiana and Mercy are welcomed by their “Friends” as “Vessels of the Grace of God” 
and greeted “with a kiss,” Bunyan’s own avowed discomfort with haptic fellowship does 
not interfere: the gloss states approvingly that “Christians’ love is kindled at the sight of 
one another” (224). The two women’s relationship—a remarkable commingling of loving 
companionship, wonder and desire, and procreative marriage (with Matthew’s help as a 
necessary but oddly peripheral third party)—thus infuses the narrative of Part Two with 
romantic eroticism and reproductive continuity.  
 Alongside Christian’s inspirational heroism, Christiana and Mercy’s affective union 
generates and sustains Part Two’s community, first by extending it beyond the confines 
of Christian’s nuclear family and then by providing for the expanded family’s futurity. 
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Heterosexual marriage, homoerotic intimacy, and communal love cooperate to help 
Christian’s biological and spiritual descendants “spread abroad […] upon the face of the 
Earth” and “uphold” the romance of Part One as a living, proliferating narrative (262). 
We will recall that Christian’s story moved Valiant-for-truth to forsake his father and 
mother and join Christiana and Mercy’s growing band; his detachment from his parents 
recalls Jesus’ assurance in Matthew 19:29 that “every one that hath forsaken houses, or 
brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children […] for my name’s sake, 
shall receive an hundredfold.” Believers are promised not only countless brothers and 
sisters in Christ, but also a multiplicity of spiritual parents, children, and spouses.346 
Bunyan’s community therefore embraces godly intimacy, tinged with eroticism, as a 
divine gift that thrives outside of normative marriages and nuclear families: he represents 
it flourishing between unmarried men and women, between women themselves, and 
amongst women praying—even reading the right sort of romance—in the privacy of 
“their Cabinets, their Bosoms, and their Hearts.”  
 The common denominator that unites all these sites of desire and fellowship is, 
evidently, feminine presence. Bunyan may indeed have been personally “shie of women” 
and intimate contact, as he claims in Grace Abounding, but he declares in the same 
volume that his sincere conversion began when he discovered that his “heart would tarry” 
in the company of “three or four poor women” he encountered sitting together and 
                                                
346 Luxon discusses Bunyan’s use of this assurance in his sermons, but he seems to take a literal or 
biological view of these familial goods, which Christ technically can restore even though they mean 
nothing “in the long run” (87). In Part Two, however, Bunyan is deeply invested in the spiritual family that 
emerges when biological relation is acknowledged to be not meaningless, but markedly secondary. 
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“talking about the things of God […] as if they had found a new world.”347 Bunyan 
identifies a community of women whose greatest pleasure was to tell “how God had 
visited their souls with His love in the Lord Jesus” as his spiritual mothers; the intimacy 
and erotic devotion that he finds unsettling come enviably easily to them.348 In Part Two 
of The Pilgrim’s Progress, the Interpreter shows Christiana and Mercy a tableau 
Christian did not see, of a hen sheltering her chicks: he explains, “I choose, my Darlings, 
to lead you into the Room where such things are, because you are women, and they are 
easy for you” (203). The hen signifies not simply biological maternity, as we might 
expect, but the “Methods” by which God gathers and sustains “his People” (203): Bunyan 
seems to regard not just motherhood, but also love, desire, and erotic romance, as 
comparatively “easy” for female believers, and as the means by which they generate and 
nourish the expansively nontraditional family of the elect. 
 
Romance and/as Allegory: Christian’s Imitators in Time and Space 
The conventions of romance, including reproductive love and imitative chivalry, are 
instrumental in constructing Bunyan’s unconventional community. However, along with 
romance’s power to produce fellowship in Part Two comes a challenging meta-consciousness 
of genre and unstable temporality. The concerns of both the female characters and their 
martial male companions cause narrative time to take on a different, much less 
straightforward cast in Part Two than in Part One. The women’s investment in love and 
family, so central to Bunyan’s reimagined community, also forces discontinuities between 
                                                
347 Grace Abounding, 14-15. 
348 Ibid., 14. 
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romance and spiritual allegory. In lieu of Christian’s journey of spiritual days, Christiana’s 
travels through equidistant allegorical space require real years as her children grow up, 
marry, and have offspring of their own. However, the rate at which time passes in Part Two is 
virtually impossible to determine: for instance, the narrator tells us that after James’ marriage 
to Gaius’ daughter Phebe, “they yet stayed about ten days at Gaius’ House, spending their 
time, and the Seasons, like as Pilgrims use to do” (271). In order for Christiana’s sons to 
mature and reproduce, “ten days” must indeed stand for some number of “Seasons,” but 
Bunyan offers us no formula for performing this calculation.349 Elsewhere, we are simply 
told that Part Two’s various marriages unfold “in process of time”: Mercy and Matthew 
marry after the Pilgrims have stayed at Gaius’ house for “more than a Month” (265), James 
and Phebe also wed at “about this time” (271), and Christiana’s two youngest sons take 
wives after resting at the house of Mnason for an ambiguous “great while” (278).   
Bunyan’s descriptions of the children and the illustrator’s woodcuts (added to the 
1687 edition) only further complicate matters. When Christiana and her family depart the 
City of Destruction, the narrator describes her sons as “little Children” or “Babes” (181-
2); later, when Matthew first begins to “blush” at making Mercy smile, he is still 
identified as a “little boy” (219).350 Even in Gaius’ house, where Christiana’s sons 
become eligible for marriage, they remain “Boys” to whom Gaius serves “a Dish of Milk 
well crumbed [...] that they may grow thereby” (263). Meanwhile, the illustrations depict 
their rapid growth. As they begin their pilgrimage in the first, Matthew’s head reaches the 
                                                
349 Batson, among others, represents the temporality of Part Two as “relaxed,” “without haste,” and lacking 
in “urgency,” but does not note its allegorical inconsistency with Part One (48-9). Hill notices that time in 
Part Two seems “elusive” since “Christiana’s children grow up from infancy to marriageable age” (223).  
350 For other reference to the uneven ages (and aging) of Mercy and Christiana’s sons, see Lynn Veach 
Sadler, John Bunyan (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), 103; and Breen, 449-50. 
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waist of Mercy, his future wife (Fig. 2). Next, when Great-heart is leading the band to 
House Beautiful some days or weeks later, the children stand about a head shorter than 
the women, and the illustrator may offer some clue to their sudden growth in the remark 
below the image: “See here too how the Child doth play ye man / And weak grow strong, 
when Great heart leads the van” (Fig. 3). And in the final woodcut, in which the Pilgrims 
circle the head of Giant Despair, there is no discernible difference amongst their height or 
ages (Fig. 4). The illustrator’s images, while consistent with the narrator’s account of the 
boys’ maturation into husbands and fathers and with Great-heart’s observation that they 
are learning to conduct themselves spiritually “like [men]” (245), offer a striking visual 
example of the strange temporality of Part Two’s romance.351 Through them, we witness 
“real” time passing at a rapid rate that has tacitly slipped out of alignment with the 
temporal and spatial limits of Part One’s spiritual allegory.    
Further, as Luxon has emphasized, the conventional goals of feminine or family 
romance—love and marriage, procreation and inheritance—are concepts eliminated in 
Heaven or at the end of time, even though characters such as Gaius hold them essential 
for the furtherance of the worldly church and thus to a larger sacred plot. Christian 
completes his romance when he enters the Celestial City and is “swallowed up” from the 
narrator’s and our sight, but this sense of an ending is withheld from the generation that 
follows him. Although the narrator allows us to witness Christiana and several of her 
companions’ passage over the River, he leaves her children’s narrative open: 
                                                
351 While it troubles the linear narrative of The Pilgrim’s Progress, the boys’ amorphous and rapidly 
shifting age may speak to Bunyan’s concept of Christian wisdom; he noted that his Book for Boys and Girls 
was designed not only with real children in mind, but also “spiritual children” in need of child-like tools to 
draw them into Puritan theology. Breen makes a similar point in “The Sexed Pilgrim’s Progress” (450).  
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As for Christiana’s children, the four Boys that Christiana brought with her, with 
their Wives and Children, I did not stay where I was, till they were gone over. 
Also, since I came away, I heard one say, that they were yet alive, and so would 
be for the Increase of the Church, in that Place where they were for a time. 
(313-314) 
 
Mercy’s story, then, concludes not in the Celestial City that figures in her dreams, but 
breaks off when she, Matthew, and their siblings begin their quest to continue Christian’s 
elect line. As Gaius insists, her mission will ensure “that the Name of their Father, and 
the House of his Progenitors, may never be forgotten in the World” (262). But even as 
this concern with the communal memory and the repetition of Christian’s heroic exploits 
reinforces our impression that we are reading the next generation (both biological and 
spiritual) of his family romance, we must observe that the next generation’s “bear[ing] up 
their Father’s name” and “tread[ing] in their Father’s steps” are not—indeed, must not 
be—coterminous with “com[ing] to their Father’s end” (262). The young families’ 
ostensible destination, still quite deliberately unreached when the narrator leaves them in 
Beulah “yet alive [...] for the Increase of the Church,” would signal both the desired end 
and the erasure of their story, since erotic love, reproduction, and intergenerational 
inheritance are staples of romantic temporality that are rendered meaningless in 
eschatological time.  
Gaius’ attempt to clarify the matter using Old Testament typology only draws 
further attention to its difficulty. Offering “to take away [women’s] Reproach” and affirm 
their heroic potential, he reminds the pilgrims that “this Sex, in the old Testament, 
coveted Children, if happily this or that Woman might be the Mother of the Saviour of 
the World” and that “Women therefore are highly favoured, and show [...] that they are 
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sharers with us in the Grace of Life” (262-3). However, his lesson evokes the paradox of 
reproductive temporality that we observed in Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder, as 
does Christiana’s prophecy to her daughters-in-law that “they have been Faithful, and a 
fulfilling of the Promise upon them, will be their end” (307-8). The maternal mission that 
Part Two’s elect women share cannot be the same share as the Old Testament heroines’ 
hope that their child might be the Messiah, yet the “Promise” of reproduction still 
somehow applies to Christiana’s descendants and lends legitimate godly purpose to the 
marriages of Mercy and the other young women.  
The prologue’s introduction of Christian’s family succinctly encapsulates, in a 
half-rhyme, the troubled compatibility of romantic and sacred time: “let them know that 
these related were / Unto him: yea, his wife and children are” (169, emphasis mine). That 
the travelers are Christian’s family is information essential to our sense that the next 
generation is continuing his quest—but the sacred end of that quest relegates that once-
crucial relation to a profane past. Marriage, that event that concludes so many romances 
while gesturing toward their potential for continuation, must therefore play a more 
circumscribed role for Bunyan. This problem would seem consistent with Luxon’s 
argument that marriage is aggressively devalued throughout his works, but the truth 
seems more complicated, and consciously so on Bunyan’s part. Christiana grieves that 
she has “lost her husband” and that “the loving bond of that Relation was utterly broken 
betwixt them”; still, she continues to rely on “husband” and “wife” throughout Part Two 
as titles that best explain their former (and future?) connection (180). Also indicative of 
the problem is the fact that Christiana regularly varies in her description of Christian as 
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either “gone over the River” (180), “gotten above” (191), or simply “dead” (223). When 
we interpret The Pilgrim’s Progress in its guise as a romance, we think of Christian as 
having traveled from one point in space to another; when we read it as a Calvinist 
allegory, we easily grasp that he has moved through time from life into death and through 
spiritual states from sin to salvation. Christiana intuits all of these possibilities at once, as 
though she were situated simultaneously within the allegory and outside of it, both 
character and reader.  
Although we might take her vacillation as straightforward evidence of the 
disintegration of romance in Part Two as an adequate model of Christian’s trajectory, or 
of her own position as “a Widow Woman” (223), we must also recognize that Christiana 
finds herself strengthened by the reintegration of romance into her understanding of her 
personal and family narrative: 
My Sons, I have, as you may perceive, been of late under much exercise in my 
Soul about the Death of your Father; not for that I doubt at all of his Happiness: 
For I am satisfied now that he is well [...] Come, my Children, let us pack up, and 
be gone to the Gate that leads to the Celestial Country, that we may see your 
Father, and be with him.  
(183) 
 
Upon acknowledging to herself and to her children that their husband and father is dead, 
she adds that they may nevertheless “pack up” and go on a journey to “be with him” in 
another “Country”; immediately after admitting the tragedy of their situation and 
exposing the limits of romance, she reaffirms its purpose. Christian’s “Relation” to her as 
her husband has indeed been “broken” by his death and by his entrance into heaven, 
where the only marriage is that of Christ to his communal Church, and yet Christiana’s 
new conviction that their “loving bond” may be repaired and restored inspires her 
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instantly to re-present her narrative through the genre that enacts the reunion of lovers 
and families. Bunyan’s rhyme in the prologue likewise stresses the endurance of marriage 
rather than its decline: in reading time, Christiana and the children “are” Christian’s 
family after they “were,” not only before. Marriage is sharply devalued, then suddenly re-
valued as a symbol of spiritual fulfillment and as a representation of the multivalent love 
that joins worldly Christians to their heavenly counterparts and to each other, a sign that 
remains persistently useful even as it is not precisely correct. 
 Feminine concerns are not the only source of Bunyan’s generic riddles. A number 
of readers have found that the highly imitative or derivative nature of Part Two’s 
adventures lowers the stakes or the interest of the romance.352 Christopher Hill, following 
Knox, jokes that “Great-heart and his shooting parties just finish off work which 
Christian had so well begun.”353 The pilgrims largely do avoid falling into Christian’s 
past perils, since “they continually gave so good heed to the Advice of [Great-heart]; and 
he did so faithfully tell them of Dangers” with the aid of his ever-present “Book or Map” 
(299). The question of whether the pilgrims’ plot has any “stakes” that can be raised or 
lowered demands a consideration of Stanley Fish’s characteristic but important argument 
that both parts of The Pilgrim’s Progress lack the narrative uncertainty necessary for 
such stakes really to exist.354 Because Bunyan’s characters are predestined as either “blest 
or not,” Fish argues, the saved are already saved and the damned are already damned; 
                                                
352 Batson’s note that “Part Two lacks the dangers, and perhaps the adventures of Part One” is typical (48).  
353 Hill, 229. 
354 Stanley Fish, “Progress in The Pilgrim’s Progress,” in Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of 
Seventeenth-Century Literature (Berkeley: U of California P, 1972), 229-38. Richard Dutton, too, discusses 
the problem of progress in the context of Calvinist double predestination in “‘Interesting, but tough’: 
Reading The Pilgrim’s Progress,” SEL 18 (1978), 439-456. 
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narrative “progress” is therefore as much the delusion of the elect as it is of the reprobate, 
a bait-and-switch Bunyan has designed first to entrap his readers and then to remind them 
of their fallen minds and literary sensibilities. The characters’ (and our) shared familiarity 
with romance’s structure stands in the way of a pure understanding of anti-progressive 
sacred time.355 We have already seen that Bunyan was, as Fish asserts, aware of the 
disjunctions between his romance and his allegory. But as we conclude this section, a 
closer look at a few of Part Two’s most imitative or derivative moments should show that 
Bunyan saw worldly genre as a “Map” with important applications and important 
limits—not as a trap, a sin, or an unmitigated error to discard.   
Great-heart’s “Book or Map”— which Bunyan glosses as “God’s Book” but 
which also strongly suggests Part One itself, the source of the characters’ and readers’ 
communal knowledge—is judged by the dreaming narrator to be a gift of grace rather 
than an easy way out: “Then thought I with my self, who, that goeth on Pilgrimage, but 
would have one of these Maps about him, that he may look when he is at a stand, which 
is the way he must take?” (300). Familiarity with the form of the text is thus not, as Fish 
would have it, a stumbling-block, but a trustworthy and divinely-provided guide. 
Nevertheless, C. N. Manlove has suggested that as a result of the pilgrims’ textual 
foreknowledge, their few dangerous exploits are often “not a part of the pilgrimage at all, 
but are done almost as hobbies.”356 Indeed, Christian is a hero whom adventures befall, 
such as his assault by Apollyon and his captivity by Giant Despair, whereas in Part Two, 
                                                
355 For a historicist reading that discusses the concept of non-linear “progress” in the Early Modern period 
to challenge Fish’s “modern sense” of the word, see Hill, 221-3. Philip Edwards has also argued against 
Fish’s reduction of the word’s meaning (“The Journey in The Pilgrim’s Progress,” in Newey, 111-117). 
356 C. N. Manlove, “The Image of the Journey in ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’: Narrative versus Allegory,” The 
Journal of Narrative Technique 10.1 (1980), 16-38, 24. 
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the community of reader-heroes and –heroines, seeking to imitate the now-famous 
Christian, both retell his trials in lieu of experiencing similar ones and increasingly go in 
search of adventures of their own. Yet this self-conscious approach to chivalric adventure 
as diversionary is really nothing new in the romance genre: like Quixote, the Pilgrims 
seek out adventure in order to emulate the protagonists they already admire. At the same 
time, this conventional practice also points explicitly to the genre’s norms and makes its 
seams visible. For instance, at Vanity-Fair, the site of Christian’s imprisonment and his 
companion Faithful’s martyrdom, the Pilgrims re-recount this “hard Chapter” of Part 
One to one another; where Christian and Faithful shared a bond of mutual suffering, their 
followers share a bond of mutual familiarity with and zeal for that suffering (273). 
Meanwhile, instead of being subjected to torment there, they seek out godly combat: the 
male Pilgrims “[enter] into a Covenant to go and engage” a deadly monster “like a 
Dragon” who menaces the town, and “with their Weapons go forth to meet” the Beast of 
Revelation (279).357 The Beast is easily wounded and routed, though not killed; like 
many of Spenser’s battles, such as Redcrosse’s voluntary pursuit of Error, the men’s 
elective chivalric conflict concludes in an immediate victory while explicitly deferring an 
eschatological one. Here, Part Two’s self-awareness of genre and of temporality again 
brush against each other: while Christian’s unsought duel with Apollyon stood for his 
psychological struggle against Satan—successful in one moment but potentially 
renewable in any other—the allegory of the Pilgrims’ combat in time with the Beast of 
                                                
357 See also the earlier episode with the Giant Slay-good: “Well, said Gaius, Now you are here, and since, 
as I know, Mr. Great-heart is good at his Weapons, if you please [...] we will walk into the Fields, to see if 
we can do any good. About a mile from hence there is one Slay-good, a Giant, that doth much annoy the 
King’s Highway in these parts [...] ’twould be well if we could clear these Parts of him” (267-8). 
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the End Times is much less tidy, simultaneously evocative of the warfaring Church’s 
communal power and of its limited temporal agency. 
This generic and temporal self-consciousness takes on further complexity at the 
site of Christian’s abduction by Despair. His reader-followers naturally recognize the 
fabled place and “[consult]” together “what was best to be done”:358 the men soon 
“[leave] the women in the road,” slay the Giant, and demolish Doubting Castle (282). 
This “Exploit” ended, Great-heart builds “A Monument of Deliverance” in a space “right 
over against the Pillar that Christian erected for a Caution to Pilgrims that came after, to 
take heed of entering into his Grounds,” reminding us again of the link to the parallel 
episode in Part One with both the monument’s location and its four-line inscription: 
This is the Head of him, Whose Name only 
In former times, did Pilgrims terrify. 
His Castle’s down, and Diffidence his Wife 
Brave Master Great-heart has bereft of Life.  
(286) 
 
Bunyan’s text alone demands that we ask: have Despair and Doubt been put down only in 
their forms as generic tropes—a giant and his lair—by the next generation of a family 
romance, or have “Pilgrims that [come] after” been delivered from the sins themselves 
for all time, a finality withheld from the battle with the Beast? Roger Pooley, likewise 
asking whether such “permanence” is “credible,” points to this episode as a prime 
example of how the 1687 woodcuts “significantly [affect] our interpretation of [...] the 
text.”359 Beneath the picture of the community of pilgrims playing music and dancing 
around Despair’s severed head, the illustrator has added his own alternative quatrain, a 
                                                
358 Schellenberg emphasizes this “group consultation” in her discussion of Part Two’s theme of sociability 
(320). 
359 Pooley, xlvi. 
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Spenserian note of caution which stands in striking juxtaposition to the verse composed 
by Great-heart (Fig. 4): 
  Tho doubting Castle be demolished, 
  And the Gyant dispair hath lost his head 
  Sin can rebuild the Castle, make’t remaine; 
  And make despair the Gyant live againe[.]   
(285)  
 
As Pooley notes, “The pastoral theology is quite different; together the incident and its  
illustration capture the mixture of the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ that is Bunyan’s sense of 
the victory of Christ.”360 This “already/not yet” paradox, of course, is essentially the same 
as the mystery of reproduction whereby elect women continue to anticipate the “Promise” 
of the Messiah many centuries after Jesus’ birth. 
While the illustrator’s etching undoubtedly reinforces the allegorical ambiguity of 
the pilgrims’ triumph at Doubting Castle, Bunyan himself seems to be drawing his 
readers up to the very edge of his allegory, “right over against” the space where Great-
heart’s success overlays Christian’s struggle, much as the Pilgrims in the woodcut press 
close to the pole of the monument, their awed expressions suggesting simultaneous 
celebration and apprehension. As often happens, the line blurs between the real 
community of reading believers and the fictional community of questing Pilgrims, who 
are themselves readers of Christian’s story and his note about the dangers of Despair. 
Each is called upon to experience, in one place and at one moment, both fear and 
deliverance, both romance and reality. It is probably no coincidence that the narrator also 
breaks in at just this moment to remind us that all these events are what he “saw in [his] 
                                                
360 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
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Dream,” an interruption he makes with greater frequency in Part Two than Part One 
(284). The dream of romance may allow the godly to unite in envisioning the defeat of 
sin, but as a dream, it also acknowledges itself as imitative—or symbolic—rather than 
real, a narrative of this world rather than the next. The worldly literary form that Fish 
takes to be a dangerous delusion, Bunyan exposes as the sleeping believer’s illusion, 
which is also an imperfect allusion to divine truth.  
Betty Schellenberg has observed that Part Two’s repetitive imitations and its 
communal and familial focus “[imply] a potentially unlimited multiplication of equally 
significant and narration-worthy pilgrimages,”361 Such unfettered narrative potential is 
entirely endemic to the romance genre, but in the form that Patricia Parker has called 
“inescapable,” endlessly dilating and indefinitely repeating.362 Bunyan certainly suggests 
that a final end to the romance exists, both for individuals like Christian and for the 
apocalyptic Church, but the central concerns of Part Two partly undermine romance as an 
adequate model of that narrative in its fullest, most “real” form. Given Bunyan’s 
extensive efforts to redeem romance and render it compatible with a Puritan salvation 
narrative, I do not think that he changes his mind in Part Two about the genre’s efficacy 
as a Christian didactic model. Far from it: the sequel stresses romance’s power to 
reconstruct the community of the elect and to map out a common teleological path. But at 
the same time, the second part of The Pilgrim’s Progress reminds its own readers of the 
limits of that progressive model and alerts us to the porous margins of the “Book or Map” 
of romance. The genre itself becomes an allegory of itself, in the way that Bunyan likes 
                                                
361 Schellenberg, 319. 
362 See Parker, Inescapable Romance. 
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best: like the old pilgrim who protests that his name is not “Honesty” but simply 
“Honest,” the romance of Part Two succeeds “not in the abstract” but in a form that 
exposes its mundane, human parameters (249). The worldly boundaries of this communal 
generic tradition are what allow Stand-fast, crossing the River, to separate the stories he 
has heard and imitated from the truth he is about to see and live fully: “I have formerly 
lived by Hearsay, and Faith, but now I go where I shall live by sight” (313). 
Stand-fast makes an important distinction: reading the Christian life as romance has 
given him an impression of the Celestial City necessary to maintain his “Faith,” but it has 
never given him “sight.” His acknowledgment points us to a final moment that highlights the 
extent to which Bunyan has reimagined the model of Protestant romance that he inherited 
indirectly from Spenser a century before. Near the end of Part One, Christian and Hopeful, 
like Redcrosse, are offered a temporary vision of their heavenly goal when the Shepherds of 
the Delectable Mountains invite them to look through their “Perspective-Glass”: 
The pilgrims lovingly accepted the motion: so they had them to the top of an high 
Hill, called Clear, and gave them their glass to look. 
Then they tried to look; but the remembrance of that last thing that the 
Shepherds had shown them [the By-way to Hell] made their hands shake, by means 
of which impediment they could not look steadily through the glass; yet they 
thought they saw something like the Gate, and also some of the Glory of the place. 
       (126-7) 
 
As is the case with a number of Bunyan’s allegorical persons and places, the hill Clear is 
named with apparently intentional imprecision, for Christian—unlike Redcrosse—cannot 
clearly see the holy city in the distance; he only “[thinks]” he might see “something like” 
it. To a fallen spectator, an elevated vision of the end of romance can never be 
permanent, but Christian’s is the faintest and most fleeting of all those that we have 
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encountered in this book. Bunyan’s symbolic narrative might capture “some of the 
Glory” of what it stands for, but it cannot show it, not even to its own characters. It is also 
noteworthy that Christiana and Mercy do not imitate this particular experience: although 
they encounter the Shepherds, no mention is made of the Perspective-Glass. In its place, 
the Shepherds comfort Mercy—who is suffering the pains of pregnancy—with a 
“Looking glass” with the power to reveal the image of Christ, “the Prince of Pilgrims” 
(289). When we recall that Spenser’s Britomart had, in place of Redcrosse’s narrative 
prospect, the troubled promise of future offspring and a glimpse of her beloved in a 
magic mirror, Bunyan may appear to be reiterating gendered norms for romantic vision, 
and to some extent these old archetypes are undeniably present. Yet Christian is arguably 
shown much less than Mercy, and the pilgrims of Part Two are not offered Christian’s 
vision not because they are weaker than he was, but because they are stronger: the “Book 
or Map” they hold in their hands and hearts has supplanted the hazy view from the 
summit. In The Pilgrim’s Progress’ self-conscious second part, the women and men of 
the elect community have distinct gendered attributes, but one common narrative vision 
as readers and imitators. Rather than requiring prophetic proof that their romance is real, 
they possess a shared earthly text that stands for, and reminds them of the superior reality 
of, its unreadable heavenly counterpart.  
 
II. Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko: Genre, Community, and Disenfranchisement 
Like Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, and unlike many of the earlier seventeenth-century 
works we have considered, Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko is not a text whose relationship to 
romance needs to be excavated from beneath its author’s protestations. One of the few 
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elements of Oroonoko about which there is abundant critical consensus is its foundation in 
heroic romance. Readers even slightly versed in the tradition of Sidney’s Arcadia—whether in 
1688 or today—can hardly miss Behn’s thoroughly idealized, and entirely typical, description 
of Oroonoko’s possession of physical beauty “the most exact that can be fancy’d,” alongside 
“real greatness of soul, [...] refined notions of true honor, [...] absolute generosity, and [...] 
softness that was capable of the highest passions of love and gallantry.”363 His love story with 
Imoinda, “the beautiful black Venus to our young Mars,” is equally familiar (14). The two 
young people, alike in nobility, beauty, and virtue, are instantly and inevitably attracted to 
each other but face obstacles to their union—in this case, Oroonoko’s grandfather the king, 
who also desires Imoinda—before their separation from one another, their travel to a distant 
land, and their unlikely (yet again generically inevitable) reunion.364 At this point, however, 
the plot of their romance veers off into some other mode or genre: again like Bunyan—
otherwise her political, religious, and cultural antithesis—Behn makes her work’s romantic 
heritage obvious in order to interrogate the genre’s artifices and applications. Unable to bear 
his nominal slavery in Surinam or to be consoled by sightseeing adventures around the island, 
Oroonoko leads a slave revolt that ends with his murder of his willing wife and his own torture 
and death at the hands of the colonial government. The romance’s collapse has also been 
widely noted: Anita Pacheco identifies the force that “intrudes into the world of heroic 
                                                
363 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko, ed. Joanna Lipking (New York: Norton, 1997), 12-13. Future references to this 
text will be cited parenthetically by page number.  
364 The first scholar to discuss Oroonoko as a romance at length is the still oft-cited Laura Brown: see “The 
Romance of Empire: Oroonoko and the Trade in Slaves,” in The New Eighteenth Century, ed. Laura Brown 
and Felicity Nussbaum (London: Methuen, 1987), 41-61. For a discussion of the literary conventions that 
constitute Oroonoko’s identity as a heroic aristocrat, see David Hoegberg, “Caesar’s Toils: Allusion and 
Rebellion in Oroonoko” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 7.3 (1995), 239-258. 
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romance” as realism,365 Richard Kroll argues that Oroonoko comments on “the generic 
difference between true history and romance,”366 Rachel Carnell and Albert Rivero note that 
the new narrative bears “the recognizable outlines” of tragedy,367 and William Spengemann 
suggests that Behn’s romance gives way to “a new way of writing fiction” whose narrative 
norms remained to be determined but which “we now associate with the novel.”368 A sense 
also prevails that this generic shift can be identified with the geographic shift between the “old 
world” and the “new”; Kroll, for one, proposes that the events in Oroonoko’s homeland of 
Coramantien “represent a site where romantic kingship is displayed and anatomized, while the 
events in Surinam represent a site where romantic kingship is tested.”369 
If critics concur that Oroonoko deliberately problematizes genre, nearly every other 
aspect of Behn’s narrative is contentious. Laura Brown has pioneered many readings of 
Oroonoko that question not simply its ideology but its ideological coherence: is it possible 
to determine whether Oroonoko critiques or condones slavery, whether it advocates 
cultural radicalism or conservatism, or whether it outlines a consistently royalist 
platform? 370  This final section is chiefly concerned with the relationship between 
                                                
365 Anita Pacheco, “Royalism and Honor in Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko,” SEL 34 (1994), 491-506, 503. 
366 Richard Kroll, “‘Tales of Love and Gallantry’: The Politics of Oroonoko,” Huntington Library 
Quarterly 67.4 (2004), 573-605, 602. According to Kroll, Behn laments “the fact that the public authority 
of history” (as opposed to the genre of romance) “is less readily available to women than to men” (602).  
367 Rachel Carnell, “Subverting Tragic Conventions: Aphra Behn’s Turn to the Novel,” Studies in the Novel 
31.2 (1999); and Albert Rivero, “Aphra Behn’s ‘Oroonoko’ and the ‘Blank Spaces’ of Colonial Fictions,” 
SEL 39.3 (1999), 443-462. Carnell describes Oroonoko’s tragic mode specifically as Restoration tragedy, 
and Rivero as revenge tragedy.  
368 William Spengemann, “The Earliest American Novel: Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko,” Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction 38. 4 (1984), 384-414, 409. 
369 Kroll, 582. Spengemann is also particularly insistent that there is something uniquely American about 
Behn’s new discourse and its incompatibility with old-world romance. 
370 In “The Romance of Empire,” Brown argues that “the treatment of slavery in Oroonoko is neither 
coherent nor fully critical” and suggests that the text may also reveal Behn’s ambivalence toward her 
royalism (55). Many readers concur with Brown that Oroonoko condemns slavery insofar as it has 
demeaned Oroonoko’s social class and his spiritual nobility, but not as an inherent evil, and that in this 
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Oroonoko’s troubled genre and this final inquiry about its political agenda, though the first 
two questions are imbricated within the last. A number of readers of Oroonoko have made 
two fundamental assessments of its political ideology: first, that the narrative (like its 
author) is essentially royalist in its representation of a virtuous prince who is degraded and 
brutalized by figures representing, and partly consisting of, republican Whigs;371 but 
second, that its royalism is not entirely consistent or uncomplicated. Brown has argued that 
Oroonoko’s predominant royalism is beset by contradictions; both she and Sara Mendelson 
suggest that Behn may have had sympathy for antiroyalist political philosophy, perhaps as 
a result of her relationship with the republican William Scot during her stay in Surinam.372 
Pacheco posits that the text is “distinctly royalist” but that “its effort at ideological closure 
is undermined [...] by its reliance on the unstable discourse of [aristocratic] honor.”373 More 
recently, Warren Chernaik has departed from the trend of beginning with an assumption of 
Behn’s royalism, pointing out that Oroonoko’s speeches on liberty and tyranny echo 
seventeenth-century republican rhetoric, and Vernon Guy Dickson has argued that Behn’s 
                                                                                                                                            
respect it is socially conservative: see also George Guffey, “Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko: Occasion and 
Accomplishment,” in George Guffey and Andrew Wright, Two English Novelists: Aphra Behn and 
Anthony Trollope (Los Angeles: U of California P, 1975), 1-41; G. A. Starr, “Aphra Behn and the 
Genealogy of the Man of Feeling,” Modern Philology 87.4 (1990), 362-72; Margaret Ferguson, "Juggling 
the Categories of Race, Class, and Gender: Aphra Behn's Oroonoko," in Margo Hendricks and Patricia 
Parker (eds)., Women, “Race,” and Writing in the Early Modern Period (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 209-24; Susan Iwansisziw, “Behn’s Novel Investment in ‘Oroonoko’: Kingship, Slavery 
and Tobacco in English Colonialism,” South Atlantic Review 63.2 (1998), 75-98; and Vernon Guy Dickson, 
“Truth, Wonder, and Exemplarity in Aphra Behn’s ‘Oroonoko,’” SEL 47.3 (2007), 573-94. 
371 Guffey popularized the reading of Oroonoko as an allegorical stand-in for a royal Stuart, in his case the 
soon-to-be-deposed James II. Numerous scholars have followed him, including Maureen Duffy, who 
identifies Oroonoko as the Duke of York (Oroonoko and Other Stories [London: Methuen, 1986]), and 
Brown, who reads him in “The Romance of Empire” as a figure for another royal martyr, Charles I (57-9). 
Many other critics interpret Oroonoko to be a composite of these and other Stuarts, and/or a representative 
of absolute monarchy more generally.  
372 See Brown, 55-6; and Sara Heller Mendelson, The Mental World of Stuart Women: Three Studies 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987), 120.  
373 Pacheco, 491-2. 
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hero recalls the individualistic honor of Philip Sidney’s Elizabethan humanism in a manner 
not comfortably compatible with hardline pro-Stuart absolutism (a dichotomy that we also 
observed in Greville’s Life of Sidney in chapter two).374 
What, then, might Oroonoko’s inconsistent politics have to do with its inconsistent 
genre? It has become commonplace to hear an elegiac tone in the failure of the narrative’s 
initial romantic norms to produce a happy ending for Oroonoko and Imoinda. Many have 
read the lovers’ grim deaths as a lament for the impending fall of the Stuart dynasty and, 
with it, the mystical splendor of absolute monarchism. In this light, Oroonoko’s unromantic 
demise “mark[s] the tragic fall of kings in an enterprise beset by self-serving privateers, 
interlopers and colonial miscreants.”375 A smaller number of readers have found that what 
Oroonoko grieves for is not precisely, or not only, royalism: for Spengemann, it is the 
collapse of the “Old-World dream” of colonial utopia; for Rivero, the passing of Behn’s 
own youth and innocence; and for Chernaik, the ineradicability of despotism and 
slavery.376 Dickson argues that Behn “enacts within Oroonoko’s character” a Sidneian 
“performance of [...] moral exemplarity and the truth of moral character that her finally 
bleak work suggests is missing within her own culture.”377 I propose that one of the chief 
losses that Behn laments in Oroonoko is the loss of romance itself as a viable narrative of 
                                                
374 See Warren Chernaik, “Captains and Slaves: Aphra Behn and the Rhetoric of Republicanism,” 
Seventeenth Century 17.1 (2002), 97-107; and Dickson, 588. Kroll also enters this debate but objects to its 
premise, arguing that Oroonoko occasionally appears unsympathetic to aspects of absolute monarchy 
because Behn’s objective as a sincerely devoted subject is to offer a cautionary tale to James II (576-8). 
375 Iwansisziw, 95. Elliott Visconsi similarly argues that Oroonoko’s tragedy signifies, for Behn, the 
dominance of England’s “barbarous national character which prefers violence and personal independence 
to the mercy an moral prudence of kingly government” (“A Degenerate Race: English Barbarism in Aphra 
Behn’s ‘Oroonoko’ and ‘The Widow Ranter,’” ELH 69.3 [2002], 673-701, 673. For other arguments or 
assumptions that the narrator’s grief for Oroonoko’s death is tantamount to Behn’s grief for the decline of 
Stuart royalism, see Guffey, Duffy, Brown, Pacheco, Carnell, and Kroll.  
376 See Spengemann, 414; Rivero, 447; and Chernaik, 104. 
377 Dickson, 574. 
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English political history, national identity, and spiritual election.378 Oroonoko’s story 
presents a vision we saw in Bunyan and have encountered many times before, that of a 
small community bound together by enthusiasm for and participation within heroic 
romance narrative. But by that story’s end, the promise of romance has failed: no matter 
how strong its faith in the genre’s real-world potency, that community finds itself forsaken 
by divine providence, stripped of the power to recover its losses or to prevail over tyranny.  
 We have seen how, throughout much of the seventeenth century, both royalists and 
republicans tended to adopt a posture of ridiculing their enemies’ flighty, egotistical 
obsession with romance while tacitly embracing the genre for their own purposes. In 1688, 
with the civil war long over and further national turmoil and aspiration on the immediate 
horizon, Behn abandons this pose and takes up its opposite. Instead of denouncing romantic 
republicanism while pursuing romantic royalism, she acknowledges that commitment to a 
romantic vision of heroism and nationhood transcends England’s ideological divide. 
Instead of competing with her opponents over the genre’s power to represent English 
history, she relinquishes claim to that power, mournfully concluding that romance is not 
worth the competition to either side, since its function of identifying history’s patterns and 
its heroes is illusory. Behn seems to have concluded that the long struggle between 
royalists and republicans for control of a national romance was in vain: in terms of 
advancing a desired political reality—as opposed to imagining an impossible utopia, which 
                                                
378 Although Rivero suggests that Oroonoko is based on the “lofty heroic French romances” that Behn and 
her royalist contemporaries enjoyed reading (see 451-3), we are by now familiar enough with the 
prevalence of romance through a long thread of English literary and political discourse to acknowledge that 
Behn also had this rich native tradition to refer to, a fact acknowledged by Dickson in his discussion of 
Behn and Sidney. 
  
323 
all subjects remain free to do—the genre is not a field that merits contention. Romance is 
no longer the narrative form of English, human, or sacred history, if it ever was.  
Behn’s unique new position, I think, goes a long way toward explaining the 
supposed ideological inconsistency of her text.379 Oroonoko is not only about the death of 
Stuart royalism or Tory romanticism; it is also about the failure of a larger romantic 
conception of English identity and historical trajectory, a noble fantasy that Behn perceives 
that (some, perhaps few) Tory royalists share with (some, perhaps few) republican-leaning 
Whigs. Critics have already observed that heroism and romantic sensibility in Oroonoko 
are not split along racial boundaries: the story’s noble lovers of virtue, its corrupt 
authorities, and its servile rabble may all be either African or English. Indeed, by placing an 
African prince at the head of her narrative’s heroic community, Behn attempts to subvert 
the Calvinist tradition of excluding the black descendants of Noah’s son Ham from the 
romantic narrative of the elect (though her effort will be undermined, in turn, by the religio-
racial climate of Surinam). Behn does not divide these attributes along political lines either. 
Oroonoko’s heroes and villains may be either transparently partisan or not obviously so; its 
virtuous romantic community is distinguished not by race or by politics, but by that 
community’s own identification with romance. Each of its members venerates social and/or 
spiritual nobility while despising tyranny, which Behn acknowledges may be that of a 
single despot or of a dangerous mob. The tragedy of Oroonoko, however, lies partly in the 
fact that even as romance creates and coheres this elite community, it disenfranchises it: 
                                                
379 Dickson offers a comparable rationale for his examination of Behn’s Sidneian poetics: “I believe that 
reading Behn as a participant in and conservator of an earlier humanist tradition of exemplarity instead of 
primarily, as is commonly done, the beginning point of the novel and new models of historicity helps to 
explain many of the seeming incongruities and ruptures of her text” (574). 
  
324 
Oroonoko and his friends, despite exhibiting all the conventional characteristics of romance 
heroes (including a love of the genre itself), are destined for defeat as a viable society. 
Those who love, and live, romance possess some unstable cultural caché in the new world, 
but they cannot maintain practical or providential power there. Their genre of choice binds 
them together as a community but offers them neither real political authority nor divine 
protection.  
 
“Infinitely pleas’d with this Novel”: Romance, Race, and the Cohesion of Behn’s Elite 
Community 
 
 Like most readers of Oroonoko, I agree that it makes little sense to call Behn’s 
essential pro-Stuart royalism into serious question. Behn dedicates her book to the royalist 
Lord Maitland, a man whose “noble Principles of Loyalty” to the king are of the kind that 
“this Nation Sighs for” (6). The story’s narrator, whom Behn does not distinguish from 
herself as author (although we may), expresses horror at the murder of Charles I, which 
Oroonoko’s martyrdom certainly does recall. Further, Oroonoko’s sympathetic master 
Trefry explicitly and passionately defends the absoluteness of monarchical authority in his 
attempt to protect Oroonoko from Byam, Surinam’s villainous deputy governor: 
Trefry then thought it time to use his Authority; and told Byam his Command did not 
extend to his Lord’s Plantation; and that Parham was as much exempt from the Law 
as White-hall; and that they ought no more to touch the Servants of the Lord --(who 
there represented the King’s Person) than they cou’d those about the King himself; 
and that Parham was a Sanctuary; and though his Lord were absent in Person, his 
Power was still in Being there, which he had intrusted with him, as far as the 
Dominions of his particular Plantations reach’d, and all that belong’d to it; the rest of 
the Country, as Byam was Lieutenant to his Lord, he might exercise his Tyrany upon.  
      (59) 
 
Trefry’s protest incorporates the tenet that the king’s authority is “exempt from the Law,” 
the belief that royal power mystically extends beyond the monarch’s person, and even the 
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Jacobite doctrine of passive obedience in Trefry’s acknowledgment that Byam’s own sway 
over his legitimate domain is absolute, even if he wields it as a tyrant.  
Still, we cannot ignore the aspects of Oroonoko that trouble its royalist overtones. 
As Pacheco and Chernaik have shown, the character whose political ideology is most 
challenging is the Royal Slave himself. Pacheco draws our attention to Oroonoko’s 
ultimate willingness to resist the arbitrary tyranny of his grandfather, the king of 
Coramantien, who holds Imoinda in his harem despite his sexual impotence. Although 
Oroonoko is extremely reluctant to oppose himself to the king, his friends at court finally 
persuade him that the monarch’s power is not above the law: “But it was objected to him, 
that [...] Imoinda being [Oroonoko’s] lawful Wife, by solemn Contract, ’twas he was the 
injur’d Man, and might, if he so pleas’d, take Imoinda back, the Breach of the Law being 
on his Grand-father’s side; and that if he cou’d circumvent him, and redeem her from the 
[...] Seraglio, it was both just and lawful for him so to do” (18).380 Convinced, the hero 
infiltrates the harem and consummates his marriage with reliance on the law, on his honor 
and conscience, and on the pathos of his own erotic romance, vowing to kill anyone who 
violates his legal, moral, and generically conventional right to Imoinda: “Therefore stand 
back, and know, this place is sacred to Love, and me this Night; to Morrow ’tis the King’s” 
(25). Although both he and Imoinda initially demonstrate passive obedience to the king’s 
will, in order for their romantic narrative to proceed, they must and finally do unite in 
resistance to his tyrannical disregard for their love and for the law.  
                                                
380 Although Oroonoko himself is of royal blood, this fact does not enter into his friends’ reasoning; even as 
a private man, the authority of his “solemn Contract” with Imoinda apparently supersedes the king’s. For 
Pacheco, this conflict illustrates how “aristocratic pride [...] engendered an intrinsic resistance to authority that 
on occasion rendered the alliance between the monarch and the nobility less than stable” (501). 
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Oroonoko’s skepticism about the mystical absoluteness of royal power seems only 
to increase as the narrative continues. He proposes that the leader of Coramantien’s army 
ought to be “the bravest Man amongst ’em, let his Quality or Birth be what it wou’d: For, 
O my Friends! (said he) it is not Titles make Men brave, or good; or Birth that bestows 
Courage and Generosity, or makes the Owner happy” (28). And in Surinam, Oroonoko 
(now called Caesar) reacts uneasily when his former subjects recognize him and venerate 
him with “even Divine Homage”: “Caesar troubl’d with their Over-Joy, and Over-
Ceremony, besought ’em to rise, and to receive him as their Fellow-Slave; assuring them, 
he was no better” (37). His apparent conviction that authority is derived from merit rather 
than from divine right clashes with Stuart absolutism and, as Chernaik remarks, “echo[es] 
the rhetoric and the concerns of seventeenth-century republicans.”381 Chernaik makes much 
of Oroonoko’s bitter shame, after his failed rebellion, at “endeavoring to make those Free, 
who were by Nature Slaves, poor wretched Rogues, [...] treacherous and cowardly, fit for 
such Masters,” pointing out that his speech uncannily echoes Milton’s dismay over the 
impending Restoration in The Readie and Easie Way (56). He argues that while Oroonoko 
is “unrepentant, steadfast in his principles [of resistance to tyranny] to the last,” the hero 
“comes to realize [...] that all revolutions are failed revolutions” due to the servility of the 
masses, and that—as Milton puts it in Paradise Lost—“Tyranny must be, / Though to the 
tyrant thereby no excuse.”382 While I find it very doubtful that Behn is using Oroonoko as a 
vessel for her own secret republican sympathies, she does seem to recognize that the 
                                                
381 Chernaik, 97. 
382 Ibid., 97, 104. Chernaik cites Paradise Lost 12.95-6, in John Carey and Alastair Fowler (eds.), The 
Poems of John Milton (London: Longman, 1968).  
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distinction between republican and royalist frustration is not always an impassable gulf. 
Oroonoko’s Miltonic complaint that the vast majority of people are naturally cowardly and 
servile, be they African slaves or English colonists, is difficult to distinguish from a royalist 
lament: the masses either cannot or will not resist the demagoguery of ignoble leaders, mob 
rule soon becomes its own form of tyranny, and the rabble are incapable of appreciation for 
or participation in the high-minded genre of heroic romance. 
Other critics have remarked on Behn’s division between the few characters who 
admire both romance and Oroonoko and the many who run roughshod over them, though 
most associate this separation with other problematic binaries. According to Kroll’s 
reading, romantic kingship flourishes in Coramantien but cannot survive in Surinam. 
Pacheco remarks that “The text’s upper-class loyalties are kept partially intact by the 
division of the English colonists into two distinct camps: those people ‘of quality’ who 
recognize and respect Oroonoko’s royalty [...] and the rabble who [...] torture and 
eventually execute him.”383 Visconsi sees the villainous masses of Oroonoko as “a pastiche 
of undesirables incapable of government” who represent Behn’s “republican and Whig 
opponents” and fail either to recognize or to respect the kingship that “inheres somatically” 
within the Royal Slave by romantic convention.384 While each of these binary readings 
seems to approach some truth, none of their distinctions—geographical, classist, or 
political—can quite stand up to scrutiny. Oroonoko’s romantic heroism is tested by 
different forces of tyranny in both Coramantien and Surinam, encountering honorable allies 
                                                
383 Pacheco, 502. 
384 Visconsi, 674, 682. Rivero also finds that Behn’s “‘romantic’ colonial fiction [...] is the romance of 
decorous, upper-class sentiments” and argues for Behn’s belief that “If properly conducted by the right 
aristocratic sort of people [...] the colonial enterprise can have salutary effects” (451-2). 
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and opportunistic enemies in both places.385 While nobility is indeed somatically inherent 
in Oroonoko, we shall see that moral merit also appears to shine through the bodies of 
certain non-royal characters. Pacheco admits that although Oroonoko’s “allies throughout 
the novella are presented as products of upper-class culture,” Byam and his henchman 
Banister—“a Fellow of absolute Barbarity, and fit to execute any Villainy, but was Rich”—
are far from being commoners; the Irish brute Banister may epitomize wealth divorced 
from nobility of birth or nationality, but Byam is a member of the landed gentry and the 
descendant of English nobles (64).386 More importantly, neither are Byam and Banister 
republicans or Whigs, despite the fact that many of the nameless English islanders under 
their control smack of Whiggish capitalism: as Brown, Mendelson, Pacheco, and Kroll all 
acknowledge, Oroonoko’s cruelest and most deceitful enemies are real historical figures 
who served as high-ranking royalist colonial officials. Since race, rank, and political 
allegiance all fail to provide a thorough and accurate determination of the identities of 
Oroonoko’s protagonists and antagonists, affinity for romance itself is the only consistently 
reliable quotient that remains.   
Throughout Oroonoko, and in both of the text’s geographic settings, a love of the 
lofty values and stimulating stories of heroic romance—together with a predisposition to 
interpret events through the lens of the same genre—draws highly disparate individuals 
into an elite community of virtue. We must note that Behn’s elite community is expressly 
not an elect community in the Calvinist sense: as both a royalist and a Catholic, Behn 
                                                
385 Pacheco also steers clear of Kroll’s geographic binary while maintaining a sociopolitical one: “If, in the 
first half of the narrative, honor comes into conflict with royalist ideology, in Surinam it encounters the 
European colonial enterprise” (501-2). 
386 Ibid., 496. 
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evidently found radical Protestant conflations of romantic heroism and divine election 
neither attractive nor convincing. In fact, her exaltation of a black African hero undermines 
Protestantism’s racial exegesis (widespread throughout, and well after, the Early Modern 
period) that understood the black race to be the offspring of Ham and his son Canaan, 
declared reprobate by God and cursed by Noah to unremitting slavery to the descendants of 
Ham’s brothers. Both their reprobation and their enslavement disqualified them for 
participation in the progressive narrative of the elect. Milton, quite possibly because of his 
rejection of double predestination, does not include the episode with Noah and his sons in 
Adam’s vision of biblical history in Paradise Lost, but the more orthodox Calvinist Lucy 
Hutchinson rehearses the curse with considerable interest in Order and Disorder:  
‘Cursèd be Canaan, vassalage his doom, 
His brothers’ servants’ servant to become. 
Blessed be the God of Shem: by special grace 
He shall be lord of Canaan’s servile race. 
God shall enlarge Japhet’s still growing stem, 
He shall inhabit in the tents of Shem 
And Canaan shall be servant unto him’. 
   (9.205-211) 
 
Although Hutchinson regards this “parent’s curse” as “Sad” evidence of Noah’s own 
sinfulness, which prompted Ham’s unfilial dishonor, she asserts that it did not go 
“unconfirmed in heaven,” since “So heinous, so degenerate a crime / Deserved a brand to 
all succeeding time” (9.224, 282-3). This pronouncement of the reprobation of Ham’s 
descendants, she explains, revivified the Worldly State after its destruction by the Flood, 
and so allowed Satan to rekindle “The fatal war […] / Against the new foundation of 
mankind” (9.213-14). Canaan’s black “children” are thus “Excluded from the special 
blessing” of their cousins, which “little would avail a hapless race / Still multiplied to 
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sorrow and disgrace”; their moral and literal “slavery” binds them to fight for the wrong 
side of Hutchinson’s spiritual war, and so they are “Cut […] off” from the romance of the 
elect (9.277-81, 271, 287). Behn’s Oroonoko moves to spurn the religious and narrative 
implications of this Calvinist convention. The degeneracy that is supposed to characterize 
Ham’s descendants instead flourishes in the white enemies of the heroic and genteel 
African prince, who stands at the head of the narrative’s romantic community due to a 
secular nobility of spirit that signifies neither providential rejection nor election.      
Whether the members of Behn’s elite community are African or European, noble 
by birth or only in spirit, self-evidently royalist or not, they find profound gratification 
within their like-minded society, even as their romantic sensibility separates them from the 
majority of their neighbors. Oroonoko’s membership in this small but diverse group long 
predates his meetings with the narrator or Trefry, his chief allies in Surinam. Not only has 
his natural excellence endowed him with physically European features—perhaps another 
sign of Behn’s disregard for the Curse of Ham—his inherent appreciation of heroic 
narrative has attracted him to the histories of peoples he has never encountered who have 
otherwise nothing to do with him. The narrator is amazed to discover that “He had heard 
of, and admir’d the Romans: he had heard of the late Civil Wars in England, and the 
deplorable Death of our great Monarch; and wou’d discourse of it with all the Sense, and 
Abhorrence of the Injustice imaginable” (13). As soon as the Englishwoman and the 
African prince meet in Surinam, they have their shared sense of sympathetic admiration for 
the martyr-king Charles I to unite them as friends, allies, and lovers of heroic virtue (even 
though Oroonoko’s simultaneous enthusiasm for Roman honor may remind us, again, more 
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of republican cultural preferences than of royalist ones). 387  At the same time that 
Oroonoko’s affinity for European chivalric conventions helps him bond with select 
foreigners, it distinguishes him from the masses of his own people. Having observed many 
of the signs of secular “election” by Love when he comes to desire Imoinda—in good 
Sidneian fashion, falling in love by a “strange Inspiration,” marveling that a woman could 
“[gain] a perfect Conquest over his fierce Heart,” and communicating with her in a “silent 
Language”—he vows to prefer romantic convention even to “the Custom of his Country,” 
promising her that “she shou’d be the only woman he wou’d possess while he liv’d; that no 
Age or Wrinkles shou’d incline him to change, for her Soul wou’d be always fine, and 
always young; and he shou’d have an eternal Idea in his Mind of the Charms she now bore, 
and shou’d look into his Heart for that Idea, when he cou’d find it no longer in her Face” 
(14-15). Oroonoko’s oath of monogamy and fidelity to a neoplatonic ideal of love and 
beauty wins him Imoinda’s heart while separating him from his grandfather the king, who 
keeps a harem and discards his older wives; the same sensibilities that cause him to lose his 
position at his grandfather’s court make his amorous story especially appealing to the 
narrator in Surinam and to her romance-reading English audience. 
 However, Behn never suggests that romance is a genre or a system of values that is 
unique to England or to Europeans. Rather, it is a mode of thought and action that allows 
its virtuous followers (whatever their rank or race) to recognize one another and to identify 
themselves as distinct from the masses whose spirits are not sufficiently elevated to ascribe 
to it. We begin to see romance’s power to form an improbable community from its 
                                                
387 We might remember Margaret Cavendish’s complaint in her Life of William about republicans’ 
“romansical” admiration of and self-comparison to Roman heroes (see Chapter Two). 
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audience members while we are still in Coramantien. In battle, Oroonoko’s army 
encounters a force led by Jamoan, a noble youth clearly intended to parallel Oroonoko 
despite their military opposition. Seeking a worthy rival, Oroonoko “single[s] out” Jamoan 
in combat and “[takes] him Prisoner with his own Hand, having wounded him almost to 
death” (29). As with many chivalric heroes before them, the enmity that brings the two 
warriors together on the battlefield transforms into firm friendship once they have 
witnessed each other’s martial prowess and manly virtue. Oroonoko recognizes his hostage 
as a reflection of himself, just as we do: “This Jamoan afterwards became very dear to him, 
being a Man very gallant, and of excellent Graces, and fine Parts; so that he never put him 
amongst the Rank of Captives, as they us’d to do, without distinction, for the common Sale, 
or Market; but kept him in his own Court, where he retain’d nothing of the Prisoner, but the 
Name” (29). Jamoan, continuing to mirror his captor’s feelings, “return’d no more into his 
own Country, so great an Affection he took for Oroonoko” (29). Moreover, he instinctively 
knows how best to minister to Oroonoko’s lovesickness for his lost Imoinda: “by a 
thousand Tales and Adventures of Love and Gallantry, [he] flatter’d his Disease of 
Melancholy and Languishment: which I have often heard him say, had certainly kill’d him, 
but for the Conversation of this Prince and Aboan,” the hero’s other best friend (29). 
Oroonoko, Jamoan, and Aboan form a fellowship of romantic warrior-courtiers who love to 
tell and listen to stories of others like themselves. Their affinity for the genre in which they 
perceive themselves to live binds them together and sustains them through loss and 
captivity. Notably, Oroonoko is gratified by Jamoan’s romances not because they ease his 
sorrows but because they sharpen and intensify them. Behn’s narrator identifies the 
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paradoxical nature of Jamoan’s treatment: it “flatter[s]” the illness that torments Oroonoko 
by reiterating his experiences and exalting them to a literary height, yet at the same time 
that it nourishes and glorifies his “Disease,” Oroonoko becomes convinced that it has saved 
his life by providing him with the vital “Conversation” of a few others who sympathize 
with his woes and share his heroic sensibilities. For now, the question of whether romance 
chiefly imparts solipsistic “Languishment” or communitarian salvation is left open.  
 Jamoan and Aboan abruptly exit the narrative at the point of Oroonoko’s capture; 
however, the episode in which two adversaries are united by their mutual recognition and 
appreciation of romance conventions repeats itself as soon as Oroonoko arrives in Surinam. 
There, he is purchased by Trefry, “a man of great wit and fine learning” who overhears his 
disdainful farewell to the duplicitous captain of the slave ship and his hope to “meet with 
more Honour and Honesty in the next World” (34). Trefry, instantly attuned to and 
impressed by Oroonoko’s innate nobility, seems poised to answer that hope: 
He reflecting on the last Words of Oroonoko to the Captain, [...] no sooner came 
into the Boat, but he fix’d his Eyes on him; and finding something so extraordinary 
in his Face, his Shape and Mien, a Greatness of Look, and Haughtiness in his Air, 
and finding he spoke English, had a great mind to be enquiring into his Quality and 
Fortune; which, though Oroonoko endeavour’d to hide, by only confessing he was 
above the Rank of common Slaves, Trefry soon found he was yet something 
greater than he confess’d; and from that Moment began to conceive so vast an 
Esteem for him, that he ever after lov’d him as his dearest Brother, and shew’d him 
all the Civilities due to so great a Man. 
      (35) 
 
Trefry discovers Oroonoko’s rank and his moral quality simply by beholding that 
“something so extraordinary” about him, whatever it may be. As many readers of 
Oroonoko have remarked (and as we have often seen), the ability of a displaced or 
disguised aristocrat to radiate some indefinable allure that evidences his concealed status is 
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a romance cliché. 388  Having participated in this generic convention by recognizing 
Oroonoko’s rank, Trefry correctly assumes that the royal slave might reciprocate with an 
engaging, ennobling story about his “Quality and Fortune.” Since Oroonoko is initially 
reluctant to trust his new master, Trefry sets out to “entertain” him “with his Art and 
Discourse” (35). Their conversation makes Oroonoko, in turn, aware of “a kind of 
Sincerity, and awful Truth in the face of Trefry; he saw an Honesty in his Eyes, and he 
found him wise and witty enough to understand Honour; for it was one of his Maxims, A 
Man of Wit cou’d not be a Knave or Villain” (35). Mysterious virtue thus inheres in the 
mere gentleman Trefry as well as the prince Oroonoko, and it is communicated both 
through the body (in particular, the face) and through the elite “Art and Discourse” that 
delights both men. 
Although he concedes that “he [has] little Reason to credit” a white foreigner, 
romantic sympathy forms a bond of faith and respect between Oroonoko and the man who 
is both his master and his inferior: “he was no less pleas’d with Trefry, than [Trefry] was 
with the Prince; and he thought himself, at least, fortunate in this, that since he was a Slave, 
as long as he wou’d suffer himself to remain so, he had a Man of so excellent Wit and Parts 
for a Master” (35). Accordingly, Oroonoko “made no scruple of declaring to Trefry all his 
Fortunes [...] and put himself wholly into the Hands of his new Friend, whom he found [...] 
charm’d with all the Greatness of his Actions; which were recited with that Modesty, and 
delicate Sense, as wholly vanquish’d him, and subdu’d him to his Interest” (35). If Trefry 
                                                
388 Visconsi suggests that “The trope of the unsuccessful disguise invokes directly a common seventeenth-
century trope of somatic kingship, a trope found most overtly in the Coronation poetry of 1660-1661” 
(684)—though of course, the “trope of somatic kingship” is far older than the seventeenth century and is 
found in countless romance texts beyond commemoratory verse for Charles II. 
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were not endeared to Oroonoko through his heroic countenance alone, his account of the 
true romance of his life has earned his complete devotion. Oroonoko, in turn, is now in a 
position superficially identical to the one his friend and hostage Jamoan occupied in 
Coramantien: having entered into a bond of brotherhood with a man who is inwardly like 
himself, he turns to a friendship originated by instant mutual admiration, and sustained by 
romantic storytelling, to salve his loss of his freedom—for the time being. Although he 
seems satisfied that he has indeed found romantic honor “in the next World,” however, the 
terms of his and Trefry’s affective bond are not precisely the same as those surrounding his 
friendship with Jamoan. In Coramantien, Jamoan became Oroonoko’s captive through 
conquest in single combat between racial and social equals; in Surinam, Oroonoko has 
become Trefry’s slave through monetary exchange in a new world where their present 
impression of their likeness and equality is largely held as absurd. Another question—
whether Jamoan, as an honored hostage in Coramantien, could have maintained his 
contented friendship with his captor/host—arises and remains unanswered. 
But for now, the men’s delighted recognition of themselves in one another makes 
Trefry eager to reciprocate Oroonoko’s romantic true story with one of his own. We learn, 
unsurprisingly, that being “naturally Amorous,” Trefry “lov’d to talk of Love as well as 
any body”; he tells his newly purchased friend of “a fine she-Slave” who has made every 
man in the vicinity, black or white, “undone in Love” (38). The promise of amorous 
narrative continues to pique Oroonoko’s interest, as it did back in Coramantien: “the 
Prince, who never heard the name of Love without a Sigh, nor any mention of it without 
the Curiosity of examining further into that tale, which of all Discourses was most 
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agreeable to him, asked, how they came to be so Unhappy, as to be all undone for one fair 
Slave” (38). But while Trefry’s tale furthers his friendship with Oroonoko, the pair’s 
unique attitude toward it distances them from every other listener at their dining table. 
Questioned by the prince, Trefry explains why he himself has been unable to force his 
female slave to submit to him: 
I confess, said Trefry, when I have, against her will, entertain’d her with Love so 
long, as to be transported with my Passion; even above Decency, I have been ready 
to make use of those advantages of Strength and Force Nature has given me. But oh! 
she disarms me, with that Modesty and Weeping so tender and so moving, that I 
retire, and thank my Stars she overcame me. The Company laugh’d at his Civility to 
a Slave, and Caesar only applauded the nobleness of his Passion and Nature; since 
that Slave might be Noble, or, what was better, have true Notions of Honour and 
Vertue in her. 
      (38) 
Either Trefry and Oroonoko are alone in recognizing the Sidneian romantic norms inherent 
in the scenario—the impassioned lover, the chaste beloved, her disarming modesty and his 
awakened virtue—or else they are alone in placing any value on them; the rest of the 
audience (probably composed primarily of upper-class royalists—the most likely islanders 
to be Trefry’s guests) see only comic absurdity in Trefry’s mock-heroic reluctance to 
dispose of his property as he likes. Oroonoko reminds us once again that romance is not 
clearly the province of one class or ideology: perhaps the chaste heroine ought to be 
respected for her noble blood, or, even “better,” for her extraordinary moral merit alone. In 
any case, these three figures—Trefry, Oroonoko, and the “fine she-Slave”—comprise a tiny 
elite class distinguished from a larger aristocratic audience only by their “true Notions of 
Honour and Vertue.”   
 The apex of the romance plot in Oroonoko, and the highest pleasure for the 
members of the text’s romantic community, occurs as a result of Trefry’s amorous 
  
337 
discourse: keen to see the beauty and nobility of the slave woman “Clemene” for himself, 
Oroonoko discovers that she is his own Imoinda. The miraculous occasion passes all 
description: 
’tis needless to tell with what transports, what extasies of Joy, they both a while 
beheld each other, without Speaking; then Snatcht each other to their Arms; then 
Gaze again, as if they still doubted whether they possess’d the Blessing: They 
Graspt; but when they recovered their Speech, ’tis not to be imagin’d, what tender 
things they exprest to each other; wondering what strange Fate had brought ’em 
again together.     
      (39) 
 
Critically, this triumphant moment delights an audience beyond the lovers whom it directly 
concerns. Trefry, in some sense responsible for the happy reunion he has just witnessed, is 
“infinitely pleas’d with this Novel, and [...] not a little satisfied, that Heaven was so kind to 
the Prince, as to sweeten his Misfortunes by so lucky an Accident” (40). Overcome with 
enthusiasm for the apparently providential true romance unfolding before his eyes, he is 
“impatient” to repeat the “Novel”—a strange new event that also involves a romantic 
narrative—to another sympathetic listener: Behn’s persona (40). The narrator, already 
familiar with Oroonoko and his story “from his own Mouth” and “concerning and intresting 
[her] self, in all that related” to him, is equally “impatient” to see its reunited hero and 
heroine for herself (40). She and Trefry, being distinctively attuned to such things, had 
sensed previously that Clemene too was a person “of Quality,” but her value to them 
increases exponentially once they learn that she is the female protagonist of Oroonoko’s 
stirring romance: “when we knew Clemene was Imoinda, we cou’d not enough admire her” 
(40). As Oroonoko and Imoinda celebrate their romantic reunion firsthand, Trefry and the 
narrator relish the vicarious experience of being party to this “real” romance that so much 
resembles the stories they like best. At this point in the text, their central community of four 
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seems to have reached a pinnacle of joy and cohesion: while Oroonoko and Imoinda renew 
their commitment to one another in marriage, the narrator and Trefry commit to restoring 
them and their newly-conceived heir to their rightful home and throne in Coramantien, as 
soon as Surinam’s Lord-Governor returns to meet the Royal Slave and approve his freedom. 
 
“The last of his Great Race”: Communal Disenfranchisement and Decline 
 
 William Spengemann has succinctly described what the end of Oroonoko and 
Imoinda’s romance might look like, were it to conclude in the expected fashion: 
For the happy conclusion of the romance, only the rupture between these lovers 
and the old King of Coramantien remains to be healed; and, as anyone familiar 
with the genre would know, such problems are easily dispatched. Whether 
Oroonoko and his gravid spouse return to the welcome of a once tyrannical 
parent now softened by remorse, or the King conveniently dies during their 
absence, or they decide to remain in America and establish a peaceful dynasty of 
commingled love and honor in that regained paradise, the romantic action has 
virtually arrived at its projected conclusion.389 
 
Trefry, Behn’s narrative persona, and Behn’s readers all share Spengemann’s general 
impression of what ought to happen next in order to complete the formulaic plot. 
Oroonoko, too, has fantasized about a happy ending for himself and Imoinda that seems 
suddenly to lie wide open before them: when he is barred from access to her in 
Coramantien, he imagines “fly[ing] with her to some unknown World, who never heard our 
Story” (18). As Rivero has noted, Surinam will shortly provide the “grim fulfillment” of his 
dream.390 Romance has proven its capacity to delight its admirers, to soothe their woes 
while indulging their sensibilities, and to draw them together while distinguishing them 
from all others—but here, the genre’s powers have reached their limit. By the end of 
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Oroonoko, romance will have failed to deliver Oroonoko and his allies, and it will have 
disenfranchised and doomed the very community it created. 
At first, the redemptive limits of romance are easily conflated with its temporary 
usefulness for forming community and consoling the dispossessed. Much as Jamoan 
comforted Oroonoko in his lovesickness—and perhaps himself in his captivity—by telling 
“Tales and Adventures of Love and Gallantry,” the narrator attempts to “entertain” her new 
African friends through romantic storytelling and adventuring until ambiguous 
circumstances make it possible for them to return to Coramantien. She recounts to him and 
Imoinda “the Lives of the Romans, and great Men”: once more, Oroonoko is “charm’d [...] 
to [her] Company” upon discovering that they both enjoy heroic narrative (41). He is less 
fond of her “stories of nuns” and “of the true God”: if Oroonoko does not clearly share the 
narrator’s royalist politics, he clearly does not share her Catholic faith.  Still, the narrator 
reports that their “Conversations fail’d not altogether so well to divert him, that he lik’d the 
Company of us Women much above the Men” (41). Again, romance has drawn Oroonoko 
(and presumably also Trefry, who “love[s] to talk of Love as well as any body”) into an 
unorthodox fellowship, which breezily makes light of distinctions of race or religion, while 
separating them from their likelier peers. When the friends are not absorbed in heroic 
discourse, they sustain their community by dabbling into heroic action, much like the 
pilgrims of Bunyan’s Part Two. Behn devotes a significant portion of her text to episodes 
in which the group explores the island, interacts with its exotic native population, and slays 
wild beasts “of a monstrous Size, which this Continent affords in Abundance” (42). Such 
“novel” curiosities further stimulate their sensibilities and give Oroonoko “occasion of 
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many fine Discourses; of Accidents in War, and Strange Escapes” (46). Indeed, the prince 
feels the same impulse that his English comrades do to turn to romance as a source of both 
diversion and communion: “Caesar made it his Business to search out and provide for our 
Entertainment, especially to please his dearly Ador’d Imoinda, who was a sharer in all our 
Adventures” (51).  
Yet all that romantic storytelling and sightseeing have really done so far, other than 
unite these fit and few friends, is amuse and distract them; unlike the imitativeness of 
Bunyan’s pilgrims, their play with the conventions of genre eventually loses its cohesive 
properties and turns cloying. For Oroonoko, being “diverted” finally proves insufficient: 
“these were not Actions great enough for his large Soul, which was still panting after more 
renown’d Action” (51, 42). Imoinda, too, begins to long for the promised happy ending to 
her family romance: as her pregnancy progresses, she eventually “[does] nothing but Sigh 
and Weep for the Captivity of her Lord, her Self, and the Infant yet Unborn” (51). 
Realizing that their freedom is not forthcoming, Oroonoko finally takes matters into his 
own hands and attempts to inspire his fellow slaves with the heroic values and romantic 
expectations that have always guided his own conduct. He begins by pointing out the 
existential horror of their interminable slavery, which—as the Calvinist tradition of Ham’s 
curse emphasizes—lacks a romantic trial’s teleological capacity to ennoble or redeem the 
sufferers: “He told ’em it was not for Days, Months, or Years, but for Eternity; there was 
no end to be of their Misfortunes: They suffer’d not like Men who might find a Glory, and 
Fortitude in Oppression; but like Dogs that lov’d the Whip and Bell, and fawn’d the more 
they were beaten: That they had lost the Divine Quality of Men” (52). Oroonoko’s gradual 
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degradation has opened his eyes to the difference between his friendship with the narrator 
and Trefry in Surinam and his friendship with Jamoan in Coramantien: he and his fellow 
slaves have not been conquered “Nobly in Fight” or “by the chance of War,” and his 
indignation at his unheroic servitude overcomes his love for his fancied hosts. Oroonoko 
urges his fellows to embrace both the standards of real martial heroism—“the more 
Danger, the more Glory”—and the concomitant hope of providential protection and 
restoration: “He said, they wou’d Travel towards the Sea, Plant a New Colony, and Defend 
it by their Valour; and when they cou’d find a Ship [...] guided by Providence that way, 
they wou’d Seize it, and make it a Prize, till it had Transported them to their own 
Countries” (53). Having spent months in Surinam talking of romance and playing at it with 
his English friends, he chafes against the anti-romantic aimlessness of their diversions and 
of his slavery, and he orchestrates a return to the real thing.  
For Behn, however, Oroonoko’s rebellion and its tragic aftermath sharply expose 
the limits of romance as a “real thing” that can control the shape of historical narrative or 
yield any tangible benefit to its devotees. We suddenly discover that while the narrator and 
her comrades’ romantic sensibility has granted the group an illusory impression of their 
own cultural status, it gives them no political power at all. The narrator is inclined to 
conflate these two types of authority (which are, indeed, not normally separate in 
traditional romance): she remarks that “The Men, of any fashion,” whom she also terms 
“the better sort,” have too much “Respect for Caesar” to march against him, so that “now 
the only violent Man against him” is Byam, “The Deputy Governor, of whom I have had 
no great occasion to speak, and who was the most Fawning fair-tongu’d Fellow in the 
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World, and one that pretended the most Friendship to Caesar [...] He was a Fellow, whose 
Character is not fit to be mention’d with the worst of the Slaves” (54). Her scorn for Byam 
initially conceals the weight of his authority in Surinam; the Deputy Governor at first 
appears to be pitted as “the only violent Man” against large numbers of “the better sort” 
who despise his cruelty. Yet the contempt that the men “of any fashion” feel for Byam’s 
low character proves to go hand-in-hand with their remarkable passivity, since their 
“Respect” for Oroonoko’s heroism does not translate into any heroic exercise on their own 
part.391 And the women of fashion, including the narrator herself, “fly down the River, to 
be secur’d” from Oroonoko’s sudden violence (57). The narrator’s commentary on her 
decision to flee from her friend betrays both her remorse about what follows and her 
confusion about her status in Surinam as a cultured, aristocratic woman: “while we were 
away, [Byam] acted this Cruelty: For I suppose I had Authority and Interest enough there, 
had I suspected any such thing, to have prevented it” (57).  
Whether we regard the narrator as deeply deluded about her power, shockingly 
remiss in exercising it, or both, the fact remains that while the high-minded aristocrats 
disdain or fear to involve themselves in the conflict, Byam assembles a mob armed with 
“rusty useless Guns,” “old Basket-hilts,” and “long Staffs, and Clubs” (55). The ensuing 
battle is the antithesis of chivalric combat: the Deputy Governor’s rabble are too disorderly 
to do much damage to Oroonoko’s men, but the slaves, in turn, are too cowardly to resist 
them (and Byam’s promise of mercy) for long. Oroonoko and “his Heroick Imoinda” are 
                                                
391 Carnell likewise notes the impotence of gentility here: “the moderate plantation owners are entirely 
overruled by the powerful group desire for revenge against the escaped royal slave; there is no effective 
voice of protest against Oroonoko’s brutal dismemberment” (14). 
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forsaken by their followers, who seem after all to lack “the Divine Quality of Men” that 
would allow them to share in the protagonists’ dream (55). The prince’s belief that his 
comrades might “find a Glory, and Fortitude in Oppression,” and so transform their 
suffering into heroic narrative, has proved illusory; in this new world dominated by white 
Protestants, the Curse of Ham does effectively exclude slaves from romance. Although 
Byam too can muster only a vulgar band of brutes, his “fair-tongued” demagoguery gives 
him far more material potency than either Oroonoko’s moral outrage against tyranny or the 
narrator’s mystical faith in royal power and virtue. Surinam’s elite community of lovers of 
romance finds itself figuratively and literally outgunned by a coarse Whiggish mob 
controlled by corrupt royalist officials, all of whom perceive that success “in the next 
World” of America depends upon opportunistic policy, not sentimental idealism.392  
Byam, “one that abounded in his own Wit, and wou’d take his own Measures,” 
seems well aware that he can turn his opponents’ romantic sensibilities against them, using 
their naiveté as an instrument to further his own ends (55). He co-opts honest Trefry, whose 
face radiates “Sincerity, and awful Truth,” to help extract Oroonoko’s fateful surrender by 
promising his freedom and appealing to his heroic virtue:  
Trefry and Byam pleaded and protested together so much, that Trefry believing the 
Governor to mean what he said; and speaking very cordially himself, generously 
put himself into Caesar’s hands, and took him aside, and perswaded him, even 
with Tears, to Live, by Surrendering himself, and to name his Conditions. Caesar 
was overcome by his Wit and Reasons, and in consideration of Imoinda[.] 
      (56) 
 
                                                
392 Pacheco expertly summarizes the situation: “the ideology that works to affirm an endangered tradition 
simultaneously connives its destruction [...] This gradual shift in power relations spelled not the eclipse of 
aristocratic might, but a growing collaboration among elite groups [...] which brought with it an intermingling 
of cultural systems of value” (503). 
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Trefry’s honesty, sincerity, and tears are genuine; he intends no evil by pleading with 
Oroonoko, and Oroonoko does not err by trusting him per se. Both men’s errors lie, 
instead, in their commitment to chivalric honor and affective friendship, and in their 
enduring faith in the historical reality of romance. Trefry is particularly credulous: ever 
since recognizing Oroonoko’s royalty and effecting his improbable reunion with Imoinda, 
he has been “infinitely pleas’d with this Novel” that he believes directs the plot of his 
friend’s life, and he remains convinced that his story must end with his return to his rightful 
kingdom in Coramantien accompanied by his bride and his heir. Byam’s story that 
Oroonoko and his royal family “shall depart free out of our Land” as soon as a ship arrives 
to take them from Surinam may be calculated to flatter not only Oroonoko’s desire but also 
the expectations and honor of Trefry, who has “promis’d him on his Word and Honour, he 
wou’d find the Means to reconduct him to his own Country again” and thereby perfect his 
romantic narrative (56, 35). Trefry is manipulated by his enthusiasm for the values and 
outcomes of romance, and Oroonoko by the same trust of Trefry’s courtly “Wit and 
Reasons” that first facilitated their friendship. 
 Once he has discovered Byam’s deceit, Oroonoko’s consequent murder of the 
willing Imoinda and of their unborn child highlights not only the community’s political 
impotence, but also the emptiness of any appeal to providential protection or election. 
When Oroonoko kills his unborn heir—“the last of his Great Race”—he has destroyed the 
hope of restoration in the next generation that undergirds royalist romance (40). Moreover, 
he has applied his variation on Noah’s curse to his own son: in Hutchinson’s words, “Who 
sentences his sons his own sins dooms / And his own executioner becomes” (O&D 9.236-
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7). Behn posits at the beginning of her narrative that black Africans can take on heroic roles 
in romance—but by definition, the enslaved, whose lives and labor are not their own, 
cannot. The majority of Africans on Surinam, like the majority of white colonists, are unfit 
for heroism or freedom; far worse for the anti-Calvinist romantic vision of Behn and her 
elite community, Oroonoko himself finally degenerates into the brutality that is supposed to 
characterize his race, degraded by the racial and religious suppositions of his colonial 
masters. His violence against Imoinda and their child, which remains heroic in the eyes of 
the lovers from Coramantien, horrifies even the narrator with its foreign barbarism.  
The narrator’s fellowship with Oroonoko fails him for the same essential reasons 
that Trefry’s does: not through a deficiency of noble sentiment, but through an excess of 
romantic sensibility. When a surgeon informs Oroonoko that he will not recover from his 
wounds (and will therefore neither take revenge upon his enemies nor ever return to 
Coramantien), the narrator reports that “We were all (but Caesar) afflicted at this News”: 
while Oroonoko is settling into his final role as heroic martyr, the community that has 
cohered around him cannot bear for his “Tale of Love and Gallantry” to decline into 
tragedy (63). Rather than remain with the prince to witness his tragic end as it unfolds, the 
narrator flees the scene again: “the Sight [of his injuries] was gashly,” she reports, “his 
Discourse was sad; and the earthly Smell about him so strong, that I was perswaded to 
leave the Place for some time (being my self but Sickly, and very apt to fall into Fits of 
dangerous Illness upon any extraordinary Melancholy)” (63-4). Literally unable to stomach 
the decay of Oroonoko’s once-idealized heroic body and the gruesome collapse of his 
romance, she allows Trefry and his servants to promise “to take what possible care they 
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cou’d” of Oroonoko and travels by boat “about three Days Journey down the River” (64). 
The enemies of their shrinking society fall upon the house as soon as she is gone and take 
Oroonoko by force; the narrator’s attachment to the aesthetics of romance thus result in her 
abandonment of the man she once believed to embody them as soon as his story becomes 
too “earthly,” “gashly,” “sad,” and “melancholy” to remain a real-life representation of the 
genre.393 She is not present to witness his death, but her account of it concludes by 
emphasizing, once more, the utter impotence of her extended authority against the vulgar 
mob and the unheroic tyrants at their head: “My Mother and Sister were by him all the 
while, but not suffer’d to save him; so rude and wild were the Rabble, and so inhumane 
were the Justices, who stood by to see the execution” (64). Neither the freedom fighter who 
esteems republican-inflected merit to the last, nor the English aristocrats who revere his 
enduring royal majesty, can prevent the opportunistic alliance of Whiggish plebeians and 
Tory politicians from turning their romance into all-too-realistic tragedy. Even if their 
community never renounces its love of romantic heroism, it must witness the racial and 
religious diversity of its fellowship crumble in colonial Surinam, and it has no choice but to 
abandon the fancy that romance is a providential key to historical reality. 
Spengemann has drawn our attention to a connection between the tragic end of 
Oroonoko and the deeply melancholy verse that Behn composed shortly after her story’s 
publication and shortly before her death. Responding to a request that she continue to 
                                                
393 Rivero argues that “the narrator, having lovingly fashioned [Oroonoko and Imoinda’s] attractive bodies, 
now details their defacement and dismemberment as a way both of completing her own work of mourning 
and of expiating the guilt she feels over her inability to have done anything to have helped them avoid their 
fate [...] Yet the accounts of the violent deaths of Imoinda and Oroonoko appear excessive. It seems as 
though the author, having made their beautiful bodies, must now unmake them, must render them 
repulsive” (457). 
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enrich the public sphere with her poetry in the wake of the “Glorious Revolution” that 
ended the Stuart dynasty, Behn sorrowfully declines: 
         My Muse [...] would endeavour fain to glide  
  With the fair prosperous Gale, and the full driving Tide, 
  But Loyalty Commands with Pious Force, 
         That stops me in the thriving Course, 
  The Brieze that wafts the Crowding Nations o’re, 
         Leaves me unpity’d far behind 
         On the forsaken Barren Shore, 
  To sigh with Echo, and the Murmuring Wind; 
  While all the Inviting Prospect I survey, 
  With Melancholy Eyes I view the Plains, 
  Where all I see is Ravishing and Gay, 
  And all I hear is Mirth in loudest Strains; 
  Thus while the Chosen Seed possess the Promis’d Land, 
         I like the Excluded Prophet stand, 
         The Fruitful Happy Soil can only see, 
         But am forbid by Fates Decree 
  To share the Triumph of the joyful Victory.394 
 
Spengemann suggests that we keep Oroonoko in mind when reading Behn’s deathbed 
poem in order to perceive the “wonderful irony” in her lament that she will never enter 
the new world she surveys from her prophetic height: 
the Promised Land that calls the Crowding Nations across the Atlantic is, as 
Oroonoko discovered, an Old-World dream, already dispelled by the efforts to 
realize it; while the dishonored prophet, who seems to sit on the Forsaken Barren 
Shore of the Old World, consoling herself with the devalued bric-a-brac of 
antique legend, has in fact been there ahead of the rest and has already learned 
what it will take the Chosen Seed another two hundred years to realize—that the 
Old World is gone, and that the New one will require its makers to conceive an 
entirely new idea of their collective destiny.395 
 
This perceptive reading allows us to hear in Behn’s tone not only irony, but also a 
strange, half-mocking sympathy that connects the disenfranchised community of royalist 
romance with its Puritan cousin. Her description of those who celebrate the “Triumph” of 
                                                
394 Cited in Spengemann, 414. 
395 Ibid. 
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the Glorious Revolution as “the Chosen Seed” racing to “possess the Promis’d Land” is 
apt enough: such people, after all, are the republican-leaning Whigs and radical 
Protestants who had long identified themselves with the biblical nation of Israel and with 
its romantic journey through the wilderness. But in comparing herself to Moses, that 
favorite visionary hero of religious reformists, Behn aligns herself with her political and 
cultural adversaries rather than against them. She and the “Chosen Seed” shared the same 
narrative goal of arriving at the “Fruitful Happy Soil,” the same dream of “Ravishing” 
prosperity and “joyful Victory”—but as a defeated and dying royalist woman, Behn’s 
“Excluded Prophet” has found herself awakened from that dream. The masculine 
mountaintop prospect she has commandeered from Moses shows her a chastened vision 
of her nation’s narrative. Although she is compelled by her “Loyalty” to the deposed 
Stuarts to abstain from rejoicing in England’s future, Behn sounds more wistful than 
resentful, perhaps even feeling pity for those who have left her “unpity’d far behind”: 
unlike them, she has seen enough of that “Inviting Prospect” to have concluded that the 
“Chosen Seed” may be headed unawares toward yet another “Barren Shore.”  
Both Behn and her diverse characters have been forced to put aside their romantic 
fictions about their community’s “collective destiny”; Behn’s opponents have yet to do 
so. Before their inevitable disillusionment, she seems to suggest, they may as well enjoy 
“the fair prosperous Gale, and the full driving Tide” that spur them onward to the “next 
world.” Soon enough, they too will discover that the narrative they have cherished is “an 
Old-World dream,” a cultural relic that will mark its adherents not as divinely-
predestined victors but, “by Fates decree,” as losers. When that time comes, they will find 
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that their tide’s illusory telos has taken them nowhere after all, and that they remain on 
the same shore as their “Excluded Prophet,” unable to compete with the hordes of anti-
romantic opportunists who ravage the Promised Land, and thus “forsaken” along with 
her. United by their common vision of national romance before their separate ideologies 
drove them apart, the collapse of that vision as a viable historical hermeneutic may bring 
them together again, free to escape to their old-world heroic fantasies rather than warring 
over the identity of the “real” heroes. Seen as a literary and cultural aesthetic rather than 
as a map of history, the genre might “flatter [their] Disease of Melancholy and 
Languishment” while also erecting a bulwark against total despair, as it did for Oroonoko 
and his allies. For Behn, a community’s shared love of romance is its own, and its only, 
reward. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 If Behn’s late work suggests that the end of the seventeenth century brought with it 
the tragic death of romance, we ought to recognize the extent to which this is true: pure 
romance as a form of high literature or political mythmaking had declined in England in the 
hundred years since Sidney and Spenser’s aristocratic and nationalistic narratives, and 
royalists such as Herbert and Cavendish were among the last to publish “serious” prose 
tales of amorous or chivalric quests for politically-engaged upper class readers. Their 
efforts, moreover, were beginning to push against romance’s conventional reliance on 
providential teleology and heroic idealism, a task that Behn effectively completed when her 
African prince came to a tragic and barbaric end. As Michael McKeon and others have 
demonstrated, the prose romance—primarily a royalist genre throughout the Civil War and 
Restoration eras—declined, or grew up, into the novel, a form characterized by the gestures 
toward ostensible realism, contingent narrative, and the psychological “world within” that 
we found in The Princess Cloria, Assaulted and Pursued Chastity, and Oroonoko.396 Under 
McKeon’s formulation, the novel may not reject romance so much as accomplish its tacit 
incorporation and elision: by pretending to portray a fictional world in which all events are 
contingent yet “natural,” both rationally and psychologically plausible, the novelist plays 
the empiricist while also adopting the role of an invisible providence.397 
 However, I have taken care throughout this project not to conflate royalist romance 
or prose romances with the complete picture of seventeenth-century English romance; 
                                                
396 McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel. 
397 Ibid., 105-109 and passim.  
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accordingly, we should not mistake the decline or the transformation of the royalist prose 
romance into other modes for the death of the genre. First and foremost, Behn’s 
disillusioned prophecy—that heroic or civic romance was doomed in both the Old World 
and the New—was wrong. (We may recall that Greville, too, was mistaken when he 
forecasted the end of English romance after Sidney’s death many decades earlier.) Sacvan 
Bercovitch’s The Puritan Origins of the American Self has shown that romantic 
constructions of selfhood and nationhood, dependent upon providential quests and chosen 
heroes, flourished in American soil during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and, 
indeed, far beyond) as the community of “the Chosen Seed” journeyed across dangerous 
seas and unknown territories to “possess the Promis’d Land” and triumph over their 
unregenerate enemies.398 As accurate as it was, Behn’s vision of oppression, suffering, and 
death in the New World nevertheless underestimated romance’s enduring persistence, 
adaptability, and fluid subjectivity. Second, the broad generalization that the realist novel 
outstripped the providential or supernatural romance after the seventeenth century overlooks 
another important fact: that Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress achieved stunning popularity 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, becoming (as is commonly cited) a household 
staple rivaled only by the Bible itself. Bunyan’s allegorical romance saw countless new 
editions, an unauthorized sequel by Thomas Sherman (which partly prompted the authentic 
Part Two), and an anonymous Part Three after Bunyan’s death; Christian, Christiana, and 
their many heroic companions became models of spiritual and psychological selfhood 
through which subjects could “read [them] sel[ves],” just as Bunyan envisioned (9).  
                                                
398 See Spengemann, 414. 
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Together with Behn and her turn to tragic realism, the unapologetically romantic 
Bunyan concludes this project not only because he wrote at a crux of traditionally-
defined periods and because he was one of the last major seventeenth-century writers to 
have an adult memory of the Civil War, but also because he is unlike most other authors 
in these pages in that he does not deny or conceal his debt to England’s chivalric romance 
tradition. Despite the brief concerns about the worldliness of the genre that he expresses 
in the preface of The Pilgrim’s Progress, his “apology” leaves him reasonably 
comfortable with it. While Milton and Hutchinson disclaimed romance in their biblical 
poetics only to reclaim it, Bunyan is open about the fact that his religious fictions are 
drawn both from the Bible and from Bevis of Hampton. In part, the difference can be 
linked to the disparate social standing of these Puritan authors and their intended 
audiences: as many scholars have noted, sincere and generically straightforward romance 
had become increasingly associated with lower-class readers, and Bunyan, a craftsman’s 
son raised on tales of adventure from cheap chapbooks, had a humble readership to 
appeal to and no intellectual or aristocratic face to save. However, the shift in Puritan 
romance’s overtness from Milton to Bunyan may also signify something more 
interesting. We have explored in detail how the Civil War and the Restoration witnessed 
a protracted ideological battle over romance; by 1688, though, Behn’s Oroonoko had 
effectively surrendered the field, judging that the genre’s promises to its chosen 
champions had failed and were not worth the fight. As Annabel Patterson suggested of 
Milton (I believe incorrectly), later seventeenth-century royalists may really have had 
their “last chance at true romance,” mined the genre for its remaining veins of political 
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usefulness, and begun to move on to new modes of narrative.399 Not all of their 
opponents, however, concurred that romance’s value had expired, even if it was limited. 
While the battle was still at its height, Milton and Hutchinson felt obligated to associate 
romance with Cavalier vainglory or worldliness, just as royalist writers insisted that the 
genre was so much Puritan or republican nonsense. But as the two ideological models of 
heroic narrative became more distinctly separate from one another, Bunyan found himself 
free to turn to fantastical romance without much worry that he was doing wrong by his 
faith or his politics. Monsters, giants, and knights with magical weaponry—the kind of 
figures that Spenser had embraced but that Sidney had already found problematic, and 
that were either decorously or anxiously shadowed in Milton and Hutchinson’s work—
could fight it out in broad daylight in The Pilgrim’s Progress, and continued to do so for 
the entertainment and Christian education of generations of readers, including those who 
shared neither Bunyan’s politics nor his Calvinism.400  
Royalists’ and republicans’ battle for romance far outlasted the armed conflicts of the 
Civil War, but as the seventeenth century and the Stuart dynasty neared their ends, the 
generic competition also died down. To declare a victor, we would need to clarify the terms 
of victory, and it might be much easier to say that romance itself won on two fronts. Under 
seventeenth-century royalist treatments, the genre was gradually altered due to political and 
religious requirements until it became something new, experimental, and tentatively realist; 
meanwhile, driven by different and opposing ideological exigencies, their Puritan adversaries 
                                                
399 Patterson, “Last Chance at True Romance.” 
400 In “‘Interesting, but tough’: Reading The Pilgrim’s Progress,” Richard Dutton discusses Bunyan’s 
legacy in works such as Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Louisa May Alcott’s Little 
Women, noting both the problems of interpreting The Pilgrim’s Progress in the absence of a Calvinist 
framework to Christianity and the fact that these difficulties did not deter most readers. 
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were increasingly motivated to preserve and maintain a form of romance that had prevailed 
in earlier eras and in popular chapbook stories of questing and dragon-slaying, a form 
dominated by providential design, absolute standards of good and evil, and exceptional 
heroic subjectivity. Bunyan and Behn’s politics and religions may have been passionately 
opposed to one another, but their models of romance were no longer in competition. Behn’s 
royalist narrative freely owns its romantic roots but is exploring new, “modern” literary 
territories and has been hailed as the first “American novel.”401 Bunyan’s Puritan fiction is 
unabashedly conspicuous as fantastical, allegorical romance; while apocalyptically proleptic, 
it is artistically nostalgic—in some ways, literally “medieval”—and can perhaps be regarded 
as the most influential ancestor of countless fantasy adventures, including religiously-
inflected twentieth-century classics by J. R. R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis.   
I do not mean to suggest at all that romance progressed or transfigured through 
royalist writing but remained static or regressed under Milton, Hutchinson, and Bunyan. 
The seventeenth century may have seen both the birth of the novel and the deliberate 
revaluation of certain elements of medieval romance, but writers of diverse ideologies 
together transformed the ways in which the genre purported to model history, prescribe 
norms for gendered heroism, and create community. From Sidney and Spenser to Bunyan 
and Behn, romance changed from the form in which God had written the narrative of 
humanity to a mode in which subjects actively interrogated the ambiguous relationship 
between providential authorship, human agency, and random chance. Even for Bunyan, 
romance was less the genre of history than a heuristic approximation, and if his monsters 
                                                
401 See Spengemann. 
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are medieval, something about his self-conscious and self-referential play with genre in 
Part Two of The Pilgrim’s Progress may strike us as postmodern. Tragedy and the death of 
heroes, too, went from creating tension with romance (as they did in Sidney’s New 
Arcadia, Greville’s Life of Sidney, and Hutchinson’s Memoirs of her late husband) to 
becoming incorporate with it: postwar royalist romances, Paradise Lost, Order and 
Disorder, and Oroonoko are all concerned with how best to accomplish the obligatory 
integration of the romantic and the tragic, and it can be easy to forget that the allegory of 
The Pilgrim’s Progress demands that it also end with the deaths of most of its protagonists. 
Hobbes feared that romance offered its readers a naïve sense of their own invincibility, but 
in the decades after Leviathan, the same genre that empowered its subjects typically also 
called upon them to question their heroism and the inevitability of their temporal success.  
Further, the romantic norms for gendered heroism and narrative vision that 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene illustrated through Redcrosse and Britomart gradually went from 
being types that writers worked within to obstacles they worked around, challenged, or 
even demolished. Spenser’s model, in which the male hero is granted a prophetic prospect 
of the full map of romance while the “lady knight” must relinquish her chivalric quest for 
normative roles and rely on her progeny to achieve what she cannot see, troubled 
Cavendish’s and Hutchinson’s efforts to find some form of heroic agency for themselves in 
their glorifications of their husbands as visionary warrior-lovers. Beyond their 
historiography, though, Cavendish and Hutchinson created romantic worlds in which 
women shared or surpassed their male counterparts’ heroism and their capacity for insight 
or foresight, and in which narrative uncertainty and reproductive promise were common to 
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both genders. Milton, too, who performed a near-perfect reiteration of Spenser’s gendered 
archetypes through Adam’s mountaintop vision and Eve’s dream of her children in 
Paradise Lost, reconsidered those types in Paradise Regained, which ends with the ideals 
of masculine action and vision and feminine patience and faith dwelling together in Jesus’ 
“Mothers house” (4.639). Like Hutchinson in Order and Disorder, Behn positioned herself 
on a visionary peak, and went further by likening herself (rather than a male proxy) to the 
prophet Moses, although the end she saw for the “Chosen Seed” was not a romantic one. 
And Bunyan, while celebrating his female pilgrims as “Mother[s] in Israel,” imagined them 
much more comprehensively as figures who embody the erotic and communitarian 
“Methods, which [God] walketh in towards his people” (221, 203). 
 The “methods” whereby romance draws ideological communities into coherence 
have been the final major subject of this project. Here, too, we find remarkable 
consistencies alongside remarkable transformations. “They onely know it, which 
inwardly feele it”—the defense of Sidney’s Pyrocles that makes romance a matter for the 
private psyche, an extraordinary experience that might draw the few who shared it into 
exclusive fellowship, and a source of individual and communal power that need not look 
outside itself for validation—was a formulation that continued to express the subjectivity 
and ideological potency offered by the genre throughout the seventeenth century (85). 
Romantic exclusivity and interior conviction allowed royalist and republican readers to 
interpret Sidney and Spenser as they pleased, armed William Cavendish and John 
Hutchinson against their cynical enemies and skeptical wives, divided Milton’s Jesus 
from Satan and Hutchinson’s Holy State from the Worldly State, and enabled Bunyan’s 
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and Behn’s heroes and readers to ally with companions in their quest against the 
unregenerate who would hinder it. However, romance soon became more than a litmus 
test for locating the spiritual elect or the cultural elite and excluding their supposed 
adversaries. It became a field for exploring the problems inherent in its own non-rational 
subjectivity, where heroes could grapple not just with their enemies but also with the 
elusiveness of certainty about their identities, obligations, and destinies. Finally, it 
became an instrument not simply for identifying preexisting “elect” communities, but 
also for working to reimagine and rebuild them. For Dryden, struggling in his poetry to 
heal the wounds of the Civil War, the vision of romance community was one of universal 
(and royalist) union rather than Puritan exclusivity and exceptionalism, and for Behn, 
romance nourished the abortive hope that an elite English heroic subjectivity need not 
remain divided by politics or religion, or even by race and nationality. Even the Calvinist 
Bunyan, for whom election and double predestination were at least as important as they 
were for Sidney or Spenser, strongly suggested that creating community through romance 
meant much more than separating those who were “blest” from those who were “not”: it 
also meant envisioning a Christian fellowship constituted and sustained by non-normative 
bonds of love and kinship, by heroic imitation, and by the repetition of shared story (9). 
This final element, perhaps, was romance’s greatest and most enduring promise, 
embraced by each of the writers in these pages, including Behn: that when idealism 
seemed destined only for tragedy, and when a collective quest seemed to have gone 
hopelessly astray, a community of would-be heroes might survive though the story that 
always remained, ready to be told again. 
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